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The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and explain the
organization of Greek broadcasting, and particularly its
relationship to the state and politics. The study begins with
the introduction of state-owned radio in 1936 and ends with the
abolition of the state monopoly and the introduction of private
local radio by a Socialist government in 1987.
Through a mainly chronological structure the study examines
the development of Greek radio and television set against major
developments in the sphere of politics from the inter-war
period until the late 1980s. These developments include the
establishment of a quasi-fascist dictatorship in 1936, the
Right-Left cleavage of the 1940s and the nature of
parliamentary regime which was established as a result of the
Communist defeat in the civil war (1946-1949). Subsequently,
the study deals with the imposition of the dictatorial regime
in 1967 and examines the contradictions which led to its
eventual downfall in 1974. Finally, the thesis covers the
transition of the country to democracy, the nature of the
democratic regime, the party system and the major aspects of
policy of both the Conservative governments (1974-1981) and the
Socialists (1981-1987).
Placed within the framework of the debate about the role of
broadcasting in liberal democracies, the thesis examines the
applicability of two antithetical models, the 'fourth estate'
and the 'dominance' models to the Greek broadcasting system
from 1936 to 1987. Neither is found to be satisfactory. Our
study of government-broadcasting relations since the introdu-
ction of radio demonstrates that the broadcast media have
always been subordinate to partisan political control and that
neither the editorial autonomy nor the political independence
of Greek broadcasters, on which the 'fourth estate' model is
based, have ever been safeguarded by Greek politicians.
The 'dominance' model, on the other hand, to the extent that
it considers the mass media as an instrument of the dominant
classes fails to describe accurately the role of Greek broad-
casting institutions and of the state which controls them
within Greek society. Due to the uneven and belated industrial
development of the country, the state has acquired a dominant
position in social and economic life by distributing resources
and safeguarding the vital Interests of various social groups.
Political parties have always relied on the mechanisms of the
state to consolidate their power. Broadcasting institutions
have therefore been used by those holding executive power as a
legitimating mechanism of their policies. Preoccupied as they
were with the political output of radio and television, Greek
politicians never pursued the development of a public service
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INTRODUCTION
The present study could be broadly described as a political
history of Greek broadcasting. It examines the evolution of
radio and television in Greece - from the introduction of radio
in the inter-war period to the dismantling of the state
monopoly in the late 1980s - against the background of major
developments in the political sphere. In essence, the following
pages constitute an attempt to explore and evaluate the
contribution of radio and television to the process of
political communication in Greece, that is, to the transmission
of messages from political actors to their political receivers.
As a means of information, broadcasting appears to occupy an
increasingly important role in our everyday lives. An
indication of this is the high degree of penetration of radio
and television receivers in - at least - the most developed
parts of the world (Table mt. 1) and also the significance
that audiences appear to attach to broadcasting and especially
to television as a source of information on world events1.
In Greece, television set ownership soared in the l970s
bringing about significant - though not as yet systematically
assessed - changes in lifestyle, and inflicting a fatal blow to
the national cinema industry (Table mt. 2). By 1985, when
saturation point was reached (Table mt. 3), It was estimated
that Greek adults were spending three hours daily in front of
television and that the number of those who did not watch
television at all had been reduced to a mere two per cent of
the total population 2 . Moreover, although there has been no


























































different media, television seems to have become a major source
of information, insofar as the peak viewing period is between 9
and 10 p.m., the time when the two public networks transmit
their evening news bulletins (Table mt. 4).
TABLE mt. 1
Penetration of television sets in Western Europe
Television sets per 1000 inhabitants
1973	 1982	 per cent increase
Source: N. IIAERETAKIS: The penetration of television and its
audience In Greece (In Greek). In, Television and Communica-
tion, Paratiritis, Thessalonikl 1988.
The use of broadcasting as a means of transmitting political
messages has always fascinated and troubled Greek politicians.
Radio and television were hastily and most haphazardly
organized in Greece (In 1938 and 1968 respectively) by
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TABLE mt. 2
Penetration of television sets in Greece, 1966-1976













Source: Statistics on radio and TV, 1960-1967, UNESCO Statisti-
cal Report, No 23, p. 55.
TABLE mt. 3
Penetration of television sets in Greece, 1980-1985







Source: NIELSEN survey, In N. HAERETAKIS: The penetration of
television and its audience in Greece (in Greek). In,
Television and Communication, Paratiritis, Thessalonlki 1988.
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dictatorships in order to serve as legitimating mechanisms of
the new political orders that the dictators aspired to
establish. During and after the painful civil war (1946-1949)
radio was used as a major weapon of anti-communist propaganda,
while the military, which had emerged as an Independent centre
of power from the civil strife, established Its own
broadcasting service to run alongside the state organization.
TABLE mt. 4
Percentage of adults (in the total Greek population) who had
watched television the day before.
1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984	 1985
2-3p.m.	 8	 5	 3	 3	 3	 5	 5	 7
	
4-5	 6	 5	 4	 5	 8	 7	 7	 7
	
5-6	 4	 5	 4	 4	 6	 6	 7	 7
	
6-7	 11	 7	 10	 9	 17	 15	 14	 13
	
7-8	 22	 17	 21	 25	 37	 24	 26	 24
	
8-9	 36	 41	 45	 52	 59	 47	 46	 44
	
9-10	 49	 55	 58	 65	 79	 76	 75	 78
	10-11	 45	 53	 49	 52	 75	 75	 77	 75
	
11-12	 31	 39	 34	 31	 57	 55	 59	 60
12+	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 3	 13	 20
Source: NIELSEN survey, in N. Haeretakis. op. cit.
After 1974, when transition to democracy began, broadcasting
became a centre of conflict and polarization between the
government and the opposition. Battles were waged for the
control of the broadcasting organizations both inside
Parliament and outside, as opposition leaders took to the
streets to protest against the continuous manipulation of radio
and television by the government.
The debate on the control and role of broadcasting became
increasingly heated in the latter part of the 1980 g . The
disappointment with the Socialists' heavy-handed policies on
the broadcast media and the major structural changes in the
sphere of West European broadcasting - dismantling of state
monopolies, introduction of new channels and the anticipated
expansion of cable and direct broadcasting via satellite - led
to increased pressure from various sides for the abolition of
the state monopoly. Political and economic actors who had
previously been excluded from the broadcasting field were
striving to gain a foothold in it - most of the time with a lot
of success.
At the moment, Greek broadcasting is at a crossroads. On the
one hand, the state monopoly has been abolished along with
government control over most of the broadcast media. On the
other hand, the proliferation of private television channels
and the increasing competition among them for audiences and
advertisers have already led to a deterioration in programme
quality and to the emergence of reporting with an emphasis on
sensationalism and crime. There is no doubt that at the present
time a redefinition of the role of the broadcast media is
urgently needed, as well as a redefinition of public control
over their operation.
But what was the role of broadcasting in the first place?
If, as the available evidence suggests, politicians In
government used radio and television in order to serve their
partisan political ends, the question which emerges Is why did
they need to do so? Moreover, In what ways did politicians seek
to control the broadcast output and what were the implications
of their policies on the development of Greek broadcasting
Institutions? Notwithstanding the vigorous debate on the future
of radio and television In Greece, questions like the above
have not yet been answered. Until now, the nature, purpose and
operation of these Institutions have remained a mystery. Yet,
an inquiry into the historical structure and practices of
broadcasting institutions and Into their specific relationship
to political power is surely of vital importance when defining
their purpose In the process of mass communication in general
and of political communication in particular.
It is a remarkable fact that so far there has been no
systematic, comprehensive academic study of the operation of
Greek broadcasting institutions. True, within the last decade
or so, a number of significant legal studies have been
published, which examine the legal history of Greek
broadcasting and the potential impact of the changes taking
place In the international, and especially the European, legal
framework within which broadcasters operate. Valid as these
studies are, however, they provide little analysis of the
Internal functioning of the broadcasting organizations and
their role in the general political process. Though of
contemporary Interest to legal practitioners, they lack a
historical reference point and a feel for the essentially
political nature of Greek radio and television3 . In addition to
these studies, the broadening of the debate on the future of
broadcasting beyond the confines of Parliament in the 1980s has
led to the publication in Greece of a growing number of
articles on the Greek broadcast media. Although these are
important contributions to our understanding of how
broadcasting institutions operate, they tend - in most cases -
to be brief examinations of different, and not necessarily
related aspects (e.g. political history, media policy,
programme production) of the evolution and operation of
broadcasting4.
Thus, the present thesis aspires both to fill a large gap In
the existing literature and to provide the basis for further
research into the process of mass communication in Greece. More
specifically, our study provides a historical background to
future inquiries into the structures and practices of Greek
-16-
broadcasting organizations as well as the detailed Information
for the public debate on the evolution of Greek radio and
television and their relationship to the political process.
From a broader perspective, this thesis also constitutes a
major contribution to our understanding of the development and
workings of Greek political institutions from the 1930s to the
present day. This examination of the attitudes of Greek
politicians towards broadcasting and of the ways in which they
try to influence public opinion increases our knowledge of the
functioning of the Greek political process, of policy
formulation and implementation and of the elite political
culture.
The present thesis focuses on two major issues:
- one relating specifically to the development and operation of
Greek broadcasting;
- and the other concentrating on more general developments in
the political (and to a lesser extent the social and economic)
sphere.
Both issues are inter-related. The latter provides the
essential background for a full understanding of the factors
which have influenced the operation of Greek radio and
television and shaped their content. The former can be seen as
a case study of political behaviour, exemplifying practices,
policies and attitudes which are predominant in the Greek
political process. However, the thesis should be seen as a
coherent whole, locating the history of Greek broadcasting in
its relationship with the political world.
It was also considered necessary to make references to
developments in the press throughout the period under examina-
tion, in order to provide the reader with a clearer view of the
general context of political communication in Greece. These
brief accounts regarding recent press history, offer the basis
-.17-
for a comparison of the relationship between the political
elite and the press on the one hand, and broadcasting on the
other.
Inevitably, as a survey of broadcasting and politics this
book contains two kinds of literature:
i) the first refers to general media theory and to different
interpretations of the role of the mass media In contemporary,
liberal, democratic society.
ii) the second refers to studies on contemporary Greek history,
politics and society.
A review of the first body of literature is Included in
Chapter 1 to help provide the general theoretical framework
within which this research is placed and to set the main
questions contained In this thesis. By contrast, as the studies
of the second body of literature refer to different periods of
Greek political history, these are Introduced into the thesis
when specifically dealing with the relevant periods or aspects.
For the purpose of our analysis we concentrated our
attention on: (a) the examination of different reforms of the
broadcasting framework and the implications that these have had
for the relationship between broadcasting institutions and the
government; (b) the ways In which politicians have sought to
control broadcast output, with emphasis being placed
particularly on ministerial interventions and on appointments
to key managerial and editorial posts in the broadcasting
organizations; and (c) the effects of the above factors on the
content and form of news programmes and on the relationship
between the government and the opposition parties.
With regard to the methodology of our research, two main
source of information were utilized. The first comprised
published material, both primary and secondary. This included:
published works (books and journal articles); official
-18-.
documents of broadcasting organizations; legal documents;
minutes of parliamentary debates and of committee meetings;
reports of foreign experts on the reform of broadcasting
organizations; material from the personal archives of
broadcasters; unpublished academic theses; and a large number
of newspaper and magazine articles. The second source of
material consisted of a series of twenty interviews with
members of broadcasting management, journalists, politicians
and foreign media experts. These interviews were not
representative in any statistical sense. They have been used to
clarify or exemplify certain points which had in most cases
already emerged from the published source material.
It should be stressed, however, that the collection of data
proved a far from easy task insofar as the legendary
inefficiency of Greek public administration meant that
significant documents and archive material which would have
shed more light to our research have been lost, or at least
impossible to find. Another limitation was the unwillingness of
some interviewees to give specific information about their
personal experiences from their work in the two networks.
In conclusion, it would be useful to present an outline of
the structure of the thesis. Chapter 1 examines the theoretical
framework of the relationship between the mass media and
politics. The rest of the chapters (2-8) are a chronological
presentation of the inter-relationship between politics and
broadcasting In Greece. This chronological presentation is the
most practical way of arranging the findings of our research in
order to give the reader the opportunity to keep pace with
successive developments in the political and social sphere as
well as in the field of Greek broadcasting. Chapter 2 covers
the introduction of radio under the dictatorship of General
Metaxas and the first years of Its development up to the end of
the civil war in 1949. In Chapter 3 we analyse the ideological
role of radio during the period 1950-1967 within the repressive
-'9-
political framework established in the aftermath of the civil
war. Chapter 4 deals with the political developments which led
to the military coup of April 21 1967 and the development of
television as a means of legitimating the regime. Chapter 5
examines the first seven years of democracy, the structure of
the new political system and the policies of the Conservative
(New Democracy) government. Chapter 6 analyses the policies and
practices of the Conservatives towards broadcasting. Chapter 7
concentrates on the period of Socialist government (1981-1987)
and examines the character of PASOK and its policies during its
period in office. Chapter 8 deals with PASOK's policy vis-a-vis
radio and television and analyses the factors which led to the
dismantling of the state monopoly in broadcasting. Finally, the
Conclusion discusses the role of Greek broadcasting in the
process of political communication and, on the basis of our
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CHAPTER 1
MASS MEDIA AND POLITICS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 Introduction
In the last days of December 1989 the political events in
Romania underlined the importance of television as a means of
mass communication. This was so not only because this
particular audiovisual medium enabled the inhabitants of the
'global village' to watch in excitement and horror one of the
tribes executing its chief, but because a decisive act of what
has been termed the 'Romanlan revolution' took place inside the
studios of the country's national television. In this latter-
day revolution, it was the 'storming' of television
headquarters rather than of any Winter Palace which appeared to
be the symbolic as well as the critical moment of political
developments in that country. Extreme as this case may be, or
perhaps precisely for this reason, it is indicative of
television's central role as a means of information and hence
of power within society. It is not accidental that the first
non-communist government of Romania was formed and held its
first meetings in the television studios before the eyes of an
entire fighting population.
The issue of who has power and control over television and
over the mass media more generally has been the subject of
political debate and even conflict internationally as this
study of Greek broadcasting will exemplify. The main reason for
this is that the media are seen as "a power resource - a means
of control, management and innovation in society, which can be
a substitute for force or other resources" 1 . There are however
-22-
other factors which contribute to the importance of the media
for contemporary society; as McQuail has suggested:
-"The mass media are a growing and changing industry providing
employment, producing goods and services and feeding related
lndustries;they are also comprising an Institution in
themselves, developing their own rules and norms...
-They are often the location of developments in culture, both
in the sense of art and symbolic forms, but also in the sense
of manners, fashions styles of life and norms.
-They have become a dominant source of definitions and images
of social reality for individuals, but also collectively for
groups and societies"2.
Due to their increasing Importance as social and political
institutions, in the last fifty years the mass media have been
the subject of systematic research, which has given rise to a
host of studies almost as diverse in aspect, scope and method
as they have been numerous. For instance, an obvious
distinction in media research has been between studies which
view the media as institutions dependent on, or in Interaction
with their external social, economic and political environment
and studies which attribute the significance of the media as
the means of change within society to their Intrinsic
technological properties - this Is the so-called 'technological
determinism' approach whose best known representative has been
Marshall McLuhan3.
At the very early stages, media research was associated with
the Frankfurt School of writers - particularly Marcuse,
Horkheimer and Adorno - and their attempts to explain the
failure of the Left to bring revolutionary change and the
subsequent rise of fascism In Europe. The mass media, the
Frankfurt theorists argued, turned the people vulnerable to
fascist propaganda and domination; moreover, in the modern
industrialized countries, they turned society into a mass of
-23-
passive, atomized individuals, isolated in their world of
consumption and hypnotized by their addiction to media
entertainment 4 . The result was indifference to common social
problems, unwillingness to indulge in collective action and
thus the atrophy of democratic institutions.
In contrast to the pessimism of the Frankfurt School,
American empirical studies on media effects between the late
1940s and early 1960s showed that the media had only very
limited influence upon the people and that social ties and
democratic principles were still strong. As empirical studies,
usually conducted during the brief timespans of election or
advertising campaigns, suggested, media effects were not direct
but mediated by extra-communication factors and conditions such
as group or Individual relationships and Influences from
'opinion leaders'. In general, the media were found to serve
more as agents of reinforcement of one's views rather than of
conversion 5 . Instead of being passive consumers of what the
media had on offer, individuals appeared to expose themselves
selectively to and to use the media according to the needs they
wished to satisfy which themselves could vary according to
one's educational or social background 6 , leisure opportunities,
etc7.
Although the media effects approach dominated the field of
research for a long time, it Is not the only line of enquiry
into the power of the mass media. More recent studies have
shifted attention from the response of individuals to mass
communication to the structure and workings of media
organizations In order to answer the question of how and by
whom media power is wielded. Thus, to name but a few major
examples, research has focused on aspects of media operation
such as the process of newsmaklng 8 and the coverage of
controversial issues 9 ; professional practices, values and
career orientations' 0 ; the limitations placed upon programme-
-2+-
making by the economic or political environment 11 ; and the
structures of media ownership and control'2.
Another current of media studies influenced by structuralism
and semiology has looked at the content of media output by
analysing media messages and signs (both visual images and
sounds) 13 and revealing their underlying ideological frames and
meanings14.
As it becomes apparent from the above review, the field of
media research is wide and continuously expanding in different
directions on the basis of new findings and developments in the
sphere of mass communications. The question which is raised
then is how useful existing media research is for the study of
Greek broadcasting. In general terms, this study falls into the
field of media institutions research, as distinct from content
analyses and effects approaches. As such it will touch, albeit
briefly, upon aspects like news production, professional
practices and the coverage of political events. Nevertheless,
as has been explained in the introduction, the aim of the
present thesis is to examine historically the establishment and
development of Greek broadcasting organizations and explain
their particular role within the process of Greek politics.
Therefore, in order to evaluate the importance of existing mass
media research for our analysis, it is necessary to move from
the micro-level of analysis to one where the combination of
individual studies produces a more general picture of the power
of media institutions within society.
For our research, we have concentrated primarily upon the
ever-growing body of Anglo-Saxon literature on media theory.
The main reason for doing so is the fact that the Anglo-Saxon
school has provided a great variety of analyses and paradigms
regarding the role of the mass media in contemporary society.
It is true, that in the last decade or so, a number of books
and articles have been published with reference to the
-25-
operation of the media in other countries of Europe and of the
developing world15 . However, notwithstanding their value and
contribution to the understanding of the operation of the mass
media in other parts of the world, these studies are primarily
empirical, failing so far to produce concise models which could
serve as theoretical tools for media research. Amid the variety
of approaches and methods of enquiry, two major perspectives
emerge which are of particular importance for this study.
1.2 The liberal—pluralist viev of the mass media
In discussing the political effects of television, J.
B].umler has listed five main components of liberal democratic
systems: Ci) the accountability of the rulers to the ruled;
(ii) the autonomy of the mass media; (iii) the media's power to
choose among a plurality of messages competing for publicity
those deemed as most newsworthy; (iv) the media's power to act
as 'watchdogs' of governments; and (v) the presupposed
fallibility of those in power 16 . What Blumler suggested
was that in the classic model of political communication:
A(politicians)	 C(channels of information)______ B(voters)
the element C, that is mainly radio, television and the press
are not mere transmitters of messages from A to B, but also, by
adopting a critical stance towards power they expose the errors
of rulers and hold them accountable to the electorate.
The above view is underpinned by the conception of the role
of the press in liberal democracy as a 'fourth estate' which
alongside Parliament and the judiciary scrutinizes the
government and protects the citizens from the excesses of
power. But how has the press come to be considered as the
-26-
"guardian of the guardians" 7? And does broadcasting perform a
similar role within the context of liberal democracy?
The pluralist view of the press has its roots in the theory
of the 'free press' and its evolution into the theory of
'social responsibility' in the latter part of the twentieth
century. The 'free press' theory originated in the seventeenth
century when, due to technological advances, a flood of
publications rendered the official control and the exercise of
censorship on printed material impossible' 8 . An extension of
the right of free expression, the 'freedom of the press' was
one of the central principles in the emerging liberal
democratic state, together with the belief in the supremacy of
the individual, reason and the sovereignty of popular will9.
The main tenet of press freedom was that only through the free
expression and competition of alternative or conflicting
opinions and ideas can rational individuals learn the truth
about politics and their rulers and arrive at reasonable
decisions. Freedom of the press was identified with
independence from government and was embodied In the right of
property, as the right of any Individual to own and use the
means of publication without official Intervention. Thus,
newspapers of diverse opinions could be produced and circulate
like material goods In what J.S. Mill envisaged as a free
marketplace of Ideas where every Individual could express
him(her)self.
Nevertheless, new technological and commercial developments
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
particularly the immense increase of the cost of publishing and
the consequent concentration of ownership into fewer and fewer
hands, led to a thorough revision of the free press theory. It
was then realized that private ownership and free market
conditions could not by themselves safeguard the freedom of the
press, nor guarantee high quality of output in regard to
society's needs for information and cultural progress. The
-27--
emergence of new media such as film and broadcasting increased
awareness of the need for new mechanisms which secure high
standards of performance for the media and would hold them
accountable to the public.
In 1947 the American Commission for the Freedom of The Press
set forth what became known as the 'social responsibility'
theory of the press. Underling the new theory was the basic
principle that apart from private enterprises the mass media
are powerful institutions with vital social and political
functions to perform within a democratic society. The media's
independence was not unlimited; it was in fact bounded by an
obligation to the society they were expected to serve. To meet
this obligation the media had to apply higher professional
standards (Informativeness, accuracy, truth); to reflect the
plurality and diversity of opinion in society and offer access
to different viewpoints; and to apply self-regulating
mechanisms within the framework of the law and established
Institutions20.
In the case of the press the 'social responsibility' theory
was reflected In the emergence of a new kind of
professionalism; journalists became Increasingly specialized,
following established codes of professional conduct and
supervised in their activities by voluntary bodies set up by
the newspaper industry itself (for instance, the Press Council
in Britain).
It was, however, In the establishment of public broadcasting
that the 'social responsibility' theory found its best
expression 21 . The creation of public - but independent - bodies
to deal with the management of broadcasting In the Inter-war
period, reflected official concern, that was expressed from a
very early stage, about the responsible use of what was a rare
national resource. The awareness of the new medium's capability
to attract large audiences and the belief that it could exert
-2-
enormous influence upon them rendered broadcasting too powerful
to be left to private enterprise. To ensure that broadcasting
was to serve the public interest as a whole, detailed sets of
rules were introduced by the state with emphasis placed upon
principles such as objectivity, neutrality, impartiality and
balance, by which broadcasters had to abide especially when
dealing with political issues. State supervision, previously
regarded as a menace to free expression, was now seen as the
necessary safeguard for the responsible operation of the new
medium in a society whose members were no longer seen as
rational and capable of reaching reasonable decisions. "Into
broadcasting, its culture and its institutions, was fed a
picture of the modern audience, vast and simultaneous. That
audience owned the medium. The broadcasters served it. The
relationship was too highly charged with political tensions for
the old Millian theory of free expression to survive"22.
In the sphere of radio and later television the power and
spontaneity of press journalism were limited. In the case of
British television editorializing was absent from its
programmes, for its messages were addressed to the nation as a
whole, not to a limited number of readers with a common
political predilection. Was then broadcasting divorced from the
idea of the 'fourth estate'? On the contrary, as Blumler
suggest, television has Introduced new terms according to which
governments come under media scrutiny 23 . If Investigative
reporting is almost non-existent on television, if the medium
does not serve so much as the watchdog of political power as
does the press, yet it holds politicians accountable to the
electorate In a different way: if television does not expose
the errors of the rulers, yet it echoes the mood of the ruled;
it functions as a kind of 'para-parliament' 24 where
Interviewers act as the conveyors of the electorate's opinions,
questions and criticism.
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The central point in this argument is that public
broadcasting, although regulated as it may be by the state, Is
not subjected to government control. The framework within which
the broadcasting media operate is one of 'socially responsible
autonomy' 25 not one of servitude to the dominant political
institutions. Broadcasters are free to practise their skills so
far as they abide by the set of rules and principles to which
we referred above. These principles are at the same time the
limits of broadcasters' freedom and the limits of political
control over them. In fact this framework Is flexible enough to
allow broadcasters to adapt their practices to new social and
political circumstances. Thus, commenting on broadcasting
coverage of British election campaigns In the period 1945-1970,
Seymour-Ure has observed26:
"The principles (his emphasis) of non-partisanship remained
the same. What changed was the critical matter of who had the
power to interpret them in practice (...) Before 1959
partisanship could be measured In quantitative terms ('how many
minutes of party broadcast each'?), after 1959 it needed a
qualitative judgement and the question 'who is to judge?' could
in the nature of things more often be answered by the people
actually making the programmes than by party leaders and
managers".
In his study of the British media, Seymour-Ure observes two
related developments in broadcasting coverage of national
elections since 1959: first, the increasing Independence of
broadcasters to decide what Is newsworthy, combined with an
Increase In quantity and quality of election coverage; and
secondly, the gradual disappearance of party-imposed rules and
conventions on programmes about the election.
In effect, he argues, the increasing independence of the
broadcasting media from political control, which the above
developments suggest, together with the detachment of
newspapers from party politics can cause 'serious dislocations'
to the political system. This Is so because political parties
can no longer project their policies through the media in the
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way they see fit in order to generate and sustain the support
of the electorate. With its ability to make its own definitions
of reality Instead of relying for them on the political
parties, "television now, like the press, has become itself an
arena in which politics is carried on" Seymour-Ure argues in a
more recent study 27 . In this new political arena, journalists
are not only independent to practise their skills, they can
also exercise political leadership: "In broadcasting the
leadership of potential broadcasters such as Robin Day and
Brian Walden - even newscasters like Alistair Burnet - has been
considerable... In a sense it is recognized by the bestowal of
honours (Sir Robin...)" 28 . Moreover, so far as television
studios can serve as arenas for the exercise of political
leadership, they may contribute to the decline of party
organizations; for, Seymour-Ure concludes, television can offer
party leaders a tribune from where to influence the electorate
without the mediation of party structures.
Broadcasting, like the press, Blumler and Gurevitch argue,
derives its power precisely from its ability to deliver to the
politicians an audience so sizable that it could not be
available by any other means 29 . This power has enabled
broadcasting to enter Into a 'horizontal' relationship with
political institutions rather than of subordination to the
latter. In the communication system of liberal democracies the
media and the political institutions are bound in a "network of
mutual dependencies" 30 . Thus, although tensions may arise from
time to time between the two interacting parts due to different
or even conflicting interests, the mutual dependence will
entail at least a minimum of accommodation, without which
neither the media's nor the politicians' aims - in the last
analysis the process of political communication itself- could
be realized31.
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1.3 The dominance view of the media
The dominance perspective, which is embedded in the Marxist
school of thought, adopts a critical, radical approach to the
mass media. According to this view, the mass media in liberal
democracies are not independent factors in the A______ _____
communication system to which we referred above; instead they
are integral parts of the institutions of power and domination
within society, whose role is to legitimate and preserve the
existing status quo. Far from being an effective mechanism of
control upon power, the mass media are seen In this paradigm as
Its servant. Three major trends are distinguishable here to
which we will refer In turn.
A. According to the first of them, the media are seen as
Ideological Instruments of domination by the ruling class or
classes, either through direct ownership or, as in the case of
public broadcasting, through the control of ruling class
representatives within the state. Seen from this perspective,
the main task of the media is to reproduce the values and ideas
of liberal capitalist society and to generate the agreement and
consent of subordinate groups to the interests of the dominant
classes 32 . The views and opinions projected by both the press
and broadcasting are those which project what is loosely
defined as the 'middle class consensus' 33 upon which modern
liberal democracy is based. This, Marxist critics argue,
applies primarily to public broadcasting, which due to a system
of extensive controls and detailed state regulation, is more
vulnerable to political pressure.
Thus, in the case of British broadcasting organizations, for
instance, state control over their finances (fixing the licence
fee for the BBC or the levy on the ITV companies) constitute
significant government powers through which it can exercise
constant Influence on broadcasters 34 . The fact that the
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broadcasting media perform a conformist rather than a critical
role, however, is not the result of direct political
intervention in programme making. Instead, the social
background, education and political orientations of the
broadcasting Institution's governors, controllers and staff
usually suffice to guarantee that programme content will not
go beyond a safe and limited Ideological framework and that it
will not challenge the existing social and political order. As
Miliband suggests, even In these cases where a programme goes
beyond the bounds of the consensus, the government-appointed
Board of Governors for the BBC and the members of the IBA can
function as 'safety valves' for the political system; these two
bodies consist of distinguished personalities of the British
establishment, whose political preferences extend from the
Conservative to the Labour Party35.
Moreover, the recruitment of professional staff from the
narrow range of university graduates usually with middle class
backgrounds, contributes to the creation of what Garnham has
called the 'cultural ruling class', a group of privileged
media practitioners who have accepted the values and norms of
the establishment without question 36 . Additional factors such
as the pursuit of promotion or job security may also encourage
broadcasters to adopt a compromising stance. Broadcasters, Hood
argues, are not Independent as they claim; usually they have to
"compromise, balance and suppress", especially when they come
under pressure from leading groups and elites which the
broadcasting institution finds necessary to "appease" 37 . To
make the news the broadcaster must absorb the organization's
"sense of political realities" 38 as these are internalized by
the editorial office. "A good and effective editor will be one
who Is, by his social and political outlook, in tune with the
organization, so that his judgements coincide with the
judgements of the upper management or, to put It another way,
who is able to persuade that management that any changes he
wishes to make are a logical extension of accepted positions39.
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In this context the principles of impartiality, objectivity and
balance are not the basis of the broadcasters' autonomy as the
liberal-pluralist theory and the professionals' self-
perceptions claim, but as safeguards of the existing status
quo40 . Impartiality and balance exist only within the bounds of
the consensus; they are applied to the parties which occupy the
middle ground of politics. When it comes to controversial
issues and the coverage of activities which challenge the
conventions of the established social and political order,
impartiality and objectivity disappear. The result is the
constant absence or marginalization of all dissenting views and
voices, particularly those which derive from the Left. If the
media are seen as performing a watchdog role in liberal
democracies, Miliband concludes, then this watchdog barks
primarily against the Left41.
Although in general agreement with this classic Marxist
approach, the other two trends constitute major shifts from
the instrumentalist towards more sophisticated analyses of the
mass media. Thus, studies within the first of these two
approaches concentrate on the ideological and cultural role of
the mass media, whereas the subject of the second is what has
been termed the 'political economy' of media institutions.
B. Studies on Ideology and culture stress the relative autonomy
of the ideological superstructure and its central role
In reproducing the class relations of advanced capitalist
societies. Particularly Influential for this shift of attention
In media studies have been structurallsm and semiology and
especially Althusser's studies on Ideology and Gramsci's
writings on culture and the role of Intellectuals In sustaining
capitalist domination42.
Gramsci did not develop any particular theory for the media,
but his central concept of hegemony has been applied In several
media studies 43 . Hegemony may be defined as the process whereby
the ruling class or class alliance dominates over the
subordinate classes by establishing its own ideology as the
universal one and its interests as the interests of the entire
society. In other words, hegemony is the construction of the
consent of the dominated classes to the established order44.
Although hegemony (the leadership of the ruling classes)
depends on both consent and force, in the liberal capitalist
state Gramscl argues, consent Is prevailing, whereas coercion
remains in the background. Thus, although the repressive
apparatus Is always present, It is primarily through the
ideological institutions of society (the family, the
educational system, the church, trade unions and the mass
media) that hegemony Is maintained. As part of the
Institutional-ideological complex, the media, 'the mass
hegemonic institutions' as Downing has termed them, have
enormous political power, for through their continuous flow
they reproduce specific 'definitional categories' which are
deeply embedded in the dominant ideology45.
The reproduction of the hegemonic view of the world,
however, Is neither deliberate nor the product of a ruling
alliance conspiracy, notwithstanding the fact that senior media
personnel, editors and reporters come from the petty
bourgeoisie, which in Gramsci's view Is the natural ally of the
capitalist class. Media professionals are not seen as biased
nor as conforming to overt or covert pressure by political or
economic elites; If the reading of the world's events is biased
in favour of the established order, yet this reading Is largely
unconscious.
"Normally the dominant frames are taken for granted by media
practitioners and reproduced and defended by them for reasons
and via practices which the practitioners do not conceive to be
hegemonic. Hegmony operates effectively (...) yet outside
consciousness"'"'.
Journalists may be unaware of the fact that the Ideological
frames on which they are drawing meanings to describe real
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events is reproducing the dominant values and ideas of society;
for media messages are conditioned by the underlying and
unconscious 'deep structure' of ideology. According to L.
Althusser 47 ideology is a representation of the individual's
imaginary relationship to their real conditions of existence.
The imaginary character of this relationship implies that
ideology is largely distorting; as Althusser suggests,
ideologies do not correspond to reality; they are an illusion
of it; they are moreover, unconscious 48 . Reality therefore, is
not a given set of facts and it does not identify with a single
meaning. Through the process of what structuralists have termed
'signification', that is the process of meaning production, an
individual's perception of reality can be structured by the
unconscious function of ideology, no matter what are the
conscious intentions or biases of this individual 49 . Hall
suggests, that even a Trotskyist journalist may read
controversial events, events which threaten the status quo,
through the application of dominant ideological frames (for
instance, to view the rise in wage demands as the sole cause of
inflation) 50 . Thus, Hall concludes, the power of the media, the
means par excellence through which reality is described and
analysed, is that they reproduce the dominant ideas of
capitalist society in such a way that they reproduce also its
structure of domination51.
C. Unlike the above approach, studies on the 'political
economy' of the media focus on the economic base - particularly
on patterns of ownership and control of media organizations -
as the main determinants of the media's political and
ideological orientations 52 . According to this model media
organizations are seen as 'economic entities' engaged in the
production of surplus value. As Garnham suggests, culture Is
today as much a superstructural phenomenon as it Is a "part of
material production itself, directly subordinate, or at least
in a closely determined articulation with the laws of
development of capital" 53 . The outcome of the 'industriall-
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zation of culture' is the subordination of mental production to
market logic, since big business media organizations are
primarily concerned with their survival and growth; that is the
magnetization of audiences and readership and consequently the
maximization of advertising revenue. In pursuing these
objectives, media enterprises seek increasingly for the common
denominator in tastes, interests and values of a politically
and ideologically differentiated public. Thus, the more intense
the competition, the less variety is on offer from the media
industry. This market logic, Westergaard comments on the
British press, has led to the search and support of the middle-
ground in politics, the diminution of the diversity of opinion,
the watering-down of press 'radicalism' and to increased doses
of populism. These developments, he concludes, have
disqualified the British press from the role of the 'fourth
estate'54.
Similarly, Curran and Seaton argue that the massive
concentration of press ownership after the war, the
disappearance of many new titles and the enormity of cost for
the launching of new papers have led to a prolonged crisis of
press legitimacy in Britain, as market forces can no longer
safeguard the plurality of opinion nor the press's
accountability to the public55.
Even public broadcasting has been affected by market logic.
Thus, the BBC has been caught up in a competition for at least
half of the total audience in order to sustain its claim to the
compulsory license fee and be able to request its increase. As
a consequence, the share of popular programming is steadily
increasing at the expense of educational and other quality
programmes56.
In summary, according to the 'political economy' paradigm,
the ideological power of the media is the result of the
economic activity of the media industry. "...the determining
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context for (media) production is always that of their market.
In seeking to maximize this market, products must draw on the
most widely legitimated central core values while rejecting the
dissenting voice or the incompatible objection to a ruling
myth. The need for easily understood, popular, formulated,
undisturbing, assimilable fictional material is at once a
commercial imperative and an aesthetic recipe"57.
As it becomes apparent from the above analysis, there is a
variety of perspectives on media institutions within the
Marxist tradition, with each perspective focussing on different
aspects of the media's operation. However, notwithstanding the
disagreements and sometimes the fundamental contradictions (for
instance, the stress on the autonomy of the ideological
superstructure in structuralism and the determination of
ideology by the economic base in 'political economy'
approaches) there is a general agreement that the power of the
mass media in liberal capitalist societies is ideological. No
matter the particular processes and mechanisms through which
the media perform their ideological function, the main elements
of this function are similar in all different approaches: the
reproduction of the dominant values and Ideas of society; the
systematic exclusion or marginalization of dissenting views;
and the reinforcement of the existing consensus and established
power relations.
1.4 Conclusion
There are two main perspectives with regard to the study of the
mass media within the liberal democratic political process.
Each of them Is associated with a major school of thought on
society and politics, the liberal-pluralist and the Marxist
respectively. According to the liberal-pluralist view, media
Institutions In Western societies are part of a system In which
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power is diffused among various competing groups and interests
of which none is dominant. The media in this context serve as
fora in which diverse ideas and proposals may contest for
support; in this way the media contribute to the effective
control of the governing by the governed and to political
change.
From the opposite perspective, power in Western society is
seen as concentrated on the side of a dominant class and
dominant institutions. From this viewpoint the media are seen
as "part of an ideological arena" in which although "various
class views are fought out" 58 , the predominant view of the
world is shaped, consciously or not, according to the norms and
interests of ruling classes and groups. In capitalist societies
the media play a central role in securing the continual
legitimation of the established order and in excluding any
challenge or call for change.
Notwithstanding the substantial differences between these
two schools both can be very relevant and useful to our study
of Greek broadcasting. To start with, both approaches have
similar starting-points. Both relate the question of the
media's power to the broader question of how power is
distributed and wielded within contemporary society, and it is
this dual question with reference to Greece which forms the
basis of this study. Moreover, although the liberal-pluralist
and the 'dominance' dichotomy in media research Is based on
disagreements between two fundamentally opposed schools of
thought, it could be argued that the two perspectives of the
media are not incompatible; they could even be seen as
complementing each other. Indeed the two perspectives focus on
different aspects of the same phenomenon. Thus, while the
liberal-pluralist perspective stresses the role of the media
within the context of parliamentary politics, the 'dominance'
view considers the workings of media Institutions In relation
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to the more general dynamics of power within liberal
capitalist society. As Tracey arguably 	 suggests:
"the media do indeed function as a fourth estate within the
context of the rather narrow confines provided by the
Parliamentary system, but not within the broader framework of
the political, econom and moral order that underpins that
Parliamentary system" '.
It is perhaps indicative of this coinpiementarity of
approaches that in some cases, albeit within the general
ideological and theoretical framework of each one of them,
there is a detectable convergence of positions. Thus, some
Marxists suggest that media organizations are "relatively
autonomous" 6° or "autonomous within the boundaries of the
hegemonic system" 61 . This autonomy from direct class or state
control as it is enshrined in the everyday practices of
production through the principles of impartiality and balance
is the basis of the media institution's legitimacy62.
On the other hand, Blumler and Gurevitch suggest 63 that the
media's coverage of events, although in general terms guided by
the established professional principles stated above and by
news value criteria, is nevertheless influenced by the 'degree
of respect' that journalists accord to different groups and
Institutions on the basis of the value system of society. Thus,
whereas certain institutions such as the monarchy and
Parliament receive the most favourable treatment, other
institutions such as trade unions or deviant groups ("muggers",
"terrorists", etc) may receive less positive or even negative
coverage. The media, Blumler and Gurevitch conclude, do not
simply legitimate or undermine society's dominant institutions.
They perform both tasks; they have "both legitimating and
disruptive Implications for the social order. They are involved
in processes of both social control and social change"64.
Another example is N. Garnham who 65has come very close to
Seymour-Ure 66 by arguing that the operation of public
broadcasting within the framework of objectivity and balance
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has contributed to the decline of the political party. At the
same time, he suggests, "by concentrating on personalities TV
has enhanced the position of political leaders at the expense
of party organizations".
Taking into account the above and returning to the subject
of the present thesis, both the liberal-pluralist and the
'dominance' viewpoints will be relevant to our study of Greek
broadcasting. At one level this study will focus on what Tracey
calls the "formal processes and relationships" 67 , that Is the
formal distribution of power and control within the Greek
broadcasting organizations and their role within the system of
political communication (especially with reference to Its
relationship to government and political parties).
In relation to the above, informal processes will be
detected, through which power is wielded by forces external to
broadcasting institutions over the latters' general policy and
especially over programme production. Therefore, a part of the
following analysis will be to test the 'fourth estate' theory
and the view of the media professionals' autonomy against the
available evidence on the workings of Greek broadcasting. To
put It more crudely, this enquiry will involve at this stage
the question of who has power and control over Greek radio and
television, that Is the capacity to determine or Influence the
content of these media's output. Attention will also be
directed to two foci: to the soclo-political environment of the
broadcasting institutions and the ways and extent that it
Impinges upon their performance; and to the role of Individual
actors, the managerial staff and broadcasters and the processes
through which external pressure is translated Into work
practices.
At the same time, this study will examine from a broader
perspective the role of broadcasting within the general
framework of power relations in Greek society. Here the
question involved is whether broadcasting has ideological
power; if so, what are the components of the dominant ideology
that Greek radio and television are supposed to reproduce? This
points in turn to the wider issue that we stated above, the
structure of power within Greek society, that is the structure
of economic, political and social life. In particular, as the
subject of enquiry is state-owned broadcasting, the study will
examine the nature and role of the state within Greek society.
If, as available evidence suggests, the state exercises
considerable control over broadcasting, then in whose interest
does it do so?
In conclusion, the subject matter of this thesis covers two
inter-related questions. First, we shall examine the
organization and operation of Greek broadcasting institutions
and their relationship to the political process. Secondly, this
leads us to the wider question of the structure of Greek
society and the role of the state within it. Only by examining
the role of the broadcasting media at both these levels
('micro' and 'macro'), can the political nature of radio and
television in Greece be fully appreciated.
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CHAPTER 2
RADIO, THE FIRST YEARS: FROM DICTATORSHIP TO CIVIL WAR.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the early period of the operation
and development of Greek broadcasting; it examines the first
efforts of Greek governments towards the introduction of radio,
the establishment of the Greek Radio Service by the
authoritarian regime of General Metaxas and the integration of
radio into the extensive network of Nazi propaganda during the
years of German occupation (1941-1944). Particular emphasis is
placed on the social and political conditions under which Greek
broadcasting was established, including the political and
social upheavals of the 1930s; the establishment of the quasi-
fascist dictatorship of loannis Metaxas in 1936; the painful
experience of the civil war (1946-1949); and the establishment
of a repressive parliamentary regime in the aftermath of the
Communist defeat.
2.2 Dictatorship, political upheaval and the introduction of
radio.
Greece was the last country in Europe to acquire a
broadcasting service. It was only in 1938 that the dictatorship
of general loannis Metaxas introduced radio into the country.
Until then the few radio set owners 1 enjoyed infrequent
broadcasts from the Radio-telegraphic Service of the Ministry
of Transport and amateur broadcasters 2 . There was also the
regularly operating station of Thessaloniki which was
established in 1928 by the pioneer of Greek radio, Christos
Tsigirides and which was the first radio station in the whole
Balkan peninsula3.
It is not known why the issue of broadcasting had been
neglected by successive governments during the 1920s. A likely
explanation could be the extremely unstable political situation
of that time. Established in 1924, the Greek Republic had been
riddled with conflict within the governing Liberal camp. This
had manifested itself in military intervention and short lived
dictatorships which reflected the inability of the traditional
political forces to present a viable solution to the country's
mounting social and economic problems. Between 1924 and 1928
the country had ten different prime ministers, three general
elections, eleven military coups and pronunciamentos and a
military dictatorship which was then itself overthrown by a
military coup4.
Thus, It could not have been a coincidence that broadcasting
became a matter of governmental consideration only at the end
of the 1920s, after the most stable government of the inter-war
period, that of Liberal Eleftherios Venizelos (1928-33), took
office 5 . In 1930 after a competition had been held, the
Liberals passed the first law on broadcasting according to
which the Greek state granted to a private entrepreneur E.
Markoglou the 'exclusive privilege to install and exploit radio
stations' with the aim of educating and entertaining the
public 6 . Markoglou's company was to cover all costs for the
installation and operation of the radio service, while the
state was obliged to provide all necessary facilities for the
realization of the venture7.
The agreement between Markoglou and the government did not mean
however that the establishment and operation of broadcasting In
Greece were to be the exclusive domain of private enterprise.
Beyond a significant number of regulations regarding the
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content of programmes, the transmission of commercials
(articles 2 and 24) and the quality of transmission equipment
(article 6), the law established extensive state participation
in most aspects of the broadcasting company's policy.
Thus, all plans for the expansion of the service and the
renovation of its equipment were the subject of government
decisions; most important though was the provision according to
which radio programme content should be approved by a seven-
member committee appointed by the Minister of Communications
(article 24). In addition, a government commissioner was to
supervise the daily transmission of programmes (article 25).
Also, the company was bound to provide up to 1-1.5 hours daily
airtime for state broadcasts whenever this was requested by
the government (articles 21,22). Finally, the state was to
receive a large share of the income and profits of the company,
depending on the number of subscribers and the amount of
advertising 8 . Such extensive state control of a private
company reflected the concern of Venizelos' government about
the significance of the social and political role of
broadcasting. Moreover, the statutory provision that after 21
years the ownership of the organization was to be transferred
to the state proves that the ultimate purpose of the agreement
was the eventual establishment of a public broadcasting service
after it had been effectively organized and developed by
private capital9.
It is not clear, nevertheless, why the Liberal government
did not seek the immediate establishment of a state-owned
broadcasting service. A possible explanation could be the
financial strains that Greece was experiencing at that time.
After 1929, the country faced one of its worst economic crises
as the inherent problems of the Greek economy were aggravated
by international depression. Between 1928 and 1932 the
country's national income fell from $600 to $330 million. At
the same time almost one third of the national budget was going
to the liquidation of the country's enormous public debt,
leaving the government with very little to invest in public
works. As a	 result, in 1932 the government was forced to
declare partial economic bankruptcy 10 . Therefore, it might
have been under these circumstances that the government, unable
or unwilling to finance the setting up of a state broadcasting
service, resorted to private investors. In any case, the
venture was never realized	 and the agreement was finally
repealed in 1935 by the dictatorship of General Condylis'1.
The eventual failure of Narkoglou to establish a
broadcasting service and the absence of any other initiative
until 1936 prove that the matter although deemed important was
not seen as a main priority by the governments of that time.
The widely felt repercussions of the depression (by 1932
237,000 wage earners, almost half of the urban working
population, were unemployed) 12 , growing social strife (for
instance, the number of strikes increased from 199 in 1932 to
473 in 1933) and the apparent inability of the traditional
political forces to cope with the country's aggravating social
and economic problems brought about a political upheaval in
view of which the issue of broadcasting could only be of minor
importance.
In the period until 1936 the country, which had been
profoundly shaken by the republican-royalist cleavage,
experienced the following: the defeat of the Liberals in the
1933 general elections and the victory of the royalist Populist
party; an assassination attempt against Venizelos which fuelled
once again political passions; an abortive coup of republican-
Venizelist officers and the subsequent purging of the state
machine of most republicans; another election in 1935; a
military coup by royalist general G. Kondylis and subsequently
a farcical referendum which led to the re-establishment of the
monarchy. Finally, new general elections were held in January
1936 which resulted in a hung parliament. In April that year
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General loannis Metaxas, a man of outspoken authoritarian
convictions, was appointed Prime Minister. On August 4 he
declared a dictatorship and a month later his government
established the Greek Radio Service. The Introduction of
broadcasting by a dictatorial government almost as soon as it
seized power was not accidental; it reflected the need of the
regime to win the support of the masses and thus to gain full
legitimacy. The significance of broadcasting for Metaxas'
government will be better understood if we first make a brief
reference to the conditions under which the dictatorship was
established and to the peculiar characteristics of that regime.
The pretext under which the dictatorship was declared was a
general strike announced for the 5th of August and the alleged
Imminent danger of a communist insurrection. The reality was
rather different, as the Communist party (the KKE), although
It had made Its best performance ever in the elections of
January by gaining 15 seats in Parliament, had still a very
limited Influence upon the masses. By the time the dictatorship
was declared, the KKE had only 14-16,000 members, whereas the
number of workers participating In strikes and demonstrations
was about 500,00013. The reference to the communist menace
reflected both Metaxas' profound anti-communism and his attempt
to exploit the widespread fear of communism in order to justify
the declaration of the dictatorship. There was some truth to
these allegations, however, to the extent that Metaxas Intended
to smash the growing political movement.
As we have already said, the deterioration of the Greek
economy by the depression had been widely felt among the
country's lower income groups; unemployment, meagre wages and
Inflation were the major causes of discontent, the expression
of which through strikes and demonstrations had reached
enormous proportions14 . The massive mobilization of the 1930s
reflected the disillusionment of the lower classes with the





the republican-royalist cleavage. This development alarmed
politicians of both camps who realized the danger of losing
their grip on the masses. Thus, unable themselves to put an end
to the social strife, the bourgeois politicians surrendered
power to Metaxas, a man who had publicly declared his dislike
for parliamentary institutions' 5 . The bourgeois leaders' stance
reflected also the unwillingness of the upper classes which
they represented to make any substantial economic concessions
to the lower social strata. Hence, through a consensus of the
two rival political camps Metaxas was granted by parliament
semi-dictatorial powers for five months- 6 . Metaxas was also
supported by King George II who saw the dictatorship as the
only way to consolidate and reinforce the powers of the throne.
Nevertheless, whereas for traditional leaders - and perhaps
for the King - Metaxas' government was a temporary break with
representative institutions and a necessary prerequisite for
the restoration of the previous order, for Metaxas himself the
dictatorship was the opportunity he was awaiting in order to
dissolve parliamentary institutions and to institutionalize his
own ideals about the state. Thus, his first move was to abolish
all political parties including his own minuscule party, the
'Free Thinkers'. A graduate of the Berlin Military Academy and
an ardent believer in Prussian militarism and social
discipline, Metaxas was convinced that totalitarianism was the
only natural and suitable system for Greece. In pursuit of
discipline which was to replace for ever the 'destructive
individualism' of Greeks, Metaxas adopted many of the ideas and
symbols of German Nazism and Italian Fascism which he so
profoundly admired. For the dictator the nation was a totality
above the people and social classes; all individual and class
interests had to be sacrificed for the 'national interest',
the expression of which was the dictator's 'National State'. In
imitation of Hitler's Third Reich, Metaxas declared as his
ideal for Greece the creation of the Third Hellenic
Civilization which, coming after the civilization of ancient
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Greece and that of Byzantium, was to combine the virtues of
both17 and develop under the auspices of the 'New State'. By
the end of 1938, Greece was well Into the process of becoming a
totalitarian state. All major institutions of the country
Including the economy, labour and agrarian organizations,
education, the church and the press had been radically
reorganized and incorporated into Metaxas' state.The dictator
also created an elaborate bureaucracy which could secure the
state's increasingly interventionist role in the economy and
society.
Metaxas' attachment to fascist Ideology and policies, as
well as the excessive projection of him as a great leader by
the regime's propaganda, have led many historians to consider
the 'fourth of August' a fascist regime 18 . Yet his dictatorship
lacked one of the most essential characteristics of fascism,
i.e. a mass fascist movement which could be the concrete basis
of Metaxas' power. Instead, the dictator had based his power
primarily on the support of the King on whom he remained
politically dependent until the end. Thus, despite the
festivities and the rest of the regime's propaganda which at
times attributed to him enormous, almost metaphysical powers,
Metaxas never acquired the powers of a Fuhrer-9.
In order to consolidate his power and secure the future of
his 'New State', the dictator created a number of repressive
and ideological apparatuses which interrelated and cooperated
with each other. Thus, within the first few months of the
dictatorship Metaxas established the Undersecretariat of Public
Order (YDA), the National Youth Organization (EON) and the
Undersecretariat of Press and Tourism (YTT). The YDA was a
powerful autonomous repressive mechanism which controlled the
security forces and was directly answerable to the dictator.
Headed by Metaxas' personal friend, K. Maniadakis, this
Undersecretariat was to become notorious for its treatment of
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political opponents and for Its extensive network for the
policing of all sectors of society and the state machine20.
EON on the other hand, having Metaxas himself as its
president, represented the dictator's intensive efforts to
create a mass party base. Organized In a military fashion (with
uniforms, ranks and military training) and with the purpose of
developing the 'national and religious beliefs of the youth',
EON was both an ideological and repressive mechanism. Its
members were indoctrinated In the ideals of fascism and taught
to develop discipline and obedience to the state and the
'Chief' 21 . Also, a major indoctrinating function had been
undertaken by the Ministry of Education, which was taken over
by the dictator himself in November 1938. This ministry
contributed also to the development and strengthening of EON.
Metaxas also founded the Undersecretariat of Press and
Tourism which could just as well be called the Ministry of
Propaganda. Apart from censoring the press, books, cinema and
theatre, Its main purpose was to disseminate the ideals of the
'New State' and project the dictator as the country's only
undisputed leader. As with the YDA, Metaxas appointed another
of his close friends as head of the YTT, Theologos Nikoloudis,
an ex-press publisher fully committed to the aims of the
dictatorship. Among other things, the YTT's activities included
the production of a large number of voluminous publications
containing the dictator's speeches and accounts of his
achievements22.
More effective however, was the propaganda channelled
through the press and broadcasting, both of which had been
placed under the complete control of the undersecretariat. The
role of the YTT as well as that of the YDA and EON was
strengthened further after the regime entered its second phase
in early 1938 with the intensIfIcation of the dictator's
efforts to establish a totalitarian state 23 . Thus, with
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Compulsory Law 1075/1938, the dictatorial government
systematized the legislation on the security of the regime and
introduced new measures which extended the powers of the YDA
even further. Indicatively we mention here the Introduction of
the 'certificates of loyalty' to the regime which were
necessary if one intended to find work in the state machine and
most private businesses. Also, with compulsory law 1798/1939
the state now undertook officially the organization of EON. In
practice this meant the intensive use of state resources and
repressive mechanisms for the aggrandizement of EON. As a
result, the organization's membership increased from a mere
15,000 in 1938 to a staggering one million in 194024. Finally,
with a number of compulsory laws both the press and
broadcasting were incorporated in the 'New State' through the
YTT.
As soon as the dictatorship was declared, the press was
subjected to censorship regulations which according to some
historians were drafted by the dictator himself and circulated
to newspaper editors by the YTT 25 . Criticism of the government
was unequivocally forbidden and so was the printing of any
information about political parties or their leaders. In
addition, newspapers were prohibited from publishing any news
regarding the public debt, the state finances, the economy and
the currency unless the information originated from the Cabinet
and was fully approved. Newspapers were not allowed to print
information about labour union activities unless such
activities were supportive of the regime. Blank spaces due to
censorship could not be filled with advertisements. Any
material revealing censorship was also forbidden. Finally, all
newspapers and periodicals were required to praise the 'New
State' and Its accomplishments. Before publication the censor's
stamp of approval was necessary.
Apart from censorship, the press was also subject to the
anti-communist legislation which was promulgated by the
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dictatorship. Thus, according to Compulsory Law 117/1936,
everybody who 'pursued orally, in writing or otherwise the
dissemination, development or implementation of theories, ideas
or social systems which tended to overthrow the social system
of the country' was to be condemned to imprisonment of up to
five years or to deportation ranging from six months to two
years. If the above crimes were committed by the press, they
led to the suspension of the implicated journalists, editors,
publishers and printers from their work for a period of up to
six months. In the case of a second offence suspension from
work could be extended up to three years and the authorities
could order the confiscation of the printing equipment26.
According to article 10 of the law, all publishers,
booksellers or owners of books whose content breached the law
were required to hand all these publications to the local
police authorities or face imprisonment and deportation for a
period of up to a year. Of course, the terms 'communist' and
'subversive' were interpreted broadly enough to include a wide
variety of books including Sophocles' Antigone and Thucidides'
The Funeral Oration of Pericles. Maniadakis himself as head of
the YDA banned 445 books in November 1938. Moreover, in clear
Nazi fashion the government organized the ceremonial burning of
hundreds of books by Greek and foreign writers. Apart from the
works of Marx, Lenin and Engels, the works of Shaw, Freud,
Darwin and Dostoievsky were burnt 27 . Censorship was also
applied to cinema and theatre by various multi-membered
committees operating within the YTT28.
Apart from censorship, newspapers were primarily used as
instruments of the regime's propaganda, constantly supplied
with material from the services of the Undersecretariat of
Press and Tourism. Beyond the exaltation of the government's
works and Metaxas' personality, newspapers were also obliged to
publish favourable reports about Germany, Italy, Spain and all
other countries with dictatorial governments. Moreover, with
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the aim of demoralizing KKE members and supporters and in
collaboration with the Undersecretariat of Public Order, the
YTT fed the press with signed declarations of 'repentance' by
which tortured or Imprisoned communists allegedly renounced
their beliefs29.
Metaxas' policies regarding the press did not face any
significant resistance from journalists and publishers.
Rizospastis (The Radical), the official organ of the KKE was of
course outlawed, while another three papers closed down during
the dictatorship. Most publishers, however, willingly placed
their papers at the service of the regime. Among them were not
only ardent advocates of the dictatorship such as the Kyrou
brothers and George A. Viachos, publisher of the largely
influential Kathimerini (Daily), but also Dimitrios Lambrakis,
publisher of two major liberal papers 30 . This stance towards
the regime reflected clearly the support of the Greek
bourgeoisie for the dictatorship as the only way to end the
political mobilization of the lower classes.
Nevertheless, in view of his plan to transform Greece into a
totalitarian state, Metaxas sought to create a system which
would guarantee in the long run the support of the press for
the 'New State' even after the abolition of censorship and
other emergency measures. It could not have been a coincidence
that the government passed new press legislation at the
beginning of the regime's second phase in 193831. The new
legislation introduced a large number of conditions for the
confiscation of newspapers and magazines. These included the
insult of the Orthodox Christian Religion, the person of the
King or public decency, the publication of information
regarding military preparations and fortifications 32 , the
insulting of the Country and the foundations of the existing
regime, the person of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet and the
royal family, and any material published without the permission
of the Undersecretary of the Press. The latter could order the
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confiscation of any publication he considered as damaging the
'national interest' ( article 51). Moreover, the law Introduced
heavier sentences for crimes committed through the press
(article 3, paragraphs 2 and 3). Especially in the case of a
second offence, the involved journalist and director of the
paper as well as the manager of the printing works where
the paper was printed were to be suspended from their work for
up to one year, while the publisher was forbidden to use the
title of that publication for the same period of time.
The new legislation Increased the number of requirements
that the publishers should fulfil in order to be granted
permission to publish. Among other things, a prospective
publisher should be of 'upright character and adequate
education' and had to deposit a large amount of money as a
pledge to the state33 . No newspaper could be published without
a licence granted by the Undersecretary of Press at his
discretion. As a result of these measures, only those papers
that the government approved of were allowed to be published.
The novelty of the new legislation, however, was the
introduction of a 'Press Register' which was to be organized
and updated by the YTT. All publishers, journalists and other
press employees had to be registered in this record in order to
receive permission to work in the press business. A number of
conditions had to be fulfilled before the Undersecretary
considered anyone eligible to be registered in the record. For
example, the candidate should have not been condemned for
breach of the anti-communist legislation, while journalists in
particular had to pass an examination organized by the YTT
(articles 1-7).
Finally, the law established an elaborate corporate system
which was to represent collectively the Interests of
publishers, journalists and other press employees. On the top
of the pyramid stood the powerful General Union of the Greek
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Press (GEET), administered by a council whose members comprised
representatives of press employees and three representatives of
the YTT. The Undersecretary of Press was also the honorary
chairman of the Union (articles 10-33). Therefore in practice
the regime turned press publishing into a closed shop organized
and supervised in all its functions by the almighty
undersecretary and in which membership was limited only to
those deemed safe by the regime. Moreover, in order to secure
the cooperation of both publishers and journalists, the
government introduced a number of benefits such as an increase
in the price of newspapers, the introduction of duty free
newsprint and the establishment of Sunday as a holiday plus a
number of minor privileges (such as free entry to public
spectacles). Thus, by 1940 the regime propaganda could boast
that the 'New State' had transformed the 'depressing'
profession of journalism into a real social function and that
it had ended the financial insecurity of newsmen by
safeguarding their welfare34.
Apart from the press, the Metaxist regime sought to develop
radio as a major instrument for its propaganda. Only a month
after the declaration of the dictatorship, the government
passed new broadcasting legislation. Compulsory Law 95/1936
established the Radio broadcasting service (YRE), a public
organization aimed at the 'education and entertainment of the
public' and financed through subscription fee and
advertising 35 . The organization was to be administered by a
Board of Governors consisting of state officials, military
officers, a representative of the Greek Orthodox Church, the
chairman of the journalists' union, a representative of the
management of Athenian dailies and four from the field of
culture. Some of the members were appointed ex-officio, but the
majority were appointed by the Minister of Communications. An
employee of the same ministry was to be appointed as Director
General of YRE by the minister. Apart from control of
appointments, the latter could also intervene in the policy of
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the Board of Governors by presiding over its meetings whenever
he considered it necessary. Moreover, the minister exercised
control over the organization's finances and set YRE's internal
regulations. It is characteristic of the haphazard fashion in
which the law was passed that it did not explicitly define the
competences of the Board of Governors, nor those of the
Director General; according to the law, YRE's organizational
structure was to be defined later by a number of royal decrees.
Despite the hasty introduction of broadcasting legislation,
the regime did not start radio broadcasts until eighteen months
later, mainly because of the lack of the necessary premises and
equipment. This must have been one of the main reasons why in
the meanwhile Metaxas' government was considering granting the
exclusive right to broadcast to the German company Telefunken,
a decision which if realized would have meant the abolition of
the broadcasting law we have just referred to. On 25 January
1938, the government made an agreement with Telefunken
according to which the latter was to provide and Install a 15KW
transmitter for radio and to organize and operate the radio
service In Greece. The reasons behind this change of direction
are not known. A possible explanation could be the strong
political and commercial ties between the 'fourth of August'
and Hitler's Germany, as well as the remarkable influence that
the representative of Telefunken In Greece, I. Voulpiotis,
seemed to be exercising within the government36.
Nevertheless, although Telefunken installed the transmitter,
the agreement was not ratified until the German occupation,
when the quisling government re-discovered and Implemented it.
Thus, Metaxas' government proceeded with Its initial plan for
broadcasting and on March 25, 1938 it Inaugurated the Athens
Radio StatIon, RSA. The date was chosen symbolically as It
coincided with the anniversary of the beginning of the war of
Independence, which Is the greatest national celebration in
Greece 37 . The station was set up in a haphazard way and as
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there were no special headquarters for broadcasting the RSA was
housed in a room of the Zappelon museum near the Houses of
Parliament. Thus, after various ill-fated attempts and delays,
radio was finally introduced in Greece without prior planning
and adequate equipment to cover much of the country outside the
Athens area. For almost the next 15 years the Greek
broadcasting service was to operate with that 15KW transmitter.
Initially the daily programming was five hours long, but by
1940 it had been expanded to eleven hours divided into three
parts: morning, afternoon and evening.
In 1939, ostensibly to serve more effectively the regime's
need for propaganda, the RSA was placed under the supervision
of the YTT in which a special Directorate for the Press and
Radio had been set up. It was this directorate which in
practice undertook the administration of the station. The head
of the directorate was journalist Dimitris Svolopoulos, one of
the regime theoreticians and a consultant of the Department of
Education of EON 38 who became in essence the Director General
of RSA. As part of the station's reorganization by the YTT, all
its staff were dismissed and only forty per cent of them were
re-hired as 'appropriate' - defined in terms of loyalty to the
dictatorship 39 . While hard evidence has proved Impossible to
find, It seems likely that as in the rest of the state machine
a 'certificate of loyalty' to the regime issued by the
Undersecretariat of Public Order must have been required from
all prospective RSA employees. In this way all those suspected
of leftist or liberal ideas could be excluded from the
broadcasting service.
In addition to anti-communism which became the main theme of
the regime's propaganda and ideology, the organization and
programming of the RSA were also affected by the widespread
'anti-intellectualism' of the 'New State'. Metaxas had often
expressed his aversion to intellectuals who 'contaminated the
Nation with foreign, impure Ideas' 40 . A number of Greek
intellectuals (academics, writers and journalists) were
arrested and deported to remote islands 41 . Those who escaped
arrest had to remain silent, though some of them were involved
in the resistance against the dictatorship42 . In any case, the
silence of all those who constituted the vanguard of Greek
left-wing and liberal thought In the Inter-war period deprived
Greek radio of the human resources which could have contributed
to Its development as a cultural medium.
The absence of creativity from the RSA must have been widely
felt for a well known Metaxist writer and propagandist felt
obliged to apologize for the low quality of programming: "I
know that there are many people who complain about the quality
of voices or do not find the level of programmes satisfactory
enough. But are they right?(...) Every talent of this country
has been presented on our radio. And If the country has run out
of artistic minds we should not blame the RSA for that"43.
The poor quality of programmes did not prevent the regime's
propaganda from boasting that the 'fourth of August' had
established a 'popular cultural' medium which had "improved the
taste of the audience and had marked a return to the traditions
of pure folk music" 44 . However, radio was seen by the
dictatorial government more as an Instrument of propaganda
rather than a medium for education and entertainment. As
another Metaxist writer put it, "what makes radio utterly
necessary for Greece is the sense of discipline that It conveys
by its nature. Only one speaks; the others listen. They cannot
dlscuss...radlo teaches people how to listen without
discussion"45.
Censorship on radio was exercised by the Speeches Department
of the YTT, which scrutinized all kinds of broadcast texts46.
In Its news and current affairs policy the RSA followed the
same guidelines as newspapers: praises for the 'Chief' and the
accomplishments of the 'New State', propagation of the regime's
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ideals and favourable reporting of fascist countries. It is
characteristic that even after the sinking of the Greek cruiser
'Elli' by an Italian submarine in August 1940, the RSA
concealed the nationality of the attacker and attributed what
was the first clear sign of war between Greece and the Axis
powers to an "unknown submarine"47.
Far from denying the propagandistic use of radio, the
government had often attributed to it publicly a significant
role as a tool for the building of the 'Third Hellenic
Civilization'. For instance, in one of the numerous articles In
the press celebrating the fourth anniversary of the regime, the
RSA was presented as "a medium of enlightenment of the masses
in the big cities as well as in the countryside; a medium of
communication of the government with the people; a medium for
the transmission of the great political ideals of the 'fourth
of August'. The Prime Minister and many members of the cabinet
have used broadcasting several times for this Important
purpose"48.
It is impossible to estimate the effect of radio as a
propaganda weapon on the Greek people. When broadcasting was
introduced in Greece, radio set ownership was limited to about
10,000 sets nationwide. Even with the rapid increase of
subscribers In the next three years (60-62,000 by 1940), the
penetration of radio In Greek society was still limited, with
about 8.5 sets per 1,000 inhabitants by the time of the
regime's downfall 49 . With just over thirty eight per cent of
the population earning an income sufficient only to cover their
bare necessities and another forty per cent living below the
poverty line , the acquisition of a radio set remained a
luxury that the vast majority of people could not afford. In
the few rural areas which could receive RSA's broadcasts a
radio set in the local coffee shop usually served the entire
community. The impact, such as it was, of radio propaganda
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throughout the four and a half years of the dictatorship is not
of major importance for our analysis.
What is Important to emphasize here, Is the establishment
and organization of Greek broadcasting by a dictatorial
government which saw it as a precious tool In the long run for
the consolidation of Metaxas' 'New State'. Moreover, together
with the numerous well staged parades and festivities, radio
could offer a unique opportunity to Metaxas for personal
contact with the people that he so badly needed if he were to
achieve the unquestioning support of the masses. To serve these
ends better, broadcasting was incorporated into the huge
propaganda machine of the government and was turned more into
an Instrument of persuasion rather than a medium for the
information and education of the people.
2.3 War, internal cleavage and repressive parliamentarisni
In October 1940 Greece entered the war against Italy at
first and a few months later against Germany despite Metaxas'
efforts to maintain the country's neutrality. His government's
decision to side with the Allies was the victory of the pro-
British faction of the power bloc headed by the king over that
part of the ruling class and the military which had close
political and economic ties with Hitler's Germany50.
The declaration of war and the largely anti-fascist
character that was given to it by the people marked In essence
the end of the dictatorship. In February 1942, the dictatorial
regime was also officially abolished by the government that the
king had appointed In exile 51 . In Athens, a quisling government
was formed by the Axis forces, as soon as they occupied the
country, In April 1941. It was headed by General G. Tsolakoglou
who had played a leading part In the signing of the armistice
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agreement with Germany behind the backs of the king and the
government 52 . Keen to achieve acceptance by and if possible the
support of the Greek people, the occupying authorities and
particularly the Germans - more than the Italians and the
Bulgarians - sought to organize an extensive and effective
propaganda network within the country. Thus, the daily press
was placed under strict censorship, while with German
sponsorship a number of collaborationist publications undertook
also the task of disseminating the ideals of national-socialism
to the Greeks.
Initially German propaganda aimed at creating among the
people a climate of suspicion and hostility against the Allies
and especially Britain, whereas after the defeat In Stalingrad
in early 1943 the propaganda was turned against the Soviets and
the left-wing liberation movement in Greece, EAN 53 . Of course,
radio played a major role as a propaganda weapon In the hands
of the Germans. Less than forty days after the Axis forces
occupied Greece, the new quisling government changed the
broadcasting legislation. In fact the new legal framework for
broadcasting was nothing more than the above mentioned contract
that the Metaxas government had arranged with Telefunken In
January 1938. According to that contract, as modified by the
Tsolakoglou government, the German corporation represented In
Greece by I. Voulpiotis was to establish a new organization for
broadcasting called Greek Radio Company (AERE), which was given
the exclusive right to "operate and exploit" the Greek
broadcasting service. In return, Telefunken was obliged to
supply all transmitting and other technical equipment necessary
for the operation of the Athens radio station. All this
equipment was to be the property of the Greek state 54 . AERE was
responsible only for the entertainment part of the programming,
whereas the news and current affairs broadcasts were the
responsibility of the collaborationist government. According to
one testimony, news bulletins were prepared by a team of
German-speaking Greeks at the German embassy In Athens55.
Apart from the news, however, a large number of programmes such
as lessons in Italian and German, travelogues, speeches and
the presentation of selective German and Italian works of
literature, also served propaganda purposes.
Indeed, headed by Voulpiotis himself as its Director General
and a number of ardent Nazi admirers who had worked also for
Netaxas' ideological and repressive apparatuses, AERE became
the mouthpiece of the Germans and the collaborationist
government. Most prominent among the AERE propagandists was
writer Sitsa Karaiskaki who during the dictatorship had been a
top official of EON specializing in methods of
indoctrination 56 . As a result, the discredited Athens radio
ceased to be a source of reliable information for the public
who turned their attention to news bulletins broadcast in Greek
over foreign radio stations (particularly the BBC in London and
also Cairo, the place of exile of the Greek King and his
government). To prevent the reception of these foreign
broadcasts the Germans ordered the sealing of all radio sets in
such a way that only the reception of the Athens station was
possible; it is estimated that in the capital city alone,
43,000 radios were sealed in this way 57 . Moreover, listening to
foreign radio stations was declared an act of resistance
against the occupying forces and listeners caught were punished
to death58.
Foreign radio programmes, however, were not the only
alternative source of broadcast information in Greece. At the
same time, EAM was operating in the provinces its own radio
stations as part of an extensive communications network,
organized for the first time in the countryside by the
resistance movement. The contribution of these radio stations,
which could reach Crete and even remote Aegean islands, to the
information and boosting of morale of the population in all
probability must have been significant; their importance for
our study is only minor, however, not only because our
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knowledge about their organization and policy is still very
limited, but also, because they disappeared together with the
resistance movement during the turbulent period which followed
the end of the war 59 . In any case, even the establishment and
operation of radio broadcasting nationwide by EAM Is yet
another indication of the significant social, political and
cultural role that the left-wing movement played in Greece
during the second world war. The impact of this movement on
Greek society was enormous and determined to a large extent the
political developments which took place after the war.
EAN (National Liberation Front) was founded on 28 September
1941 by the Communist party, the Socialist and agrarian parties
and other minor political forces and personalities of declared
socialist ideas. Although Communist-led, EAN was not dominated
ideologically by the KKE. Its programme had two major
components: the anti-fascist struggle and liberation of the
country, and the establishment of a democratic regime based
on social and political equality after the war.aln reality EAM
was the continuation and development of the massive
mobilization of the lower classes which had taken place in the
l930s. The war and the resistance finally enabled the social
forces which had been demobilized by Metaxas' dictatorship to
become politically active again and prepare the ground for the
establishment of a dynamic political formation independent of
the traditional parties.
Apart from Influencing large segments of the urban
population, EMI's programme and activities also contributed to
the radicalization and mobilization of the peasantry. EAM not
only assumed control over the largest part of the provinces
through its military branch ELAS (Greek People's Liberation
Army), but It also made a great effort towards the political
and administrative reorganization of the areas it controlled.
New institutions of self-government and people's courts of
justice were introduced which made known to the peasants for
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the first time the benefits of democracy and political
participation. New schools and theatre contributed to the
cultural development of the rural population, which had
previously been neglected by the centre. As a fierce opponent
of EAM-ELAS later admitted, "the benefits of culture and
education appeared in the mountains for the first time (...) A
communal life was organized to replace the traditional
individualism of the Greek peasant. EAM-ELAS created the
conditions of what the Greek governments had overlooked: an
organized state in the mountains"60.
These policies together with a programme of social welfare
applied especially at times of food shortages and hunger
increased immensely the popularity and broadened the social
base of EAM and contributed to its development Into the biggest
movement followed far behind by smaller resistance groups of
liberal or conservative convictions 61 . Although there are no
accurate figures available regarding the membership of EAN-
ELAS, it appears that by the end of the war EAM had between
500,000 and 2,000,000 members (in a population of 7,000,000) As
for ELAS Its members were estimated at 50,000 during the same
period62 . By 1944 almost all Greece apart from Athens was
under the control of EAM-ELAS which had become consequently the
major political force in the country.
The establishment of a government in the mountains (PEEA),
in March 1944 marked the beginning of a process of realization
of EAN's plans for a social and political reform and the
prevention of new dictatorial solutions after the end of the
war. With the preservation of national unity as one of its main
objectives, PEEA (Political Committee of National Liberation)
sought to achieve the cooperation of the traditional political
leaders, most of whom were participating in the King's
governments in Cairo, for the formation of a coalition
government after the liberation of the country. Indeed in May
1944, representatives of PEEA, of all resistance groups and
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political parties met at a conference In Lebanon, presided over
by the Prime Minister of the Cairo government, G.Papandreou.
Among other things, the participants agreed upon the formation
of a government of national unity which after the war would
take the necessary measures to guarantee the holding of free
elections and a referendum on the future of the monarchy63.
The political situation, however, was far from Idyllic. The
prospect of the domination of EAN and of a political reform
that the majority of the population seemed to be in
favour of, was not welcomed by any of the forces which had
participated in or supported the government of Cairo. As could
be expected, the left-wing movement in Greece was seen with
hostility by the traditional political leaders insofar as It
called into question the social and political structures which
had existed in Greece before the war, thus posing a threat to
their own political future. The parliamentary representatives
of the bourgeoisie, whoa alarmed by the mobilization of the
l930s had surrendered power to Netaxas, chose not to
participate in the resistance; instead, they followed the King
Into exile seeking support primarily from the British
government which in turn saw them as a political counter-weight
to the power of EAM-ELAS.
The British had also every reason to be alarmed by the
enormous influence of EAM among the Greek people: first because
under the domination of the Left the prospect of the abolition
of monarchy, the power of which the British government was
eager to restore after the war, was very likely. And secondly,
because this domination of EAN was counter to Britain's
interests in the Mediterranean; it is now well known that
already by the end of 1943 (Teheran conference) Greece was
considered to lie within the British sphere of influence64.
Finally, hostile towards EAN-ELAS were all those ultra
Right-wing segments of the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy and the
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military which were looking forward to a return to the
political situation that had been established with Metaxas'
dictatorship in 193665. All those forces united by their
hostility towards EAM were preparing to prevent the
establishment of any de facto situation by the Left after the
Germans' withdrawal. Their plans were also facilitated by the
stance of EAN itself, which keen to preserve national unity
accepted the allocation of minor posts to its representatives
in Papandreou's coalition government.
Moreover, with the agreement of Kazerta in September 1944,
EAN accepted to place all its resistance organizations under
the command of British general Scoble and also agreed that ELAS
would not enter Athens 66 . The problems of the policy of
national reconciliation which had become apparent soon after
the Lebanon conference aggravated rapidly when the government
returned to liberated Greece in October 194467. At the centre
of the dispute which erupted between EAM on the one side and
Papandreou and the British on the other was the disbanding of
ELAS which the latter were pressingly demanding. At the same
time Papandreou's government backed by the British, refused to
dismantle the fiercely anti-communist 'Mountain Brigade' and
was unable to control a number of collaborationist groups used
by the Germans to fight EAM-ELAS and to terrorise the
supporters of the left in the provinces. It was this dispute
which led to the first military confrontation and defeat of EAM
by the government forces in December 1944. The policy of
national unity had failed and the prospects for the
implementation of EAN's programme of social reform became more
and more bleak.
A last attempt to preserve peace was made with the Varkiza
Agreement in February 1945. According to this agreement which
was drafted under British pressure, the Left was obliged to
disband all its military organizations - ELAS, ELAN (EAN'S
Navy) etc - while the Athens government undertook the
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responsibility among other things of restoring civil liberties,
purging the military and security forces of all collaborators
of the Metaxas' regime and of the Nazis, and of holding as soon
as possible the referendum on the monarchy and
subsequent general elections for a new Constitutional Assembly.
Nevertheless, whereas ELAS was disarmed within the agreed
deadlines, the government did not take the necessary measures
for the implementation of the agreement. Moreover, it tolerated
the development of an unprecedented surge of terror against the
supporters of EAM and other democratic segments of the
population in which Nazi collaborators together with the local
police and the militia were involved. The number and fierceness
of atrocities, the destruction of property and the constant
fear which a large part of the population was experiencing led
many left-wingers and ex-partisans to form the first groups of
self-defence. These groups, together with a small number of
ELAS fighters who had refused to conform to the Varkiza
Agreement, became the nucleus of a new army of the Left which
was to fight against the government forces during the imminent
civil war68.
It was under these conditions of fear and destruction that
the first general elections In ten years were held on 31 May
1946; EAN, as well as the KKE and other democratic parties of
the Liberal camp abstained from the elections In protest. Apart
from the royalist Right, the National Political Union also took
part in the elections under the leadership of three major
Liberal leaders S.Venizelos, G.Papandreou and P.Kanellopoulos
who were campaigning also for a cooperation of all " nationally
minded" forces against EAN. The abstention of the majority of
the democratic forces from the elections, combined with
widespread terror and electoral fraud, resulted In an
overwhelming victory of the Right with sixty five per cent of
the votes 69 . Thus the royalist Right was to be responsible for
the preparation of the referendum on the monarchy, which was
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held on the 1st of September of the same year. Although all
political forces participated in the campaign, again white
terror and excessive fraud gave the monarchy a staggering 68
per cent against 32 per cent for the republic 70 . A few weeks
later George II, who had lived abroad until then, came back to
his throne.
The results of the general elections and the referendum
Inflicted the final blow to the policy of national unity and
the prospects of a peaceful political arrangement between the
Left and Its opponents. As available Information suggests, this
outcome of the elections and the referendum largely influenced
the KKE's decision to support the increasing movement of self-
defence militarily as well as politically. By the end of 1946,
Greece was well into the civil war 71 . It is far beyond the
scope of this study to analyse the reasons behind KKE's
decision to enter Into this conflict, although it had been
Isolated by the other forces of the non-communist Left which
had participated in EAM. Our account of this controversial
period aims to highlight the social and political developments
In the 1940s and the political climate that led to a civil war.
This new ordeal of the Greek people ended with the defeat of
the Communists in August 1949. Between 1946 and 1949 the loss
of human life and destruction of property reached appalling
proportions: 40,000 people were killed, while 80,000-100,000
others took refuge in neighbouring communist countries72.
Most important of all, however, was that the result of the
civil war created a political, social and ideological cleavage
between the Right and the Left, the repercussions of which
were to be felt for several decades. In the last part of this
section we will briefly analyse the bourgeois regime which was
established after the war, namely the organization of power and
its contradictions, the guiding principles and Ideology. Such
an analysis we believe, is necessary for a better understanding
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of the social and political conditions under which broadcasting
developed in the post-war period.
The electoral victory of the Right and the restoration of
monarchy marked the return to the political situation of the
inter-war period. The bourgeois regime was far from being
consolidated however, as neither the result of the elections
nor of the referendum represented the will of the large
majority of the people. For although the popularity of EAM had
suffered a first blow with the events of December 1944 the Left
was still the largest political force in the country. According
to American reports in the beginning of the civil war at least
1/10 of the population - 700,000 people - openly considered
themselves as left—wingers and another 150-200,0000 could be
mobilized for violent confrontation against the authorities.At
the same time according to the same sources, 50 per cent of the
people were hostile or suspicious towards the government73.
For these reasons the government Introduced a number of
emergency measures which aimed at the final suppression of the
"rebellion" and also at the continuous exclusion of the Left
from politics. Most important of all pieces of legislation in
this respect was compulsory law 509/1947 by which the Communist
party, EAM and all organizations and trade unions affiliated to
them were outlawed and activities deemed subversive, such as
meetings and assemblies, were punished with very heavy
sentences. Moreover, with the Third edict Implemented in June
1946, which punished all conspiratorial activities turned
against the "integrity of the country", hundreds of people were
sentenced to death by martial courts all over Greece 74 . A much
larger number of people were deported to prison camps without
trial for being suspected of subversive activities or ideas by
decision of ad hoc established Committees of National Security.
According to the Red Cross, In summer 1948, the number of those
interned in prison camps was 16,000, while many hundreds of
others were deported to small islands. In the winter of that
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year all these were transferred to the prison camp of
Makronissos which became notorious for the barbarous methods
applied to prisoners75.
Particularly effective in the suppression of leftist ideas
were the certificates of social beliefs which, based usually on
a declaration of loyalty to the regime by the person concerned,
were necessary for almost every activity: from finding
employment and entering university to receiving a driving
licence or a passport to emigrate. The ideological function of
this and the other emergency measures of that period was of
immense importance in a society which at first was not hostile
to the communists.
If repression and atrocities contributed to the shrinkage of
the social base of the Left,they were not enough to achieve an
overwhelming victory of the Right in the civil war. As we have
already said, the traditional political leaders of the inter-
war era had lost the support of the masses, while the bourgeois
strata - those which survived the war and those which emerged
from it- 76 were still very weak to constitute a social base
for the bourgeois regime. Moreover, there was not a properly
organized army to confront the rebels effectively. The Greek
governments were too weak to cope with the problems of a
complex political situation. Being in essence a creation of
British intervention, these governments depended upon Britain
for aid and support and they would collapse whenever this
support was withdrawn.
Foreign intervention during and after the war played a
decisive role in the establishment and the consolidation of the
bourgeois regime. For although the civil war was primarily an
internal conflict, it had also a major international dimension
as it was placed within the context of the cold war. Both the
British and the Americans (the latter took over in 1947)
undertook to support the government in Its fight against
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communism. According to available evidence, the Americans'
involvement in the Greek civil war was based on their
interpretation of the conflict as an immediate consequence of
Soviet expansionism. Seen from the cold war perspective Greece
was the most eligible place for the implementation of Truman's
policy of "containment" 77 . Hence, thanks to the Truman doctrine
and the Marshall plan Greece became the recipient of enormous
military and economic aid which for 1947 alone reached $300
million78 . With American support the military was reorganized
and by 1949 was strong enough to inflict a fatal blow on the
rebels.
Moreover, American economic aid contributed significantly to
the strengthening and consolidation of a new Greek bourgeoisie.
Thus a large part of the Marshall aid, about 50 per cent of the
Gross National Product (GNP), was transferred in the form of
loans to the emerging capitalist classes. Equally important was
the contribution of the United States in the establishment of a
new class of ship-owners; by an agreement between the Greek
government and the Americans 100 old warrior ships were sold to
Greek ship-owners at less than 50 per cent of their initial
price. Thus in all, between 1941 and 1953 40,000 new industries
were established which together with enterprises in other
sectors of the economy (trade, shipping, transportation and
construction) amounted to about 140,000 businesses79.
Therefore, British and then American political support as well
as military and economic aid determined to a large extent the
outcome of the civil war and the establishment of the post-war
social and political status quo.
The defeat of the Communists in August 1949 marked the end
of the social conflict which had originated in the inter-war
era and come to a head in the 1940s. The enormous suffering of
the 1945-49 perIod combined with repression and anti-communist
state propaganda led to the dramatic shrinkage of the social
base of the Left. The latter was now pushed to the margins of
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political life, whereas the reconstituted traditional forces of
the Right and Centre dominated once again the political scene.
Highly personalized, the political parties of these two camps
consisted of notables with local clienteles clustered around a
powerful leader. Another important development which took place
during the civil war was the ideological and political
convergence of the two traditionally rival political camps. The
future of the monarchy which had created a cleavage In the
inter-war period between the Right (Populists) and the Centre
(Liberals) was no longer a dividing issue. In the face of the
Communist threat and the danger of their own political
elimination most Liberal leaders finally recognized the throne
as the cornerstone of the existing social and political order.
As Meynaud has pointed out, the post war forces of the
Right and the Centre were two alternative versions of
conservatism, respectively the authoritarian (or traditional)
and the liberal 80 . Their differences did not refer to the form
of the social and economic structures, but to different
political strategies in the management of power. Both political
formations agreed upon the need for rapid economic development.
But whereas the Right put forward a programme of intensive
capital accumulation at the expense of the lower income groups
and based on social discipline and repression, the model that
the Centre proposed was the establishment of a wider social
consensus through a relative liberalization of the regime and
the widening of the internal markets.
In the first general elections after the civil war in March
1950, the parties of the Centre with their programme of
moderation and national reconciliation won 57 per cent of the
vote. However, the fragmentation of the Liberal forces caused
primarily by personal rivalry among their leaders and
fundamental disagreements on the Issue of amnesty to the
defeated of the civil war resulted in political instability and
successive government reshuffles.
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In 1951, Field Marshal Papagos, a wartime hero and the chief
commander of the military forces in the last phase of the civil
war, announced the establishment of a new party of the Right.
Papagos, who aspired to present himself as the Greek De Gaulle,
managed to reunite all the forces of the Right into his Greek
Rally which was both in terms of its title and strategy
influenced by the Rassemblement du Peuple Français. Under
strong American pressure, a new majority electoral system was
introduced which in the elections of November 1952 gave the
Greek Rally 49.2 per cent of the vote and 82.3 per cent of the
seats in parliament. This result marked the beginning of an 11
year rule by the Right which at first under Papagos and later
(1955) under his successor Constantine Karamanlis (and under
the new name of Greek Radical Union, ERE) introduced a new form
of authoritarian government. To a considerable extent the
monopoly of power by the Right was facilitated by the
continuous fragmentation of the Centre forces, which throughout
the 1950s proved unable to form a united party and thus to
present a credible alternative to the Greek Rally and ERE.
In any case, the Right with its uncompromisingly anti-
communist stance and its governmental stability became the
safeguard of the interests of all those forces which
constituted the winning side of the civil war - the palace, the
bourgeoisie, the anti-communist state apparatus (the military,
the security forces and the bureaucracy) and the Americans. The
political period after 1952 was characterized by a systematic
use of all mechanisms of mass manipulation, which N. Mouzelis
would call systems of political incorporation and exclusion81.
The main components of the post war political system were the
revived patronage networks which benefited mostly the party in
power; and the continuous application of the emergency
legislation of the civil war, which became an effective
mechanism for the exclusion of the Communists and their
sympathizers from politics and the state machine. The KKE and
its organizations remained outlawed while the members and
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supporters of the United Democratic Left Party, EDA, the only
legitimate representative of the Left in that period, faced
constant persecution and intimidation from the repressive
apparatus. It Is characteristic that between 1951 and 1967 the
number of people deported reached 1,72282. Moreover, with a law
on espionage first introduced by Metaxas in 1936 (Compulsory
Law 375/1936) a significant number of Communists were condemned
to death by martial courts and several of them executed83.
Another major characteristic of the post—war parliamentary
regime was the establishment of government tutelage of the
labour movement through an elaborate system which secured a
majority of the Right In all major unions and especially the
General Confederation of Labour, GSEE. Furthermore, special
mechanisms were established for the effective policing of trade
unionists; most important of these was the trade unions section
of the Public Security Services 84 . Finally, through a series of
unfair electoral systems which were designed to secure right-
wing majorities and through the Intimidation of the rural
population by the security forces and various para-state
organizations both the Greek Rally and especially ERE managed
to dominate the political life of Greece for more than a
decade.
To summarize, the bourgeois regime which was established
after the civil war was not In reality a democratic one.
Imposed from above as the outcome of a violent confrontation
rather than the outcome of a social consensus, the regime had
to be protected from the dangers posed by the popular movement.
Thus, the forces which emerged as the victors of the civil war
resorted to a complex system of control and manipulation of the
masses in order to prevent the emergence of new movements which
could demand social reforms and the democratization of
political structures. Therefore, behind the parliamentary
facade, which was enhanced by the presence of EDA, a powerful
anti-communist state was established. Its main components were:
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the emergency legislation of the civil war and a fiercely anti-
communist repressive apparatus (military and security forces)
which throughout the post war period served as guardians of
the social and economic order. It Is for these reasons that
analysts of Greek politics have called the post war regime
repressive parliamentarism85 , exclusivist system 86 and parlia-
mentary dictatorship87.
2.4 Conclusion
The initial phase of Greek broadcasting coincided with the
most turbulent period of modern Greek history. The social
conflict and political mobilization which originated In the
inter-war period, led to the establishment of a dictatorship in
1936 and subsequently to a civil war, the political and
Ideological implications of which were to haunt Greek public
life for several decades. Radio was Introduced by the Metaxist
dictatorship in a haphazard fashion and was subsequently
Incorporated in the machinery of the government in order to
serve as a means for the legitimation of the new political
order that Metaxas aspired to establish.
The extremely centralized organization In which all aspects
of policy were determined by the powerful Ministry of
Information and Tourism laid the foundations of a tradition of
government manipulation of radio which continues until the
present day. The authoritarian and anti-communist policies of
the 'New State' led to the development of a mentality of
conformity within RSA's largely conservative staff, which
provided the necessary grounds for the medium's subjugation to
political power in the anti-communist state which was
established In the aftermath of the civil war.
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CHAPTER 3
BROADCASTING IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR ERA: 1950-1967.
3.1 Introduction
As was shown in the preceding analysis, the socio-political
order which was established in Greece in the post-war period
was not based on a broad social and political consensus; it
was imposed from above and secured through the defeat of the
communists in the civil war. Thus, those forces which found
themselves on the victorious side, and especially the Right
which monopolized power for over a decade, sought to employ
extensively the mechanisms of the state in order to consolidate
the bourgeois regime and reproduce their power. Apart from
repression and the consolidation of new bourgeois and middle
classes through the distribution of resources by the state,
ideology also played a central role in legitimizing the new
status quo. In particular, broadcasting was used by successive
governments as a major means for anti-communist propaganda and
for influencing the electorate in favour of their policies. In
this chapter, we will examine the institutional organization of
broadcasting after the war and the rationale behind the
establishment of a state monopoly; the ideological role of
broadcasting; and the relationship between broadcasting
institutions and the political world, especially those holding
executive power.
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3.2 The new ideological framework or the search for legitimacy.
We briefly examined In the previous chapter the process
under which the post-war bourgeois regime was established in
Greece and the measures that the victors of the civil war
applied in order to eliminate politically the left-wing
movement. Repression was the necessary strategy for the
continuous exclusion of the most radical part of the population
from the political process. It could not guarantee, however,
the final abandonment by the masses of the demand for political
and economic reforms. The mass mobilization of the 1940s and
the "direct experience of collective political activity"
combined with the discontent caused by the ambiguous stance of
the traditional politicians during the occupation had largely
destroyed the foundations of the pre-war political system.
After the war the reconstitution of patronage networks and the
institutionalization of repression became the main forms of
political control of the masses. Nevertheless, the political
balance which had been Imposed from above was still
precarious. Despite the hostility that the majority of the
population seemed to feel towards the Communists after the
civil war, the elections of 1950 and 1951 clearly Indicated
that the largest part of the people favoured a policy of
reconciliation and consequently of democratisation. Moreover,
despite the terror exercised by the state and para-state
organizations, in 1951 the newly established EDA gained 10.57
per cent of the vote and 10 seats In parliament 2 . A new
strategy had to be Invented, therefore, which could in the long
run achieve a broad popular consensus for bourgeois domination
and the power structure which became Its political expression.
New legitimating mechanisms had to be developed and it was
the Greek state which undertook this task. In the post-war
period the state acquired a dominant position within the Greek
social formation by allocating resources to and securing the
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vital Interests of a large part of the population. The role of
the first post-war governments was decisive in the
establishment and consolidation of a new capitalist class,
through loans based primarily on American aid, a large number
of subsidies, protective measures and a system of Indirect
taxation. Moreover, amid conditions of widespread poverty and
unemployment (the latter was estimated at 30 per cent
throughout the l950s) the state became the main - if not the
only - hope for employment for a large part of the population.
Already in 1949, the number of civil servants had reached
144,000, an Increase of 69 per cent within a decade.
Furthermore, the permanent military staff amounted to 65,000
whereas an unspecified number of people were working In state-
controlled organizations (banks, transport, telecommunications,
local government, etc) 4 . In this way, a new petty bourgeoisie
emerged of state employees which together with the wealthier
strata constituted the social base of the new regime.
The consolidation of the middle strata through the
distribution of wealth was the main component of the
legitimating strategy of the post-war state. It was not enough
to secure a broad popular consensus. What was also necessary
was the Ideological Integration of the dominated classes. A new
'hegemonic' Ideology was therefore necessary and the state
sought to provide it. Although the civil war was presented as
the struggle between liberal democracy and communist
totalitarianism 5 , In reality the Greek bourgeoisie was too
weak, Insecure and dependent on the state 6 for its survival to
be able to reproduce Western bourgeois values as the dominant
Ideology of Greek society; the traditional liberal principles
of political pluralism, freedom of speech, equality before the
law and free elections could threaten its uncertain power. A
new ideology had to be introduced, through which the
authoritarian organization of power and the limited political
role of the masses within it could become broadly accepted;
this new official Ideology was anti-communism.
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The content of this new ideology was not, however, the
criticism or resentment of the principles and shortcomings of
communism or socialism. At a time when poverty and unemployment
had hit hard the largest part of the population 7 the Ideology
of the Left had to be stripped of its political and social
content and its relevance to class relations. Political
antagonism had to be separated from class conflict. In this
context, communism became a menace against national security,
while the Left was identified with the perennial enemies of
Greece - the Slavic countries which after the war happened to
have established communist regimes. Hence, the Right-Left
polarization was no longer a conflict between the bourgeois
regime and the dominated classes, but a fight of the "Nation
against its enemies". The reinforcement in 1950 of the law on
espionage, by which the Communists were in practice identified
with spies, is indicative of the climate of that period. In
this way the 'national interest' was identified with the
security of the established regime. A new term,
'Ethnikofrossyni' (commitment to nationalistic attitudes), was
invented to describe the approved political ethos, which in the
last analysis was nothing more than conformity to the
restrictions imposed on political activity through repression
and patronage. A new nationalism was developed therefore, which
unlike that of the 19th and early 20th centuries did not have
an Irredentist but rather a defensive character; its main ideal
was the reference to the Ancient and Greek-Orthodox traditions
which the 'nation' had to preserve in order to survive the
'external menace'. The similarity to the Metaxist Ideals is
very obvious.
This climate of repression and Ideological confusion
affected the cultural life of the country. As Tsoukalas rightly
points out 8 , in a period of acute political and social
problems, social criticism was absent from all sectors of
Intellectual life. The Left, from within which a significant
number of thinkers and writers had emerged in the 1930s, was
now placed in a political and ideological ghetto. Many of its
Intellectuals had been imprisoned, self-exiled or simply
silenced by censorship and repression. In 1955, to give only
one example, many leftist publishers and writers were deported
to prison camps while the police even confiscated translations
of 'suspected' classics, such as Hugo, Balzac and DostoIevsky9.
As for the non-communist liberal Intellectuals of the Inter-war
period, they chose to abstain from any commentary on the
political situation and turned to other less controversial
subjects 10 . Oddly enough, they were the same people who had
overtly opposed Metaxas' dictatorship. We will not try to
explain their stance, for this is a complex matter requiring a
separate study; It seems to us however, that the establishment
of representative Institutions after the war and the illusion
of democracy and free expression that parliamentarism created
must have been largely responsible for the adoption of this
neutral stance by non-communist Intellectuals. Under these
circumstances, the social and political sciences also remained
underdeveloped for almost the entire period until the downfall
of the dictatorship.
The state with its reinforced role In post-war Greece took
on the most significant ideological-indoctrinating functions.
Beyond the purely ideological apparatuses, education and the
media (especially broadcasting), of major importance as means
of ideological persuasion was the anti-communist legislation
which had been introduced after the civil war. These emergency
measures aimed primarily at punishing the Ideological
Inclination towards the Left, being Interpreted as an intentIon
of subversive activity, as well as the activities themselves.
For Instance, Compulsory Law 509/1947 punished any "attempt at
the implementation of ideas ostensibly aiming at the violent
overthrow of the regime (...) or the detachment of a part of
the country"' 2 . We should also mention here the ideological
pressure exercised through the 'certificates of social beliefs'
which were the necessary ticket to employment in the state
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apparatus. In a country where more than one third of the
population were unemployed, the selective offer of employment
by the state on Ideological grounds appeared as reward for the
'nationally minded' and conversely, a punishment for those with
left-wing ideas.
Education, one of the state's most important ideological
apparatuses, was seriously affected by anti-communism. By 1947,
3,633 teachers and university professors had been purged, by
far the biggest number of all sectors of the state machine13.
This policy caused a serious shortage of staff and for this
reason serious disruptions to the already problematic
functioning of Greek education 14 . The content of the curricula
was also influenced by the post-war Ideals. According to the
1952 Constitution (article 16), school lessons had as their
goal the "moral and intellectual education and the development
of the national consciousness of the youth on the basis of the
Ideological directions of the Helleno-Christian civilization".
To give only one example, in 1961, at a high school of
classical orientation (emphasis on language and literature) out
of the 36 hours of the weekly timetable, 7-8 were taken up by
ancient Greek (grammar and syntax, rather than discussion of
content) whereas only 4 hours were dedicated to the modern
Greek language. Also, religion was a compulsory lesson for all
classes of the high school taking up 2 hours of the weekly
timetable, while only three hours were allocated to history and
civil education together15.
The press became from the beginning of the civil war one of
the main targets of repressive legislation and practice.
Government measures were aimed especially at left-wing
newspapers and publications, a large number of which had sprung
up during the years of the occupation by the Axis powers.
According to one source, EAM-ELAS and its various local and
other organizations as well as the KKE and the other parties
which participated in EAN published regularly throughout the
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occupation 252 newspapers, magazines and other publications.
There was also an unspecified number of leaflets and
newsletters published under the most primitive of conditions by
members and supporters of EAM16 . Moreover, a significant
number of journalists of different political affiliations
contributed regularly to underground publications while working
at the same time for the official press which was under the
control of the occupying forces and the quisling government'7.
Some of the major illegal publications continued to circulate
for a short period after the liberation of the country18.
Shortly after the civil war began, however, under a number of
emergency measures most of the publications were banned and the
people involved in them were persecuted.
The first major piece of legislation which restricted the
freedom of the press was passed in November 1946 and authorized
the confiscation of newspapers, magazines and other
publications if they contained articles of "rebellious content,
aiming at the overthrow of the democratic bases of the existing
regime or being against the security of the State and the
public order". Confiscation was also authorized when papers
sought to publish information about the movements of the armed
forces and about the fortification of the country19 . The main
target of this measure was Rizospastis (Radical), the official
organ of the KKE, which published on a daily basis information
about the rebels' movements and announcements of the party
leadership which the official government was keen to prevent
from reaching the public. Nevertheless, it was not until a year
later that the government decided to silence the Communist
press. Until then, Rizospastis and a number of other papers and
publications were circulating legally; besides, the government,
keen to maintain a democratic facade, was still hesitating to
outlaw the Communist Party. By the end of 1947, however, the
situation had so aggravated as the struggle intensified
further, that the muzzling of the Communist papers was
considered an Indispensable measure in the fight against the
-92-
rebels. As Christos Ladas, the Minister of Justice remarked,
"it is necessary to oppose the tricks of the rebels with the
determination of the State to finish with the rebellion and its
propagandists" 20 . And he went on, "the continuation of the
struggle is unacceptable according to common sense while at the
same time the rebel continues to be served by journalistic
organs circulating freely (...) poisoning every effort,
praising the rebellion, calling for Its continuation (...) and
undermining shamelessly everything which is sacred In the
Motherland"21.
Hence, edict 31 banned "as long as the rebellion continued"
the publication of all newspapers and magazines the contents of
which proved that "by serving consciously and purposely those
who raised their weapons against the Motherland and who
conspired against the integrity of the country, (these
publications) refused systematically to abide by the laws of
the State and evidently served by all means the rebellion". At
the same time the court had to order the confiscation of the
assets, furniture, printing machines and other material of the
banned publications. The martial courts which were exclusively
empowered to deal with these cases could sentence to temporary
- or even life - Imprisonment those who sought to continue the
publication of the paper under the same or a similar title.
Finally, those who were caught holding copies of the outlawed
publications could be sentenced to a maximum of three years'
imprisonment if It was proven that their intention was to
distribute them. The Implementation of these stipulations led
to the banning of sixty two newspapers, including Rizospastis
and Eleftheri Hellada (Free Greece) the official organ of EAM.
Moreover, as It appeared that some banned newspapers continued
to be published under different titles 22 , under the provisions
of edict 32 the government forbade the publication of any
new papers and periodicals without previous permission from
the Undersecretary of the Press and Information. Also, many of
the publishers and journalists who were working for left-wing
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papers were arrested and deported to islands and prison
camps 23 . Beyond these edicts, there was also Compulsory Law
509/1947 which stipulated life imprisonment and in certain
cases capital punishment for anybody who "pursued the
implementation of ideas (.1.) aiming at the overthrow of the
regime or at the detachment of part of the country by violent
means" or anybody who "exercised indoctrination for the
implementation of these ideas" (article 2, par. 1). In those
cases where these offences were committed by the press, the
writer of the article, the director or publisher of the paper
and the distributor - if he was informed in advance about the
content of the publication - were suspended from their work for
one year and in cases of a second offence sine die (article 3,
par.2); all offences defined by law 509, including those of the
press, fell under the jurisdiction of martial courts (article
7,par.2).
The peculiarity of the press legislation of the post-war
period was that it could neutralise the left-wing press and
also prevent any serious criticism in the press about the
government's policies, especially those concerning civil
liberties, without the imposition of censorship. These measures
enabled the government to refuse permission for the publication
of new papers 24 and the banning of others 25 . Moreover, in many
cases publishers and journalists were arrested and tried by
martial courts for articles on the government's record on human
rights. A major example of this policy was the Socialist paper
Machi (Battle), the only left-wing paper in our knowledge to
circulate legally at that time, the director of which as well
as some of its reporters were repeatedly tried by martial
courts 26 . In this way, while giving the impression of
safeguarding press freedom due to the lack of censorship, the
first governments of the post-war period managed to neutralize
the left wing press. The grave situation of journalists at that
time was best described by Machi which went so far as to
suggest in one of its editorials that " censorship was a more
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humanist measure (than the rest of the legislation)...because
it affected texts, whereas the emergency measures affected
individuals" and to conclude that "the freedom of the press is
restricted in Greece not by censorship but by terror" 27 . Beyond
these measures the circulation of liberal and leftist papers
was hindered outside the urban areas by the intervention and
zeal of the local gendarmerie who intimidated readers and
forced distributors not to sell the 'anti-national'
publications. In Rethymno, for example, the local newsagent was
forced by the police to hand to the authorities a list with the
names of all buyers of Machi28.
The emergency measures and the practice of the local
security forces created a climate in which only newspapers of a
limited ideological and political scope were allowed to publish
and circulate freely. After the closing down of Machi in the
early 1950s due to a lack of readers, the only paper to
represent the Left was Avgi (Dawn) which came out in 1952 as
the official organ of EDA 29 . The legislation which restricted
the freedom of the press remained in force until the
"rebellion" was officially declared finished in 196230. In the
meantime, having achieved the exclusion from press publishing
of those who were not 'nationally minded', the emergency
measures fell into abeyance 31 . Even without these stipulations
persecution against the left-wing press continued
systematically under the provisions of the Penal Code and
especially those articles dealing with insults against the
authorities (article 181, par. 1)32.
The 1952 Constitution, with the numerous restrictions to
press freedom that it introduced, safeguarded the "disciplined"
function of the press within the limits of the repressive
parliamentary system. Hence, the Constitution introduced a
significant number of cases in which the confiscation of
newspapers and publications was allowed. Such cases included:
i. insults against the person of the King and his family; ii.
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publications offending the Christian religion and public
morals; iii. the revelation of information about the movements
of the military and of plans regarding the fortification of the
country; iv. the publication of texts which were of a
"rebellious" character or undermined the national integrity of
the country or constituted provocation to the commitment of
high treason, Also, for the above offences and under certain
conditions, the Constitution provided for the banning of
newspapers and magazines and for the final deprivation of the
right to work as journalists of those who had been convicted of
press offences33.
Thus, after the civil war and until the dictatorship of 1967
the political scope of newspapers, with the exception of Avgi,
clearly reflected the domination of the two traditional camps,
the Right and the Centre, in the post-war political system. All
dailies of that period supported either the Greek Rally and
after 1956 ERE or the various forces of the Centre and after
1961 the integrated Centre Union party (ER). The support of the
major Athenian dailies 34 for the right-wing and liberal parties
was almost equally distributed as the table below shows:
TABLE 3. 1
Morning	 Evening
RIGHT :	 'Kathimerini'(Daily) 'Messimvrini'(Noon)
(Greek Rally,	 'Acropolis'	 'Apogevmatini'(Afternoon)
ERE)	 'Ethnikos Kyrix'	 'Vradyni'(Evening)
(National Herald)
CENTRE:	 'To Vima'(Tribune) 	 'Ta Nea'(The News)
(various,	 'Eleftheria'(Freedom)	 'Athinaiki'(Athenian)
ER)	 'Ethnos'(Nation)
Amid the climate created during and after the civil war,
these measures determined to a large extent the political
orientation of the Greek press in the post-war period. Apart
from the legislation, the increasing economic dependence of the
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national papers on the state for their survival constituted
also a major, and perhaps the most important, means by which
successive governments have exercised pressure on newspapers
and particularly on those of the opposition. State advertising,
subsidies (especially the removal of duty on newsprint),
significantly reduced tax rates and loans have been used by
governments in the entire post-war period as both the carrot
and the stick for publishers.
3.3 The establishment of the National Broadcasting Institute.
Less than a year after the liberation of Greece the
government of Petros Boulgarls 35 introduced new legislation on
broadcasting. With the Constituent Act 54/15 June 1945, a new
public broadcasting organization was established, the National
Broadcasting Institute (EIR). AERE had been abolished in the
meanwhile and Its equipment which had been sequestrated by the
state as enemy property was transferred to the new
organization 36 . EIR was given the monopoly of all broadcasts of
sound and vision. In fact the new statute was the first to
establish explicitly a state monopoly on broadcasting. The
institute was placed under double state control: on the
technical aspects it was to be supervised by the Minister of
Communications, whereas the general supervision was to be
exercised by the Undersecretary of Press and Information.
EIR was to be administered by a Board of Governors
consisting of 15 members and a Director General. Thirteen out
of all the members of the Board were appointed by the
government, and the same applied to the Director General, who
was classified as a civil servant with the same rank as the
General Directors of ministries. The main sources of income of
the new organization were to be the subscription fee, income
from commercials and the sales of the radio-programme magazine,
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as well as subsidies and loans from the state. We will not
elaborate on the main principles of EIR's organization which
were introduced by the new law. These provisions became the
basis of broadcasting legislation and were repeated with minor
modifications in all subsequent statutes. An overall review of
broadcasting legislation until 1967 is given below. EIR was
housed in the same old headquarters in the Rigillis square and
the studios continued to be in the basement of the Zappeion.
The radio service continued to broadcast via the pre-war 15 KW
transmitter, for Telefunken never fulfilled Its obligation
established by the contract with the Greek state to provide a
new transmitter of 150 KW in exchange for the operation of
AERE. In a country devastated by the war (the total cost of
damages was estimated officially at $14 billion in 1938 prices)
and with the entire communications network (railways, bridges,
telephone and telegraph) destroyed 37 , the expansion and
modernization of the broadcasting service could not be seen as
a top priority. Besides, in the turbulent period which followed
the liberation of the country, radio was seen primarily as a
significant weapon of the government and the foreign powers
which supported It in their fight against communism. It Is
characteristic that a large part of the daily programme in the
first post-war years was produced by the British forces and
especially by the A4 Army Broadcasting Unit and the joint
English and Greek Information Service38.
After the Americans took over in 1947, Greek radio became
part of a masterly organized anti-communist campaign which
aimed at "arousing the people within Greece, breaking the
guerilla morale and counteracting the widespread confusion of
world opinion" 39 . In late 1948 an extensive psychological
warfare programme began within the country organized and
financed by the US State Department which also provided experts
In different media. The American officials were actively
involved In this programme mainly because they considered the
propaganda of the Greek authorities as "inept" and thus
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ineffective. "The Greeks must be taught to preach a dynamic
doctrine of victory" an American official suggested 40 . One
major operation of this programme was the setting up of a radio
station in Thessaloniki, Northern Greece,whlch would also cover
the communist Balkan countries. For this purpose, a 50KW
transmitter was installed, which was by far the most powerful
in Greece (the transmitter that EIR managed to install in the
same city by the end of the 1940s had a power of only 2KW)41.
The "New Radio Station of Thessaloniki" broadcast an eight-hour
programme of which only two hours were in Greek. Apart from the
British and American broadcasts, propaganda was exercised by
the daily programmes of the General Staff, the air force and
the navy42.
In January 1946, as the civil war appeared to be inevitable,
the government of Liberal Th. Sophoulis passed a modification
of the constituent act 54, by which preventive censorship was
introduced43 . According to article 1 of the new law, the
Ministry of Press and Information had the right to forbid the
transmission of any texts with overall or partly political
content. Thus, all political programmes had to be submitted to
the Ministry of Press and Information; also, every news
programme crew had to include a journalist appointed especially
by the Minister of Press, apparently to act as the watchdog of
the government within the news department of EIR.
Apart from censorship and propaganda, the operation of Greek
broadcasting was affected by the ideological climate of the
civil war and the emergency legislation which was implemented
at that time. As a part of the wider public sector, EIR fell
within the stipulations of edict 8 of 28 August 1946 by which a
large number of civil servants and more generally public
workers were purged on the basis of their political beliefs.
According to available information more than 14,000 people
were purged by this edict up to 1949, of whom 4,000 were
employees of banks and public organizations of the same status
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as E1R44 . Unfortunately, although testimonies of the employees
of EIR suggest that purges did take place at the Institute, it
became impossible to obtain any figures as to how many people
were dismissed45 . However in our view, more important than the
number of the dismissed employees were the long-term effects
of the emergency legislation on the mentality and attitude of
employees within EIR as well as in the rest of the state
machine. Here we refer especially to Emergency Law 516/1948
which introduced the concept of "loyalty to the regime".
According to this law, which was a Greek version of Truman's
Loyalty Order 46 special Councils of Loyalty were established in
all parts of the administration and state-controlled
organizations, which scrutinized the political beliefs and
activities of all public workers. Additionally, these councils
could request the employees to sign a special declaration of
'repentance' or 'loyalty' to the regime; those of them who
refused to do so or were considered to be of 'anti-national'
ideas were dismissed from the service. In practice a 'Damocles'
sword' over the heads of all public employees, this legislation
which remained In force until after the downfall of the
dictatorship, constituted one of the most effective means for
the subjugation of employees to the dominant ideology and the
political power which represented it.
Beyond the general anti-communist legislation, special
emphasis was placed on the legislation regarding EIR, which
aimed at the complete manipulation of its personnel. Thus,
included among the breaches of discipline which could even lead
to the dismissal of an employee were: lack of "loyalty and
devotion to the country and the national ideals" as well as any
intention to overthrow the existing political and social
regime; the participation in any strike, or any activity which
could instigate a strike; the breach of confidentiality on
matters concerning EIR's policy; habitual gambling and
inappropriate conduct; and finally every activity of political
character which constituted public expression of political
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ideas or indoctrination47 . The following testimony of an EIR
employee of that time is typical of the climate that these
measures had created within Greece's broadcasting organization.
As a former announcer of EIR said, "there was a widespread
anxiety whether we managed to retain our jobs. For according to
the regulations the heads of the institute could find any
reason to fire us; under a legal cover, the management was
applying a high-handed practice towards the employees" 48 . Thus,
the above measures largely contributed to the development among
EIR's staff of a mentality of subordination and guaranteed the
reproduction of the dominant ideology through broadcasting.
Moreover, through a series of laws the first post-war
governments safeguarded the tight control of the state over the
broadcasting media.
In the 1952 Constitution, broadcasting was only briefly
mentioned. According to article 14, par. 8, radio and "similar"
audiovisual media were exempted from the provisions which
protected the press against preventive measures (censorship)49.
In this way, the Constitution authorized the imposition of any
restriction on the freedom of expression through broadcasting
and in practice enabled the establishment of an extensive
government control over the medium. Following the principles
which were introduced by the Constituent Act 54/1945,
successive governments of the Centre and Right established in
the early 1950s a legal framework for broadcasting which led to
the manipulation of radio by the successive governments.
Of all pieces of legislation which retained more or less the
same organizational structure for EIR we will examine in more
detail,here, the Law 2312 which was passed by the Greek Rally
government in 1953 and remained in force 	 with various
modifications until the advent of the dictatorship50.
According to this law the Institute, which as mentioned above
had the monopoly of broadcasting, was administered by two main
organs: the Board of Governors and the Director General. The
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Board consisted of 11 members seven of whom were top-rank
members of the judiciary and state officials, appointed either
ex-offlcio or by the Minister to the Prime Minister 51 . The
remaining four members were personalities of "distinguished
authority and education and with national activity" who were
selected personally by the Minister. Finally, the Director
General, who was classified as a revocable civil servant, was
appointed by the government following a proposal by the
Minister to the Prime Minister and could be dismissed in the
same way.
Hence, the majority of the members of the administration of
EIR were appointed directly by the government which had in this
way an absolute control over all aspects of the institute's
policy and particularly over programming. Most crucial In this
respect was the role of the Director General who was primarily
responsible for programming (the Board of Governors dealt In
practice mostly with economic matters and the appointment of
personnel). Being appointed primarily according to political
criteria, the Director General was completely dependent on the
favour and confidence of the government and especially the
Minister to the Prime Minister who was the overall supervisor
of the Institute's operation and was primarily responsible for
appointments. As characteristically stated in the report with
which the Bill (later Law 2312) was introduced by the
government to Parliament the Director General, who was
described as a "watchdog of the governing party", was seen as
being "directly responsible to the government for the general
policy which was applied at the institute".
As a result, whenever EIR's policy failed to please the
government the Director General was dismissed. It is not
accidental that in a period of 18 years (1945-1963) the
government changed seventeen Directors General. We should note
here that according to the previous legislation (Constituent
Act 54/1945 and Compulsory Law 1775/1951) the Director General
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of EIR was a permanent civil servant. The purpose of this
provision was to render the head of the institute independent
from the government and thus prevent any intervention In his
policies. In practice, however, the provision was
systematically Ignored by successive governments and as a
result, between 1945 and 1953, EIR had six different Directors.
By Law 2312, the Greek Rally government abolished the
permanency of the Director General removing In this way any
potential legal obstacle to government intervention with the
excuse that the provision had been In practice a dead letter52.
Following the same reasoning, the government omitted from
the new statute a stipulation of the previous legislation
according to which the structure and content of programmes
should not be determined by party political criteria and
preferences but should serve the "Nation" as a whole 53 . As it
was not accompanied by the necessary guarantees for its
Implementation, this stipulation had constituted rather a
declaration of good intentions than a deterrent against the
political intervention of the governing party. The abolition by
Law 2312 of the few restrictions to the control exercised by
the government on broadcasting was in essence the legalization
of an authoritarian practice which was as old as the
broadcasting institute itself.
Moreover, with a modification of the law in 1957, the powers
of the Minister to the Prime Minister who exercised in practice
government control over EIR were further extended 54 . Thus, all
decisions of the Institute's Board of Governors had to be
examined by the minister before they were ratified. In case of
a disagreement, the decisions were sent back to the Board of
Governors for reconsideration 55 . Furthermore, the minister was
empowered to request the submission by EIR's management of
all programme schedules and of the relevant texts of all radio
stations for approval before their transmission. In this way,
the government of ERE re-established unrestrained, preventive
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censorship on radio 56 . Although there has been no available
evidence suggesting that this stipulation was implemented in
practice 57 ,it is largely Indicative of the government's
attitude towards broadcasting.
Finally, by a decision of the Council of Ministers in 1959
an attempt was made for the further centralization and
systematization of government control over broadcasting 58 . The
decision established a Council for the Coordination and Control
of Radio Programmes attached to the Undersecretary of the
Ministry to the Prime Minister. The Council had a wide range
of competences which included: i. The coordination and control
of radio broadcasts; ii. the preparation and definition of the
content of programming; and iii. the supervision of the
production of all radio programmes of all stations, both of
those which belonged to EIR and of those under the command of
the General Staff. The Council consisted of three members who
were the Director General and the Director of Programming of
EIR and a representative of the General Staff, who was a higher
or top-rank officer appointed by the Minister of Defence. All
the actions and decisions of the Council should be submitted to
the Undersecretary for approval and modification if necessary.
In this way, radio programming became in essence a matter of
government policy. We should also emphasize here the
composition of the Council in which no representative of the
arts, science or literature was Included, although as it was
explained in the decision, the rationale behind the
establishment of the council was the "importance of radio for
the education, information and entertainment of the people" and
the need for the "best possible constitution of radio
programmes". In any case, as available evidence suggests, this
Council did not function in practice for reasons which are not
known59
Nevertheless, even without the enforcement of prior
censorship by the Minister to the Prime Minister and the
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operation of the Council for Programming, the post-war
broadcasting legislation laid the foundations of extensive
government intervention in the general operation of EIR and
particularly in its programming policy. Hence, in practice,
the complete dependence of top appointees and especially of
the Director General by the Minister led to the abolishment of
the Institute's autonomy which was established by Law
2312/1953 (article 1, par. 2).
The post-var legal framework of broadcasting reflected the
politicians' perception of the medium as a major legitimating
mechanism for the policies of the party in government. As the
representative of the Greek Rally government G. Lychnos stated
during the parliamentary debate on Law 2312:
"Radio (...) constitutes a power in the service of the
Nation and the People and should be in the service of the
Government which represents the Nation and the People (...)
Greece is a democratic country and Democracy is not anarchy.
And we must give the government the power to govern the
country, to influence public opinlon...But what is going to
happen if every party, every politician, every citizen could
attack through radio the government seeking to refute its views
and overthrow the policy that it implements? (...) The
opposition has all the means available to influence the people.
It has the Parliament, the press, the public assemblies. Why
should radio also be placed in the service of the oppositi9fl,
whether this opposition is loyal or disloyal to the regime?".
The significance of radio for the government as a means to
influence public opinion was further enhanced by the rapid
increase in radio set ownership after the war and consequently
by the increased importance of radio as a medium for public
information.	 In a period of seven years (1946-1953), the
number of subscribers of EIR had Increased from 35,000	 to
250,000; by 1962, the number of radio receivers had reached
740 , 000 61 and continued to increase at a quicker pace
throughout the 1960 g . This outcome was largely due to the
expansion of EIR's services, with the establishment of a second
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station in Athens and a number of regional stations in the rest
of the mainland and the islands62.
Of prime importance for the government were of course the
news bulletins and all other programmes of political content.
The rest of the daily programme, which was mostly light
entertainment, did not seem to be of particular political
concern. Apart from that, the appointment of a member or
affiliate of the governing party as Director General and the
mechanisms of ideological control of employees were enough to
guarantee that the non-political content of the programming was
harmless and reproducing the dominant ideology. The political
content of radio was not very significant. In 1950 the total
time allocated to news and current affairs was between 65 and
75 minutes daily. By the mld-1960s the length of news
programmes was still only around two hours. Only the National
Programme of Athens broadcast news pertaining to politics,
which was then carried by regional stations. The reason for
this must have been the eagerness of the central government to
maintain overall control over the content of news broadcasts63.
According to one writer on broadcasting, the news bulletins of
EIR were being prepared by the Department of Press of the
Ministry to the Prime Minister64.
Even if this is an exaggeration, the fact remains that the
news programmes were dominated by national news and dealt
exclusively with the daily activities of the government. Radio
was totally inaccessible to the political parties and leaders
of the opposition. Consequently, party political broadcasts,
radio discussions among representatives of different political
parties or interviews with party leaders and cadres were
completely unknown to the Greek audience. It is characteristic,
that while the broadcasting statute (article 15, par. 1 of law
2312/1953) established an obligation for EIR to transmit all
announcements of the government, no such provision was made for
the announcements or replies of the opposition. In cases where
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a leader of the Liberal camp (from the evidence that we have,
EDA did not have this option) wished to address the people, he
had to request special permission from the government, and
particularly the Ministry to the Prime Minister; and even then
the permission was not always granted 65 . It was only during
electoral campaigns that the leaders of the opposition - though
not of EDA - were allowed to use radio. The usual practice was
the relay of the leaders' speeches at mass rallies in Athens
and Thessaloniki. Only in the elections of February 1964 did
the caretaker government of I. Paraskevopoulos allocate an
equal amount of airtime to the three major contestants: ERE,
the Centre Union (EK) and EDA66.
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the governments of the
Right and especially of ERE which remained in power for seven
years sought to promote their policies through radio to an
extent that the news programmes often acquired the character of
propaganda by the governing party. The handling of political
information by EIR was best described by two of its ex-
directors: "It would constitute contempt for the truth to say
that EIR does perform its duty in reference to the Information
of the public (...) Radio has been a harassed Institution ever
since its inception. In Greece radio has always been 'his
master's voice'" 67 . A more detailed description of the style
and content of news broadcasts was given by D. Svolopoulos,
Director General of EIR between February 1947 and March 1950:
"Neither the newscasts nor the comments of the Athens Radio
Station inform, because their content is limited to the
Information that best serves the government (...) Their bias
and partisanship Is obvious. The pompous style of news-reading
is totally unsuitable for radio and emphaslses the biased
content of EIR's news bulletins (...) The censorship Imposed on
broadcast Information Is noticeable by the audience. For many
events which the people experIence or read in the newspapers
are omitted from newscasts""0.
Apart from the continuous promotion of the government's
accomplishments,very often newscasts and commentaries contained
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direct or indirect attacks against the parties of the
opposition, to which the latter did not have any opportunity to
reply69.
In all, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the general
performance of EIR and particularly the content of its
political programmes reflected the authoritarianism of right-
wing governments and their continuous effort to maintain power.
To this end, the Greek Rally and especially ERE, sought to use
in full the right-wing dominated state apparatus. We do not
refer here only to the repressive mechanisms applied against
political opponents, particularly of the Left; we mean the
systematic use of the state administration by the governing
party in order to maintain popular support and reproduce its
power. According to Meynaud, many of the tasks of the General
Secretariat of ERE, which	 was	 responsible for the
organization, propaganda and electoral campaigning of the
party, had been undertaken by the political bureaux of the
ministries. These tasks included the allocation of favours
to the party clientele and the staging of a propaganda campaign
in favour of ERE70 . In this latter task, the Ministry to the
Prime Minister played a central role. Beyond the tight control
of EIR, the promotion of the governing party's policies was
conducted through various publications issued and distributed
by the Ministry to the Prime Minister. As an example we will
mention here the "Information Bulletin", a luxurious
publication of 60 pages which apart from praising the
accomplishments of the government, contained attacks against
the leaders of the opposition. Characteristically, one of its
issues included an article titled 'The Political Gimmick of Mr
Papandreou' 71•
One of the most Important components of ERE's strategy
throughout the period we are examining was the reproduction of
the Right-Left polarity and consequently the climate of
communist fear which were largely the basis of ERE's power.
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Based on the legal fiction of the "continuous communist
rebellion", the Right preserved and implemented extensively the
emergency legislation of the civil war many years after the
defeat of the Communists. As Prime Minister K. Karamanlis told
Parliament in 1960:
"The extreme Left (obviously meaning EDA) taking advantage
of the freedom which has been given to it by the democratic
regime, has started a resolute effort to erode the Nation. It
uses all means available to disarm materially as well as
psychologically the Greek People In order to make it a prey for
itself and its mandators (...) It encourages (...) every demand
and promises to solve any problem trying In this way to create
a revolutiona psychology to the citizen and make him an enemy
of the state'"'.
Therefore, repression and propaganda were justified as the
necessary weapons for the defence of the state against the
communist menace. It Is characteristic of this strategy that
in March 1957 there were still 3,209 people imprisoned since
the civil war 73 . In the same year the government forfeited the
citizenship of 5,521 Greek political refugees in the East
European countries, a record number since 1948 when the
measure was first introduced; for Instance, in 1950, only a
year after the end of the civil war, there were 93 cases of
citizenship forfeiture and in 1951 only
The ideological polarization was reflected also in the
cultural life of the country. Suspicious books and theatre
plays were banned and publishers persecuted. In 1957 the
government stopped all cultural exchanges with the socialist
countries and a little later refused permission to the Bolshoi
Ballet to visit Greece, for, as the deputy Prime Minister
explained in Parliament, the group with Its artistic
achievement could influence the people In favour of the Left.
In February 1960, the police interrogated an eighty-year old
writer, because he had visited the Soviet Union three years
earlier 75 . These few examples are indicative of the effort
that the ERE government was making In order to preserve the
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cold war climate in Greece at a time when the first signs of
detente were visible worldwide.
The same line against communism was also applied in radio.
According to the internal regulations, EIR's Directorate of
Programming should, among other things, listen to the
broadcasts of foreign radio stations, especially those which
conducted propaganda in support of or against Greece, submit to
the government daily reports on the received programmes and
transmit counter-propagandistic broadcasts in foreign
languages 76 . Moreover, EIR transmitted twice daily programmes
of the 'Voice of America' In Greek (30 minutes In all) as
well as broadcasts In Greek from the BBC and the Paris radio
station. We should see these broadcasts coming from three NATO
members within the context of the cold war and the need to
counter-weight communist propaganda beamed into Greece from
neighbouring socialist countries. The radio of EIR frequently
broadcast attacks against the socialist countries as well as
EDA which in the general elections of 1958 gained 24.43 per
cent of the vote and 79 seats In Parliament, becoming thus the
official opposition 77 . The following quotations of EDA
representatives from their speeches In Parliament in April
1960, give a clear picture of the anti-communist performance of
radio at that time:
"Greece broadcasts through state radio a rabid propaganda
from morning till night. We transmit the most anti-Soviet
speeches, speeches of hatred against other nations, belligerent
speeches which tend to make suspicious even the word 'peace'".
"It is beyond imagination the campaign of the government
against these (the communist) countries. One hears the Greek
Radio saying to the people 'do not believe those who talk to
you about detente'".
"Greek Radio turns continuously against EDA, the biggest
party of t,ç, opposition, calling us 'these traitors' and
defaming us" 0,,
Nevertheless, despite the stifling control of EIR by the
right-wing governments throughout this period, broadcasting did
not become a matter of particular consideration by the
-hO-
political parties of the opposition. Criticism regarding the
treatment of political opponents through radio was expressed
occasionally and sometimes could be rather fierce, as in the
case of a liberal deputy who called Greek radio a "stupefying
medium" 79 . Even then, however, the debate on broadcasting was
always part of a general attack against the government's
authoritarian policies. As available evidence suggests, all the
political parties of that time and of the entire ideological
spectrum, shared the same short-sighted view of broadcasting,
which concerned them only for its political content. The
following comments of a writer on Greek broadcasting8°
summarize the politicians attitude towards the medium:
"Broadcasting has been always by-passed in the
parliamentary debates with such a unanimity which shows either
an ignorance of the fundamental importance of the medium, or,
more probably, a tendency to maintain the status quo that
always was the political subordination of broadcasting by the
government".
3.4 The Radio Stations of the Armed Forces.
EIR was not the only source of broadcast information in post
war Greece. Alongside it operated the nationwide network of the
Armed Forces. In March 1948, during the most crucial phase of
the civil war soldiers of the 781 Communications Company used
military channels to broadcast popular music to their
colleagues in the battlefield 81 . Soon, however, the political
potential of radio was recognized by the General Staff and In
December of the same year the Radio Station of the Armed Forces
was organized in Athens. By 1950 a number of military radio
stations had been set up all over Greece, operating as a rival
network to EIR, with a programme which was addressed to the
general public and not only to the personnel of military units.
To understand the major political significance of these radio
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stations, the operation of which breached the legally
established broadcasting monopoly of EIR, it is necessary to
examine the role of the military In the post-war Greek society.
With their victory over the communists in the civil war, the
armed forces became the main mechanism for the preservation and
reproduction of the established social and political status
quo. Financed and trained by the Americans 82 , the military
undertook the role of the watchdog of the bourgeois regime
against the communist menace. The army constituted the main
repressive apparatus which, together with the police, the
gendarmerie and various para-state organizations were the
deterrent forces against social mobilization, while in many
cases they intervened in order to determine the result of
general elections. Thus, TEA (Battalions of National
Security), the military reserve units of the countryside, were
used to terrorise the supporters of the opposition, while,
through the transference of entire regiments to areas where the
support of the constituencies for the Right was marginal, the
vote of military personnel could secure the victory of the
Right-wing candidates 83 . This does not mean, however, that the
military was simply an instrument in the service of the right-
wing governments which were the political expression of the
post-war status quo.
Being in essence the main pillar of the bourgeois domination
in post-war Greece, the military emerged as an autonomous and
dominant centre of political power with an Integrated
ideological basis, the main component of which was anti-
communism. The armed forces no longer reflected the political
divisions (Venizelists-Royalists) of the inter-war era. After
the abortive Venizelist coup of 1935 the purge of most liberal
officers started a process which led to the autonomy of the
military from any form of political control. This process was
continued and completed during the Metaxist dictatorship, the
years of German occupation and the civil war, with further
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purges of democratic officers, the recruitment of ex-members
of the pro-Nazi Security Battalions and the appointment to all
key posts of officers loyal to the King 84 . Hence, in the post-
war period a new military emerged which was a politically and
Ideologically solid force, the cohesive elements of which were
anti-communism and a profound distrust for parliamentary
Institutions and politicians.
The political autonomy of the military was Institutionalized
in 1949 when the Sophoulis government In a final effort to
defeat the communists transferred to Alexandros Papagos,
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, all powers regarding
their organization and structure as well as the planning of
military operations. His decisions were to be compulsory for
the government. Moreover, Papagos was empowered to declare
martial law wherever he considered that as necessary85 . This
new legal framework which vested Papagos with almost
dictatorial powers was the actual recognition by politicians
of the military as an independent political force, the only one
which could wage successfully the anti-communist struggle and
guarantee the established order. The situation remained the
same even after Papagos' resignation as commander-in-chief in
1951. His powers were taken up by different military
authorities and especially by the General Staff and the staffs
of the three services. The Minister of Defence and more
generally the elected government had very little control over
major military matters pertaining to finances, the structure of
the armed forces and the organization of defence86.
The main expression of the political autonomy and the
dominant role of the armed forces in the post-war power
structure was IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers), a
paramilitary organization established In Athens In October 1944
by officers, members of wartime paramilitary organizations.
Fiercely anti-communist and profoundly "nationally minded",
IDEA aimed at the "punishment of communists and their fellow
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travellers". The main component of the organization's ideology
was the identification of the military with the 'Nation'. The
military and IDEA in particular were seen as the "embodiment"
and the only guarantors of the national interest. The ultimate
purpose of IDEA was the disciplined organization of society
with the military as the dominant centre of political power.
According to the organization's manifesto, the only means of
achieving this was the "dictatorship of IDEA" which was to be
established "whenever the circumstances allow it, for the
benefit of the motherland" 87 . Throughout the civil war the
influence of IDEA within the army was significant and by 1950,
2,500 officers were members of the organization. When Papagos
became Prime Minister, IDEA officers were appointed as
commanders of the military staffs. From then on, IDEA was to
occupy and control most major posts in the administration of
the armed forces 88 . With the rise of Papagos to the premiership
in 1952, the military and IDEA In particular acquired direct
control of the elected government. Under the repressive
parliamentary regime which was established after the war most
of the aims of IDEA were fulfilled. The military was beyond any
political control, the anti-communist legislation of the civil
war remained In force and the masses were "disciplined". The
political situation remained the same after the death of
Papagos and the rise to the premiership of C. Karamanlis; thus,
there was no need for a dictatorship at that time. The 1950s
was a period of Inertia for IDEA, which was reactivated only
after the elections of 1958, alarmed by the overwhelming
Increase of popular support for EDA89.
In the early 1960s, in view of the increasing social
mobilization and the Impact of the new Centre Union party on
the masses, the military and its para-military organizations
were engaged in a number of activities which - directly or
Indirectly - led to the destabilization of parliamentary
institutions. The unprecedented Intervention of the military In
the general elections of 1961 and the excessive use of violence
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and fraud secured another victory for ERE, but also aggravated
the climate of popular discontent against the government.
Moreover, the implication of top-rank officers of the military
and the security forces in the assassination of the EDA MP G.
Lambrakis in Thessaloniki in May 1963 damaged decisively
Karamanlis' authority and contributed to his downfall later
that year. Similarly, the bombing attack in Gorgopotamos in
November 1964 and the so called "sabotage of Evros" which was
masterminded by the future dictator G. Papadopoulos were clear
attempts to discredit the Centre Union government by creating,
especially in the latter case, a climate of anti-communist
hysteria90.
To summarize, in the post-war period, the military emerged
as a separate centre of political power, with an autonomous
political and ideological role to perform. Part of this
ideological role was the Indoctrination of conscripts Into the
"national", Greek Orthodox ideals. It is characteristic that
the General Staff through a confidential circular had imposed
strict censorship on all publications read by conscripts, a ban
which was extensive enough to Include works of the classics
such as Renan and Hugo91 . The dominant role of the military was
reflected also in the legal framework of EIR. From 1945
onwards, the armed forces were continuously represented in the
Administrative and Advisory Councils and the Programming
Committees of the Institute. Military officers were also
appointed to the post of the Director General of EIR. We should
note here, that according to the 1951 statute, the Director
General of EIR could be either top-rank state official or a
top-rank military officer92.
However,it was through the operation of its own radio
stations in the late 1940s that the military undertook a major
ideological-indoctrinating role, especially because In this way
It could reach directly a very wide audience. At a time when
the civil war had entered its most dramatic phase the military
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broadcasts must have been seen as a precious weapon of anti-
communist warfare. It was not probably a coincidence that out
of the nine radio stations which had been set up by the
beginning of the 1950s, five were installed in North and North-
West Greece, in areas close to Greece's borders with the
communist countries. A sixth station was set up in Macronissos,
the notorious prison camp, used for the rehabilitation of
political prisoners and later of conscripts with left-wing
affiliations93.
During the cold war these stations' programmes were seen as
a counter-weight to the communist propaganda broadcast in
Greece through the Grecophone programmes of eight East European
stations. Apart from entertainment for troops, the radio
programme provided by the Central station in Athens, included
nationalistic programmes such as royal and ministerial
addresses, religious services and cultural broadcasts with
"liberal doses of patriotism" 94 . The importance of military
radio as a propaganda weapon must have been a major reason for
the lack of any government reaction against the de facto
operation of the military stations. However, the most important
reason was the political and institutional autonomy that the
military had acquired. It is in this light that decision of the
liberal government of Venizelos-Papandreou to authorize the
network's continued existence in 1951 must be seen. According
to the provided legal framework 95 the General Staff was
empowered to Install and operate radio or television stations
the purpose of which would be the "enlightenment, entertainment
and education of the armed forces" and also, at times of war
the "boosting of the morale of the fighting Nation". By that
time, however, the military broadcasting network was already
performing a much more significant political role, which
exceeded by far the purposes defined by legislation. In 1950,
the Athens radio station (later It was named Central Radio
Station of the Armed Forces) was broadcasting 11 hours daily, a
service only 2.5 hours shorter than that of EIR. The variety of
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programming and the amount of advertising - 30 minutes daily,
as much as the amount of advertising of EIR - as well as the
broadcasting of news bulletins and programmes of political
content indicate that the broadcasting service of the military
was addressed to an audience much wider than the personnel of
military barracks. Therefore the broadcasting service of the
armed forces had become by the early 1950s as important as that
of EIR in terms of volume and content of programming and had
entered into competition with the official broadcasting
organization for audiences and advertising. We should note
here, that even after the provision of a legal framework the
operation of the military network continued to be illegal, for
It breached the broadcasting monopoly of EIR which was never
legally abolished. On the contrary, the provision securing
EIR's monopoly was repeated in the 1953 statute which was
passed by the Papagos government.
This was not the only inconsistency regarding the operation
of the military broadcasting service. Being under the command
of the General Staff (it operated as part of the military
administration and a large part of Its personnel were
conscripts and reserve officers) the network was practically,
like every other aspect of the military's activities, beyond
the control of the elected government and the Parliament; a
practice, which as It has been rightly suggested abolished In
essence the basic principles of parllamentarlsm96.
All in all, we could say that the structure of post-war
broadcasting was an accurate reflection of the organization of
political power around two dominant and largely antagonistic
poles: the government and the military, each one of which
controlled a nationwide radio network97 . The political
significance of the military radio service did not lie only
with the newscasts and programmes of political propaganda. The
supply of a wide variety of free entertainment (there was no
subscription fee for the military radio service) through a
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medium which was still a novelty for the majority of the
population contributed, In our view, to the legitimation of the
dominant role of the armed forces in public life.
Although throughout the 1950s the political interests of the
government coincided with those of the military, the latent
antagonism between these two centres of political power was
expressed through the attempt of the government to obtain
control over the military radio network. A first major attempt
was the establishment of the Council for the Coordination and
Control of Radio Programmes by which the programming policy of
the military network was placed under the control of the
Undersecretary of the Ministry to the Prime Minister 98 . For
unknown reasons this measure was never implemented. In the
early 1960s the Karamanlis's government came under pressure
from the opposition and the management of EIR Itself to abolish
the network or to allow Its merger with the Institute. For some
time it appeared that the government was about to give in to
the pressure (at that time ERE and KaramanlIs especially had
been under constant attack from the Centre and EDA for their
authoritarian policies, especially after the fraudulous 1961
elections). With the resignation of Karamanlis in 1963,
however, the merger was abandoned99.
The operation of the military network was not questioned by
the Centre Union government (1963-1965) which was apparently
keen to secure the support of the military (for the same reason
Prime Minister G.Papandreou appointed as Minister of Defence P.
Garoufalias, an extremely conservative politician with close
ties with the palace and the military) 100 . After EDA criticized
the Minister of Defence for the political content of the
military newscasts, the Central Radio Station was ordered to
follow the same political line as that of E1R 101 . In 1964, the
Armed Forces Broadcasting Service asked Papandreou s permission
to expand into television. According to one theory, this was
the personal wish of King Constantine who wanted the
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establishment of a television network of the military in order
to counter-weight the liberal-controlled E1R 102 . The Prime
Minister, however, refused permission. Under the palace-backed
governments which succeeded Papandreou, the armed forces
finally managed to install television transmission equipment.
In April 1966 the military started its experimental television
transmissions. The regular nationwide television service of the
military would be established later by the dictatorial
government.
3.5 Liberalization: The rise of the Centre Union.
The result of the general elections of 1958 was a first
major sign that the Right was losing its hold both in the rural
and urban areas and that the influence of the Left on the
masses was far from being eliminated. Thus, whereas ERE's share
of the vote dropped from 47.38 per cent in 1956 to 41.17 per
cent, EDA made spectacular gains (24.43 per cent of the vote)
and became the main opposition in Parliament (with 79 out of
300 seats) 102 . This development was the expression of
widespread popular discontent due to repression and the growing
economic inequalities. The major social problem of 1950s
appeared to be the high rate of unemployment which was a result
of the absence of any large-scale productive investment. It is
characteristic that employment in industry rose within a decade
only by a marginal 1 per cent (from 21.1 per cent in 1952, to
22.1 per cent in 1962); in manufacture things were even worse
as within the same period employment remained at the same
levels (13.3 per cent to 13.4 per cent) 103 . By the end of the
1950s, the unemployed accounted for 20-24 per cent of the
workforce104 . The result was massive emigration which in 1958
amounted to 24,251 and in 1960 to 47,768 people. Other main
reason for the emigration were the extremely low wages and the
meagre income from agriculture; according to statistics of the
Foundation of National Insurance (IKA), the average daily wage
in 1960 was around 39 drachmas. Equally gloomy, if not worse,
was the situation of those engaged in agriculture, as more than
three quarters of the peasant families (866,000 out of 1.026
million) received a monthly income between 316 and 650
drachmas105.
Moreover, lower income groups were hit hard by indirect
taxation which provided more than half of the state's revenues.
In 1958 alone, indirect taxes absorbed 12.7 per cent of the GNP
while only 4.2 per cent was absorbed by direct taxation 106 . At
the same time, the government eager to attract foreign
investors, accorded enormous privileges to big capital,
especially foreign and mixed, in terms of taxation, credit
facilities, cheap energy etc, so that "it would not be an
exaggeration to say that in many cases industrial expenses and
risks are socialized whereas the fruits of any industrial
success go solely to private capital" 107 . In this way, the
burden of Greece's industrial development fell largely on lower
income groups.
By the end of the 1950s, growing inequalities and repression
had created a climate of social discontent the first
significant indication of which was the result of the 1958
elections. The major shift of the electorate towards EDA and
the mounting social unrest (frequent strikes and
demonstrations) 108 put on the alert the forces of the para-
state and especially IDEA. Many anti-communist organizations
were established or reactivated, in many cases with government
support, with the aim of intimidating supporters of the Left
and the Centre 109 . This practice reached its climax in the
general elections of 1961, when IDEA used the 'Pericles'
contingency plan, initially devised for the neutralization of
the communists in case of war, in order to secure the victory
of ERE. As a result, ERE gained 50.81 per cent of the vote,
while the Pandemocratic Peasants Front in which EDA was the
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main participant received 14.63 per cent of the vote and gained
24 seats in Parliament110.
This overt intervention of the military and para-state
organizations in the elections became the starting point for
'Anendotos' (Unyielding struggle), an all-front campaign staged
by G. Papandreou, the leader of the newly established Centre
Union party against ERE's repressive policies. The formation of
the Centre Union, EK, in September 1961, was to a large extent
the outcome of the defeat of the liberal forces in the
elections of 1958. The continuing fragmentation of the centre
parties had contributed to the impressive electoral gains of
EDA and had proven that only a unified Centre could challenge
effectively the Right's monopoly of power. As available
evidence suggests, the formation of EK was favoured also by the
American administration which, alarmed by EDA's appeal to the
electorate, saw the establishment of a second major bourgeois
party as the necessary alternative to ERE and thus as a safety
valve of the bourgeois regime111.
The objective of EK's political programme was not a change
of the social and economic system. The party's policy was to
boost capital investment and lead the country to industrial
development through a different strategy than that followed by
ERE, however. EK's purpose was to achieve a broad social
consensus which was not to be based on the fear of communism
and repression, but on the - relatively - free function of
parliamentary institutions, and a fairer redistribution of
wealth112 . The programme of the party , together with
"Anendotos" appealed to the people; thus in 1961, despite
violence and fraud, EK received 33.66 per cent of the votes.
In a climate of growing discontent and political
mobilization, the campaign of EK became the main expression of
the masses' opposition to the government's authoritarian
policies. Papandreou disputed the result of the elections and
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targeted his attacks against ERE's corruption, scandals and
repression. The appeal of "Anendotos" to the people became
clear in the elections of November 1963 in which EK gained a
majority of the vote (42 per cent) and ERE came second with
39.37 per cent. New elections held in February 1964, gave
Papandreou a landslide victory with 52.72 per cent of the vote;
the share of ERE decreased further (35.26 per cent), while EDA
received 11.8 per cent1-1-3.
The main component of EK's strategy was the increase of
incomes and the consequent boosting of consumption, which was
expected to give momentum to industrial investment.Thus, wages
and salaries of all levels were increased and agricultural
products were subsidized. Soon the expansion of demand proved
to be effective; in 1964 the GNP increased by 8.5 per cent and
in 1965, the value of industrial production exceeded for the
first time that of agricultural production114 . The government
also increased state expenditure in welfare and education. For
the latter in particular, the government increased expenditure
by 36 per cent in 1964, abolished fees for university education
and increased the years of compulsory education from six to
nine.
EK's reforms included also the democratization of the trade
union system, the release of all political prisoners (with the
exception of 125 people convicted for breach of Law 375 on
espionage). Nevertheless, In the 21 months that the Centre
remained in power, it did not attempt to make any institutional
reforms which could change the post-war power structure. Thus,
although the emergency measures of the civil war were now
scarcely implemented, they remained in force. The legalization
of KKE remained out of the question and the political refugees
to the Eastern bloc were not allowed to return en masse;
instead, the government agreed to examine certain cases and
grant Individual permits of return. Moreover, no attempt was
made to purge IDEA, although the government dissolved eleven
-122-
para-state organizations 11- 5 . A number of IDEA officers were
removed from their key positions and sent to frontier posts,
but the power of the army was never challenged. Any attempt to
change radically the power structure would lead to the fierce
reaction of the repressive apparatus and the consequent
dismantling of parliamentary institutions. To achieve even the
moderate liberalization of the regime, Papandreou needed the
support of the King who appeared to control the military after
the death of Papagos 11- 6 . For this reason, Papandreou appointed
to the post of the Minister of Defence P.Garoufalias, an ultra-
conservative member of ER and a personal friend of King
Constantine, who enjoyed the confidence of the military.
Papandreou's half-hearted attempt to liberalize the political
system can be also explained by the propaganda of the Right
(ERE, as well as the state apparatuses) which presented the
Premier as paving the way for communism 117 . Apart from the
above reasons, we should not disregard the conservative and
anti-communist position of Papandreou, who twenty years before
had played a leading part in the smashing of the left-wing
movement.
In any case, it is a fact that after ER's electoral victory,
Greece experienced a spectacular change of the ideological
climate. Anti-communism ceased to be the main component of the
official ideology and practice. Repressive measures were
slackened, the open political intimidation In the countryside
was ended and the use of the certificates of social beliefs was
limited. There was also a timid change of the state's attitude
towards the resistance against fascism, which until then was
associated with communism In Greece. Thus, although the
resistance was not officially recognized as a national
liberating movement, many celebrations were organized to honour
the entire resistance movement'1-8. This moderate
democratization had an enormous impact on the people. It
provided the grounds for the development of an unprecedented
political and social movement. Massive marches, demonstrations
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and cultural events were organized, which gave the opportunity
for the expression and exchange of ideas to an extent that had
never existed in the past.
The political liberalization was also reflected in the radio
broadcasts, particularly that of EIR 19 . It is indicative of
the changed political climate that the Institute started a
series of broadcasts to celebrate the anti-fascist resistance
movement 120 . Anti-communist propaganda disappeared from EIR's
programmes. Moreover, in May 1964 by a decision of the Prime
Minister's son Andreas, who had been appointed as Minister to
the Prime Minister, the Institute ceased the transmission of
the Grecophone newscasts of the British, French and American
radio. The reason behind this decision, which reflected the
government's determination to adopt a more independent foreign
policy vis-a'-vis NATO, thus provoking the hostility of the
Americans, was the transmission of controversial broadcasts
about the Cyprus issue by the "Voice of America" 121-. Also, ER
established spoken Greek (demotic) as the official language of
the radio programmes instead of 'purist' Greek (katharevousa)
which was associated with the nationalistic, anti-communist
ideology.
There was finally a marked change of attitude towards the
opposition in the political broadcasts; the activities of the
parties of the opposition were often covered and the statements
of their representatives transmitted. To the post of the
Director General, Papandreou appointed lawyer Anastassios
Peponis, an ex-manager and producer of radio programmes who
during the German occupation had been involved in the
resistance press 122 . According to Peponis' own account of his
policy at the Institute, "a significant change was made in the
mentality of news and current affairs programmes. Radio was
never used as a means of defamation against political
opponents...and we never intended to turn it into an instrument
of attack against political forces or against foreign
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countries" 123 . This did not mean, however, that the traditional
government grasp on EIR was released. The legal framework of
broadcasting which enabled the complete manipulation of radio
by the government remained in force. A few modifications
regarding the composition of the administrative bodies did not
constitute any essential change, as the management of EIR
continued to be appointed by the government' 24 . EK's attitude
towards broadcasting, an attitude not very different to that of
ERE, was best summarized by Peponis himself:
"When a political party becomes the government under
democratic procedures It has every right to promote government
activities. In that case an 'equal' treatment of the
democratically elected gpvernment and the other political
parties would be unfaIr"'.
Although this mentality was largely due to the long
political tradition of manipulation of all state mechanisms by
the government, it can also be explained by the general
political situation of the time. EK was facing fierce
opposition particularly from ERE which in many cases tried to
discredit the government's policies. As an example, we will
refer to the campaign against the policy of income increases;
ERE accused Papandreon of undermining monetary stability and
for some time It created a panic among depositors, with serious
effects for the economy. At the same time, through a surge of
strikes and demonstrations organized by the Left, EK was
pressured to Introduce more radical changes 126 . Under these
circumstances and with a state apparatus dominated by the
Right, government-controlled radio must have been seen as a
major means for EK to counter-weight opposition and increase
its Influence on the masses.
In any case, the moderate liberalization of the post-war
regime released new dynamic social forces which had been
suppressed for almost twenty years. This unprecedented
political mobilization and pressure of the masses could lead to
a radical reform of the political system. Within the EK a
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strong left wing emerged led by Andreas Papandreou. The anti-
NATO positions of this wing and its social-democratic programme
(Meynaud paralleled it with that of Harold Wilson and Willy
Brandt) 127 had an enormous appeal to the population. Andreas
Papandreou himself was seen by many as the natural leader of a
renovated Centre whose strategy was to be based more on
political issues and less on clientelism128.
The prospect of any radical change in the existing status
quo alarmed the military and particularly IDEA which saw in the
strengthening popular movement a threat to its own domination.
Hence, by a series of provocative activities the para-military
networks attempted to discredit the government by creating a
climate of anti-communist hysteria. Among other things,
A.Papandreou was accused of being involved in a subversive
group within the army called ASPIDAl29 . It was then that G.
Papandreou realized that it was necessary to achieve government
control over the military, as the latter's activities
undermined the government and together with it the whole
strategy of social consensus. Thus, Papandreou sought to change
the Chief of the General Staff. When Garoufalias refused to
conform with the Premier's decision, Papandreou decided to
dismiss the minister and take up himself the Ministry of
Defence. It was now the King's turn to react to Papandreou's
decision; with the Prime Minister being also the Minister of
Defence, the King's control over the military would be
diminished and the post-war balance of forces disturbed. Thus,
Constantine refused Papandreou his constitutionally established
right as Prime Minister to appoint the ministers of his
government. Amid the stalemate which followed this disagreement
Papandreou threatened to resign. The King hastily accepted the
informal resignation, as he had already the solution at hand.
After a few unsuccessful attempts a government was finally
formed with the support of ERE and a number of defectors from
the EK. The two-year period which followed the downfall of the
Centre Union was marked by governmental instability and social
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upheaval, caused by a profound crisis of representation.
Through demonstrations and strikes the masses challenged the
new governments' power and demanded new elections.
The so-called governments of "defectors" were a last attempt
for the preservation of the post-war power structure. The
political climate changed again. The IDEA officers were
returned to their key posts; the control of radio became again
suffocating and anti-communism returned to the programmes. As
an example we mention the banning of the music of composer
Mikis Theodorakis because he was an MP for EDA and his music
was deemed political propaganda130 . Finally, at the armed
forces network the military resumed full control over
programming; in the Central Radio Station were appointed among
others, two specialists on anti-communist propaganda, V.
Stamatopoulos and G. Georgalas who were to become the leading
propagandists of the 1967 dictatorship131.
3.6 Conclusion
The state monopoly for broadcasting was established
officially for the first time after the liberation of the
country and came as a direct consequence of the reinforced role
of the state in post war Greece. It was the state which
undertook the reconstruction of the country's shattered economy
and which secured the vital interests of a large part of the
population by offering employment and allocating resources. The
public broadcasting monopoly was accepted by all political
forces at that time, since the state was obviously regarded as
the guardian of the public interest, although this concept was
never defined by politicians.
The civil war and eventually the communist defeat led to the
establishment of a largely defensive state, within which the
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Right presented itself as the only safeguard against the ruin
of the country by communism. As the only representatives of the
national interests, the right-wing governments which ruled the
country until the early 1960s, resorted to an unprecedented
manipulation of the state machine In order to preserve their
power and defend the regime from Its enemies. Together with
repression and patronage, propaganda played a decisive role In
the reproduction of the power of the Right. In a society which
was torn apart by the Right-Left cleavage, broadcasting was
seen as a legitimating mechanism for the established status
quo.
Under these circumstances, the concept of objectivity lost
every meaning and even came to constitute a threat to the
national Interest especially as part of the opposition was the
left-wing EDA. The latter was continuously denied access to
radio and the same applied with a few rare exceptions to the
liberal opposition. In the anti-communist defensive state of
the post war period there was no place for compromise and this
was reflected in the operation of radio. In any case,
broadcasting was not turned Into a central political Issue by
any of the parties in opposition, for although they criticised
the government for Its methods, they never proposed an
alternative solution. A truly pluralist system on radio was
never on the agenda of either the Centre or the Left. It seems
that there was a unanimous acceptance by all political forces
that broadcasting was an instrument of Influencing public
opinion and also, or rather for this reason, that the
government had a right to employ it for Its own ends.
This practice was continued by the Centre Union after its
rise to power in 1963. Indeed, although anti-communism and the
defamation of political opponents disappeared from broadcasts,
the liberal government did not lose Its grip on radio. In any
case, even if during the 21 months of E.K.'s government the
first signs of a new political consensus had appeared, the
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crisis which followed Papandreou's downfall and the subsequent
military dictatorship did not allow the development of radio to
anything more than an Instrument of political persuasion.
Political attitudes towards broadcasting revealed in
practice an amazing Indifference and/or ignorance of the role
that broadcasting could perform as a cultural and educational
medium. This was one of the main reasons that until the early
1970's even technically the broadcasting networks remained
completely underdeveloped. In view of what we have already
said, if the mission of public service broadcasting is to
"cater for all sections of the community, reaching all parts
regardless of cost, seeking to educate, inform and improve"132,
then certainly Greek broadcasting of the period under analysis
did not fulfil this mission.
-129-
NOTES
1. K.TSOTJKALAS: State, Society, Labour (in Greek), Themello,
Athens 1986, p. 30.
2. In the 1950 elections all Liberal forces together gained 57
per cent of the vote. In 1951, with the added votes of EDA the
Centre-Left gained 54.3 per cent; J. MEYNAUD: Political Forces
in Greece (in Greek), Byron, Athens (exact date missing), p.
85-91.
3. Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 94
4. Ibid, p. 22
5. N. ALIVIZATOS: "State of Emergency and Political Freedom,
1946-1949", in, Greece in the 1940s and 1950s, a Nation In
Crisis, Themello, Athens 1984, p. 383.
6. For more about the relation of the Greek bourgeoisie with
the state see K. VERGOPOULOS: "The Establishment of a New
Bourgeoisie". In Greece In the 1940s...ibid; N. MOUZELIS:
"Capitalism and the development of the Greek state". In, R.
SCASE(ed) The State in Western Europe, London 1980
7. The real wages in 1950 corresponded only to the 58 per cent
of the wages in 1938. At the same time 1/3 of the population
were unemployed. Vergopoulos, Ibid, p. 546.
8. Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 39-50; also, K. TSOUKALAS: The Greek
Tragedy (in Greek), Nea Synora, Athens 1981 p. 102.
9. S. LINARDATOS: From the Civil War to the Junta, Vol 2,
Papazisis, Athens 1978, p. 30-31. Among the deported were
writers Th. Kornaros and N. Loundemis.
10. Most writers turned to historical, philosophical and
autobiographical subjects. For a concise reference to the
Intellectual production of the 1950s and 1960s, see K. DIMARAS:
The Reform That Was Not Made, Nea EllIniki Vlvliothlki, Athens
1988, and Tsoukalas' above two mentioned works.
11. As Tsoukalas noted in 1969, "Marx Is excommunicated and
sociology is an unknown science.the history of philosophy ends
with Kant. Even recently an Athenian daily accused Darwin of
-130-
subversive ideas". Greek Tragedy, op.cit., p. 105.
12. N. ALIVIZATOS: The Political Institutions in crisis, 1922-
1974, Themello, Athens 1986, p. 511-23.
13. The information which was based on official- and for this
reason perhaps smaller than the real- figures was given by
MACHI, 25.12.1949 and referred to the purges under Edict 9.
14. Dimaras, op.cit.; Linardatos, op.cit., vol 2, p.107 and vol
3, pp. 241 and 507
15. Dimaras ibld, pp. 309 and 241. S.Linardatos, ibid, vol. 3,
refers to the expulsion from all high schools of Greece of a
pupil who refused to write a composition against the
communists; he was the son of the previously director of the
KKE's official organ - Rizospastis - K. Karagiorgis, who was by
that time, 1961, dead. The case which must have not been an
isolated incident, had caused uproar among public opinion
16. V. GEORGIOU: A History of the ResIstance, 1940-1945 (in
Greek), Avlos, Athens 1979, Vol 4, p. 1445. There was also a
number of underground publications by other resistance
organizations and groups. An other estimate raises the total
number of underground publications at more than 700; see: D.
KARMOKOLIAS: Political Communication In Greece 1965-1967,
National Centre of Social Research, Athens 1974, p.125.
17. Georgiou, names 52 journalists, the most prominent ones,
but as he admits the list Is much longer. ibld, p. 1471.
18.See for the press in the war J. DIMAKIS: "The Greek Press".
In, J.T.A. KOUMOULIDES(ed), Greece in Transition, Essays In the
History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974, Zeno, London 1977.
19. Edict IE' of 25 November 1946. Alivizatos, The Political
Institutions...op.cit., p. 506-507
20. Introductory Report to Parliament for Edict 32 of 22
October 1947 (in Greek), Kodix Themidos l947,p. 297
21. Introductory Report to Parliament for Edict 31 of 17
October 1947 (in Greek), ibid, p. 281.
22. See Ladas' Introductory report for Edict 32, as in note 20.
23. See for Instance, the telegram of the managers of six local
newspapers deported to the Island of Lemnos, published in
-'3'-
MACHI, 18.8.1947. See also for names of journalists tortured in
the prison camp of Macronissos, in MACHI, 11.4. 1950.
24. See the complaints of two prospective publishers whose
applications were rejected by the Undersecretary of Press and
Information in MACHI, 17.11.1947, for Laiki Phoni (People's
Voice); and in MACHI, 24.11.1947, for an unnamed paper.
25. In January 1951, the court order the paper Democraticos
(Democrat) to fold
26. See for instance the cases of prosecution of the director
and journalists of Machi in the issues of 1 March 1948 and 18
May 1950.
27. MACHI, 1 March 1948
28. MACHI, 1 December 1947. The intervention of local
authorities in newspaper circulation has been also mentioned by
Dimakis, op.cit., p. 231 and Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy,
op.cit., p. 132.
29. From 1964, EDA started also the publication of the evening
paper Democratiki Allaghi (Democratic Change).
30. See article I par. 1 of the legislative decree 4234/1962.
31. We mean here the edicts which were issued during the civil
war and not the law 509 which was not abolished until the
downfall of the dictatorship.
32. Alivizatos, The Political...op.cit., p. 557, footnote 65.
33. Ibid, p. 533.
34. There was also a number of short-lived papers during the
same period which also supported one of the two camps. We
should also mention here Estia (Hearth) a conservative paper
which supported the Progressive Party, a minor party lying
politically between the Right and the Centre, and also, the two
papers of EDA which we named above.
35. This was one of the numerous short-lived governments which
in essence were appointed and supported by the British before
the elections of March 1946.
36. Constituent Act 82/17,18 December 1945
37. J. IATRIDES: "Occupation, Resistance and the British". In,
Greece in the 1940s...op.clt., p.46
-132.-
38. The author possess a number of photocopied documents
(correspondence of the A4 Army Broadcasting Unit with the heads
of the Greek radio service, records of the daily output and
weekly schedules for office use), from the archive of the then
announcer N. Hakkas. It is characteristic of the influence of
the British forces on Greek radio programming that at four o'
clock every day a music programme called 'Tea Time' was
scheduled.
39. These were precisely the suggestions of American officials
as quoted by L.S. WITTNER: American Intervention in Greece,
1943-1949, New York 1982, p. 160.
40. Ibid. Care was of course exercised to keep the role of US
administration in the background.
41. World Broadcasting, early 1950s (exact date missing), p.
32, from the archive of N. Hakkas.
42. Unfortunately, it became impossible to have access to
archives of that time and study the very content of broadcasts.
43. Emergency law 818 of 8 January 1946.
44. The Edict 8, provided also for the dismissal of employees
on the grounds of their lack of proper professional
qualifications, lack of the necessary ethos and inability to
fulfil their obligations at work. These conditions were so
vague, however, that it becomes apparent that their purpose was
to serve as an excuse for dismissals on political grounds. See
figures given by MACHI, 25-12-1949.
45. See for instance, the testimony of N.Hakkas interviewed by
the author 16.12.1986.
46. This order was issued by Truman on 22 March 1947, according
to the proposals of the Committee of Anti-American Activities.
See Alivizatos, The Political...op.cit., p. 479-87.
47. Royal Decree of 20 January 1954 for the ratification of the
internal regulations of EIR.
48. N.Hakkas, op.cit.
49. Exempted were also cinema, phonography and other public
spectacles.
50. We will mention here the modification of the above law, the
-'33-
law 3188/1955 and the legislative decree 3778/1957.
51. Some pieces of legislation refer to the Minister to the
Prime Minister, while others to the Undersecretary for Press
and Information. The Ministry to the Prime Minister is an
umbrella ministry which supervises the function of the entire
state administration. In many cases the law transferred the
supervision of broadcasting from the Minister to his inferior
Undersecretary for the Press and Information.
52. See in the relevant Parliamentary debate, the speech of the
Minister to the Prime Minister P. Sifnalos, Gazette of
Parliamentary Debates, Period 1, Session 3, 1952-1953, sitting
19 of 27.2.1953, p. 415.
53. Article 2 par. 4 of Constit. Act 54/1945. See also the
similar provision of article 3, par. 2 of Comp. Law 1775/1951.
54. Legislative Decree 3778/1957 which modified the Law
2312/1953.
55. The new decision of the council was final. See article 3 of
the above decree.
56. The relative provision of the Compulsory Law 818/1946 had
been abolished by the law 2312/1953, article 27.
57. Dagtoglou suggests that this provision was never
implemented; see P. DAGTOGLOU: Broadcasting and Constitution,
Sakkoulas, Athens 1986, p. 29.
58. Decision of the Council of Ministers 85 of 11/26 June 1959.
59. Dagtoglou, op.cit., p. 30.
60. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Period 1, Session 3,
1952-1953, Sitting 21 of 3.3.1953, p.445. It is clear in the
last phrase of the speech the reference to the left-wing party
EDA.
61. Figures given by the Minister to the Prime Minister P.
Sifnaios in the above Parliamentary debate, Gazette of Parliam.
Debates, Period 3, Session 1, Sitting 19 of 27.2.1953, p. 416.
Figures for 1962 from U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1965, mentioned
by Karmokolias, op.cit., p. 27.
62. By 1954 there were regional stations (one each) in
Salonica,, Kos, Komotini, Rhodes, Chania, Patrae and Volos. See
the Royal Decree of 20,1.1954 for the ratification of EIR's
Internal regulations In Athens there was a transmitter of 150
KW for the First Programme and another of 51 KW for the Second
Programme. Karmokolias, ibid, p. 27. There was also an
expansion of the Armed Forces radio stations to which we will
refer below,
63. IbId, p. 27.
64. Dagtoglou, op.cit, p. 28.
65.See for instance, Linardatos, op.cit., vol 2, p. 148, for
examples; also, the speech of G. Mavros in Parliament, Gazette
of Parliamentary Debates, Period 5, Session 2, Sittings
14.11.1959-3.6.1960, Sitting 76 of 4.4.1960, p. 559.
66. Dagtoglou, op.cIt., p. 158; N. ALIVIZATOS: State and
Broadcasting (In Greek), Sakkoulas, Athens, p. 30.
67. Comments of G. Alexiades General Director of EIR between
March 1953 and May 1954, in the magazine ELEFTHEROTYPIA,
September 1965.
68. Ibid. Some of the comments have been slightly paraphrased
In the translation.
69. See for instance, the speech of G. Mavros in the Gazette of
Parliamentary debates, Sitting 76, op. cit., p. 559.
70. Meynaud, op.cit., p. 238.
71. See the speech of G. Papandreou In Parliament in the
Gazette of Parliamentary debates, Sitting 76, op. cit., p. 604.
72. See Gazette of Parliamentary Debates ibid, p. 664.
73. Linardatos, op.cit., vol 4, p. 220. The figures were given
by the opposition in Parliament in March 1957.
74. Allvizatos, The Political Institutions...op.cit., p. 491.
75. Linardatos op.cIt., vol 3, p. 509- 510. See also the speech
of President of EDA in Parliament, Gazette of Parliam. Debates
sitting 76 op. cit., p. 666.
76. Royal Decree of 16.7.1955.
77. Meynaud, op.cit., p. 104-105.
78. Speeches of the EDA MPs H. HelIou, A. BrillakIs and I.
Passalides, the latter being President of the party. Gazette of
Parliam. Debates Sitting 76 op. cIt., pp. 546, 617 and 666
-135-
respecti vely.
79. Speech of G. Mavros, ibid, p. 558.
80. Dagtoglou, op.cit., p.17.
81. See the memories of the first news editor of the Athens
Radio Station of the Armed Forces, N. LABRINIDES: 33 Years in
YENED (in Greek), Phillipotis, Athens, 1982, p. 14-44.
82. Out of the $3,984 million of American aid, 53.5% or $2,114
million went to military expenses. Moreover, in the period
1950-1970 one in three military officers was trained in one of
the U.S. military schools. Alivizatos, The Political
op.cit., p. 261.
83. N.MOUZELIS: Parliamentarism and Industrialization in the
semi-periphery (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1987, p.237-238.
84. We will mention here the purges of all democratic officers
from the 11,000 strong armed forces which were stationed in the
Middle East during the war. The reasons for these purges were
two revolts which took place in March 1943 and April 1944 and
which aimed at the dismissal of all pro-fascist officers and
the formation of a government of national unity with the
participation of all resistance forces.
85. See the content of Compulsory Law 822 of 20 January 1949 in
Alivizatos, The Political..., op.clt., p.199.
86. And this despite a general reorganization of political
control in 1953, according to which the government through the
Ministry of Defence and the Supreme Council of National Defence
- ASEA - was given the control of the armed forces. ibid, p.
260-271. See also, K. LEGG: Politics in Modern Greece, Stanford
University Press, Stanford California 1969, p. 222.
87. D.CHARALANBIS: Military and Political Power (in Greek),
Exandas, Athens 1985, p. 35 and 227.
88. Linardatos op.cit., especially vol 2.
89. The	 centre	 of	 para-military	 activity was	 now
EENA (Union of Greek Junior Officers), established by members
of IDEA and other officers.
90. For more details, see T. VOURNAS: A History of Modern
Greece 1953-1967 (in Greek), Tolidis, Athens, p. 215-217.
-136-
91. Meynaud, op.cit., p. 352.
92. Compulsory law 1775/1951, article 10, par. 1. Indicatively
we note here three officers appointed Director Generals Chr.
Tsigantes: 1950-1953; E.Apokoritis: 1955-1957, and E.Stassino-
poulos: 1963-1964.
93. At that time the armed forces operated stations in Athens,
Cavala, Jannina, Komotini, Kozani, Larissa, Macronissos,
Salonica and Tripolis. See World Broadcasting, op.cit., p. 33.
94. R.McDONALD: Pillar and Tinderbox, Marion Boyars, London
1983, p. 164. See also any issue of the Radioprogramine of the
late 1940s and early 1950s.
95. Compulsory Law 1663 of 24/27 January 1951.
96. Dagtoglou op.cit., p. 32.
97. Together with the military we should also mention the
monarchy, but we will refer to it and its peculiar relation
with the armed forces In the following chapter.
98. Decision of the Council of Ministers 85/1959.
99. Labrinides op.cit., p. 45 and 75.
100. Papandreou's attempt to dismiss Garoufalias in 1965 would
lead to a row with the king and to the final resignation of the
Prime Minister.
101. Meynaud op.cit., p. 352; and Labrinides op.cit., p. 86.
102. Meynaud IbId, pp. 98-105.
103. The lack of major Investments was due both to the
unwillingness of big capital to Invest in manufacture as there
were more profitable and less risky sectors (shipping,
construction, or deposits In foreign banks) in which it could
operate and a policy of high interest rates which discouraged
long-term Industrial finance with banking capital. See for
instance, Charalabis op.clt., p. 82-94.
104. Ibid, p. 103.
105. Linardatos op.cit., vol 3, p. 430 and 536-537.
106. N. Mouzelis: "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war
Greece", New Left Review, vol 96, March-April 1976, p. 69.
107. IbId, p. 70. For the privileges to foreign capital, see
the terms of the scandalous contract of the state with Pechiney
-137-
in 1960, in Charalabis op.cit., p. 95-99.
108. See Linardatos op.cit., vol 3, p. 242, 532-3 and vol 4,
p.170
109. Meynaud op.cit., p. 298-300.
110. Ibid, p. 111.
111. See ibid for the mission in Greece of the State Department
representative McGhee in summer 1961, p. 107-108.
112. For details about EK's programme, Ibid, p. 292-295.
113. mid, p. 119-123.
114. Charalabis op.cit, p. 160.
115. Meynaud op.cit., p. 299.
116. See the following chapter for the complex relation of the
military and the King.
117. See for instance, the statement of the leader of ERE after
the government gave permission for a massive pacifist march
organized by the Left, Linardatos op.cit., vol 4, p. 418.
118. Meynaud op.cit., vol 2, p. 16.
119. We have already referred to Papandreou's policy regarding
the military stations.
120. Meynaud op.cit., vol 2, p. 19.
121. Ibid, vol 2, p. 47
122. ANTI 21.9.1974.
123. ELEFTHEROTYPIA, September 1965.
124. See Royal Decree of 31.10/4.11.1964.
125. ELEFTHEROTYPIA, ibid.
126. Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 166-77.
127. Linardatos, op. cit., vol 2, p. 51.
128. Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 171, and
Mouzelis, Parliamentarism... op. cit., p. 242-3.
129. Mouzells suggests that such an organization existed In the
army but It was Insignificant and its purpose was mainly to
promote the professional Interests of Its members; Ibid, p.
247. So far there has been no proof of the group's subversive
activities or of Andreas Papandreou's involvement In it.
130. See extracts from the press ministry bulletin 15.2.1967 in
McDonald op.cit., p. 163.
-.138-
131. Labrinides op.cit., p. 107.
132. J.CURRAN and J.SEATON: Power Without Responsibility,
Fontana, London, p. 311.
-139-
CHAPTER 4
THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP OF 1967 AND THE BEGINNING OF
TELEVISION
4.1 Introduction
On April 21 1967, a month before the general election, a
group of army officers headed by two colonels and one brigadier
staged a long-prepared coup which in Andreas Papandreou's
famous expression "caught the politicians in their sleep". As a
consequence, parliamentary institutions were abolished for
seven years and politics became the exclusive prerogative of
the military. For those who have carefully studied Greek
political history since the civil war, the dictatorship was not
merely an aberration from democratic 'normality', as has often
been suggested by both conservative politicians and writers
on Greek politics. It was rather the ultimate attempt to
preserve the power structure which had resulted from the civil
war and in which the military held a dominant position.
With the dictatorship the authoritarian organization of
power took its most extreme form: parliamentary institutions
were dismantled and the monarchy was deprived of its main
prerogatives before it was in turn abolished in 1973. Hence,
the military became the sole centre of power in Greek politics,
until the Cyprus crisis in July 1974 led to the collapse of the
dictatorial regime.
The study of the establishment and policies of the military
dictatorship is crucial for two main reasons. First, seen from
a broad historical perspective, such a study can contribute to
a better understanding of post-war and post-dictatorial
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political Institutions and the elements of continuity and
change between the past practice and the present organization
of the political system. Secondly, viewed from the narrower
perspective of an analysis of the broadcasting system, the
study of the military junta's policies in the field of the mass
media is necessary not only because the latter as the principal
means of information inevitably became the prime targets of
the dictators, but also because of the historic fact that
television was established and organized by the dictatorship.
It is not a mere coincidence that both radio and television
were established by dictatorial regimes. Rather It seems that
whereas democratic politicians hesitated to develop
broadcasting, perhaps unaware of its social and political
significance, the dictators sought to exploit its Immense
propaganda potential. Hence, like radio under Metaxas,
television was seen by the 1967 junta as a means of achieving
broad popular consent for the regime. The role of broadcasting
in this respect was very Important, especially because the
dictatorship lacked any significant support from the masses.
For this reason, it is essential to examine the social and
political conditions under which the dictatorship was
established and the regime's main policies, before we turn more
specifically to Its policies on the mass media.
4.2 The rise of the dictatorship: the political context
On the morning of April 21 1967, the Greeks were informed by
radio that "due to the disorderly internal 	 situation	 the
military had assumed the governing of the country".
Consequently, Parliament was dissolved and all clauses of the
1952 Constitution regarding civil liberties were suspended. The
coup was carefully organized and staged by a group of
army officers led	 by colonels	 George Papadopoulos 	 and
Nicolaos Makarezos and brigadier Styllanos Pattakos. This group
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was the core of the paramilitary organization IDEA. What was
particularly important was that the King was completely
ignorant of the putchists' plans, although under the
Constitution he was the commander-in-chief of the military.
Symbolic as this title might have been within the framework of
the 1952 Constitution, the palace had been keen to assume
control over crucial aspects of the organization, structure and
operation of the armed forces 1 . Moreover, most officers of the
higher ranks including the chiefs of the three services were
committed royalists; that group of generals known as the 'big
junta' (in contrast to the 'small junta' of IDEA) was
conspiring at the same time as IDEA to stage its own coup in
the name of the King 2 . Yet, the successful staging of the coup
by a handful of unknown lower-rank officers proved that the
palace did not have complete command over an army which it
considered to be the pillar of its power.
Why was the military contemplating the establishment of a
dictatorship in the first place and why were there two rival
juntas? Furthermore, why were the colonels more successful than
the generals? To answer these questions, we will have to
examine more closely the political and social situation which
existed at the time of the coup and the peculiar balance of
forces which characterized the post-war power structure.
As explained in the previous chapter, the restoration of
bourgeois domination in Greece after the war became possible
only thanks to the support of the military and its final
victory over the Communist forces in 1949. Being in essence the
guardian of the established social and political order, the
military emerged in the post-civil war political context as an
independent political force. Its autonomy and crucial role for
the preservation of the status quo were acknowledged by
bourgeois politicians of all colours. Moreover, the creation of
IDEA in 1944 and the extensive influence that this organization
exercised within the armed forces is the clearest indication
that the military Itself was fully aware of its central
position within the Greek state.
Nevertheless, until 1967 it was not the military which
appeared to be the dominant force in Greek politics, but the
throne. The restoration of the monarchy after the war was based
on the unanimous agreement of all traditional politicians who,
like their British and American allies, considered the King as
the symbol and guarantor of the bourgeois legitimacy they were
seeking to establish In the country. Thus, with the
unquestioning support of the entire political world the
institution of the monarchy emerged from the crisis of the
second world war significantly reinforced.
Far from being the neutral head of state that the 1952
Constitution postulated, the King was actively Involved In
parliamentary politics with the covert or overt tolerance of
all political parties except EDA. In many cases the King
interfered in the affairs of the government, taking political
initiatives and declaring his personal views on crucial
matters, such as the question of Cyprus or internal political
crises 3 . Moreover, the King insisted upon acting as the utmost
regulator of the political life by openly promoting politicians
who in his view could guarantee the continuation of the
authoritarian organization of power, or conversely by
withdrawing his support from those political leaders who were
no longer 'cooperative'. The most telling example in this
respect, was the appointment by King Paul in 1955 of C.
Karamanlis to the post of Prime Minister at the expense of S.
Stefanopoulos whom the deceased Papagos had designated as his
successor as leader of the Greek Rally and who seemed to have
the support of the majority of the party's parliamentary group.
Eight years later, following a strong disagreement with the
King, Karamanlis was forced to resign though he was supported
by a comfortable parliamentary majority. The same scenario was
repeated in 1965, with main protagonists this time King
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Constantine and G. Papandreou. This practice of the monarch of
appointing as Premiers politicians of his choice and the
pressures he exercised on them to resign revealed a profound
distrust of party politics and democratic procedures and "In
the last analysis brought the electorate before faits accomplis
or diluted its mandate"4.
What was particularly crucial for the fate of parliamentary
institutions was the fact that, especially after Papagos death
in 1955, the throne had the final word on major matters
regarding the organization of the armed forces such as the
promotion and appointment of military officers. Hence,
throughout the period until the colonelst coup, the top
positions of the military hierarchy and also the defence
portfolio were held by people who enjoyed the personal
confidence and support of the King. This limited even further
the ability of the political power to exercise control over the
armed forces and certainly enhanced the disrespect of the
latter for parliamentary institutions. Until 1967 the palace
seemed to exercise complete control over the military while the
latter never showed any signs of disloyalty towards the crown5.
In effect, throughout the 1950s the military had no reason to
seek a more direct Involvement In the political process insofar
as the palace and right-wing governments were able to guarantee
the continuous 'discipline' of the social forces and the
reproduction of the military's central role within the state.
This balance of forces, however, was to be threatened in the
early 1960s when the economic plight of the lower classes
together with new developments In the social sphere led to an
unprecedented political mobilization which could no longer be
contained by repression. Growing economic Inequalities6,
together with urbanization and the expansion of
communications 7 , Increased political awareness and led to the
radicalization and mobilization of a large part of the
population. Hence, the 1960s witnessed the emergence of active
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youth and peace movements, the formation of trade unions close
to the Left and Centre and a dramatic increase in Industrial
action. Moreover, as Mouzelis has pointed out, the migration
of 1.5 million people from the countryside to the big urban
centres and abroad largely dislocated the local patronage
networks through which the Right had maintained its control
of the rural population8.
An expression and a result of the mounting popular
discontent were the electoral victories of the Centre Union in
1963 and 1964. Under the pressure of the mobilized
masses, the government of George Papandreou introduced a number
of economic and social reforms which aimed at the relief of
the lower social strata and also sought to liberalize the
regime by considerably slackening the measures of political
repression. The air of freedom which started to blow gave new
momentum to the popular movement which expressed itself through
an increasing number of strikes, demonstrations, peace marches
and other mass activities.
Although timid and inadequate, these reforms were enough to
alarm the military and the palace which saw in the
democratization of the system an immediate threat to their
dominant position within the state. The incompatibility of EK's
policies with the interests of the palace and the military led
to the political crisis of the 1965-67 period. The fuse for the
crisis was Papandreou's efforts to place the armed forces under
the control of the elected government. Constantine's refusal to
endorse the decision of his Prime Minister to take over the
Ministry of Defence, thus forcing him to resign, was an attempt
by the palace to defend the political status quo and its
central role within It.
Nevertheless, as was proven by the political developments
which followed Papandreou's resignation, the monarchy was no
longer able to guarantee the preservation of the existing
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structures of power. Instead of announcing the holding of fresh
elections, Constantine insisted upon forming a government from
the same Parliament. After three palace-backed governments had
failed to gain an absolute majority, a fourth one managed to
secure a flimsy majority of two votes, thanks to the support of
the ERE and of 44 EK deputies who were persuaded to defect
from their party (the leader of ERE P. Kanellopoulos himself,
spoke later of "conscience bribing" by the palace) 9 . However,
the King's attempt to turn the clock back to the pre-1963
situation created further political unrest and exacerbated the
climate of polarization, particularly between ERE and the
Centre Union'°. Through an increasing number of demonstrations
and strikes, the pro-democracy movement expressed its
opposition to the royal intervention and demanded the holding
of a general election.
Eventually, having sensed the danger of a military takeover,
Papandreou and Kanellopoulos decided in a secret agreement to
put an end to the crisis and announced the organization of new
elections for May 1967. The military leadership on the other
hand seemed to be determined to prevent the election,
especially as the prospects of a right-wing comeback appeared
to be extremely poor in view of the mounting popular
mobilization. Indeed, a new electoral victory of EK, which was
now under the increasing influence of its left wing led by
Andreas Papandreou, would inevitably lead to the reinforcement
of parliamentary institutions and consequently weaken the
position of the military and the monarchy within the state. In
particular, the strengthening of political power would mean the
establishment of stricter controls upon the organization and
activities of the armed forces, thus ending or seriously
restricting their political autonomy. The situation was
particularly alarming for those who held key positions In the
secret services and the repressive apparatus and who were
largely members of IDEA. The military had thus to intervene in
order to defend its dominance within the state.
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The conspiracy for the establishment of a dictatorship,
however, proved that there were fundamental divisions within
the officers corps. For while the royalist military leadership,
(the 'big junta'), was considering a dictatorial solution under
the auspices of the crown, the IDEA group, (the 'small
junta'), was laying its own plans for a pre-emptive coup behind
the back of the King and the generals 11 . As Charalambis
suggests, IDEA was not a monarchist organization; its 1944
manifesto did not contain any reference to the monarchy and
none of the top-ranking royalist officers had ever been a
member of the group12 . Once the King had proven unable to
safeguard the authoritarian power structure, IDEA withdrew its
allegiance from the throne and sought to preserve the
established political order itself.
It is not easy to explain, however, why there was this major
split within the armed forces. According to some analysts the
reasons must be sought in the promotion structure and the
social divisions of the Greek army. The increased needs for
military personnel that the civil war had created led to the
lowering of standards and the admission by the military
academies of children from the lower classes. Therefore, a
significant social gap now existed between the royalist top-
ranking officers who had graduated before the war and the
medium and lower-rank officers who had joined the army in the
post-war period13 . Moreover, the massive recruitment of new
officers during the civil war had created a series of
bottlenecks as the limited number of top posts severely
restricted opportunities for promotion. It seems moreover that
there had been a lot of dissatisfaction within the army against
the palace, caused by the favouritism shown by the latter
towards those officers who were outspoken monarchists 14 . Thus,
a significant number of junior officers took the side of the
'small junta' on the day of the coup anticipating that the
massive dismissals of other officers would provide them with
new career possibilities. As we will see later in this chapter,
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before the end of 1967 the dictators had already taken drastic
measures In order to advance the Interests of their military
clientele. In contrast to the IDEA group, the generals' junta
did not show any organizational activism or readiness In order
to Impose a dictatorship. Their Influence among the armed
forces was clearly limited, as it was to be proven when the
King staged his own counter-coup in December 1967. Moreover,
the generals were uncertain about the timing of the coup -
before or after the elections of May - and had conditioned
their intervention upon the will of the King, whereas the
colonels were determined to seize power at all costs'5.
It has often been suggested by writers on the Greek
dictatorship that the main reason behind the rise of the junta
was the interests and policies of the U.S.A. and particularly
of the CIA16 . As the preceding analysis has shown, the
Americans performed a central role In the establishment and
consolidation of the post-war socio-polltical system In Greece.
Also, strong bonds had been developed between the American and
Greek armed forces as a large number of Greek officers had been
trained by the Americans In the United States and elsewhere17.
Moreover, the CIA had largely assisted In the setting up of the
Greek Central Intelligence Service (KYP) in which IDEA officers
held key positIons- 8 . Finally, it Is well known that CIA
officials had meetings with members of the 'small junta' shortly
before the coup19 and that the US administration adopted a
clearly favourable attitude towards the dictatorship.
Nevertheless, although it Is likely that the Americans
encouraged, or at least did not try to avert a military
intervention, there Is as yet no serious evidence to support
the allegation of a direct US Involvement in the preparation of
the coup. Furthermore (as both Gregoriadis and Mouzells
suggest) given the strong Atlanticlst orientation of the
monarchy and Its central role In Greek politics, It seems more
plausible to assume that, had the Americans opted for a
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dictatorial solution, they would have supported the coup of the
royalist military leadership rather than that of a group of
relatively unknown lower-ranking officers20.
In summary, it is more plausible to look for the causes of
the dictatorship within the internal social and political
situation of the country rather than in external factors. In
our view, which is also the view of many analysts of the
dictatorship21 , the 1967 coup was clearly an attempt by the
military to preserve the repressive regime and its own position
within it at a time that both were being seriously challenged
by an unprecedented popular mobilization. Insofar as both
parliamentarism and the monarchy had failed to guarantee the
continuation of the system of political controls, the military
had to resort to its last means - overt repression and
violence- in order to preserve the authoritarian power
structure and its dominance within it.
What should be stressed here is that the reasons underlying
the military takeover were primarily, if not exclusively,
political. The crisis of the 1960s which led to the
dictatorship was about the political organization of power, not
about the established social order. The domination of the
bourgeoisie in Greek society was not challenged; the massive
support for the EK (and not for the left-wing EDA) was the best
expression of the wide acceptance of the capitalist class
structure. The bourgeoisie Itself had little to fear from a
liberal government, for its vital interests were not at stake.
The strategy of economic development followed by the EK was
basically the same as that of ERE. The favourable climate for
investors continued to exist in the form of various Incentives
to big capital as well as loans and subsidies. Also, despite
substantial increases, wages and social security expenditure
remained relatively low. Furthermore, to the extent that it
expressed a broad social consensus, EK's mild, reformist
programme was a guarantee of political stability. It is not
surprising, therefore, that annual foreign investment in Greece
increased from $8.7 million in 1962 to $28 million in 1963 and
to $61.3 million in 196522.
The above analysis does not mean that the IDEA group lacked
any support from the dominant social classes. An indication to
the contrary was again the right-wing press, a section of which
adopted a clearly alarmist attitude In view of the political
unrest and the prospects of an EK victory 23 . Moreover, the
junta was on friendly terms with representatives of financial
interests 24 . Nevertheless, as the stance of conservative
politicians and publishers was to prove, the dictators failed
to gain supporters even among the right-wing camp. The
political character of the crisis and the lack of an intensive
class struggle deprived the dictators of the kind and degree
of popular support offered to Pinochet in Chile six years
later. The broad acceptance of parliamentary Institutions as
the only way to resolve the crisis meant that the dictatorial
regime could not be easily legitimated. The lack of any popular
consent was the major weakness of the dictatorship and this was
to determine its policies as well as its destiny.
4.3 Towards the establishment of a new order: The organization
of military rule.
On the morning of April 21 the colonels' junta presented the
King with a fait accompli. The dictators had abolished
parliamentary institutions and suspended civil liberties
without the endorsement of the head of state. The King had been
practically stripped of all his political power. Nevertheless,
the junta did not seek to abolish the monarchy, for the latter
had to perform a vital function for the future of the
dictatorship. In order to win popular support, the putchists
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had to appear to be acting within the framework of the
Constitution and for the protection of the established social
order of which the King was the main representative. In other
words, they needed to present the coup as having been staged
with the support of the palace. For this reason, a royal
decree was hastily forged, according to which all clauses of
the Constitution regarding civil liberties were suspended25.
Constantine finally agreed to cooperate with the junta. He
consented to appoint a government most members of which were
chosen by the putchists; furthermore, he presided over the new
cabinet a few days later and signed a large number of
compulsory laws and decrees requested by the dictators. His
decision to do so was crucial for the fate of the coup, as it
secured the support of a large part of the officers corps for
the conspirators. Had he publicly denounced the coup, the
dictatorship would have probably collapsed. This option,
however, ran counter to the interests of the throne. The demise
of the dictatorial regime would have paved the way for a
general election and the establishment of parliamentary
dominance, which would have meant the drastic shrinkage of the
monarchy's powers, as these were defined in the post-civil war
political context. This did not mean, however, that Constantine
gave his consent to the dictators by choosing what appeared to
be the less damaging solution. By accepting a regime which was
established without his endorsement, he knew that he had given
up his powers as a monarch. In practice, the new government,
consisting mainly of military officers, was not answerable to
him while he himself was almost a hostage in his own palace26.
What Constantine had in mind was the staging of a counter-
coup which would overthrow the colonels, and the establishment
of a regime controlled by the palace. He was not committed to
a democratic solution to the crisis, however, as the events
preceding his counter-coup indicate. In his attempt, the King
sought the support of the members of the 'big junta' and other
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royalist officers. On the other hand, the offer of a number of
dismissed liberal officers to join the venture as liaisons
between the king's group and various clandestine organizations
was turned down. Ostensibly, the plan was the enforcement of a
solution from above, without any recourse to popular
mobilization27 . The King's intentions became clear with his
announcement to the people on the 13th of December, the day of
the attempted counter-coup. Although conveying to the people
an explicit call for support, his message was nevertheless
authoritarian and imbued with the same anti-communist ideas
which had constituted the foundations of the post-war
repressive regime28.
Whatever Constantine's intentions might have been, however,
the failure of his counter-coup proved that the basis of
popular and military support for the monarchy was very narrow.
The identification of the throne with the authoritarian
organization of power had deprived it of the wide popularity
that royalty enjoyed in other countries. Moreover, although it
is true that bad organization largely accounted for the
breakdown of the attempt, it is equally true that the King
failed to attract the support of the majority of the military
as he had anticipated29 . Within a few hours the royal counter-
coup was over and the only option left to the King was to leave
the country on the same day.
Nevertheless, the monarchy was not abolished even then, for
it was still necessary to the dictators for the reasons
explained above and also because the latter wished to avoid
any strong opposition from the King from his position in exile.
Therefore, a leading member of the junta was sworn in as
Regent, to act as official substitute for the King in his
absence. In this way the monarchy was retained and the
dictators could exercise their power without the embarrassing
presence of the King.
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The failure of the King's counter-coup gave the chance to
the junta for a major government reshuffle which brought to
the foreground the powerful man of the regime, George
Papadopoulos. On the 14th of December he became the new Prime
Minister, replacing K. Kollias, a Public Prosecutor of the
Supreme Court, who chose to accompany the King into exile. Even
in the period preceding the events of December 13, Kollias was
a figure-head in government, since the strings were discreetly
pulled by Papadopoulos, who at the time occupied the key
Ministry to the Prime Minister. Papadopoulos decided to
retain this post (which enabled him to control among other
the KYP, the General Directorate of Press and Information and
EIR) even after his elevation to the premiership and also to
post of Minister of Defence. In this way he was able to control
the most sensitive areas of government policy.
Moreover, the key ministries of the Interior and Economic
Coordination were occupied by the other two strong men of the
junta, S. Pattakos and N. Makarezos respectively. The rest of
the ministries were assigned to largely unknown judges and
technocrats, so that the government did not appear to be
totally controlled by the military. However, many other members
of the junta were appointed as general secretaries in those
ministries and in practice they assumed the ministers'
competences. Hence, in reality, political power was
concentrated in the hands of the IDEA group.
After they had fully settled in power, the dictators sought
the introduction of new institutions which aimed at
transforming the country into a military state. Thus, in 1968 a
new Constitution was introduced which had two major
characteristics: first, the armed forces were legally
established as an independent and dominant centre of power
within the state; and secondly, the monarchy and
parliamentarism were maintained, but with their position
severely weakened.
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The dictatorial Constitution institutionalized the
military's role in society as this had been envisaged by the
IDEA group. According to clause 129, the purpose of the armed
forces was to defend the "territorial integrity and the
national independence of the the state" as well as "the
existing social and political system against external or
internal enemies" 30 . In practice, this meant that apart from
their duty to defend the country from external threats, the
armed forces were empowered to intervene in political matters
at their discretion in order to prevent any attempt to change
the established order.
Moreover, the new Constitution established the complete
autonomy of the military from any form of political control.
Thus, all matters regarding the promotion and the compulsory
retirement of officers were to be dealt with exclusively by
councils of top-ranking officers, whose decisions were binding
for the government. More importantly, the administration of the
armed forces was turned Into an exclusive prerogative of the
Commander of the Armed Forces (a post introduced for the first
time by the dictatorial Constitution) who became solely
responsible for aspects of defence policy which under the 1952
Constitution had fallen under the competence of the government
and Parliament 31 . The Commander of the Armed Forces was in
essence a "super minister Independent from any government
control" 32 who, apart from dealing with all matters pertaining
to the organization and operation of the armed forces, was
empowered to prepare the budget of the Ministry of Defence and
to allocate resources to the various military branches 33 . His
political role, however, was not limited to matters of defence.
As a member of the Council of the Nation (a new advisory body
attached to the monarch), the Commander could also Influence to
a significant extent many crucial decisions of the executive,
such as the declaration of a state of siege and the appointment
of the Prime Minister34.
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The institutionalization of military dominance by the
Constitution was accompanied by a parallel diminution of the
powers of the throne. The King's powers over the appointment of
the Prime Minister and the government were drastically
restricted while his prerogative to ratify laws was almost
abolished 35 . Furthermore, whereas the dictatorial constitution
provided for the establishment and operation of political
parties, it also introduced draconian stipulations for the
operation of parliamentarism. Thus, all political parties whose
aims were counter to the 'fundamental principles of the regime'
were to be outlawed. The function of representative
institutions would be supervised by the Constitutional Court, a
new body which would act as the juridical watchdog of the
regime with the task of deciding which parties or politicians
were to be allowed to participate in politics 36 . In any case,
however, the provisions regarding parliamentary institutions
and civil rights were to be suspended indefinitely and the
decision for their reactivation rested with the dictatorial
government (a. 135 and 138). In this way, whereas the junta was
tightly holding the reins of power, it could give the
impression that the authoritarian solution was a temporary one
and that the restoration of democratic institutions would take
place at some future, albeit unspecified, time. With this
arrangement the dictators must have expected to gain the
consent of the palace and, at least a section of the political
elites and ultimately to achieve the legitimation of the
regime.
The implementation of the 1968 Constitution was mainly an
attempt to transform the power of the junta from 'de facto'
into 'de jure' especially as reaction against the regime was
mounting abroad. For the same reason, and in order to appear as
adhering to democratic principles, the dictators requested the
endorsement of the Constitution by the people through what was
in fact parody of a referendum. However, if the Constitution
was necessary to improve the junta's image both inside and
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outside Greece, violence and repression were the only way for
the dictators to retain their power within the country. These
policies of repression we will examine in the following
section.
4.4 The policies of violence and repression.
4.4.1 Silencing political opponents
The pretext used by the colonels as an excuse for their
intervention was that Greece was directly threatened by a
communist insurrection37 . Although this was untrue, it is
hardly surprising that the propaganda of the regime initially
focused on the myth of the communist peril. The reason was not
only the profound anti-communism of the dictators, but also,
the fact that the domination of the military had been
consolidated and legitimated by the fight against communism.
Hence, the anti-communist law 509/1947 which had not been in
use for many years was reactivated by the dictators and the
first to be persecuted were those with left-wing affiliations.
However, contradicted as it was by political reality, the
junta soon abandoned the argument of the communist menace in
favour of the explanation that parliamentary institutions had
led the country to "chaos" through the strategies of
"corrupted" politicians 38 . The dictatorship was presented as a
revolution aiming at "cleaning up the politicians' mess" and
leading the country to her re-birth. We will see below how the
junta propagated its ideals and "revolutionary" mission. What
should be emphasized here, is that in view of the absence of
strong support, even from the right-wing camp, the dictators
had to resort to various means of repression in order to
consolidate their power. All institutions of political
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participation which could serve as channels of opposition
against the dictatorship had to be destroyed.
Therefore, shortly after the establishment of the new
regime, all political parties were dissolved, starting with EDA
on April 29, and many of their leading cadres were arrested.
There was also a large number of arrests among the civilian
population, many of whom were deported to concentration camps
mainly in the Aegean islands. According to one estimate,
throughout the seven-year dictatorship 80,000 people were
arrested (or one citizen in 100) and of these only five to ten
per cent were brought to trial 39 . On April 25, the colonels
announced the establishment of ten special martial courts in
the biggest Greek urban centres. Nine days later, by order of
the Chief of Staff, 274 trade unions were dissolved all over
the country, for alleged 'violation of their constitution'.
Among the dissolved organizations were the Greek Committee for
International Detente and Peace and the 'Bertrand Russell'
youth association. Hundreds of trade unionists were arrested,
while many of those who escaped arrest were dismissed from
their jobs on the Instructions of the military authorities40.
The same pattern of intervention was also applied to the major
agricultural cooperatives of the country. Nevertheless, due to
strong reaction by the International trade union movement41,
the junta sought to keep a facade of trade unionism by
retaining some unions whose leadership it would effectively
control. The right to strike, however, was practically
abolished due to the numerous restrictions imposed upon it
by the dictatorial Constitution (a. 19, par 5). Moreover,
the junta forbade assemblies In the open of more than five
people, as well as assemblies Indoors, except In the cases of
entertainment or lectures at schools and universities42
From a very early stage the junta sought to control the
state machine by purging it of all those most unsympathetic to
the regime and by appointing	 many of its friends to the
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evacuated posts. Therefore, by means of a series of compulsory
laws, the dictators dismissed all the Boards of Governors of
the major public utility organizations, as well as the elected
councils of local government for "lack of healthy social
views". Through a significant number of constitutional acts the
junta abolished the civil service tenure and thus the relative
independence of state functionaries from the government. At the
same time, the legal arsenal of the civil war, under which
left-wingers had been excluded from public administration, was
reactivated by the dictators and used for the scrutiny of
employees' political views43 . All employees had to submit to
the authorities a written statement in which they were
requested to give details, among other things, of their non-
professional activities such as participation in any political
organization, membership of the communist party or attendance
at any public meeting in which "the public order had been
disturbed"44.
About 200,000 employees, civil servants and other personnel,
were compelled to answer these questionnaires and sign a
statement of loyalty to the regime. Although no official
figures have ever been made available about the number of
employees dismissed during the dictatorship, according to one
estimate, during the first three months of 1968, 572 employees
left the civil service, 162 of whom were dismissed while
another 214 simply "resigned"45.
The dictators' attitude towards education was equally heavy-
handed. During the seven years of military rule 56 professors
and readers were dismissed from Greek universities, as were 257
teachers from primary and secondary education. In the same
period of time, 46 new professors and readers were appointed by
the junta to the universities and polytechnic schools, without
being elected to the posts by the academic staff as had been
the practice until then46 . The dictators also sought to
assume control over the Greek Orthodox Church by replacing its
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decrepit head, Archbishop Chrysostomos, with another clergyman,
who had shown loyalty to the regime. The cooperation of the
clergy was essential for the junta in order to propagate its
ideals on the new 'Greece of Christian Greeks'.
In May 1968, with a constitutional act aiming at the
"restoration to health of the judiciary" 47 , the military junta
suspended for three days the life tenure enjoyed by judges.
This enabled the dictators to dismiss thirty judges considered
to be hostile to the regime, Including the President and five
members of the Supreme Court. A year later, due to strong
resistance by the Council of State to recognize these purges48
as legal, the dictators dismissed the President and one of the
Vice-Presidents of the Council, as well as eight of the
councillors. Finally, the colonels sought to purge the military
from all officers whose loyalty to the regime was questionable.
During 1967, 400 officers were dismissed for involvement In the
ASPIDA affair or for their participation in the royal abortive
counter-coup. The dismissal of top-rank officers paved the way
for the promotion of a significant number of lower-rank
officers who largely constituted the backbone of the
dictatorship49.
Therefore, through purges and the subsequent appointment of
friends to decision-making crucial posts, the colonels assumed
total control of the state apparatus within the first year of
their dictatorship.
4.4.2 Censorship, Ideology and propaganda
Greek cultural life was also a victim of the dictatorship.
Through censorship and physical repression, the colonels sought
to silence every dissident voice in literature, theatre, cinema
and the rest of the arts. For this reason a large number of
censoring committees were set up in the Ministry to the Prime
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Minister. For example, seven of these committees dealt
exclusively with cinema and theatre 50 . The censors were so keen
to rule out any manifestation of opposition against the regime,
that even plays by Sophocles, Aristophanes and Shakespeare
which dealt with or ridiculed political power were forbidden.
The authorities also banned 760 books by over 200 Greek and
foreign writers, as well as periodicals such as the left-wing
Epitheorissi Technis (Arts Review). Other journals such as the
liberal Epoches (Seasons), chose to close down of their own
accord 51 . In music, the most notable case was that of the
imprisoned communist composer and activist, Mikis Theodorakis;
his works were totally banned and all of his records
destroyed52.
Many intellectuals, artists and writers were imprisoned,
exiled or sought refuge abroad, while those who escaped prison
chose not to create anything that they would be compelled to
submit to the censors 53 . Their attitude was a significant form
of passive resistance against the junta, which needed the
cooperation of the intellectuals as the ideological vanguard
of its "revolution."
Faced with a lack of popular support, the dictators soon
realized that in addition to terror, they had to create the
basis for a new social consensus which would guarantee in the
long-term the consolidation of their power. For this reason the
junta tried to construct a new official ideology which would
contribute to the legitimation for the regime. The new Ideal
was the 'Greece of Christian Greeks', a country re-born from
the ruins left by parliamentarism and inspired by both the
ancient Greek civilization and the Byzantine tradition. In this
context, the military coup was presented as a national
revolution aiming to save the country from "corrupt
politicians" and to create a more balanced and harmonious
society without great contradictions 54 . Although classes would
not cease to exist - as social equality was unattainable -
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the "revolution", would seek to avoid wide divisions through a
fairer distribution of Income. In the 'modern state' that the
dictators were to built class struggle would give way to class
cooperation.
This ideal society would be created if, in Papadopoulos'
words, "individuals ceased to be anarchic and materialistic and
became social Individuals" 55 . In order to achieve the
'transformation' of the Greek people, the dictators sought to
impose their ideals through enforcement and Indoctrination.
Everyday life should be guided by the values and principles of
ancient Greek civilization and Christian Orthodoxy. For
Instance, church-going on Sundays became compulsory for
schoolchildren and civil servants. The latter were also
compelled to attend all national celebrations and festivities,
particularly If they were attended by members of the military
government. According to the dictatorial legislation, those
absent from the celebrations would be subject to disciplinary
proceedures 56 . 'Greece of Christian Greeks' as a slogan was
blazoned on walls and on neon signs at airports and along
motorways.
To emphasize the return to ancient Greek and Orthodox
values, a large number of parades and festivities inspired by
ancient and Byzantine history were organized by the regime.
They became legendary as the expression of the dictators'
distorted view of history and kitschy aesthetics, but served as
opportunities for the 'spontaneous', albeit enforced,
demonstration of popular enthusiasm towards the regime. All the
mumbo-jumbo which constituted the dictators' world view was
included In a voluminous work by Papadopoulos, called 'To
Pistevo mae' (Our Creed) and published at the taxpayers'
expense. In this work the arch-dictator with his usual verbose
style dealt with a variety of usually unrelated topics, such as
'anguish', 'the sporting spirit', 'mini skirts', 'Marx' and
'the moon'57.
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The regime was not short, however, of more serious
theoreticians, such as the Minister of Education, Theophylactos
Papaconstantinou, and the official spokesman of the government,
George Georgalas, both wartime Communists. Georgalas, who had
been trained In propaganda methods in Eastern Europe,
elaborated the ideology of the Revolution, while
Papaconstantinou wrote a pamphlet called 'Civic Education'
which was distributed free to schools , the civil service and
public organizations, and aimed at the political education of
the people along the Ideals of the "revolution"58.
It is not easy to define the ideology of the military
regime, least of all to call it fascist, as many observers did
during and after the dictatorship 59 . For although there were
certain fascist elements in the junta's ideology, such as anti-
communism, militarism and ultra-nationalism, the dictators
lacked the support of a huge popular movement which has always
been the main component of fascism. Despite the junta's
efforts, its youth organization 'Alkimoi' (the Strong Ones)
never attracted a large number of members - Its membership was
voluntary rather than compulsory as had been In Metaxas' EON.
In sum, the junta's propaganda efforts were a mixture of
systematic indoctrination, kitsch, verbosity and buffoonery by
the dictators, who with their outspoken sciolism became the
constant targets of ridiculing jokes circulating among the
people as an expression of passive opposition to the regime.
Nevertheless, through terror and constant propaganda, Greece
was turned into a military state in which public life was best
outlined by Pattakos' slogan, "Halt, or I shoot."
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4.5 The fight against the press
"There are positions in the front line for everyone. I
am sure that I may regard myself a colonel in active
service with the journalists' regiment in the attack
for the immediate objective which Is called development
and progress."
(Papadopoulos to journalists)
The dictators' attitude towards the newspapers was based on
the perception of the Greek press as the most important source
of power for every government. "It was the press which created
public opinion and public opinion, in turn, created
governments"60. Furthermore, the Greek newspapers, because of
their extremely partisan reporting during the 1965-67 period,
were seen by the junta as having largely contributed to the
stirring up of political passions and to the aggravation of the
turmoil which followed the political crisis of July 196561. For
these	 reasons Papadopoulos insisted upon having personal
control over the press - and, of course, broadcasting - through
direct supervision of the Directorate of Press and
Information62 . Moreover, a number of repressive measures were
applied to secure total manipulation of newspapers.
As was expected, the two papers of EDA, the morning Avgi
(Dawn) and the evening Democratiki Allaghi (Democratic Change)
became the prime targets of the dictators; they were both
closed down by troops on the very day of the coup and their
assets confiscated and dispersed among various state offices.
The publishers of a third paper, Athinaiki (Athenian) which had
fanatically supported Papandreou, were forced through
incarceration to declare voluntary bankruptcy although they
were not facing serious economic dIfficulties63. Apart from the
publisher and the two directors of the left-wing papers, the
junta also arrested the publisher of two major centrist papers,
the morning To Vima (The Tribune) and the evening Ta Nea (The
News) and kept him in solitary confinement until December 1967.
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Another 50 journalists were arrested and deported to prison
camps64.
Newspapers were subject to preventive censorship, exercised
by the Press Control Service (PCS), which was answerable to the
Minister to the Prime Minister, that is Papadopoulos himself65.
Any criticism of the actions of the dictatorial government was
forbidden, as well as any commentary or news item deemed to be
an Insult to the royal family and the Institution of the
monarchy. Reference to political parties, and particularly to
those of the Left, were forbidden too. The same applied to any
historical accounts and references which could "re-awaken
passions and sow discord". Finally, in anticipation of
foreign reaction against the regime and of radio propaganda by
self-exiled Communists, all transcriptions of broadcasts by
foreign radio stations were banned. All newspapers had to use
the purist language instead of the "vulgar" demotiki, which was
associated mainly with the Left.
Control over the content of newspapers was not confined to
censorship. In addition, government communiques, various
official texts and dictated editorials were compulsorily
printed by all newspapers. Photographs distributed by the PCS,
referring to the work of the government had to be reproduced on
the front page, while each newspaper was compelled to publish
"at least one commentary per day referring to the Government
and its work" 66 . All aspects of newspaper publication fell
within the domain of the censors who often determined even the
layout of the papers, such as the size of and typefaces for
headlines. The result of such a policy was the complete
uniformity of the Greek national press to the extent that a
newspaper of the Centre was hardly distinguishable from one of
the Right67.
Not all publishers agreed to publish under censorship. The
owner of the liberal paper Eleftheria (Freedom) which had
turned conservative amid the crisis of 1965, chose to close
down the paper and flee abroad. The worst surprise for the
dictators, however, was the decision of Helen Vlachou to close
down her two prestigious conservative papers, the morning
Kathimerini (Daily) and Messimvrini (Noon) by declaring force
majeure. Vlachou's decision was a major shock for the
dictators, especially since the publisher in the past had
repeatedly appeared to endorse a dictatorial solution under the
auspices of the King 68 . Therefore, the colonels had hoped to
get support from her papers for their "revolution" and tried
hard to persuade her to re-publish, but without success.
Vlachou, an ardent royalist, after being placed under house
arrest for a few months, finally fled the country in the wake
of the King's abortive counter-coup and became a leading
campaigner against the junta abroad69 . Vlachou's stance was a
major blow for the colonels as it indicated that the regime
did not enjoy the full support of the Greek bourgeoisie. This
became more obvious a few months later, when another
influential Conservative paper, I Vradynl (The Evening) took
advantage of a partial lifting of prior censorship and started
to oppose the regime overtly on every given occasion.
There were, nevertheless, two papers which endorsed the
dictatorial regime; the ultra-conservative Estia (Hearth) and
the Eleftheros Kosmos (Free World). The latter, founded several
months previously, had engaged itself in alarmist reporting and
propaganda about a Communist insurrection. It was published by
former Communist Savvas Constantopoulos who was a personal
friend of Papadopoulos. Before the coup both papers had very
low circulation rates: Estia with nearly 6,000 copies daily and
Eleftheros Kosmos with some 23,500 copies. With the advent of
the dictatorship, however, both papers saw their circulation
double in 1967 and nearly triple in 1968. The significant
increase in circulation of the pro-regime papers, however, was
not an indication of a popular endorsement of the dictatorship.
For although Estia and Eleftheros Kosmos ostensibly absorbed a
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TABLE 4.1
Average Daily circulation of national newspapers, 1966-1967
1966	 1967
A. RIGHT-WING
1. Acropolis	 78,559	 94,810
2. Apoyevmatini.	 48,773	 85,889
3. Vradyni	 42,659	 65,722
4. Kathimerini	 45,745	 -
5. Messimvrini	 72,239	 -
TOTAL	 288,011	 246,421
B. CENTRE and LEFT PAPERS
1. Avgi	 23,540	 -
2. Athinaiki	 29,035	 -
3. Dimokratiki Allaghi	 13,589	 -
4. Eleftheria	 14,849	 -
5. Ethnos	 28,236	 29,023
6. Ta Nea	 195,278	 142,242
7. To Vima	 91,213	 66,074
TOTAL	 395,744	 237,339
C. PRO-JUNTA PAPERS
1. Eleftheros Kosmos	 23,543	 48,017
2. Estia	 5,963	 11,245
TOTAL	 29,506	 59,262
TOTAL OF ALL PAPERS	 713,257	 543,022
Source: EIIEA (Union of Owners of Athenian Dailies).
-.166-
number of readers from the closed down newspapers, they never
reached the level of those enjoying high circulation figures70.
The general picture of the press by the end of the
dictators' first year in power was rather discouraging. Six
newspapers had closed down, three of them of their own accord.
Moreover, the uniformity of the remaining papers made the tight
control of the government so conspicuous that even the
dictators were eventually embarrassed. Worst of all, the press
had been discredited and this was reflected in the dramatic
decrease of total circulation. Of all the remaining newspapers
the hardest affected by the dictatorship were the liberal ones,
especially Ta Nea and To Vima which saw their average daily
circulation shrink by more than a quarter. This was for two
main reasons: because they bore no difference to the
conservative ones In the Initial phase of the dictatorship; and
because to appear reading a previously outspokenly pro-
Papandreou paper was a risk that not everybody was willing to
take. With the closing down of six papers and the Introduction
of prior censorship and propaganda, almost one In four readers
ceased to buy a newspaper. This was the first clear IndIcation
that the regime did not enjoy wide popularity and that the
measures against the press were not wholly effective. The
changes in the daily circulation of the national papers during
the first year of the dictatorship are shown in Table 4.1.
In the first months of 1968, the colonels decided on the
partial lifting of preventive censorship. This decision was
among a number of measures of 'liberalization' Introduced to
create the illusion of a gradual return to parliamentary
normality. Newspapers were free to decide on questions
pertaining to news reporting, page setting, editorials and the
choice of subjects to be covered. Force-feeding of the press
was to all Intents and purposes abolished and the same applied
to the restrictions on the language used by newspapers. But
reference to political parties and their leaders continued to
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be forbidden. Criticism of the military was permitted, provided
that it was responsible and 'bona fide'71.
With the relaxation of censorship, the dictators aimed to
give the impression of a press operating freely. This they did
for two apparent reasons. First, it was a response to the
international outcry against the regime and the pressure for
the restoration of press freedom exercised upon the junta by
the Council of Europe and the International Federation of
Journalists 72 . Secondly, it was intended for domestic purposes,
to show the country that the pro-regime stance of the papers
was spontaneous. This need was explicitly stated at the end of
the circular: "The scrupulous application of the present order
is intimately connected with the success of the government's
action." Moreover, it was clearly reflected in Papadopoulos'
frequent addresses to journalists during 1968-69, which showed
that the achievement of the support of the press was one of
the dictator's major preoccupations: "Gentlemen, you have
dismantled yourselves", he told newspaper representatives on
November 23 1968. "And I ask you why? Take the pen again and
launch yourselves into the struggle. The people need you. Do
not deprive them of your services"73.
Nevertheless, despite Papadopoulos' admonitions, the partial
lifting of censorship did not improve the junta's relations
with the press. Rather, it gave newspapers an opportunity to
express, albeit implicitly, their opposition to the regime74.
The colonels' failure to attract the support of the press was
the main reason for the launching of a new pro-regime paper,
Nea Politeia (New State) in September 1968. As the date for the
referendum on the new Constitution was approaching, the need
for newspapers which would carry the regime's propaganda became
imperative. The initial circulation of the paper (42,000 copies
daily) seemed promising, but before long it started to decline.
Within a year Nea Politela had lost 18,000 readers, and with
the total abolition of prior censorship at the end of 1969, the
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paper's daily circulation went down to a little more than
10,000 copies75.
With their relations with the national press at a dead end,
the dictators announced the implementation of a new law for the
press to take effect from the beginning of 1970. They decided,
however, to give the journalists a trial period, by abolishing
prior censorship complete].y 75 . Hence, in October 1969
modifications were made to the application of the martial law
on press matters and a memorandum was issued by Papadopoulos
which outlined the subjects which were still prohibited76.
With the total lifting of prior censorship, the newspapers
regained their original political orientation to a considerable
degree. Opposition to the regime became more outspoken,
especially from the liberal papers and the conservative
Vradyni, which became the regular forum for an ex-junta member,
D. Stamatelopoulos, fiercely to criticize the regime and
especially Papadopoulos himself. The pro-regime papers on the
other hand saw their circulation decrease steadily, despite the
launching in 1970 of a fourth paper, the evening Simerina
(Today's news), by the publisher of Eleftheros Kosmos. Between
1968 and 1972, the share of the pro-regime papers in the total
daily circulation fell from 18.5 to 12.5 per cent. As a result,
Nea Politeia folded at the end of 1972, and Simerina two years
later (Table 4.2).
On November 17 1969 the dictators published the new Press
Law, which was to be implemented from the beginning of the
following year. The new law, containing 101 clauses, repeated
many of the restrictions included in Papadopoulos' memorandum
to the newspapers. Among other things, the dictatorial press
law prohibited the publication of any kind of information
inciting revolt against the established political order and
outlawed publications which would harm the reputation of the
armed forces or be insulting for the royal family 77 . The
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TABLE 4.2
Average Daily circulation of Athens newspapers, 1968-1972
1968	 1969	 1970	 1971	 1972
A. RIGHT-WING
1. Acropolis	 102,127	 109,663	 86,017	 94,602 106,502
2. Apoyevmatini	 122,059	 145,348 121,055 135,762 156,185
3. Vradyni	 85,384	 101,217	 84,243	 84,677	 95,899
TOTAL	 309,570	 356,228 291,315 315,041 358,586
B. CENTRE
1. To Vima	 47,518	 44,187	 42,107	 40,820	 47,369
2. Ta Nea	 125,073	 133,151 122,051 131,316 149,545
3. Ethnos	 26,821	 26,031	 44,361	 -	 -
TOTAL	 199,412	 203,369 208,519 172,136 196,914
C. PRO-JUNTA
1. El. Kosmos	 60,911	 59,270	 50,818	 42,870	 43,490
2. Estla	 13,218	 13,629	 11,900	 11,847	 12,388
3. Nea Politeia	 41,977	 24,438	 18,530	 10,455	 7,900
4. Simerina	 -	 -	 25,006	 15,589	 15,566
TOTAL	 116,106	 97,337 106,254	 80,761	 79,344
TOTAL OF ALL	 625,088	 656,934 606,088 567,938 634,844
Source: EIIEA
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introduction of new press legislation (which was complemented
with the law on 'false Information' 78 ) was a clever device, for
whereas It gave the dictators the opportunity to do away with
censorship, it imposed so many restrictions upon newspaper
reporting that in essence it penalized the expression of any
substantial criticism against the regime. Indeed, in the
following years a large number of journalists were prosecuted
and condemned by courts through press law action and an
influential liberal paper, the evening Ethnos (Nation), was
forced to close down in l97O.
The junta also exercised economic pressure on newspapers.
For example, under Legislative Decree 345/1969 the dictators
abolished the right to free newsprint that newspapers had
previously enjoyed. From now on, duty would be payable
according to circulation on a set scale (Table 4.3 ).
TABLE 4.3
Newsprint Duty payable according to Article 20 of L.D.346/1969
	
Circulation	 Duty and ancillary
taxes payable
	
0 - 25,000	 Nil
	
25,001 - 50,000	 50%
	
50,001 - 75,000	 75%
75,001 - 100,000	 90%
	
over 100,000	 95%
Source: Helen Vlachou: The colonels and the Press.
In practice, this measure punished large circulation papers,
and so seriously affected the most popular of the opposition
papers which were forced to increase their prices by 67 per
cent In six weeks. As a result, instead of benefiting from the
abolition of censorship, the opposition papers saw their
circulation rates falling in 1970 (by 1971, however, they had
started to win back their readers). By the same decree the
-171-
junta also eliminated all tax privileges of newspapers: tax
according to circulation was abolished and replaced by tax on
income revenue. According to I. Agathangelou, alternate
Minister to the Prime Minister, with the new system newspaper
taxes were to increase up to five or six times80.
Another way of exercising economic pressure on newspapers
was through the introduction of preferential state advertising.
The latter had always been a major source of income for the
Greek press, as a large number of public organizations, state
agencies, banks and local authorities, let alone the
government, frequently published their decisions, accounts,
notifications and various other advertisements in newspapers.
The dictators used newspapers selectively for the publication
of state advertising, with preference for the pro-regime ones.
Hence, Eleftheros Kosmos, which had had the smallest share of
state advertising in 1966, occupied the second position behind
the other pro-regime paper Nea Politela in 1971, and passed to
the first place a year later. At the same time, To Vima saw its
share of state advertising - the highest until 1966 -
decreasing by 76 per cent 81 . In this way the preferential use
of state advertising became a reward for support to the regime
and a punishment for the expression of opposition.
Finally, whenever legal action or economic pressure did not
prove very effective, the authorities sought to prevent the
circulation of newspapers in various areas and especially in
the provinces. This unofficial interference with circulation
was realized in the form of an order by the gendarmerie to the
local distribution agency not to release opposition papers to
specified villages; or, when papers were released, agents were
"advised" not to sell them and to return the bundles
unopened82.
However, the stick was not the only means used by the
dictators against the press. In order to attract the support of
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publishers, they also used the carrot in the form of loans to
different newspapers. Borrowing had always been a major source
of dependence of the press on the government, as no loan could
be allocated, even from a private bank, without the approval of
the Cabinet. Nevertheless, despite the danger of Increased
dependence on the dictatorial government, some publishers
accepted loans from the junta. Most publicized of all cases
were those of the Lambrakis group (To Vima; Ta Nea) and the
Botsis brothers (Acropolis; Apogevmatini), who each received a
loan of 50 million drachmas 83 . The allocation of loans to the
press contributed for a time to a lowering of the opposition
tone from those papers which were Involved 84 . In the long run,
however, the dictators failed to buy off any newspaper.
In short, like the majority of the population, the Greek
press resisted the dictatorship passively rather than through
open confrontation. Nevertheless, even the passive opposition
of the press against the regime was a major blow for the junta
and must have contributed to the aggravation of the regime's
contradictions. The publishers' refusal to cooperate with the
dictators reflected the failure of the latter to achieve a new
alliance of forces headed by the military. The stance of Helen
Vlachou was a first indication that a large section of the
bourgeoisie did not endorse the dictatorship. This became more
clearly manifested when the conservative Vradyni started its
more overt opposition to the junta. The frequent references by
Vradyni to politicians as the only remedy to the crisis often
outraged and embarrassed the dictators and led to the
newspaper's final closure in 197385. A measure of the popular
support for the junta was the circulation of the four pro-
regime papers. Two folded within four years, while the
remaining two saw their daily circulations drop significantly
after the lifting of prior censorship. The dictators' failure
to achieve any substantial cooperation from the press in the
propagation of their militaristic ideals led them to place
particular emphasis upon other media, notably broadcasting. In
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particular, they sought to exploit in full the great propaganda
potential offered by the newly arrived medium of television.
4.6 Repression and propaganda: The policy on broadcasting
4.6.1 The militarization of EIR and the advent of television
On the first day of the coup, the dictators sent both tanks
and raiding forces to secure control of EIR's headquarters at
Zappeion, five minutes away from the Parliament building. The
radio network of EIR and that of the Armed Forces were linked
into a unitary national grid which broadcast news bulletins
prepared by EIR. Thus, for the first six days of the coup a
single military network was the only source of broadcast
information in most of Greece 86 . Such was the importance
attached to the control of broadcasting by the dictators, that
EIR's headquarters were occupied by a military unit for a long
time 87 . EIR went on air on the seventh day, after instructions
for censorship had been given 88 . The previous management of the
network was dismissed and replaced by people loyal to the
regime, with Lieutenant Colonel loannis Anastassopoulos as the
Director General. He was the head of communications at ASDEN,
the Higher Military Command of the Interior and the Islands and
one of the most prominent members of the 'Revolutionary
Committee', a kind of executive body of the junta which defined
the general policy line under the chairmanship of
Papadopoulos89.
The junta sought not only to establish firm control over the
existing radio networks, but also to develop the television
services which until then had remained at an experimental
stage. The reform and development of state monopoly
broadcasting were a major component of the military
government's overall effort to improve Its Image and to win
support for its policies both within the country and abroad.
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In the absence of any substantial popular support for the
dictatorship and facing the political and diplomatic isolation
of the junta, Papadopoulos decided in December 1970 to assume
personal control over the information policy of his government.
For this reason the General Directorate for Press and
Information which supervised both the press and EIR was
detached from the Ministry to the Prime Minister and reformed
into an independent secretariat, the General Secretariat for
the Press and Information (GSPI). It was placed under the
direct control of 9° the Prime Minister, that is of Papadopoulos
himself. The main purpose of the GSPI was the Information of
public opinion inside the country and abroad on all national
issues, so that "an accurate and objective picture of the
existing regime" could emerge 9 . Among other things, the
Secretariat would seek to send special envoys and press
officers abroad to Inform foreign 'opinion leaders' on the
aims of the 'revolution' and on the work of the military
government. The creation abroad of a climate favourable for the
regime was necessary not only for political reasons, but also
because the dictators were anxious to attract tourism and
foreign investment - both crucial elements in their plans for
economic development.
For the influence of domestic public opinion, a special
directorate was to be formed within the GSPI to deal with all
aspects regarding the functioning of the press, broadcasting,
cinema and the theatre. Among the competences of the
directorate were the supervision of the above media and the
setting of guidelines for the "proper use" of radio, television
and "all other means which formed public opinion"92.
Papadopoulos was to appoint the Secretary General, send envoys
abroad and supervise all activities pertaining to the control
of information, the exercise of censorship and the application
of propaganda techniques.
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The new law on information policy was complemented by a
significant modification of EIR's 1953 statute, which enabled
the dictators to tighten their grip upon the 'civilian'
broadcasting organization. With Legislative Decree 745 of
December 10 1970, the name of the Institute changed to EIRT
(literally, National Institute of Radio and Television) to
cover the network's recent expansion into the new medium.
According to the new law, EIRT was to be administered by a
five-member Board of Governors, whose chairman was to be none
other than the Secretary General of Press and Information. The
board also included a top-ranking civil servant, a top-level
technician of the Ministry of Communications and another two
members with knowledge and experience on matters pertaining to
broadcasting. All members of the board were to be appointed by
the Prime Minister for a three year period, but could be freely
dismissed whenever the government considered it necessary. Day
by day operations were to be the province of the Director
General under the supervision of the General Secretary.
According to the dictatorial decree, the organization,
functioning and distribution of tasks among the different
directorates of EIRT were to be defined by royal decree issued
at the request of the Prime Minister. In practice this meant
that every aspect of the network's operation was to be dealt
with by Papadopoulos directly. Thus, with its quasi
independence abolished de jure as well as de facto, EIRT was
practically transformed by the military junta into a department
of central government, with many of the competences previously
reserved for the Board of Governors and the Director General
now performed by the head of another government department -
the General Secretary of Press and Information - and by the
arch-dictator himself. This more than anything else reflected
Papadopoulos' personal interest In broadcasting as a powerful
propaganda medium.
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The first General Secretary to become the chairman of EIRT's
board was its previous Director General, I. Anastassopoulos.
Three of the four remaining posts were taken by former junta
cohorts: Brigadier L. Paravantis, an electronics specialist and
Director General of the National Telecommunications
Organization (OTE); Brigadier V. Frangos, former tank commander
and also Director General of the National Theatre, and Major
General G. Raptis. The fifth post was taken by a State Legal
Councillor. Yet another, albeit retired, army officer, Major
General loannis Ploumbis of the Signal Corps 93 was appointed
Director General of the Institute. Thus, like every other
section of the state apparatus, EIRT was run primarily by
military officers94.
Anastassopoulos was not to last long in the post of General
Secretary. In 1971 an acute crisis erupted within the junta as
most of its cadres, disillusioned with Papadopoulos's
leadership demanded his resignation. However, the dictator
managed to hold on to power, largely thanks to the support of
the chief of the military police D. loannidis, and sought to
secure his position by removing all of his major opponents
from the key positions in government. Among those to go were
G.Georgalas, the government spokesman and propagandist and
Anastassopoulos who was transferred to the Ministry of Public
Order. His successor as Secretary General of Press and
Information was the lawyer Loukas Papangelis, a civilian who
had fully embraced the ideals of the 'revolution' and was now
keen to propagate them through radio and television. The post
of Director General was taken by Major General Constantine
Mitrelis, former head of the Psychological Warfare Directorate
of the General Staff and hence a propaganda expert. Ostensibly,
the change of heads at EIRT had to do mainly with the internal
balance of forces within the junta and with the appointees'
experience in propaganda methods, rather than with the actual
policy they implemented at the Institute. In fact, the military
government had not articulated any specific policy for
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modernization of Greek society, they did not see it as an
essential priority.
Nevertheless, in 1963 Karamanlis's government laid plans for
the renovation of EIR's radio and the establishment of a
complete television system. For this reason seventeen new
transmitters were to be installed for both media to provide
coverage for 80 to 85 per cent of the population. At the same
time, experts invited from the Italian Broadcasting Corporation
(RAI) made a voluminous report with recommendations on the
technical and economic re-organization of E1R 98 . Additionally,
the ERE government forged ahead with a scheme for the
construction of new buildings for the Institute, which would
house both television and the various radio services which had
until then been dispersed in a number of public buildings all
over Athens 99 . The whole project remained in draft, however,
due to Karamanlis's resignation later that year and to the
successive defeats of ERE in the elections of 1963 and 1964.
In 1965 the Centre Union government publicized new plans for
the establishment of a television network, which included the
holding of a new international competition for the provision of
technical equipment. At the same time, following a decision by
G. Papandreou, EIR set up an experimental television station.
Nevertheless, the first transmission was not carried out before
September 1965, amid the political upheaval caused by the
downfall of Papandreou's government. Five months later the
network started a limited schedule of regular broadcasts for
two hours daily100 . The start of television was made In a
haphazard fashion without any previous planning. As there were
no proper television studios, the service had to be housed on
the fifth floor of the new building of the Telecommunications
Organization, OTE. All in all, EIR's television 'headquarters'
consisted of a main studio of ten square metres and another two
rooms for the technical processing and transmission of the
audiovisual material101.
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broadcasting. According to Papangelis, the mission of radio
and television was to "contribute to forming democratic
citizens within the framework of the overall effort to build
the new state of the Constitution of 1968. New educational
broadcasts will fulfil their aim within the framework of our
ever developing modern soclety.(...) Greek film serials based
on the nation's struggles will be shown for the first time on
television.(...) Radio and television will make a constructive
effort (...) to create democratic citizens of whom the new
democracy is In such great need"95.
In view of the above statement it Is no surprise that the
dictators vigorously pursued the expansion of the undeveloped
television service which had started to operate in February
1966 for a mere two hours daily. Until the mid-1960s Greece was
the only Western European country without a television network.
Deliberations for the introduction of television had started
as early as 1952. Throughout the 1950s three international
competitions were held for the Installation of a preliminary
television system, but all were annulled for reasons which were
never fully explained in public96.
In 1960 it was announced by the ERE government that a
significant part of the Italian war reparations was to be used
for the technical refurbishment of the radio network, the
Installation of television transmission equipment and the
establishment of an industry for the production of cheap radio
and television receivers. The decision generated an uproar
within the opposition who accused the government of wasting
vital resources for the provision of a luxury good such as
television that, given the economic conditions of the time, the
country could ill afford. Eventually the project was dropped
and the Italian money directed to other sectors of the
economy97 . It seemed that whereas politicians considered the
Introduction of television as an important step towards the
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However, as early as December 1967 the dictators decided to
proceed quickly with the development of television; thus, they
took up ERE's architectural scheme In Its entirety and proposed
to construct new headquarters for the Institute In the Athens
suburb of Aghla Paraskevi at an estimated cost of 85 million
drachmas excluding the technical equipment. The actual
construction started in 1970 and finished three years later,
six months behind schedule and at a final cost of 250 million
drachmas - almost three times above the original estimate.
There were allegations of embezzlement and fraud, but these
were never proved102 . The completed building had an excessive
number of radio studios, corridors and...toilets and was In all
respects completely unsuitable for television production. There
were only three television studios, the smallest with an area
of 70 square metres and the biggest of 165 square metres-°3.
This was due to the fact that the 'white marble monument' which
was erected for EIR was In fact only the rear wing of the
initial plan, which was to house the radio studios and the
laboratories of film processing for television programmes.
There was to be a front wing for offices, two large television
studios and a huge theatre for concerts and performances'04.
The front part was never to be built and so all offices,
laboratories and studios had to be squeezed Into the rear
building. An explanation for this must have been the enormous
increase In the cost of the project which prevented the
construction of the most important front part of the building.
Another major reason must have been the dictators' need to add
as soon as possible the new headquarters of EIR to the large
number of embellishing constructions with which they intended
to give the impression that they were well engaged In the huge
task of 'national reconstruction'.
The colonels forged ahead with the re-equipment plan as this
had been formulated by the ERE government. A new international
competition was held In March 1968, though not without
complications. The successful bidder with a tender of just over
-180-
$16 million was the American-Italian company Page Europa SPA,
which was not a producer of transmitting equipment but acted as
an intermediary for other manufacturers. The loser in the
tendering process was Thomson-Houston CSF of France with a
higher bid. Thomson challenged the deal which showed Page as
being the most competitive and alleged that secret negotiations
had taken place between government officials and Page. It
appeared that although Page did not fulfil many of the terms of
the tender, it was favoured by the dictators. The pro-regime
Estia twice called on Papadopoulos to investigate the matter
and end the controversy. In response to this pressure,
Papadopoulos rescinded the deal in January 1969, but after a
brief period of consideration Page was eventually awarded the
contract 1-° 5 . Due to preventive censorship, no further details
were publicised at that time. In the period following the
downfall of the junta, the press and various politicians made
passing references to what was termed the Page-Europa scandal,
but despite calls from the opposition the Conservative
government conducted no investigation on the matter and the
whole story was soon forgotten-° 6 . EIRT, however, was to suffer
for a long time the effects of the junta's excessive
expenditure in developing broadcasting. The construction of the
broadcasting house together with the purchase of new equipment
bestowed the Institute with a deficit amounting to 743 million
drachmas for the period 1971-74, which It struggled to cover
for years through interest bearing credit from the Loan and
Consignment Fund107.
4.6.2 The establishment of the 'military channel'
The dictators also sought to organize the various radio
stations of the armed forces into a unitary broadcasting
network which would include the newly established television
service. The military had started efforts to expand into
television as early as 1964, but permission had been refused by
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the Centre Union government. Nevertheless, under the palace-
backed governments which succeeded the EK, the armed forces
managed to start their television service in April 1966 for
three nights a week 108 . Such was the eagerness of the military
leadership to establish a regular television service, that the
whole venture started before the necessary headquarters were
built and the technical infra-structure obtained. Initially,
the military television service was housed in the Geographical
Service of the Army in Athens and later moved to a building
which had formerly served as dormitories for conscripts109.
Soon after the establishment of the dictatorship, however, the
construction of a new building for television began next to the
dormitories. This was intended to cover the needs of daily
programming which had commenced in 1968 for three hours In the
evening.
In 1970, the same year that the new legislation on EIRT
appeared, the dictators decided to put their broadcasting house
in order by establishing a new unitary service for both radio
and television. The new Information Service of the Armed Forces
(YENED) which was established by Legislative Decree 722/1970,
was nothing more than a military unit placed under the control
of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. It was to be
administered by a military commander and his deputy and was to
employ military personnel, officers, warrant officers and
conscripts as well as civilians. The main functions of YENED
were: the operation of psychological warfare according to the
guidelines given by the General Staff; the national, moral and
social education and information primarily of the armed forces
and secondly of the people; the Information of the public on
the work done by the armed forces; the strengthening of
national morale in wartime; and the training of military staff
on the use of audiovisual technology. These functions clearly
reflected the militaristic mentality that the junta wanted to
inspire to the new institution. The aims of the second
broadcasting organization of Greece had nothing to do with the
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traditional principles of public service broadcasting, that is,
to educate, inform and entertain. Instead, YENED would aim at
the indoctrination of both the armed forces and the public with
the 'national' ideals of the dictators. For this reason, in
addition to the radio and television services, YENED also
included a directorate for cinema which was responsible for the
production of films and other visual material to be used mainly
for propaganda purposes. Among others things, this directorate
would be responsible for productions aiming at "the promotion
of major events, the exaltation of heroic deeds and the
boosting of national morale"110.
The organization and operation of YENED were imbued with the
militaristic mentality which characterised all units of the
armed forces. All aspects of YENED's policy such as
administration, selection of personnel and general programming,
were the province of Its military commander and his deputy111.
Also, all directorates of the network (radio, television and
cinema) were manned by military officers. Within the service
operated a personnel bureau, dealing among other things with
matters of military recruitment and the preservation of order
and dIscip1Ine-' 2 . There was also, a bureau of information
which among other tasks was responsible for the 'enlightenment
and national education' of personnel, the issuing of special
Identification cards for all employees and most important of
all, for the scrutiny of all employees' loyalty to the
regime 113 . Strikes were forbidden, as was any activity which
could cause disruption to the operation of YENED. Also
forbidden were all public discussions of political matters by
personnel while on duty; the reading of the press; the
disclosure of any kind of information regarding the network and
the organization of any meeting for any purpose without
previous authorization by the Commander in Chief of the armed
forces. One of the main characteristics of the internal
regulations was their moralising language and content. The
personnel had to behave Impeccably and with decency, to respect
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all commands pertaining to security, order and discipline and
to show hierarchical obedience" 114 . Apparently, one of the
purposes of the regulations was to educate the employees on
discipline, one of the main components of militaristic
ideology.
Like EIRT, YENED was under the control of Papadopoulos, not
only in his capacity as Minister of Defence, but also because
the dictator had appointed to the post of network's chief a
personal friend and classmate, Brigadier General Tryphon
Apostolopoulos 115 . The control of both networks became even
more centralized in 1972 when Papadopoulos decided to set up a
committee at the General Secretariat of Press and Information
with the sole task of defining the terms of operation of radio
and television' 16 . It consisted of the Undersecretary of the
Ministry to the Prime Minister, the Secretary General of Press
and Information, the Director General of EIRT, a top-rank
official of the Armed Forces High Command and the commander of
YENED. The committee would set the guidelines for the content
of programmes on both networks "according to the cultural,
social, national, and other needs of the state". It would also,
coordinate the programming of both networks, outline a common
economic policy regarding advertising and define the prices and
method for the purchase of films for television. In this way,
every aspect of programming policy was to be defined centrally
by this committee which in turn was answerable to Papadopoulos,
not only because it was part of the GSPI, but also because most
of its members were appointed to their posts by him. At the
same time, the two broadcasting organizations, deprived of the
relative independence to make decision on even secondary
matters, were turned into mere instruments of the regime's
propaganda.
Nevertheless, despite the domination of both networks by
military men, there was still a major difference between EIRT
and YENED. The former continued to be a 'civilian' network
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under the control of the government, employing civilian staff.
EIRT was no more militarized than most other sectors of the
state apparatus under the military dictatorship. YENED on the
other hand was organized as a military unit; it operated
according to the general rules applied to the operation of any
other sector in the armed forces. In some cases the operation
and needs of a nationwide broadcasting service were
incompatible with the mission of the military. For instance,
the main source of revenue for YENED was income from
advertising on both radio and television. Advertising, as a
profit-making activity, was incompatible with the mission of a
military unit. Apparently the dictators, cautious not to
overload the budget of the MoD with the huge expense of a
broadcasting network, resorted to advertising in order to cover
YENED's financial needs117.
4.6.3 Television programming policy or junta-style propaganda?
It was in this climate of militarism and improvisation that
regular programming started on television. There was no
properly organized news department, or indeed any other
department for television in either network. Initially news
bulletins consisted of a studio announcer reading the news to
the camera. The only visual material were photographs and
footage from the Greek Newsreel - an account of the week's
events prepared by the Ministry to the Prime Minister and
released to cinemas to be shown usually before the scheduled
film. It contained general interest information and coverage of
political events, mainly projecting the government of the day.
Soon, however, EIRT started to organize a special news
department for television. A camera for outdoor filming was
bought and footage of one or two minutes was added. By the last
years of the dictatorship EIRT had increased its news
programmes to three daily bulletins and enriched its visual
material with footage from Visnews, UPI and Eurovision118.
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The television service of the armed forces was much less
organized; news was written by the same team which prepared the
radio bulletins and consequently the content of radio and
television news programmes was basically the same. This team
was housed in a building formerly used as the dressing rooms of
the Army School of Gymnastics, which was scornfully called by
the employees the 'hen-coop' of news. Later, however, the news
department of YENED moved to the new premises built by the
dictators especially for television 119 . On Sundays YENED
television presented a 'tele-newspaper', prepared by a team of
journalists of the pro-regime paper Nea Politela; later, the
'tele-newspaper' became the daily news programme of the
network.
News programmes were the regular slots in television
programming for the image projection of the dictatorial
government. Both networks were compelled to transmit all
Papadopoulos' tape recorded speeches in full. Later, however,
some editing was made, as the dictator could consume with his
verbosity the entire broadcast time' 20 . In addition to the
Prime Minister's speeches, news also involved constant coverage
of all government activities. In view of the general stagnation
of the regime the dictators were keen to appear to be engaged
in constructive work. Television screens, therefore, were
constantly occupied with pictures of ministers cutting ribbons
and turning sods. The most common feature of all was Deputy
Premier S. Pattakos, who appeared on television laying so many
cornerstones that he became publicly known as 'Mr Trowel'.
It is impossible to obtain accurate information as to how
censorship committees operated. According to one source most
journalists employed by the two networks subjected themselves
to self-censorship121 . In a number of cases, members of staff
who had escaped dismissal following thorough scrutiny of their
political affiliations could not cope with the policy of hymns
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and praises to the regime and consequently were either
dismissed or forced to resign1-22.
As part of an overall propaganda programme, government
information on radio and television was organized by the
Minister to the Prime Minister, George Georgalas, who as a
wartime Communist had been trained by Agitprop. Each Friday
evening he would practise his skills on YENED television in a
programme called New Horizons. No matter the topic, he would
always come to the same conclusion, that the coup was a popular
revolution aimed at saving the country from disaster1-23.
The rest of the programming consisted of ancient American
series and British, French, German and American documentaries
and travelogues. With the introduction of commercials in
September 1967, the television service of the armed forces
began transmission of a large number of popular foreign series,
mostly American, which attracted large audiences and
subsequently a large number of advertisements' 24 . A similar
policy was followed by EIRT which introduced commercials in
1970. Before long, both networks had started the production of
their own series. Not surprisingly, the main themes were often
inspired by Greek history and tradition. The armed forces were
glorified. In the most popular of all series, a heroic Greek
colonel of the armed forces intelligence service was fighting
during peace-time to defend national ideals.
Television also promoted sports, and especially football
which was offered in heavy doses to the audience as an antidote
for lack of participation in politics. The encouragement of
sporting activity was one of the main projects of the colonels
who added to their embellishing constructions a large number of
sports grounds. One of the main slogans constantly repeated on
radio and television was: 'Every city with a stadium, every
village with a gymnasium'. In the four-year period 1967-1970
the average annual rate of expansion in central government
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spending was particularly pronounced in sport (estimated at
more than 50 per cent)125.
Daily programming was dominated by light, easily digested
material on both radio and television. The colonels imposed
their own standards on broadcasting production; at YENED, with
a decree issued by Papadopoulos in 1970, three censorship
committees were set up to vet all output of radio and
television. According to the decree, the content of programmes
should not offend public decency; convey political messages;
rekindle political passions; or be imbued with pessimism126.
As might be expected, the dictators were completely indifferent
to questions regarding programme quality or the cultural role
that broadcasting could perform within Greek society.
Television production was almost entirely left in the hands of
external producers who received the lion's share of the
channels' advertising revenue. Programming policy was based on
the profitability of a particular programme and television
output was flooded with light entertainment programmes and
commercials 127 . This was particularly true for YENED, about
which Apogevmatini wrote in 1971: "If Greek television as a
whole possesses the European record of babble and bad taste,
YENED is - save for very rare examples - a can in which the
most unbelievable advertising concoctions are preserved". The
paper also urged the government to set up a programming
committee of academics and artists to draw up the standards for
television output and to free the two networks from the
exploitation of self-proclaimed producers 128 but to no avail.
In general, television was exploited by the dictators as a
major means for the propagation of their ideals and the
promotion of their policies. It also reflected the dictators'
attempt to create a society preoccupied with consumerism,
entertainment and sport, and Indifferent to politics. Through
an economic policy which encouraged demand and turned
consumerism into a social value the dictators sought to create
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the basis for a new social consensus. In this context,
possession of a television set was popularly seen as an
additional source of social prestige, while through commercials
the medium promoted the new consumerist lifestyle. This was
reflected in the increase of set ownership throughout the
dictatorship: while in 1966 the ratio of television sets per
1,000 inhabitants was 0.4, by 1972 it had increased to 58.7 and
reached 107 a year later 129 . By the early 1970s, television had
already become the dominant form of mass entertainment, a
development which had disastrous consequences for cinema.
Between 1970 and 1975 the number of cinema-goers fell by nearly
two thirds (from 128.6 to 47.9 million)130.
Greek popular drama series and quizzes reproduced the model
of cheap and light entertainment that the domestic cinema
industry offered to the large mass audience which was
uneducated culturally and indifferent towards the arts' 31 . As a
result, within a decade (1965-1975) production plunged from 131
to 38 films annually; consequently, a significant number of
film producers who had been attracted to the cinema industry
because of the great profit opportunities it offered, turned
their attention to television production132.
In short, Greek television developed at a time that cultural
production was at a standstill, party politics had disappeared
and free expression was deemed to be an offence. The main
purpose of the new medium was to serve the junta's need for
propaganda. As a result a great part of the population tuned In
to the Greek-language programmes of many foreign radio
stations (London, Paris, Moscow) and especially Deutche Welle
from Cologne, whose transmissions were the most outspoken and
critical of the regime 133 . In practical terms, the hasty
fashion In which television was established caused severe
disruptions to both networks' operation, many of which are felt
to the present day. Greek television is still suffering from a
lack of proper premises and technical equipment, as well as
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from an Irrational and incoherent organization which has its
roots in the years of the dictatorship. These effects will be
examined In the chapters which follow.
4.7 Deadlock: The failure of the regime to be legitimated
Despite the blatant propaganda via the media, public opinion
both domestic and international was hostile to the junta.
Moreover, Papadopoulos' determination to exercise power alone
appeared to have resulted In the complete disorganization of
the state machine. The state of the ?revolutIon* was most
explicitly outlined in a letter from Pattakos to Papadopoulos
in 1968. In it, Pattakos asked the arch dictator to reorganize
government, accept collective leadership and deal more
effectively with the Information apparatus In order to counter-
balance the negative publicity which the regime had received
worldwide134 . It seemed that, due to lack of popular consent
and to Internal fighting within the junta, the dictatorship was
already in a position of deadlock only a year after the coup.
A major blow for the military government was Its continuous
political isolation by Greek politicians as well as by foreign
governments and organizations. The opposition of most prominent
political figures, not only from the Centre and Left but also
from the Right demolished the dictators' plans for a long-term
coalition of forces with the support of the Conservatives.
Through statements and declarations to the foreign media and
appearances as defence witnesses at the trials of political
prisoners, politicians such as G. Papandreou, P. Kanellopoulos,
K. Karamanlis and many others expressed their rejection of the
dictatorship as a solution to the country's chronic political
problems. Moreover, International reaction to the coup from a
very early stage indicated that the regime was short of
political support outside the country. Opposition to the
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regime was most explicitly expressed by international
organizations such as the Council of Europe, the European
Commission of Human Rights, the International Press Institute
and Amnesty International135.
At the same time, within the country and abroad various
resistance organizations were set up, mostly by politicians and
activists of the Centre and the Left. Prominent among these
organizations were the Patriotic Antidictatorial Front (PAN)
established as early as May 1967 mainly by members of EDA and
trade unionists; the Democratic Defence, the major resistance
organization of the Centre; the Panhellenic Liberation Front
established by A.Papandreou In exile; and other smaller groups.
Although these organizations lacked the massive membership
required for an effective confrontation with the dictatorship,
their activities aroused public opinion, especially abroad, and
became a constant reminder to the junta of its lack of popular
support. To these organizations must be added the large number
of artists, intellectuals and journalists who fled abroad and
engaged themselves in an Intensive anti-junta campaign136.
More Importantly, the dictators were confronted with the
passive opposition of the population within the country. On
some occasions In particular, this opposition took a massive
and overt character as in November 1968 when as many as 300,000
gathered for the funeral of G. Papandreou, shouting slogans
against the dictatorship. As Pattakos's letter indicated, after
a year In power the junta had realised that the creation of a
new social consensus was a very difficult task.
The colonels had set as their main objective the
intensification of the process of economic development which
the civilian governments had started In the early 1960 g . Rapid
economic growth and a spectacular rise In living standards,
constituted for the dictators a political necessity	 in their
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effort to win the support of the people and consolidate their
power.
In fact, the first three years of the dictatorship were
characterized by a substantial increase in GNP (from 162,280
million drachmas in 1966, to 185,600 million in 1968, and to
219,500 million In 1970) 137 and in Industrial production138.
This growth, however, was largely the outcome of the extensive
investment (especially In key areas such as chemicals,
metallurgy and refineries) which had taken place in the period
preceding the coup, and of the development by the junta of
unproductive sectors such as construction and tourism. In
general, the economic policy of the dictators aimed at creating
the impression of rapid development and Increasing prosperity.
For this reason, resources were mainly directed to
construction, tourism and the manufacture of light consumer
goods at the expense of other productive sectors of the
economy.
As a result, In the period 1967-1972, investment In
construction of public works and buildings doubled, while
investment in tourism increased sixfold between 1967 and 1973.
During the same period, investment in housing Increased by 115
per cent. By contrast, the share of investment in industry as
part of total investment fell from 12.5 per cent In 1965 to
10.3 per cent in 1971. It is characteristic that no industrial
unit of advanced technology was built during the seven years of
the dictatorship139.
The junta promoted a consumerist model of society and
consumption Increased to an unprecedented extent due to the
significant rise of Income, especially of the middle and upper
classes. Private per capita consumption increased from $780 In
1970 to $1,413 in 1974140 and excessive demand (demand which
cannot be satisfied by national production) increased sevenfold
between 1967 and 1973141.
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The disastrous effects of this policy on the economy as a
whole were soon to appear and to become particularly pronounced
during the international crisis of 1973. Between 1965 and 1973
imports as a remedy against imminent inflation increased three
times142 and this seriously affected the balance of payments
deficit which in the period 1972-73 alone increased from
$367,000 to $1,175 million. In order to pay for the increased
imports, the junta resorted to external borrowing. As a
consequence, in 1973 foreign debt reached $3.3 billion'43.
Moreover, the dictators proved unable to control inflation
which due to the effects of the international economic
situation and especially the energy crisis, rose from 4.4 per
cent in 1972 to 15.5 per cent in 1973 and to a record 31.9 per
cent in 1974, the second highest of all OECD countries'44.
The dictators had been keen to attract foreign capital in
order to accelerate the pace of economic development and to
achieve the political support of foreign governments. Yet,
never throughout the seven years of the dictatorship did
foreign investment reach the proportions of the 1965-66 period.
On the contrary, the influx of foreign capital fell
dramatically in the first three years of the dictatorship to
start rising again only in 1970. All in all, in the period
1967-1973 foreign capital Invested in industry did not exceed
$300 million, only $80 million more than the seven-year period
preceding the coup' 45 . The average rate of Increase in
Industrial Investment fell from 20.5 per cent In the period
1961-66 to 10 per cent in the period 1967-71. Apparently, the
dictatorship did not constitute a guarantee for political
stability or social calm for either domestic or foreign capital
holders.
Finally, the dictators' economic policy combined with the
prevention of strikes and other repressive measures, deepened
social inequalities and seriously affected the lower income
groups. To give only one example, within 1973 average wages in
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manufacture increased by 12 per cent while food prices had gone
up by 21.2 per cent and the price index by 16 per cent. Hence,
in practice there was a substantial decrease in real wages146.
4.8 Internal contradictions and the failure of liberalization.
Setbacks in economic policy as well as the constant
expression of opposition against the regime aggravated the
contradictions within the junta itself. From the early years of
the dictatorship there was a continuous fight among the
different factions within the junta, which reflected the
colonels' complete lack of a coherent policy. A major reason
for the conflict was Papadopoulos' insistence on monopolizing
power, which ran counter to the interests and ambitions of
other groups within the junta. Moreover, there was a clash
between the 'moderates' and the 'intransigents'. The former,
headed by Papadopoulos, were in favour of measures which would
give the impression of a gradual liberalization and would
subsequently generate support for the regime. The latter
insisted upon the application of more 'radical' policies, such
as the abolition of the monarchy, and stricter measures of
repression against political opponents. The result was the
eruption of periodical crises within the junta, estimated at
one a year. The continuous fighting led Papadopoulos gradually
to concentrate most powers in his own hands, so that he could
control the state machine more effectively. By June 1973,
Papadopoulos was simultaneously Regent, Prime Minister,
Minister responsible for government policy, Minister of Defence
and Minister of External Affairs.
Anxious to generate political support for the regime both
within the country and Internationally, Papadopoulos started as
early as the end of 1967 to Introduce measures which gave the
impression that the coup was a temporary aberration from
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parliamentarism and that representative institutions would be
gradually restored. Thus in the wake of the King's abortive
counter-coup Papadopoulos decided to free most of the political
leaders, including George and Andreas Papandreou and
Kanellopoulos. In 1968 a referendum on the new Constitution was
also announced. In this way the regime would be vested with a
sort of constitutional legality and appear as having the
endorsement of the overwhelming majority of the people.
Papadopoulos' tactic to create the illusion of an imminent
return to parliamentarism was the reason for the establishment
in 1970 of a 'mini Parliament', an advisory body whose members
were elected by unions and organizations approved by the junta.
Other measures included the abolition of 'certificates of
social beliefs', a major component of the post-war repressive
apparatus; the gradual lifting of martial law; the release of
most political prisoners; and the closure of all concentration
camps147.
Nevertheless, none of these measures helped the junta to
Increase its popularity. The dictators also failed to attract
the support of a large part of the Greek bourgeoisie, as the
stance of the latter's parliamentary and publishing
representatives made clear. New measures were therefore
necessary to bring the dictatorship out of the impasse and
guarantee Its continuation.
A significant development in 1973 became the catalyst for
a major reform of the regime. In May that year a large group of
royalist navy officers staged a revolt which aimed to overthrow
the dictators, bring back the King and restore parliamentary
institutions. Although the attempt eventually failed, it proved
nevertheless that the basis of support for the junta had
become dangerously narrow, even within the armed forces' 48 . The
revolt of the largely royalist navy gave the dictator the
opportunity to get rid of the monarchy officially, although
there was no evidence of any immediate involvement by the King.
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The abolition of an institution which had been identified
with many of the country's misfortunes and the post-war
repressive regime could be presented as a measure towards the
democratization of the political system. By eliminating a much
hated institution, Papadopoulos could appear as a reformer and
even hope to gain the support of the more progressive, anti-
royalist part of the population. The package of reforms
included the establishment of a 'Presidential Republic', the
return to parliamentarism and the preparation of general
elections. Papadopoulos was to become the first President of
the Republic for a period of seven years, that Is until June
1981. The constitution of 1968 was to be modified accordingly
and a referendum was to be held in July 1973 for a popular
endorsement of the Republic 149 . The reform of the Constitution
was accompanied by the application of a number of major
measures of liberalization. Hence,the law on the 'state of
siege' was lifted completely and an amnesty was granted to all
political prisoners. Moreover, the freedom of the press was
restored and newspapers were free, for the first time in six
years, to openly criticize the regime.
To mark the transition from dictatorship to parllamentarism,
Papadopoulos resigned as Prime Minister on 8 October 1973 and a
new government was formed, consisting only of civilians. No
member of the junta was Included. The new Prime Minister was
the only prominent politician who agreed to cooperate with the
junta, the right-wing Spyros Markezlnis. The new government was
to hold general elections by the end of 1974.
Papadopoulos' reforms reflected the major contradiction of
the regime: the dictatorship was established in order to
preserve the post war balance of forces and the domination of
the military within it. Then, as repression failed to secure
the new regime, the restoration of parliamentarism was the only
option left If this domination was to be legitimated and the
powers of the military preserved.
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Nevertheless, the regime established by the 1973
constitution could hardly be considered a democracy, so far as
the powers of the government and Parliament severely
restricted. The real centre of power was to be the President
of the Republic who was to be directly elected for a seven-
year term. The competences of the head of state would be both
executive and legislative, with most important of all his
exclusive control over three key areas of policy: defence,
public order and foreign affairs 150 . Moreover, the President
was empowered to activate the law on the 'state of siege',
suspend the civil liberties provisions and dismiss the Prime
Minister whenever he considered it necessary. Finally, he was
to appoint 20 of the 200 members of Parliament.
Behind the parliamentary facade the role of the military
would continue to be central, but now the latter would not be
immediately involved in politics. It would exercise its powers
through the President, who would also be the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Hence, Greece would
continue to be a military state, with the domination of the
armed forces concealed behind a weak Parliament and a powerful
President of the Republic.
It was to be shown before the end of 1973, however, that the
prospects of legitimating the dictatorship even under its
'democratic' disguise were limited. The reforms were rejected
by the majority of politicians, who even staged a campaign
against the new Constitution before the referendum. Moreover,
the junta's liberal measures did not attract the anticipated
support of the masses. On the contrary, in a climate of general
discontent, these measures became the fissures through which
opposition to the regime was finally and fiercely expressed.
Throughout 1973, dissent against the dictatorship was
manifested on several occasions, most serious among them the
occupation of the Athens Law School by students in February. It
was not until the uprising by the students of the Athens
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Polytechnic, however, that a major confrontation between the
junta and the masses took place. In November that year, after
the demands of University and Polytechnic students for reforms
in higher education had been rejected by Markezinis's
government, the students occupied the Polytechnic school in the
centre of Athens from where they protested against the
authoritarianism of the regime and called on the citizens to
join them. Although this event did not lead to a popular
uprising, the massive support offered by the people to the
students, the clashes of protestors with the police and the
disruption of daily life in the capital, were enough to prove
that liberalization could not generate support for the
dictatorship. After three days of embarrassment for the
government, troops and tanks were sent in to end the uprising,
killing at least 23 the protestors injuring another 1028151.
The declaration of martial law all over the country which
followed the student revolt marked the end of Papadopoulos'
experiment and proved that there was no half-way house to
democracy. The dictatorship had either to collapse or reinforce
its repressive mechanisms. The situation was similar to that in
the period immediately before the coup and once again the
solution was to be repression. On November 25 a faction of
hard-liners headed by the chief of the notorious military
police (ESA) brigadier Dimitrios loannides, overthrew
Papadopoulos and the government of Markezinis. After the events
at the Polytechnic, the new powerful men of the junta were
convinced that there was no possibility for the regime to be
legitimated. The only way to preserve their power was overt
terror. All liberal measures introduced a few months earlier
were abolished, either officially or in practice. The
concentration camps were once again opened and many prominent
politicians arrested.
On July 15 1974, loannides made a last desperate effort
to consolidate his power through a 'nationalistic triumph'152
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in Cyprus. Regrettably, the aims of the military junta and the
conditions under which the Cyprus adventure was planned and
executed have so far remained obscure with the official silence
on the issue preventing a full explanation of the Cypriot
crisis. Briefly, the venture involved an attempt to overthrow
the head of Cyprus, Archbishop Macarios, which, according to
the more convincing explanation offered by political analysts
and historians, was to result in the partition of the island
into North and South and the annexation of the two parts by
Turkey and Greece respectively' 53 . Whatever the reason,
loannides's coup in Cyprus led to disaster in the island
and near war with Turkey. The dictators suddenly appeared
powerless and unable to cope with a major national crisis. The
danger of a Turkish attack on other fronts and the chaotic
situation within Greece - caused mainly by the general
mobilization - created the conditions for a peaceful downfall
of the dictatorship.
The leadership of the armed forces decided to dissociate
itself from loannides's junta and to hand over power to the
politicians in order to save the military's prestige and
dominant position within the power structure' 54 . In this way,
the armed forces would appear as being at the centre of the
process for a solution of the crisis and the restoration of
democratic institutions. It was the only option left if the
prestige and domination of the military were to be preserved
before popular discontent, aggravated by a national disaster,
threatened not only the political regime but also the
established social order155.
For this reason the military officers who decided to give up
power also selected the political leader who was to succeed the
dictators. Their choice was the right-wing Constantine
Karamanlis, former leader of ERE. They hoped that Karamanlis
with his authoritarian, anti-communist past as Prime Minister,
could guarantee that the political change would not endanger
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the post-war structure of power and that the participation of
the masses in politics would be limited. Such a solution,
however, was incompatible with developments in civil society.
Karamanlis had realized that a return to the pre-1967 situation
would only perpetuate the crisis of political institutions.
The current of democratic change which had been stopped
forcefully in 1967 was now irreversible.
4.9 Conclusion
The 1967 dictatorship was an attempt by the military to
preserve the repressive post-war regime and its dominant role
within it at a time when they were both threatened by an
unprecedented political mobilization. The clearly political
character of the crisis of the 1960s, the absence of a class
struggle and the broad acceptance of parliamentary institutions
as the only means through which this crisis could be resolved
are the keys for understanding the unpopularity and final
collapse of the dictatorship. The dictators enjoyed neither the
support of the masses, nor that of the largest part of the
Greek bourgeoisie, as was demonstrated by the stance adopted
by the latter's publishing and parliamentary representatives
and also by the reluctance of industrialists to invest.
Although opposition to the regime remained passive and not
widespread, it was enough to prove that the dictatorship could
not be legitimated. Thus, the pursuit of popular consent and
consequently of the legitimation of the regime became the major
determinant of the colonels' general policies.
The junta seized power without a clear-cut and coherent
political strategy. In practice, it took over the programme of
economic development introduced by previous governments and
sought to apply it In a way that could generate political
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support for the regime. However, as the colonels' policies
failed to create a new social consensus and as the regime sank
deeper into stagnation, it became clear that the power of the
military could not be preserved through repression. A degree
of liberalization was necessary to safeguard military
domination. This was the major contradiction of the
dictatorship. With Papadopoulos' experiment of liberalization
ending in a fierce showdown between the junta and the masses,
and in the reinforcement of repression, it was finally evident
that the road of the dictatorship was in fact an impasse.
Finally, faced with the danger of a national disaster after the
events in Cyprus, the military consented to surrender power to
the politicians in order to secure its central role in the
restored democratic regime, before a mobilization of the
masses threatened not only the power of the military but also
the domination of the bourgeoisie.
Faced with opposition at home as well as international
outcry, the dictators saw the mass media as key weapons in
their fight for legitimacy. Papadopoulos' decision to conduct
personally the junta's Information policy reflected the
importance that the colonels attributed to the mass media as
means of propaganda.
Broadcasting, due to its organization as a state monopoly
and the long-established practice of tight government control,
was particularly vulnerable to manipulation by the junta.
During the dictatorship radio and especially television became
the prime means for the conduct of the colonels' propaganda.
The junta sought to expand the medium of television which,
through its capacity to present events visually, offered the
unknown dictators the opportunity to promote their policies and
to become familiar faces to the public. Hence, television
output largely consisted of programmes projecting the military
government and the ideals of the Greece of Christian Greeks
that the dictators intended to create. Moreover, through
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advertising and populist programming, television was used as a
means for the promotion of a new lifestyle characterized by
political apathy, consumerism and a passion for sport and light
entertainment. Finally, television as a consumer durable came
to symbolize the raised standard of living of the Greeks and
the illusion of prosperity that the dictators were keen to
create as part of their attempt to establish a new social
consensus.
In order to satisfy their needs for propaganda, the
dictators set up television in a haphazard fashion without any
prior planning and without having understood the particular
needs of the new medium. As a result, the television services
in Greece suffer up to the present day from a lack of suitable
premises, outdated equipment and an irrational internal
organization, all of which have had their effects on the
quality of daily output. Radio and television were left
completely discredited by the dictators. In the following
chapter we will examine how, if at all, the role of
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CHAPTER 5
THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: THE YEARS OF CONSERVATIVE
GOVERNMENT 1974-1981
5.1 Introduction
The reforms which were introduced after the collapse of the
dictatorship gave birth to a democratic system the main
characteristics of which were: the legalization of the
communist parties and the establishment of a fully competitive
party system; the abolition of the monarchy and the retreat to
the political backstage of the military; and the emergence of a
new dominant force of the Right, New Democracy, which had fully
dissociated itself from Its anti-communist, royalist past.
However, there was also a significant degree of continuity
between the pre-1967 and the post-1974 systems as many
traditional structures and practices persisted within the Greek
political forces and especially the governing ND. The latter
failed to develop into a modern mass party similar to its
European counterparts as its leader Constantine Karamanlis had
Intended. Instead, it continued to rely heavily on clientelism
and the charismatic personality of its leader and remained
largely under the influence of its ultra-conservative wing.
Thus, although It introduced some significant measures aiming
at the modernization of the economic and social structures,
ND's policy was also characterized by paternalistic practices
which contributed to a high degree to the political
polarization. In this chapter we will examine the conditions
and factors which shaped the content of the democratic reforms
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after 1974, and evaluate the changes in the party political
system and ND's policies in the seven years that it held power.
5.2 The political reform of 1974-1975
The democratic reforms which took place after July 1974 were
largely determined by the particular conditions under which
power was transferred from the military to the politicians. In
considering the transition to democracy in Greece two points
should be highlighted: 1) the downfall of the dictatorship was
not caused by any massive pro-democracy movement. With the
exception of the student uprisings in 1973 and the activities
of a number of resistance groups with limited membership
usually based abroad, the largest part of the population
remained inactive, manifesting its resentment of the
dictatorship through passive opposition. Thus, the Greek junta
never experienced the unprecedented pressure of an increasingly
militant working class movement as did the Francoist regime in
the late sixties and early seventies'. Nor was the collapse of
the dictatorship the result of a counter coup by a radical
faction within the armed forces as In the case of Portugal. The
initiative for the transfer of power to the politicians was
taken from above, by the top ranks of the military itself amid
the debacle caused by the Cyprus adventure - the last desperate
attempt of the junta to legitimate the dictatorial regime
through a nationalistic 'success'- and the subsequent danger of
war with Turkey. As a national disaster could threaten not
only the dominance of the military, but also the existing
socio-economic order, a part of the military leadership decided
to dissociate itself from the loannides junta and to turn to
the politicians in order to safeguard both the status quo and
in particular the power of the armed forces within it.
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The aim of the military leadership was the liberalization of
the regime and the preservation of the post-war authoritarian
political structures. The choice of Constantine Karamanlis to
preside over the first civilian government in seven years
reflected most clearly the plan of the military to safeguard a
high degree of continuity with the pre-1967 political system.
Karamanlis' authoritarian anti-communist past as leader of the
Right in most of the 1950s and early 1960s, coupled with his
powerful charismatic personality, led to the abandonment of an
earlier proposal for a government under the more liberal leader
of the Right-wing ERE, Panayotis Kanellopoulos, as Prime
Minister and the titular leader of the Centre Union (EK),
George Mavros, as deputy Prime Minister. In contrast to the
outspoken anti-dictatorial stance of the latter two,
Karamanlis' criticism of the regime was moderate and limited to
a few occasional statements from his self-exile in Paris; he
enjoyed, therefore, the confidence of the military while
appearing at the same time as a critic of the dictatorship.
ii) On the other hand, despite the absence of widespread
opposition to the junta, the fact remained that the primary
reason for the collapse of the dictatorial regime was Its
Inability to gain legitimacy among the vast majority of the
people, as was most clearly manifested by the failure of
Papadopoulos's strategy of liberalization. Until the end, the
military junta had to face popular rejection together with
political and diplomatic isolation. Moreover, with the
unprecedented radicalization of major parts of the population
throughout the previous decade, 	 demands for thorough
democratic reforms, which had led to the crisis of the
repressive parliamentary regime in the 1960s, 	 were now
repeated more fiercely than ever before.
Karamanlis was faced with the delicate task of reconciling
and balancing the interests of the military with the popular
pressure for democratic reform. Thus, in order to win the
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consent and cooperation of the social and political forces
beyond the Right, and to maintain national solidarity at a
time when a peaceful settlement with Turkey was a top priority,
Karamanlis formed a coalition government with the participation
of representatives of both right-wing and centrist forces,
but to the exclusion of the Left. His strategy of maintaining
the sensitive balance between the military and the people was
reflected In the appointments of G. Mavros as deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs and of the
conservative Evangelos Averoff to the post of Minister of
Defence. The latter enjoyed considerable confidence within
the military as one of the very few politicians to have called
for a rapprochement between the junta and the political world
during the dictatorship. Also, Karamanlis maintained as interim
head of state General Phaedon Gizikis, the President of the so-
called Republic appointed by the loannides regime. Extreme
caution was applied in the handling of what constituted one of
the most sensitive issues of the transition and the most
pressing of popular deinands,the punishment of those responsible
for the establishment of the dictatorship and their accomplices
in the security forces. It was only in October, and only after
the initiation of three private prosecutions by five lawyers
alleging high treason, that five protagonists of the 1967 coup,
including Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos, were arrested
and banished to an island. loannides was not placed in custody
until January 1975. All in all, charges of high treason were
passed on 24 of those involved In the establishment of the
dictatorship. Of these, Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos
were tried and sentenced to death on 23 August 1975, but a
couple of days later the government decided to turn their
sentences Into life Imprisonment 2 . Eight other defendants in
the same trial also received life sentences.
The trial of those responsible for the Polytechnic massacre
was held In the Autumn of 1975, while another two trials were
held for the torturers of the military police. Three of the
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commanders were sentenced to 20-23 year imprisonment and
another thirteen people received shorter sentences. In
contrast, the torturers from the Security Police were either
acquitted or imprisoned for very short periods of time3.
Additionally, some 104 members of the dictatorial governments
escaped prosecution through a legal device introduced by a
Supreme Court decision4 . In all, the prosecutions were
restricted to those at the top of the decision-making hierarchy
of the military regime. Similarly, there was only a limited
number of purges in the state machine, mainly concerning
prefects, mayors and civil servants appointed by the Colonels.
According to one estimation, about 100,000 appointees of the
junta were still In the state apparatus four months after the
change of the	 regime 5 . In the armed forces, according to
information given to	 Parliament by	 Averoff himself in
February 1975, only 106 officers were placed on forcible
retirement, in contrast to the huge wave of retirements during
the first years of the dictatorship (almost 3,000 officers
between 1967-1972, who were subsequently replaced by friends of
the military regime) 6 . The only sector which was thoroughly
and relatively speedily purged by all those who had openly
collaborated with the junta (Constitutional Act of 3 September
1974) was that of higher education, mainly thanks to the great
pressure for	 'de-juntification'	 exercised by a highly
radicalized student movement.
Thus, under the conditions that the transfer of power took
place in July 1974, the military managed to safeguard not only
its authority (characteristically, the 1967 coup was attributed
by the government to a "handful of foolish officers" so that
the vast majority of the military corps were distinguished from
those directly responsible for the dictatorship), but also a
significant degree of power and influence within the state.
This significant element of continuity with the pre-1967
practice was due not only to the need of the first post-
dictatorial governments to achieve the support or tolerance of
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the military in order to secure basic democratic reforms; it
was also due, as it will be explained in more detail below, to
the unwillingness of the conservative majority in power during
the first period of the transition to make an abrupt and
complete break with the pre-dictatorial political structures
especially under conditions of widespread radicalization within
society.
Nevertheless, the coalition government also introduced
substantial measures of democratization. The constitution of
the dictatorship (1968/1973) was abolished and replaced with
the 1952 one, while at the same time the clauses pertaining to
monarchy were kept in abeyance; the nature of the head of state
was to be settled later by popular referendum 7 . The decision to
subject the future of the monarchy to the popular vote,
reflected the increased concern of the provisional government
for the peaceful settlement of an Issue which had divided the
country for more than half a century. It was also a
response to the widespread anti-royalist mood of a large part
of the social and political forces resulting from the
controversial interference of the monarchy in post-war
politics, particularly during the 1965 crisis, and from King
Constantine's ambivalent attitude towards the junta. It Is
indicative of the extent of the popular pressure for thorough
democratization that In regard to the monarchy Karamanlis
abandoned the position he had adopted a year earlier, that
only the King could lead successfully the process of regime
transition 8 . This pressure from below offered at the same time
to Karamanlis a wide basis of popular support vis-a-vis the
military for the introduction of extensive democratic reforms
which far exceeded his own pronouncements during the
dictatorship. Thus, apart from the suspension of martial law
(September 23, October 9), the release of political prisoners,
the proclamation of amnesty for political crimes and the
reinstatement of all those purged by the junta in the civil
service, local government, judiciary and the universities, the
provisional government proceeded on 23 September with the
legalization of all political parties including those of the
communist left. The abolition of not only the legislation on
political parties passed by the dictatorship, but also of the
civil war law 509/1947 which banned the Communist Party marked
the major break of the new regime with the pre-1967 political
structures, with the repressive parliamentarism of the post-war
period and with anti-communism as the official ideology of the
state9.
Early in October the government announced that elections
were to be held on 17 November, followed by a national
plebiscite on the question of monarchy10 . Despite the claims of
the parties outside the coalition government that free
elections could not be held with the presence of a large number
of junta appointees within the state apparatus,the electoral
campaign was fairly and vigorously conducted and the result
(54.37 per cent for Karamanlis's newly established New
Democracy party) was not disputed by any of the participants. A
fair campaign was also conducted with regard to the referendum
on the constitutional issue, which was held on 8 December. With
the exception of New Democracy which adopted a neutral
position, all other parties overtly supported the republic,
whereas the King was not allowed to return to Greece but
instead was given the chance to put his case on four television
broadcasts. The result was 69.2 per cent of the vote for the
republic and 30.8 per cent for the restoration 11 . The
referendum of December 1974 was the first out of the six held
on the same issue in the twentieth century, the result of which
was not disputed by the defeated side. As such, it reflected
the true preferences of the people towards monarchy more
accurately than all previous ones' 2 . Finally, on 11 June 1975,
the government of New Democracy implemented the Constitution of
the Third Hellenic Republic which had been passed by the Fifth
Revisory Assembly four days earlier. The nature of the post-
dictatorial state and the structure of the regime as it was
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defined by the new constitutional framework will be examined in
detail below. The development of political institutions in
Greece after 1974, however, would be better understood and
evaluated If it were seen in the light of the conditions and
factors individual as well as collective which determined the
form of transition to democracy.
The process of democratic reform which started in July 1974
was not the outcome of a revolution, that is of an abrupt break
with past practice; it was not evolutionary either, for there
was no gradual adjustment of the system to the demands from
below as in the case of Spain13 . Unlike the Francoist regime,
the much shorter-lived Greek military dictatorship failed
to institutionalize itself and to generate a considerable
amount of popular support which could have enabled it to
maintain more strongholds within the state and society
throughout the process of democratic transition. Nevertheless,
the decision of the military leadership to call In the
politicians at the peak of a national crisis which made
imperative a policy of conciliation, allowed it a degree of
power within the state machine; it also allowed It space for
manoeuvre, particularly in regard to the choice of the person
to lead the transitional process.
On the other hand, the pressure which was exercised on the
coalition government by the radicalized segments of society
postponed the military's plans for a controlled liberalization
of the political system. Although Greece did not experience the
unprecedented working class mobilization of the last years of
Francoism, yet the passive opposition to the junta which
culminated in the fierce student protests of 1973 and the
popular demand for the punishment of the dictators in the
aftermath of the regime's collapse, was a clear Indication of
the widespread rejection of authoritarianism and of the
support for democratic institutions within society. Under such
conditions, a return to the repressive parliamentarism of the
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period preceding the coup would involve the risk of generating
a political crisis much more severe than that of the 1960s.
Thus, whereas Karamanlis was chosen by the military for his
anti-communist past, the reforms that he introduced constituted
a break with the pre-1967 political structures, to an extent
which far exceeded the expectations of the military leaders.
The transition to democracy, should be considered therefore,
within the more general context of the post-war political
system rather than in reference to the seven years of the
dictatorship. Viewed from this wider perspective, the process
of transition to democracy in Greece, exhibits many
similarities to the first two stages of Rustow's model of
transition14:
First, there is the preparatory phase in which the process
of democratization is under way through "a prolonged and
inconclusive political struggle" led by a movement of the lower
classes. In the case of Greece, growing economic inequalities,
and significant social developments, such as emigration and
urbanization, led in the early 1960s to the increasing
mobilization and radicalization of the masses and consequently,
to the breach of the system of political controls based on
clientelism and repression. Nevertheless, for reasons already
explained,the evolution to democracy which was set off under
the Centre Union government was finally "deflected" by the
military intervention of April 1967. The preparatory stage came
to an end only after the military decided to surrender power
to the politicians at the climax of the Cyprus crisis.
Secondly, there came the decision phase in which a part of
the political leadership proceeds with the adoption of
democratic rules in order to avoid the prolongation of the
struggle as well as the danger of a civil war. What needs to be
emphasized about this stage is that the end of the military
rule in Greece did not become synonymous with the
institutionalization of democratic procedures. The content of
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the democratic reform was shaped by the response of the "small
circle of political leaders" 15 who formed the coalition
government to popular pressure. Most crucial in this respect,
was the role of the right-wing elite and particularly of Prime
Minister Karamanlis. An adjustment of the Right's positions to
the new social and political conditions had already become
clear during the dictatorship as Karamanlis's own statements
from Paris had indicated: "Greece must and is able to create a
modernized, progressive (...) democracy combining freedom,
social justice and order (...) A democracy which relieved from
the prejudices of the past will (...) be able to carry out
daring reforms In all sectors of our national life" 16 . In any
case, what mattered at this stage, was not "what values the
leaders held dear in the abstract, but what concrete steps they
were willing to take"- 7 . Thus, whereas certain measures aimed
at securing both the consent of the military and a degree of
continuity with the past, the Institutional reforms initiated
by Karamanlis reflected the acknowledgement of the social,
economic and ideological changes which had taken place In the
previous decade. The crises of repressive parliamentarism
appeared to have convinced the right-wing leadership that the
Integration of all social forces in the political system was
Imperative for the long term legitimacy of the new regime
especially under conditions of extensive radicalization. It is
In this light that both the demolition of the post-war anti-
communist state and the establishment of a fully competitive
system must be seen.
The acceptance of a democratic compromise by both the
military and the politicians of the Right was also facilitated
by the absence of fierce social antagonisms such as those which
divided the country in the 1940 g . The rejection of dictatorial
rule was based upon popular support for democracy; It was not
associated with any challenge to existing class relations. The
crisis of the dictatorship, like that of the mld-1960s regime
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was a crisis of the political institutions, not of bourgeois
domination.
Despite the growing inequalities (see previous chapters),
the positive effects of the post-war economic development
continued to be extensively felt throughout the dictatorship.
Between 1970 and 1974, the gross Income per capita increased
from $999 to $1,953; also, private per capita consumption was
in 1974 twice as high as in 1970 (increased from $782 to
$1,456) and four times higher than in 1960 ($338)18. Similarly,
so far as these are indicators of affluence, the number of
private cars increased from 81,617 in 1964 to 380,388 ten years
later 19 . The penetration of another luxury item, television,
also increased from 0.4 sets per thousand inhabitants in 1966,
to 107 sets per thousand in 197420. Economic growth must have
contributed to the continued legitimacy of the existing socio-
economic order. The absence of a mass left-wing movement
(although it can be attributed to a complex of factors lying
beyond the scope of this analysis) Is indicative of the
profound social and Ideological changes which had taken place
In the two previous decades.
Whatever the ideological orientation of the pro-democracy
forces 21 , the electoral result of November 1974 showed that the
consolidation of democracy was given priority over any
essential social and economic reform. The overwhelming majority
in favour of KaramanlIs (54.4 per cent) and the poor showing of
the Communist alliance (9.5 per cent) and even of the Centre
Union (20 per cent as compared to 52.7 per cent In 1964),
reflected the determination of the electorate to prevent any
regression to authoritarianism.
In summary, the democratic reform of 1974-75 was the product
of a compromise among all social and political forces. Because
of the extreme circumstances under which the transfer of power
took place, and faced with mounting popular pressure, the
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military, at least the majority, also consented to Karamanlis's
programme of institutional change. This compromise constituted
the main difference between the new democracy and the pre-1967
parliamentary system. The latter was established on the
aftermath of a civil conflict and was based largely on the
exclusion of the defeated side from politics. In contrast, the
basis of the post-1974 democracy was to be the consent and
participation of all social and political forces in political
process. As it will be demonstrated below in more detail, the
political change in Greece created a competitive pluralist
system which could offer the opportunity for alternatives in
power. Another major characteristic of the new democracy was
the disappearance, or the retreat to the background of the
political scene, of two dominant power centres which had been
the pillars of the post-war repressive system, the monarchy and
the military. This development largely reflected the profound
changes that had taken place within the post-war ideological
framework. The monarchy was no longer the symbol of legitimacy
of the social and political order ; as for the military, the
seven years of dictatorship and the debacle of July 1974 had
undermined Irreparably its position as the guardian of the
nation against the "enemy within".
However, if the changes of the first year of the transition
laid the foundations for a new modernized political system, the
conditions under which the transfer of power took place enabled
also a significant degree of continuity with the past
structures. Thus, an unspecified number of junta appointees
continued to work In the state apparatus, which had been before
the dictatorship and remained during the transition dominated
by the Right; the military retained a considerable degree of
power, though not the Institutional autonomy of the past; and
finally, a cautious reform of the constitutional framework
established a powerful executive able to safeguard the existing
social order against future threats. All in all, the post
dictatorial political system was a mixture of elements of both
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continuity and change with the past. To the analysis of these
very elements we will now turn.
5.3 The organization of powers under the Constitution of June
11 1975
If there was an agreement on the fundamental rules of the
democratic game between the political forces involved in the
transition process, yet there was still a profound disagreement
on the content of the democratic reform. Two main trends
emerged on the aftermath of the junta's collapse: a more
radical one which was expressed by the forces of the opposition
and which demanded a definite break with the institutions,
practices and ideology not only of the dictatorship but of the
entire post-war period; and a more conservative one which was
identified with Karamanlis's party of New Democracy which
although favouring a break with the dictatorial institutions
wished to maintain a considerable degree of continuity with the
pre-1967 political structures. The eventual prevalence of the
latter view determined both the process of democratic
transition and the content of the new political institutions.
Continuity with post-war practice was underlined in the
coalition government's decision to revise the Constitution of
1952. Notwithstanding the calls by the parties of the
opposition for a constituent assembly, with the Constituent Act
of 3/4 October 1974 the government postulated that the assembly
that was to emerge from the November electIons could amend,
abolish and/or supplement all clauses of the Constitution,
defining thus its role as merely revisory. The same act made it
obligatory for the government of the day to prepare a draft of
the new Constitution which was to be the basis of the debate at
the Fifth Revisory Assembly22.
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The Constitution of 1975 was shaped according to the way
that recent political experiences had been interpreted by the
right-wing majority under Karamanlis. As the latter had made
clear in his 1974 government declaration:
"Greece needs a constitution which suits the particular
circumstances prevailing in the country and not one which Is an
imitation of foreign models; a constitution which will be
democratic but which will at the same time allow the government
to act effectively and with dispatch; which will therefore
strengthen e executive without reducing its responsibility to
parliament"
Seeing a powerful executive as the only safeguard against
political Instability, the drafters of the Constitution
proposed the institutionalization of a bi-polar executive
(government-President of the Republic) with extensive powers.
In particular, the new head of state who was to be elected by
the Parliament for a five year term was vested with
prerogatives which according to the opposition diluted the
fundamental principles of parliamentary democracy and led to
the establishment of a semi-presidential system 24 . These
prerogatives, to mention but the most crucial as well as the
most controversial included:
-The imposition of a delaying veto on legislation passed by
Parliament. By exercising his veto, the head of state could
even turn a bill into an opportunity for a political showdown
with a government with whose policies he disagreed25.
-The suspension In certain cases of fundamental civil rights,
the declaration of a state of emergency and the setting up of
special courts of justice.
-The dissolution of Parliament when the latter was in 'clear
disharmony with the public feeling' or if Its composition did
not guarantee governmental stability.
-Finally, the power to dismiss the Incumbent government at his
discretion, even if the latter enjoyed the confidence of
Parliament; In this as in other cases, the president could then
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appoint as Prime Minister any person, member of Parliament or
not, who enjoyed his confidence26.
The dominant position of the President of the Republic in the
organization of powers became the main focus of controversy
between the government and the opposition. Central to the
disagreement was the problem of the accountability of the
executive, particularly the President, vis-a-vis Parliament.
According to the draft, the latter was to elect a head of state
over whose powers It could have hardly any control and whom it
could not dismiss under any circumstances27.
The role of the President of the Republic as prescribed in
the 1975 Constitution Is that of the main arbiter who could
solve political crises before these could lead to the
destabilization of democratic institutions. As the Minister of
Justice remarked, "there is no obstacle now which could prevent
us from vesting the Head of State (...) with competences which
are necessary for the state to function effectively and to be
ready to cope with difficult situations. The lack of such
competences In the past had led the state machine either to act
unlawfully or to be paralysed" 28 . Although an obvious attempt
to safeguard political stability, the constitutional provisions
pertaining to the powers of the President revealed nevertheless
a paternalistic view of the people and a distrust of
Parliament's ability to cope effectively with major political
crises. The President was to act as a breakwater against
political turmoil and party antagonisms which could threaten
the democratic regime or, in extreme cases, the established
social and economic order.
The preoccupation of the conservative majority to avert any
political crisis which could emerge through the free function
of democratic institutions was also reflected In the clauses
referring to citizens' rights and freedoms. On the one hand,
all the remnants of the civil war legislation known as the
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'para-constitution' (see previous chapters) were abolished
(a.l11 par. 4) and more detailed provisions were introduced for
the more effective protection of human rights which had been
repeatedly violated during the dictatorship. Thus, among other
things, torture was explicitly banned ( a. 7 par. 4) and so
were the withdrawal of citizenship (a. 4 par. 3) and the trial
of citizens by martial courts (a. 96 par. 4). Moreover, the
Constitution established the right to request legal protection
from the courts (a. 20) and the right to strike for civil
servants (a. 23 par. 1). Finally, article 120 asserted the
right and duty of citizens to resist any attempt at the
overthrow of the Constitution (par. 4) and provided for the
prosecution, as soon as lawful authority were restored, of all
'usurpers of the sovereign powers of the people' (par. 3).
On the other hand, however, a significant number of
restrictions to the exercise of civil liberties were
introduced, which provided the legal basis for their future
suspension. Most notable were the banning of the "abuse of
civil rights" (a. 25 par. 3), the institutionalization of
preventive deportation under certain conditions (a. 5 par. 4)
and restrictions to the right of strike, particularly for civil
servants (a. 23 par. 2). Moreover, article 103 (par. 1)
prescribed as prerequisites for employment in the civil service
the candidate's 'belief' in the Constitution and 'devotion' to
the country, terms which as It has been rightly suggested 29 go
beyond the definition of an individual's activities and reach
the sphere of the affected person's profound ideas and beliefs.
Commenting on the constitutional draft the representative of
the opposition In Parliament summarized as follows the aims and
mentality of the governing majority:
"Dear colleagues, we either accept that a competitive
society can lead to decisions safeguarding both the existence
and unity of the polity, in which case we accept
parliamentarism, or we do not believe in the possibility of
-229-
unity at the social base, in which case with the legal device
which Is called the presidential system,ve struggle to
construct the unity of the polity at the top"'.
The leader of the Socialist party (PASOK), Andreas
Papandreou, called the Constitution "a framework of absolutism
with a parliamentary cover" 31 . Eventually, the entire
opposition abstained from the vote in protest, and the draft
was voted only by the government deputies 32 . Hence, the
Constitution which was implemented on June 11 1975 was In
essence the creation of the right-wing majority under
Karamanlis, rather than the product of compromise or
convergence between all political forces represented In
Parliament. Like De Gaulle in France, Karamanlis, who has been
rightly called the architect of the post-dictatorial regime33,
sought to secure political stability by "balancing the
executive and the legislative, the authoritarian and the
popular" 34 . As Karamanlis himself said to Parliament, elements
of the Gaullist constitution (version of 1962) had been
included in the Greek draft, particularly in the provisions
pertaining to the powers of the executive 35 . Nevertheless,
notwithstanding the significant prerogatives that the President
was accorded, no occupant of the office ever activated his
considerable powers until these were finally abolished by a
constitutional amendment in 1986. The formation of effective
governments with safe parliamentary majorities and the fact
that the head of state lacked the legitimation of a direct
election, largely explain why the President's powers remained
dormant 36 . As the practice until 1986 suggested, the powers of
the President were kept in reserve to be used at times of
serious crisis, rather than for normal policy-making. The
President of the Republic has come to symbolize, rather than
actively to realize the national unIty, exercising, thus, what
Bagehot has called "ceremonial" or "dignified" leadership In
contrast to"efficient" leadership which rests with the
government and particularly the Prime Minister 37 . Therefore,
the political system In operation since 1975 has been
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parliamentary rather than presidential in character. However,
it is far from being a "supremacy of Parliament" either. We
refer here not so much to the relatively weak role of
Parliament in influencing policy-making (a common feature of
modern government in most liberal democracies), as to the
limited powers of the Greek assembly to hold the government
accountable for its policies.
Following the pattern prior to the dictatorship, the post-
1974 political system, has been "cabinet-dominated", with the
government based upon the support of strictly disciplined
majorities in the assembly38 . The need for executive stability
after 1974 led to the re-adoption of the 1958 electoral system
of the so-called "reinforced" proportional representation
and to the consequent formation of single-party governments
with absolute majority support in Parliament. The combination
of electoral and party discipline has produced governments with
remarkable "durability", that is with least frequent changes in
terms of party composition 39 . In a recent study Lljphart et
al.(1988) demonstrated that between 1975 and 1986 Greece
had the most durable cabinet among 31 liberal democracies:
Cabinet durability in Greece was 70 months, compared to 64
In New Zealand, another main example of majoritarian
government, 55 in Spain, 30 in Portugal and an average 52
in 25 other democratic regimes 40 . Sustained by large parlia-
mentary majorities, successive governments have seen almost
all their proposed legislation enacted with the opposition
having only marginal impact on policy-making. Further
limitations to the legislative functions of the assembly have
been imposed by the Constitution; thus, according to article
73, ParlIament cannot initiate legislation on some particular
issues (mainly of financial or administrative nature).
Also, by characterising a bill as urgent, the government can
limit the length of the debate substantially, and hence, the
ability of the opposition to influence law-making (a. 76 par.
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4). In general terms, the role of the Greek assembly has been
limited to the ratification rather than to the Initiation of
legislation. Yet, it could be argued, that the decline of
Parliament in its role as legislature has been a common
phenomenon in most democratic countries. For example, according
to one estimation, about 90-100 per cent of bills passed by
Parliament in Britain and 85 per cent in France are of
government origin41.
On the other hand however, whereas assemblies in other
liberal democracies perform a central role as instruments of
executive scrutiny, the powers of the Greek assembly to oversee
the executive and force it to account for its policies were
considerably restricted under the 1975 Constitution. Hence,
at times of crisis, Parliament could only a posteriori, if at
all, make decisions upon the actions taken by the executive,
such as the declaration of a state of emergency and the
suspension of civil liberties (articles 48 and 44). Substantial
limitations were also imposed upon the assembly's powers to
monitor the executive's foreign and defence policies. As
already noted, the President of the Republic was empowered to
make treaties the content of which he could keep secret at his
discretion. Additionally, the Constitution virtually forbade
the investigation of matters pertaining to foreign policy and
defence by a special parliamentary committee of enquiry,
without an endorsement by the governing majority (a. 68 par 2).
With this latter provision which had been first introduced by
the dictatorial constitution of 1968/1973, the government has
become solely responsible and at the same time unaccountable
for an extremely sensitive area of policy, namely the
organization and control of the armed forces.
In August 1977, the New Democracy government introduced law
660 according to which the post of the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces with its over-concentrated powers (see
previous chapters) was abolished and responsibility for defence
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matters was transferred to the government, particularly to the
Supreme Council of National Defence (ASEA). The structure of
command of the armed forces followed largely the same pattern
as the pre-1967 one, with a powerful Minister of Defence at
the top, counselled by the leadership of the armed forces 42 . In
view of the recent dictatorial experience, the lack of any
effective parliamentary control over the military could lead as
before to the formation of separate spheres of autonomy within
the armed forces and thus to situations dangerous for the
democratic regime. An abortive coup by junta nostalgics In
February 1975 had already indicated that the acceptance of a
democratic solution was far from unanimous within the officer
corps and underlined the need for effective mechanisms of
scrutiny of the military. The absence of such institutionalized
mechanisms after the dictatorship has, in our view, constituted
one of the main weaknesses of Greek democracy.
Finally, the monitoring powers of the assembly were limited
by the constitutional arrangements for the vote of no
confidence. Article 84 postulated that a motion of no
confidence had to be passed by an absolute majority of all
elected deputies, whereas a motion of confidence required only
an absolute majority of deputies present In the chamber.
Designed to ensure stability, these provision which was
introduced for the first time in 1975 and Is similar to article
49 of the French constitution 43 minimized in practice the
government's dependence on the confidence of Parliament. Given
the large parliamentary majorities that successive governments
have commanded and the degree of party discipline, a motion of
no confidence is most likely to be rejected, as the practice so
far has suggested. In all, the Constitution of 1975 combined
with the arrangements of the electoral law and the
particularities of the party system, has reinforced the
subordination of Parliament In both its legislative and
controlling functions.
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In view of the preceding analysis, the dominant centre of
power within the institutional context of the Third Hellenic
Republic has been the government and particularly the Prime
Minister, whose position has been strengthened by a variety of
factors. In regard to the Constitution, article 82 (par 2)
made a special reference to the role of the Prime Minister,
postulating that the latter "is responsible for the unity of
the government and guides its activities as well as those of
the public administration in the execution of government policy
within the framework of the law". Under this provision, the
Prime Minister is no longer primus inter pares among the other
ministers as he used to be according to the previous
constitutional arrangements; he is not only the chairman of the
cabinet, he also directs the latter's action and appoints or
dismisses the members of his government as he sees fit.
Moreover, the establishment of a fully competitive political
system and victories in fairly conducted elections, the result
of which has never been disputed by any side, have also
increased the legitimacy and authority of the Prime Minister.
Since 1974, the power of the government has been solely based
on the support of the electorate, rather than on that of the
head of state, the military and even para-state organizations
as in the pre-1967 period. The authority of the office has been
also reinforced by the powerful personalities of the occupants.
Karamanlis's strong personality and status as the founder of
democracy, and successively Papandreou's charisma, dominated
the political scene almost throughout the first fifteen years
of the democratic transition. This dominance has been also
sustained by the authoritarian structure of the biggest
parties, in which the leader's appeal to the electorate has
proven to be their main asset. Policy outcomes in modern
liberal democracies, Roberts44 suggests, are the result of a
triangular relationship between the government, legislature and
party. In the case of Greece, the predominance of the leader-
Prime Minister in all three institutions 	 after 1974, has
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reinforced the personified character of Greek politics.
Paraphrasing "chancellor democracy", the term used to describe
the system of the German Federal Republic, one could speak in
Greece of "prime minister democracy" emphasising at the same
time the independence of the premier from party influence and
control to which the German chancellor, as indeed the British
Prime Minister and even the French President are vulnerable. A
closer look at the party system and individual party structures
Is therefore necessary for a better evaluation of the workings
of democratic Institutions in the first period of the
transition.
5.4 The new party system and New Democracy: continuity and
change.
The overall structure of the party system which emerged
after the collapse of the dictatorship revealed a significant
degree of continuity with the patterns which had prevailed
in the pre-1967 period. The three historical political camps or
families ('parataxels'), which in the post-war period were
defined In the context of Greek politics as Right, Centre and
Left, reappeared in 1974, and so did most of the personalities
and notables who had dominated the political scene before the
coup. Despite the dictators' efforts to discredit politicians
and eradicate the party system altogether, political loyalties
proved to be highly resilient and with deep roots within the
electorate. Seven years of dictatorship appeared to be too
short a period to destroy political Identifications and
alignments, which had developed amid the major political
conflicts of the twentieth century, the national schism of the
Inter-war period and the civil war of the 194Os. Moreover,
the credibility and popularity of the 'politikos cosmos'
(political world) were reinforced by the unanimous opposition
of the latter to a military regime profoundly resented by the
vast majority of the people.
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In each one of the political camps, however, major
organizational changes took place, due to the ideological
developments of the previous decade and the institutional
reforms carried out in the first few weeks of the transition.
The most significant element of change in the party system was
to be found within the Left, where the abolition of Compulsory
Law 509/1947 enabled the Communists to re-enter public life
legally. Thus, apart from the United Democratic Left party,
EDA, which throughout the period preceding the coup had been
the sole expression of all left-wing forces, the Left was now
represented by another two parties, the Communist party of
Greece, KKE, and the Communist Party of the Interior, KKE-
Esoterikou (henceforth KKE-eg).
KKE-es was created after the split of KKE in 1968, when a
narrow majority of the KKE's Political Bureau (four out of
seven) decided to hold the twelfth plenum of the Central
Committee in Budapest, without any significant participation
from the party's members who were in the "interior" of Greece.
Underlying the dispute on apparently procedural matters was a
profound disagreement on political and ideological questions
ranging from the party's organizational methods and its
relations with Moscow to policies during and after the civil
war and the need for democratization of its structures 46 . Those
party members dissenting from the exiled leadership's line
formed the Interior Bureau of the KKE which later developed
into the KKE-Esoterikou. The new party adopted many of the
principles of Eurocommunism (rejection of the "dictatorship of
the proletariat", commitment to parliamentary democracy and
pluralism) and declared as one of its main objectives the
renewal of the Greek Communist movement47.
By contrast, the KKE which remained faithful to Moscow,
considered itself as the representative of communist orthodoxy
and as the "vanguard of the Greek working class and that
class's organizational expression 48 . The party adhered to
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the principles of "democratic centralism" as the basis of party
organization and "dictatorship of the proletariat" and
envisaged a future economic and political change in Greece
along the Soviet model. The split of the historic KKE caused a
major crisis within EDA itself, as the majority of its members
aligned with either the KKE or the KKE-es. Those who
remained tried to restructure the party organizationally and
adopted new political principles which in effect brought it
very close to the positions of the KKE-es49.
In the Centre camp, the most important development was the
emergence of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK, under
the leadership of Andreas Papandreou. PASOK's position within
the political spectrum has been the subject of a wide academic
debate; different writers have viewed the party as socialist,
or populist similar to the Latin American type, as a direct
descendant of the traditional centre or as a completely new
political formation without precedent in the Greek political
tradition 50 . Later in this thesis, there will be a more
detailed analysis regarding PASOK's political identity, an
Important question, especially since this very party has
performed a crucial role in the development of the post-1974
democratic institutions. There can be hardly any doubt,
however, that PASOK's historical origins lay in the pre-1967
Centre Union, EK, and particularly in its left-wing which, led
by Andreas, came to exercise considerable influence within the
party after the constitutional crisis of 1965. PASOK Itself
strongly claimed to be the political heir of the EK and
particularly of the latter's "unyielding struggle" of the
1960s. It Is Indicative of PASOK's 'centrist' roots that the
vast majority of its MPs in the seventies came from the left
wing of the EK and particularly from that party's youth
organization EDIN51 . Yet, at the same time PASOK presented
itself as an entirely new political formation within Greek
public life. It adopted a distinctively radical discourse,
accepted Marxism as a method of political analysis and
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declared as its ultimate aim the socialist transformation of
Greek society. All these reflected the radicalizing effect
that the experiences of military dictatorship and the
resistance against it had on the political development of both
Papandreou himself and of a substantial part of the pro-
democracy forces of the 1960s. PASOK was essentially
established by two major resistance groups, PAK (Panhellenic
Liberation Movement) which was created by Papandreou in exile
and D.A. (Democratic Defence) which was founded by former EDIN
and EDA members with the participation of a number of
university students and a small group of former EK members52.
Concurrently, the EK re-emerged in the political arena under
the leadership of George Mavros and In alliance with a group
called Nees Dynameis (New Forces) which consisted of prominent
social democrats who had actively opposed the dictatorship. The
alliance known as Enosis Kentrou-Nees DynameIs (henceforth EK-
ND) declared its rejection of traditional clientelistic
practices and personified politics, and its determination to
build up a modern mass party organization. The party's
programme which we will examine below In more detail, was very
similar to that of the pre-1967 EK, advocating a free economy
but with emphasis on state intervention In key sectors and
indicative planning.
Finally, the Right underwent a complete reorganization with
the establishment by Karamanlis of a new political formation,
named New Democracy (ND). Karamanlis's powerful personality,
enormous prestige as the founder of the democratic regime, and
consequently his great appeal to the electorate must have
served as major guarantees of the new party's bright political
future for the old ERE cadres and deputies who rallied to ND en
masse 53 . Yet, ND was not the same party as ERE under a new
name. Karamanlis's objective was the formation of "a powerful
moderate party" 54 , which was to carry through the "renovation"
of public life 55 . ND which was presented as an "entirely new
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political camp" abandoned the fierce anti-communism of the now
defunct ERE and declared its commitment to the protection of
civil liberties and "the freedom of the individual to develop
his/her personality and participate in public life"56.
Moreover, the party adopted a more radical social and economic
programme, which although It advocated a free economy,
emphasized the need for more state intervention, for the
achievement of "greater social justice' and "the fairer
distribution of the national income"57. Karamanlis sought also
to renew the political personnel of the new party by recruiting
from among a younger generation of politicians with a more
"technocratic"outlook and more liberal background than the
traditional cadres of the Right. Characteristically, more than
half of ND's deputies in 1974 (127 out of a total of 220) had
entered Parliament for the first time while of the rest only 68
had run for office as candidates of ERE or the Greek Rally58.
The liberalization of the Right under Karamanlis left space
for the development of a party of the extreme Right; the
National Democratic Union, EDE, was led by Petros Garoufalias,
an ardent royalist and a Minister of Defence in the EK
government of the early 1960s - the man who had been at the
centre of the crisis which led to the resignation of George
Papandreou as Prime Minister in July 1965. The restoration of
the monarchy was in fact the main issue of EDE's campaign.
Moreover, although the party sought not to identify with the
military dictatorship directly, it nevertheless favoured the
institutional autonomy of the armed forces and the return of
Greece to the military wing of NATO from which the country was
withdrawn by Karamanlis in the aftermath of the Cyprus
disaster, for reasons which will be discussed below59.
As the above brief analysis has shown, after the
dictatorship each one of the broad historic camps underwent a
major restructuring with the emergence of new political
formations. Although political loyalties towards the Right,
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Centre and Left had survived, the actual strength of the
individual parties within the electorate was yet to be proven.
The general election of 17 November 1974 was to be the first
test of political support for each party. Yet, the result of
the election (Table 5.1) can only partly serve as an indicator
of the real changes in the ideological and party political
affiliations of the electorate. Of course, the lack of adequate
survey data on the factors influencing the voters' attitudes
and preferences (party ideology and programme, the impact of
leadership, social class or family tradition etc) in that first
period of the transition (as indeed in any other) makes the
evaluation of electoral results very difficult. However, a
number of factors contribute to the conclusion that the
overwhelming majority that ND polled in 1974 (54.4 per cent of
the vote) although an undisputed victory of the party, cannot
be easily interpreted as the reinforcement of right-wing
affiliations. The elections were held a mere four months after
the downfall of the military regime, at a time when the
predominant issue was the consolidation of democratic
institutions and the management of foreign affairs, especially
the continuing Cyprus crisis, the tension with Turkey and
relations with NATO and the USA. ND's electoral victory was to
a large extent due to Karamanlis's prestige as the leader who
had achieved the smooth transition to democracy and perhaps as
the only one who could prevent any regression to
authoritarianism. Composer Mikis Theodorakis's much quoted
phrase "Karamanlis or the tanks" summarized best in its
simplicity the prevailing mood of that time. Moreover, the
dismantling of the anti-communist state by the politician who
had been associated with It more than any other in the post-war
period won Karamanlis additional sympathies within the Centre
and even the Left.
In fact, ND based Its entire campaign on its leader's
charismatic personality and projected him as the sole guarantee
of political stability. A characteristic example mentioned by
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Clogg was a small party pamphlet that circulated during the
campaign, which in six pages of text contained seven full-
page portraits of Karamanlis 60 . On the other hand, the parties
of the opposition had barely two months to develop effective
electoral	 organizations	 and	 communicate their positions
TABLE 5.1
ELECTION OF 17 NOVEMBER 1974
% of votes	 seats	 % of seats
New Democracy	 54.37	 220	 73.3
EK-ND	 20.42	 60	 20.0
PASOK	 13.58	 12	 4.0
EA(United left
alliance of KKE,KKE-es
and EDA)	 9.47	 8	 2.7
EDE	 1.08	 -	 -
Others	 0.98	 -	 -
TOTAL	 100.00	 300	 100.0
properly to the electorate, a factor which must have
contributed to their rather poor performance in the elections.
The vote for EK-ND (20.42 per cent) fell to less than half
of the 52.72 per cent that the Centre Union had obtained in
the elections of 1964. One should not discount the possibility,
however, that a large part of the EK voters from the 1960s
might have switched to PASOK, which received 13.58 per cent of
the vote, a rather positive result for a newly established
party. The Left also saw its share of the vote decrease
substantially in comparison to the result that EDA had achieved
in the elections of 1963 and 1964 (14.34 per cent and 11.80 per
cent respectively); the United Left (EA), the alliance that
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KKE, KKE-es and EDA formed for the purposes of the election,
scored a mere 9.47 per cent.
In summary, the main conclusion to be drawn from the first
elections of the transition is that the consolidation of
democracy was given priority to any demand for social and
economic reform. It is in this light that the overwhelming
majority for ND (18.7 per cent increase from ERE's 1964 result)
and the low share of the vote for the Centre and Left must be
considered, rather than regarded as a clear indication of a re-
distribution of political alignments after the dictatorship.
The unanimous support for democracy was also underlined by the
low proportion of the vote (1.08 per cent) for the extreme-
Right EDE.
Three years later, the result of the 1977 general election
(Table 5.2) proved that support for different parties was far
from crystallized and that the party system was still in a
state of fluidity. Again, the absence of detailed data on
reasons for the voters' preferences (party ideology and
programme, impact of leadership, social class, family tradition
etc) imposes limits to the analysis of the parties' strength
among the electorate. The four major developments of the 1977
elections were the significant losses of ND which saw its
support shrink by 12.5 per cent; the spectacular gains of PASOK
which became the official opposition in parliament; the serious
decline of the traditional centre and the dominance of the
orthodox KKE in the Communist Left.
ND obtained 41.85 per cent of the vote and thanks to the
workings of the electoral law secured a new comfortable
parliamentary majority with 171 deputies. Significantly, the
party lost supporters not only to the benefit of the parties to
its left, but also to the ultra-right National Front (Ethniki
Parataxis, EP) founded in summer 1977 by monarchists and
supporters of the junta, was the third attempt of the
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undemocratic Right to organize politically, after the poor
performance of EDE in the 1974 elections and the establishment
of the short-lived National People's Party (ELK) in 1976. EP
demanded the re-entry of Greece into NATO's military command
TABLE 5.2
ELECTION OF 20 NOVEMBER 1977
% of votes	 seats	 % of seats
New Democracy	 41.85	 171	 56.9
PASOK	 25.33	 93	 31.0
EDIK	 11.95	 16	 5.3
(Union of the Democratic
Centre ,previously EK-ND)
KKE	 9.36	 11	 3.7
National Front (EP) 	 6.82	 5	 1.7
SPAD	 2.72	 2	 0.7
(Alliance of Left-wing
and Progressive Forces
including the KKE-es, EDA
and three minor groups)
New Liberals(K.Neophil.)	 1.08	 2	 0.7
Others	 0.89	 -	 -
TOTAL	 100.00	 300	 100.00
and the granting of an amnesty to the imprisoned members of the
junta as a precondition for national reconciliation61.
Moreover, the party accused ND of splitting the "nationally
minded camp", betraying the King, undermining national ideals
and family life and of surrendering education to the hands of
"communists"62.
Eventually, the party obtained 6.82 per cent of the vote,
and five seats In Parliament. The increased support for EP came
-2 3-
as a result of the dissociation of the Right under Karamanlis
from Its monarchist, anti-communist past. Moreover, the shift
of voters to the extreme-Right, was to a considerable extent
the manifestation of discontent for certain economic measures
taken by the government, such as the introduction of a wealth
tax and the nationalization of key sectors of the economy,
which EP considered a "socialist" development 63 . On the one
hand, EP's electoral success enhanced the moderate, even
Centre-Right image of ND; on the other, however, this result,
together with the increased support for ND's hard-liners In the
elections, forced the party to take into greater account the
most conservative sections of the electorate.
ND appeared also to have suffered losses to the parties of
the Centre and Left, which was partly due to the stabilization
of the democratic regime. In the absence of an Immediate threat
to democracy, many voters of these two camps who had voted for
ND in 1974 must have switched to their old political loyalties
in 1977. According to one estimation, ND's lost vote to its
left was on average 6.2 per cent 64 . Indicatively, the combined
vote for the Communist parties increased by 2.6 per cent,
reaching EDA's 1964 level of support (although a shift of
preference from EK-ND and PASOK can be hardly ruled out).
The most salient feature of the 1977 result was the great
advance of PASOK, which nearly doubled its 1974 share of the
vote to 25.33 per cent and displaced the traditional Centre as
the official opposition by obtaining 93 seats In Parliament
against the latter's 15. What was more important, support for
PASOK was not coming only from urban centres and some rural
areas with long-standing liberal tradition as In 1974, but from
all over the country; Its share of the vote was more or less
evenly distributed between the 56 urban and rural
constituencIes, of which only eight gave PASOK less than 20 per
cent 65 . Moreover, as a 1980 survey by the Centre for Political
Research and Information, KPEE (ND's "think tank") showed, the
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1977 vote for PASOK was also evenly distributed among different
social and economic groups 66 . Hence, PASOK appeared to becoming
increasingly the political expression of large segments of the
electorate. Many factors had contributed to this success.
First, PASOK's political platform which combined a highly
nationalistic stance on foreign Issues, with a radical
programme of socio-economIc reform and the promise of a vaguely
defined change, "AllaghI"; the above, together with
Papandreou's charisma and his uncompromisingly anti-Right
rhetoric, appealed to a largely radicalized electorate, which
was no longer inspired by the traditional Centre and which due
to Its distrust for Communism could not be attracted to the
parties of the Coinniunist Left. Moreover, the party had
developed an impressive organizational structure, unmatched by
that of any other non-communist party In Greece. By the time of
the election, more than 1,000 organizational units all over the
country were active in spreading PASOK's Ideas and programme
and mobilizing a considerable part of the population67.
Other factors which increased PASOK's electoral appeal were
the contradictions in the organizational strategy of the
parties of the Centre and Left. Within the latter, the alliance
of the three parties had been dissolved, mainly due to the
profound doctrinal differences between the KKE on the one hand
and KKE-es and EDA on the other. In 1977 the KKE contested the
elections alone for the first time In a period of forty years.
Instead of putting forward a concrete programme of social and
political reform, however, the KKE concentrated its efforts In
achieving the predominance of the Communist Left at the expense
of EDA and particularly Its main rival, the KKE-es. Its
campaign, riddled with slogans and references to the party's
"glorious struggles", aimed primarily at attracting the vote
of the traditional Communists and the working class.
Eventually, Its strategy won KKE 9.36 per cent of the vote,
almost as much as EA had polled in 1974.
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On the other hand, the Alliance of Progressive and Left-wing
Forces, (henceforth SPAD), that the KKE-es had formed together
with EDA and three smaller groups, obtained a mere 2.72 per
cent and only two seats in Parliament, in contrast to KKE's 11.
Although SPAD had put forward a radical programme addressing
all major issues, its impact on the electorate was limited.
Clearly, it could not persuade the voters that it was anything
more than an occasional electoral pact, let alone a credible
alternative to ND. Moreover, the contradictory strategy of
SPAD'S major participant the KKE-es, which while retaining its
Communist title and identity appeared to be too conciliatory
towards the Right, disaffected non-communists who had been
radicalized by political and economic repression throughout the
previous decade68.
Finally PASOK benefited from the inability of the
traditional Centre to recover the role that it had played in
the 1960s as the only force of political change. Despite its
earlier pronouncements, EK-ND failed to renovate itself both
organizationally and ideologically. Its organizational
structure remained authoritarian, as power was concentrated in
the hands of the leader and the parliamentary group, most
members of which were old Liberal notables with strong local
clienteles 69 . More importantly, EK-ND lacked a concrete
ideology and an appealing programme of social and political
reform. With the establishment of democratic institutions in
1974, the Centre Union was deprived of what constituted the
main tenets of its 1960s platform, namely republicanism and the
democratization of the political system. Moreover, the efforts
of the New Forces group to transform EK-ND into a modern social
democratic party failed primarily due to the opposition of the
party's traditional cadres. Thus, after the liberalization of
the Right under Karamanlis, the EK-ND blueprint looked like a
somewhat more liberal version of ND's own proposals.
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The absence of an effective electoral machine and the
uninspiring leadership of G. Mavros who could in no way compete
with the charisma of Karamanlis and Papandreou, also explain
why the traditional Centre failed to capitalize on the
widespread radicalism of the post-junta period. Thus, in the
elections of 1977 the party, which after four New Forces
deputies had broken away in 1976 was re-named Union of the
Democratic Centre (EDIK) experienced a drastic decrease of its
support from 20.52 to 11.95 per cent. The result marked the
beginning of a period of acute crisis, which led to the final
disintegration of the Centre and the integration of its members
into ND and PASOK alike.
In all, the process of restructuring the party system
continued throughout the 1970s, making extremely difficult any
classification, for instance according to Sartori's typology70.
This transitional phase, largely explained by the Ideological
fluidity of that time, was most clearly manifest within the
Centre and the Left. Parties within these two camps, with the
possible exception of the KKE, found themselves in competition
for the objectives of political leadership of large parts of
the social forces calling for political change. Among other
things, public demands included the purge of the state from all
junta elements, the democratization of the administration and
the labour movement, the development of the social and health
services which were In a deplorable state and the improvement
of the quality of life in the urban centres, which by the end
of the 1970s had attracted almost 60 per cent of the entire
population71.
Political radicalism was particularly pronounced among the
younger generation of voters - those who had no memories of the
civil war. Indicatively, a 1985 survey conducted In the
greater Athens area suggested that the vast majority of the
electorate under 49 were hostile towards the West and
capitalism, while about 60 per cent of those under 35, who had
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matured politically during the dictatorship and the first years
of the transition, expressed strong anti-Right feelings72.
Additionally, the above cited KPEE survey suggested that within
the same age group support for ND was particularly weak73.
In the 1977 elections, PASOK appeared to have displaced the
traditional Centre as the force that could remove ND from
power, while the KKE had achieved the hegemony within the
Communist Left. Yet, it was not until the 1981 elections, as we
shall see below, that the process of restructuring within the
Centre and Left had more or less run its course and the
features of the post-1974 party system had become easier to
define.
On the other hand, New Democracy, under the firm guidance of
Karamanlis and with the added advantage of being in power ever
since its creation, became from the start the predominant force
within the Right. In view of the ideological and social
developments of the previous decade, the long-term
prospects of the Greek Right required a complete break with the
authoritarian legacy of the pre-1967 period. The main
components of right-wing ideology, namely monarchism, anti-
communism and since the civil war an unquestioning adherence to
the policies of NATO and the USA had been discarded or
bankrupted by the military junta.
The establishment of ND in September 1974, constituted
Karamanlis's attempt to renovate the Right through a new
political formation with a well developed mass organization and
a liberal democratic strategy. ND's Ideological platform laid
emphasis upon Its commitment to parliamentary democracy and on
its respect for the Individual, condemned totalitarianism and
declared the party's determination to fight for the protection
of civil liberties. The party's main aim was to "build a system
of social peace, justice and order in which the people could
enjoy the fruit of freedom and material or intellectual
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creativity" 74 . Moreover, while ND believed in a free economy,
it also acknowledged the need for compensatory action by the
state in order to "balance economic and social conflicts and
reduce Inequalities" 75 . ND Identified political freedom with
social justice, for as Karamanlis stressed, the former could be
safeguarded only through the fairest possible distribution of
the national product 76 . Although these pronouncements could be
seen as rhetoric aimed at Increasing ND's appeal amid the
general climate of radicalization, they were nevertheless
accompanied by an ambitious programme of social and economic
modernization which Included significant reforms In education
and the extension of state control over key sectors of the
economy. A main part of this modernizing programme was the
accelerated entry of Greece Into the European community, which
In Karamanlis's view could guarantee democratic stability
within the country and act as a catalyst of economic and social
development.
In the field of foreign policy, ND abandoned ERE's
unconditional pro-NATO and pro-USA stance in favour of a more
independent line. In August 1974, largely expressing the public
feeling, Karamanlis withdrew Greece from NATO's military
command In protest at the alliance's failure to head off the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus. He also called into question the
status of the American bases on Greek soil and improved the
country's political, economic and cultural relations with
Communist and Arab countries77.
Efforts were also made towards the development of a modern
organizational structure which culminated In the party's pre-
congress in April 1977 and the congress of May 1979. The
Chalkldlki congress, the first ever to be held by a party of
the Right, approved of ND's charter and elected a 70-member
Administrative Committee. At the same time, a significant
number of organizations had developed at the regional and local
level and by 1981 fourteen regional congresses had also been
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held78 . Finally, in May 1980 when Karamanlis resigned from the
party to become President of the Republic, ND chose as his
successor George Rallis, in what was the most democratic
election of this kind in Greek political history.
Yet, notwithstanding these impressive innovations, ND failed
to transform itself into a modern mass party. In effect, its
ideology and programme, having been elaborated largely by the
party leader, proved to be confusing (for instance,
Karamanlis's definition of ND's ideology as "radical pluralism"
or the declaration that ND was a social democratic party) and
difficult to assimilate by party members and cadres79.
Moreover, the persistence of many elements of Right-wing
tradition in the party's mentality and practice eventually led
to the failure of the moderate, catch-all strategy that
Karamanlis had initially adopted80.
At the Ideological level this continuity with the past was
reflected in a set of policies, such as the labour and anti-
terrorist legislation and the considerable institutional
autonomy of the armed forces. It was also expressed by the
large group of hard-liners, the bearers of ERE's anti-communist
legacy, most prominent among whom was the Minister of Defence,
E. Averoff. It is indicative of this group's strength that in
the leadership contest, Averoff scored almost as much support
as the moderate Rallis (84 to the latter's 88 votes).
Moreover, at the organizational level, power remained
concentrated in the hands of the leader and the parliamentary
group. The party organizations were unable to Influence the
formulation of policy or the selection of candidates for the
elections. As a writer associated with ND commented, "the
party was far less significant as a mass organization than as a
group of leaders and professional politicians" 81 . This must
have been one reason for the apathy of members and the
unwillingness	 of	 supporters	 to	 join	 the	 party's
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organizations 82 . Furthermore, the significance of the latter as
mechanisms for the mobilization of ND supporters and the
communication of its positions to the electorate was largely
reduced by the operation of extensive clientelistic networks.
In many cases, the development of local party organizations was
met with the opposition of ND deputies who feared that the
disappearance of patron-client ties would lead to the decline
of their personal influence within the party83.
A dominant feature of modern Greek politics, clientelism has
been directly related to the country's particular economic and
social development and to the dominant role that the state has
come to play consequently, not only in the economy, but also in
providing employment and distributing resources to society at
large 84 . Successive parties in government always relied on
state mechanisms in order to distribute favours to their
political clienteles and thus to secure their electoral basis.
The involvement of the state in economic development increased
further in the post-war period to the benefit of the right-
wing parties which nearly monopolized power until 1967. By
allocating foreign aid resources, providing employment in the
expanded public services and offering opportunities for the
creation of wealth in the booming sectors of construction and
public works, the Greek Rally and especially ERE managed to
maintain considerable support.
After the dictatorship, the clientelistic networks of the
Right were reconstituted, helped by the fact that ND was in
government since its very creation and therefore able to
utilize state resources in order to consolidate its power. The
vast majority of ND supporters were linked to the party through
local NPs who distributed personal favours as in the pre-1967
period. ND'S parliamentarians therefore played a much more
central role in mobilizing mass support than the party's extra-
parliamentary organization. The party's 1979 charter also
emphasized the predominance of the parliamentary group by
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designating it as the only body involved in electing and
revoking the party leader85.
Nevertheless, during Karamanlis's leadership, the
parliamentary group exercised only limited influence upon ND's
policies, because of the dominance of the leader over all
aspects of the party's affairs. Major decisions such as the
selection of K. Tsatsos as ND's presidential candidate in 1975,
were taken by Karamanlis alone, rather than being the result of
collective deliberations within the parliamentary group86.
Additionally, the party leader performed two vital functions of
modern mass party organizations. The elaboration of the party
ideology and programme and selection of candidates for
election. According to the party charter, although the
candidates were, and still are, proposed by a democratic
process, the final decision and therefore the control over the
composition of the parliamentary party rested with the party
leader 87 . The mode of candidate nomination has largely
accounted for the strict discipline of MPs to the policies of
the party leadership, insofar as their political future was
determined by the latter. Expulsions from the party, although
isolated incidents during Karamanlis's leadership, were carried
out in a characteristically autocratic fashion by the leader
alone, without prior reference to the parliamentary group88.
Beyond the rulings of the party statute, Karamanlis
domination of ND was explained by the fact that the party was
his personal creation. It was Karamanlis who provided the new
party with an ideological basis, acted as a unifying force
among its different, even opposed groups and secured the
party's electoral victory with his charisma and enormous
prestige. Characteristically the party's statute postulated
that the founder of the party was also to be its leader and
that only his successors were to be elected89.
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Nevertheless, a genuine effort to transform ND from a
personal to a mass party was made with the pre-congress of
1977 and the congress of May 1979 held exactly a year before
Karamanlis resigned from the party leadership to become
President of the Republic. Among other things, the congress
replaced the leader's portrait as the party's emblem with the
flaming torch. Also, Karamanlis's successor George Rallis, who
represented the party's liberal wing, adopted a less autocratic
stance towards the cabinet and the parliamentary party 90 . Yet,
having been elected by a very narrow majority, Rallis lacked
the unanimous legitimacy that Karamanlis enjoyed as party
leader. Deprived by the latter's firm guidance, ND was plagued
by internal divisions between the liberals and the "nationally
minded". Its ideological contradictions became more apparent in
the run up to the 1981 elections, when Rallis, faced with the
dynamic rise of PASOK and under the increasing influence of the
hard-liners sought an electoral pact with the extreme Right.
In conclusion, throughout the first seven years of the
transition, the Right as embodied by New Democracy failed to
transform itself into a modern mass party according to the West
European standards. The autocratic mentality of its leadership
and the vested interest of its leading cadres in clientelistic
relations prevailed over all attempts to develop a modern
organizational structure. It was only after the electoral
defeat of 1981 and the consequent loss of state resources that
ND intensified its efforts to establish an effective mass
organization, being in need of new mechanisms to mobilize
supporters and communicate with the electorate91.
Moreover, ND lacked a coherent and convincing ideological
platform. Instead it oscillated between modernizing policies
and authoritarian practices and consequently failed to
establish itself as a party of the Centre-Right as its founder
had clearly intended.
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5.5 The policies of New Democracy and the political climate
after the general elections of 1974.
The difficult task that the political elite was faced with
after the 1974 election was the consolidation of democracy amid
conditions of acute economic crisis. Inflation was running at
27 per cent, the GNP was declining at a rate of 3.8 per cent
annually and industrial production by 1.6 per cent. Moreover,
the balance of payments deficit had reached $1,212 million92.
Yet, unlike Spain where the coincidence of the transition with
the economic crisis gave rise to a social and political
contract between Right and Left, the reforms that were
introduced in Greece constituted the political choices solely
of the governing party93 . This can be attributed to several
reasons: first, the social and political forces had played only
a marginal role in the downfall of the dictatorship and were
not in a strong enough position to negotiate the terms under
which the transition was to be carried out; secondly, the
overwhelming majority in favour of Messiah Karamanlis vested
the ND government with the broad legitimacy that it needed in
order to implement Its own programme, without having to seek a
compromise with the other political parties and Interest
groups. Moreover, ND's position was further strengthened by the
workings of the electoral system which provided the governing
party with a disproportionately large parliamentary majority,
while it condemned the smaller parties, particularly those of
the Left, to under-representation (see Table 5.1 above).
Nevertheless, ND showed a considerable degree of liberalism
with a set of measures which aimed at achieving the consent of
the electorate at large. Thus, a new income policy was
introduced which compensated lower income groups for the losses
they had suffered during the dictatorship; in the period 1975-
1978 the real wages of industrial workers increased by 46 per
cent and salaries by 31 per cent 94 . Also, between 1974 and 1977
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subsidies to agriculture were doubled (from 94 to 180 million
drachmas), while through a new taxation policy in the same
period 45 billion drachmas were transferred to the poorer
classes95 . Also, the government responded to some of the trade
union demands such as the reduction of working hours from 48 to
43 per week96 . Expenditure for social services (including
health and education) exceeded the 3 per cent of the Gross
National Income for the first time in the post-war period to
surpass 5 per cent in 198l.
Major reforms were also introduced in the sphere of
education of which the most important were the expansion of
compulsory education from six to nine years; the promotion of
technical education; the establishment of a Centre for
Educational Planning and Research (KEPE) and the modernization
of the curricula. Moreover, ND put an end to the long-standing
and controversial language issue by establishing the demotic
(spoken) as the official language of the country to replace the
katharevousa (purist).
The first years of the transition were also marked by an
unprecedented expansion of state control over the economy and
social services. ND carried out large-scale nationalizations
which included Olympic Airways, the Commercial Bank group,
transportation and oil refineries. It also invested extensively
in new industries such as fertilizers, sugar and military
equipment98.
Additionally, there was a redefinition of the state's
relations with the business world. After the dictatorship, the
latter met with the hostility of the entire political spectrum,
including the Right, due to the close cooperation of a
significant part of big business with the junta. For some
political analysts in particular, the takeover of the
Commercial Bank (by which state control expanded to over 95
per cent of the banking sector99 ) reflected most clearly the
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politicians' hostility towards those businesses which had
profiteered heavily from the junta's protectionist measures'°°.
Industrial development in the post-war period had been based
to a considerable extent, on high state protectionism,
suppression of wages and salaries and a variety of other
measures' 01 . During the dictatorship alone, thanks also to the
suppression of the labour movement, industrial profits nearly
doubled compared to the pre-1967 period 102 . After 1974,
however, ND's Income policy, the democratization of industrial
relations, the elimination of major concessions to Individual
businesses and the gradual easing of protectionist measures in
view of Greece's forthcoming entry into the EEC, created a less
favourable environment for profits. Serious tensions arose as a
result between the governing party and Greek Industrialists,
who adapted very slowly to the new situation always hoping for
a restoration of their privileged relations with the state'03.
Nevertheless, in general terms ND's economic policy produced
positive results; inflation in 1975-76 was down to 13.3 per
cent, while industrial production Increased by 4.4 per cent in
1975 and by 10.6 per cent in 1976104.
On the other hand however, the benefits of democratization
of state and society were counter-balanced by a high degree of
continuity with pre-dictatorial practices. The government's
labour policies offer a major example of this reproduction of
past authoritarian structures. It is true that after the
dictatorship trade unions and agricultural associations were
purged of junta collaborators by Karamanlis's government which
also appointed provisional leaderships until proper union
elections were held'° 5 . The elimination of mechanisms for the
policing and persecution of unions and their activists,
combined with the radicalizing effect of the dictatorship
injected new dynamism into Greek trade unionism; after 1974
trade unions and agricultural associations became more active
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in organizing and demanding Income Increases and better working
conditions106.
These first liberalizing measures, however, did not lead to
the Introduction of free trade-unionism as might have been
expected. On the contrary, ND restored the pre-1967 structures
which were designed to guarantee state manipulation and control
over the labour movement. The main objective of successive
governments In the 1950s and 1960s had been to achieve control
over the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) which
represented (and still does ) the majority of the unionized
workforce and which was solely empowered by law to negotiate
the annual national wage agreements of workers. Through a
variety of manipulations, the right-wing governments of that
time secured the over-representation of their friendly unions
In the GSEE107 . Thanks to the same system, ND was able after
the demise of the dictatorship to assume and retain effective
control over the GSEE throughout the seven years that it
remained in power. By controlling the GSEE, ND governments
could secure the implementation of their income policy,
appearing at the same time to have the endorsement of the
working class. In addition, the Ministry of Labour was
empowered to modify or declare void national and lower level
agreements, If they were deemed to be "contrary to the general
or specific aspects of the government's economic and social
policy" 108 . Finally, when arriving at a deadlock, collective
disputes had to be referred to an arbitration tribunal, through
which the government was able to Impose Its income policy on
trade unions and employers alike'09.
In addition to these regulations, ND introduced In 1976 at a
time of mounting Industrial unrest new labour legislation which
further restricted the freedom of trade unions. Among other
things, Law 330/1976 allowed employers to Institute lock-outs
in response to strikes, and to recruit strike-breakers to
continue production. It also allowed the interference of
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employers in union activities, while depriving union activists
of any substantial protection against employers" 0 . It has been
estimated that under these provisions 15,000 trade unionists
lost their jobs prior to 1981111.
Beyond the level of industrial relations, ND failed also to
carry out a thorough democratization of the state machine. The
popular demand of "de-juntification" was only partly met and an
unspecified number of appointees of the dictatorship remained
both in the administration and the public sector. ND also
maintained YENED as a military broadcasting service despite the
opposition's calls to alter it into an independent
organization. Moreover, the governing party saw the state
apparatus as its own territory; all parties of the opposition -
even the Centre Union which had participated in the government
of national unity - were excluded from key positions in the
state and the state-run organizations. Owing its victory to
the extreme circumstances that prevailed in 1974 and the
personality of Its leader, ND relied heavily on the state
machine to consolidate Its position among the electorate.
The unprecedented expansion of the public sector, which
according to the then Minister of Industry amounted to over 60
per cent of the entire eConomy' 1- 2 , provided increased
opportunities for the distribution of spoils to the party's
clientele. This policy, which as a prominent member of the
Centre remarked, "divided the citizens into the privileged
supporters and friends of the party in power and the non
privileged ones towards whom the state machine was Indifferent
or even hostIle"- 3 , contributed to the popular discontent and
the polarization between the government and the parties of the
opposition. Additionally, ND's monopoly of the broadcasting
media was, as will be shown in the following chapter, a
constant source of tension between the government and the
opposition both inside and outside Parliament.
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Karamanlis's government also placed particular emphasis on
law and order. A new security force was created, the Units for
the Restoration of Order (MAT) which became notorious for their
clashes with demonstrators and strikers. In November 1980, such
a clash with marchers commemorating the seventh anniversary of
the Polytechnic uprising in Athens led to the death of two
people and caused an uproar within Parliament and among public
opinion.
Moreover, although anti-communism ceased to be the official
ideology of the state, Greece remained perhaps the last country
of Europe which had not recognized the resistance to the Axis
forces. References to the resistance movement and the civil war
were totally banned from the state-run media and education; the
same applied to literature and art inspired by left-wing ideas.
At the same time celebrations for the victories of the army
against the guerillas in the civil war continued to be held
and even to be covered by the television services of YENED'14.
These policies, largely reminiscent of ERE T s authoritarian
mentality and practice, caused bitter conflicts between the
government and the opposition, particularly PASOK and the KKE.
The latter two adopted an uncompromisingly anti-Right stance
which, as the elections result of 1977 showed, appealed a lot
to the electorate. By contrast, policies of conciliation and
compromise like those promoted by the KKE-es had little
support among the Centre and the Left'15.
The aggravation of the economic situation, particularly
after the second oil shock of 1979, led to more tensions and
mounting industrial unrest. In industry the process of de-
investment which had started after 1973 especially in the
sectors of advanced technology was accelerated; the crisis
affected also more traditional industries (food, clothing,
textiles) which In the same period had achieved some growth'16.
Between 1979 and 1981 real wages decreased by 5.5 per cent
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while inflation was running at over 25 per cent annually117.
The rate of unemployment doubled from 1.8 to 4 per cent at that
time 118 . In the same period Greece was shaken by a wave of
industrial action: working hours lost in strikes approached 10
million in 1979, to reach a record 20.5 million a year
later 119 . The strikes were supported vigorously by the parties
of the opposition; in particular, PASOK's labour branch
(PASKE), was actively involved in the organization of strikes
which were targeted clearly against the governnient'20.
Therefore, by the end of Its second term in office, ND was
facing a major decline in its popularity and a third electoral
victory seemed a rather unlikely prospect.
5.6 Conclusion
The collapse of the dictatorship led to democratic reforms
which were the product of a broad compromise between all social
and political forces. A fully competitive system was thus
established for the first time in the post war period, which
enabled the alternation of different political parties In
power. Nevertheless, the political institutions which were
established after 1974 were not the product of a compromise
between all the political forces; instead, they constituted the
choices of the political forces under Karamanlis, which were
called to lead the transition process.
The model of democracy which was introduced was based on a
strong executive, as this was seen by the governing party and
Karamanlis in particular as the only safeguard of political
stability. The components of this model were a President of the
Republic with enormous reserve powers to use at a time of
crisis; an electoral system which guaranteed large
parliamentary majorities; and a strong government with limited
accountability to Parliament. This system produced strong
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right-wing governments which thanks to their large
parliamentary support were able to implement their programme of
reforms. Yet, it also led to the dominance of one party in the
political sphere. ND's political programme was based on a model
of government which was to express the "unity of the polity at
the top" rather than providing the conditions under which a
social and political compromise was to be reached through the
dialogue and cooperation of all the political and social
forces. ND's purpose was not to provide the basis for a social
and political contract, but to impose the terms according to
which the social and political forces were to
participate in the political process so that the viability of
democracy could be guaranteed. The emphasis on law and order,
the government tutelage of trade unions and the under-
representation of the parties of the Left in Parliament were
all parts of this strategy. This does not mean however, that
this was the only political option available given the
difficulty of the circumstances (the combination of the
transition and the economic crisis)121.
The strategy of the ND governments reflected to a large
extent the contradictions of the governing party itself: the
co-existence of the bearers of the civil war legacy with new
liberal cadres; the consequent oscillation of the party
between liberalizing measures and authoritarian policies; the
attempts at the creation of a modern mass organization and the
persistence of patronage and personalistic politics. These
contradictions have been also largely reflected in ND's policy
on broadcasting. A detailed analysis of this policy will
enhance we believe our understanding of the functions of
political institutions in the first years of the transition.
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BROADCASTING IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION: 1974-1981.
6.1 Introduction
At the time of the military junta's downfall television had
already acquired a central position in the life of Greeks,
especially as a medium of entertainment. The transition to
democracy appeared to open up new opportunities for the
development of broadcasting Into a medium of culture and
pluralistic Information. Amid the euphoria generated by the
collapse of the dictatorship and the electoral victory of New
Democracy in the 1974 general elections, Karamanils and the
party's liberal cadres pursued a policy of modernization and
democratization of the Greek broadcasting organizations. Yet,
notwithstanding their initial ambitious plans for a thorough
reform of broadcasting institutions, the Conservatives made
little effort to break with the long-standing tradition of
partisan political control of radio and television. In this
chapter we will concentrate on the organization and operation
of broadcasting institutions under Conservative rule and
evaluate their contribution to the general process of political
communication In the first seven years of the transition.
6.2 New Democracy and the politics of the press
Before we embark on an analysis of broadcasting under New
Democracy (ND), It is first of all necessary to make a brief
reference to developments in the sphere of the press after the
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dictatorship. Such a reference will provide a more complete
picture of ND's media policy and of the overall structure of
political communication in Greece during the period of the
democratic transition.
The establishment of democratic institutions and the
consequent change in the ideological climate were clearly
reflected in the operation of the press in the first weeks of
the transition. With the legalization of the Communist party in
September 1974, Rizospastis, the official organ of the KKE,
emerged from underground as a morning paper for the first time
since the party had been outlawed in 1947. After its re-
emergence the paper followed the policy of the KKE and its line
was clearly doctrinaire, aiming mostly at attracting party
supporters rather than a wider reading public.
Avgi, which until 1967 had been published as the morning
paper of EDA, re-appeared too, now as the official organ of the
KKE-es. An effort was made, nevertheless, for the paper to
adopt a broader political outlook in order to attract readers
from the broader Left, albeit without success. Eventually, the
paper followed the political fortunes of the party and its
daily readership declined threefold within five years.
Of the other papers which had closed down during the
dictatorship, Athinaiki and Vradyni re-opened in the very first
days of democracy. Both papers attempted to capitalize on their
credentials of opposition against the junta, but the re-launch
of Athinaiki proved unsuccessful and the paper folded within
the following two years'. Vradyni was rewarded for its stance
against the dictatorship with the highest circulation in 1974
(a record of 217,764 copies), but after that its circulation
started to decline and dropped to less than a quarter of the
1974 peak level. A possible reason for this decline was that
Vradyni identified so closely with ND to the extent that it
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became the mouthpiece of the party and its leader, thus
alienating a large part of its Centrist readers2.
Vlachou re-entered press publishing with the traditional
paper of the Vlachos family, Kathimerini, which was re-modelled
on the London Times. Although conservative In its general
outlook, the paper followed an independent editorial line,
ostensibly aiming at attracting readers who did not belong to
the traditional Right. Nevertheless, although it established a
reputation as the most prestigious paper In the country,
Kathimerini had only limited appeal to the public; between 1974
and 1980 its daily circulation dropped by over 50 per cent. Due
to these financial straits Vlachou was unable to re-open her
afternoon paper Messimvrini which had been a publishing success
of the l96O. Eventually the title was sold to a book
publisher in 1979 and Messimvrini re-appeared in January 1980
as a centre-right paper, never to approach the circulation of
the pre-1967 era.
Another two papers which closed down after the coup did not
re-appear at all. These were Dimocratiki Allaghi EDA's
afternoon paper and the Centrist Eleftheria. The publisher of
the latter, P. Kokkas, had died in 1973 and subsequent plans by
his family to re-open the paper did not materialize. Finally
Ethnos, which had been forced to close down in 1971, did not
re-appear until seven years after the collapse of the junta, as
the first tabloid and colour paper under a new proprietor.
Of the papers which had continued to circulate throughout
the dictatorship, the morning Acropolis and the afternoon
Apogevmatlni owned by the Botsis brothers, which had supported
Papadopoulos's liberalizing strategy in 1973, maintained their
right-wing line, after the fall of the dictatorship. Despite
the competition that they faced from the restored
publications, both papers retained a large share of the market
and Apogevmatini in particular, with its sensationalist
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reporting, continued to have by far the largest circulation of
all right-wing papers.
To Vima and Ta Nea, respectively the morning and evening
publications of the Lambrakis group, benefited considerably
from the establishment of democracy. Ta Nea reached and even
exceeded the daily circulation of the pre-dictatorial period,
while To Vima saw its circulation Increase substantially In the
first years of the transition, although in general terms it
experienced like the rest of the morning papers an overall
decline. Having closely identified with the traditional Centre
until 1967, both papers had to broaden their outlook gradually
after 1974 due to the fluidity within the Centre and the rapid
advance of PASOK. After 1975 they had also to face the
competition of a new afternoon paper, Eleftherotypia (Free
Press) which aimed at appealing to the widely radicalized
segments of the population; Eleftherotypia actually achieved
the second largest circulation of the opposition papers and the
third largest of all papers after Ta Nea and Apogevmatlni.
Finally, the pro-junta papers Estia and particularly
Eleftheros Kosmos turned their support to the extreme Right and
campaigned for the restoration of the monarchy and the granting
of an amnesty to the dictators. Despite the relative electoral
success of EP in 1977, however, the papers' circulation
declined steadily and Eleftheros Kosmos finally closed down in
1982k . Despite their close association with the junta, neither
paper faced any purge. Early in 1975 the Union of Journalists
of the Athenian Dailies (ESIEA) issued a petition In which
journalists requested that those publishers found guilty of
collaboration with the dictatorship be punished and lose the
right to publish for five years. The Issue was discussed in
Parliament and the opposition ardently supported the idea. No
legal action was taken, however, as the government evoked
an absence of specific legislation under which offenders could
be prosecuted 5 . Moreover, as the Undersecretary for the Press
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suggested, under the existing legislation the prosecution of a
paper for Its political Ideas could be considered as a
violation of the freedom of the press: "Unfortunately democracy
(...) has the luxury of allowing even the fascists to talk"6.
In general terms, the press was completely unfettered after
1974. The laws of the dictatorship limiting the freedom of the
press were abolished 7 , while the new Constitution explicitly
banned press censorship8 . Moreover, Karamanlis' increased
concern on matters pertaining to media policy was reflected in
the appointment to the post of Undersecretary responsible for
the Press and Information of the journalist P. Lambrias, a
moderate Conservative who had been the editor of Messlmvrini
until 1967. One of Karamanlis' closest friends, Lambrias had
been actively involved abroad in the campaign against the
dictatorship. As the Prime Minister's personal advisor, he had
also contributed decisively to the formulation of ND's
Ideological principles and modernization strategy 9 . Karamanlis
also established for the first time the post of Government
spokesman, whose task was to inform reporters on a daily basis
about the progress of government work 1-°. This post was occupied
by Lambrias too.
In 1975 Lambrias prepared a draft for a radical reform of
press law. Among other things, his proposals Included a code of
professional practice for journalists, a Press Council copied
on the British model and the establishment of the 'legal claim'
of the press to information from the government 11 . There was
nevertheless opposition to the draft from both journalists and
publishers' associations and Lambrias decided not to submit it
to Parliament until an agreement was reached 12 . After Lambrias'
defeat in the 1977 elections and his subsequent departure from
the government, the draft was finally shelved. The attempts at
press law reform were finally abandoned after a second draft
produced by the new Undersecretary A. Tsaldaris, who had
eliminated all innovations from the initial proposal, also met
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with adverse reactions, particularly from the journalists'
unions13.
Ever since the downfall of the dictatorship, journalists had
maintained a defensive stance against the idea of a press law,
regarding it as an attempt by the state to restrict their
professional freedom. ESIEA argued that journalistic practice
should be governed solely by the laws which apply to the
community as a whole. Even a code detailing the fundamental
principles of professional practice was treated with
scepticism14 . Moreover, major problems such as lack of access
to accurate official information, although acknowledged by
union representatives 15 , did not become a subject of union
proposals or pressure. Instead, throughout the 1970s
journalists' unions devoted their activities and militancy to
the improvement of their members' welfare16.
Press-state relations expand beyond the definition of the
legal framework within which newspapers have to operate. In
Greece newspapers depend also largely on the state for their
economic survival. By 1981, ND had allocated 1.6 billion
drachmas to newspapers, most of which faced an aggravating
economic crisis. Soaring production costs, a loss of
advertising to the rapidly growing television networks and a
declining readership were the main reasons for the papers'
mounting debts 17 . Apart from state-controlled loans, financial
support from successive post-war governments has included: the
allocation of advertising from state and state-run
organizations to the papers; tax concessions; and other
privileges such as duty-free newsprint and technical
equipment 1- 8 . Loans and other concessions to publishers were not
arranged collectively; instead, they were based on bi-partite
agreements between Individual publishers and the government.
Moreover, available evidence suggests that there was
preferential treatment for some Conservative newspapers by the
ND governments, and particularly for Vradyni which belonged to
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a personal friend of Karamanlis. There were also tax
concessions to journalists and, what was more important, after
the fall of the dictatorship an ever increasing number of
journalists were offered parallel employment in the state and
state-run organizations (for instance, in broadcasting or in
various press and public relations offices) mainly on a
clientelistic basis' 9 . Journalists have often claimed that
the centrality of the state for the economic welfare of both
newspapers and individual journalists has been a constraint on
the freedom of the press and its ability to function as a
'fourth estate'20.
Yet, although this might
subsidies on the newspapers'
to define. There has been
academic or by an ad hoc
distribution of power within
selection of stories, who co
government, policy or p0111
criteria, are questions whi
can be said Is that the pre
than ever before in the pos
persecution since 1974 of
the case, the impact of state
verall policy has not been easy
no systematic research either
commission of Inquiry on the
the Greek press. Who makes the
fers legitimacy to this or that
.cal organization and by what
i have yet to be answered. What
has been more free to operate
-war period. There has been no
'i taoer or of Its readers nn
ideological, grounds; on the contrary, the expression in the
press of different political views, at least those which have
been represented in Parliament, has been seen by successive
governments as an essential prerequisite of democracy.
Moreover, state loans and other subsidies, even in those cases
where they have been used as 'carrots' for the press of the
opposition, have contributed to the survival of weak papers
like Avgi and thus to the preservation of a plurality of
opinion. On the other hand, the persistence of serious problems
such as the limited access to official information and the
absence of a broadly accepted code of professional practice
have affected the overall performance and credibility of the
press.
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6.3 EIRT in transition: the plans for reform and the reports of
foreign experts
The collapse of the dictatorship marked the end of military
control over EIRT. In August 1974, the provisional government
under Karamanlis appointed new management to the Institute,
headed by a personal friend of the Prime Minister, actor D.
Horn, as Director General and P. Bakoyiannis, a journalist of
liberal persuasion, as his deputy. For reasons that were never
officially explained the purge that took place was confined to
the upper echelons of the administration and the key area of
news and current affairs; It did not expand to all parts of the
hierarchy. Thus, out of a total of 1,500 staff, only 45 people
were removed from the senior administrative posts and the news
and current affairs department21.
The establishment of democracy found EIRT on the verge of
collapse, overburdened as it was by massive debts accumulated
through the extravagant expenditure on the Institute's new
headquarters. There was also a huge bureaucracy, which in
Bakoylannis's view was completely incompatible with the
function and needs of a broadcasting organization22 . For
Lambrias, who as Undersecretary for the Press was also
responsible for broadcasting, a complete reorganization of the
EIRT was necessary if radio and television were to become
really cultural media in a democratic society23.
6.3.1 The report of Sir Hugh Greene
In drawing up plans for EIRT's reorganization, Lambrias
requested the assistance of the former Director General of the
BBC, Sir Hugh Greene. As became apparent from the post-junta
parliamentary debates on radio and television, the British
model was considered by Greek politicians as the archetype of
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democratic broadcasting. Characteristically, Lambrias told
Parliament that Hugh Greene had been chosen because he was
"the most successful director general of the most successful
radio and television organization in the world" 24 . There was
another, more personal reason behind Lambrias's decision:
Greene, who was also an old friend of the Undersecretary, had
been actively involved In the campaign against the dictatorship
and because of this had been highly appreciated by Greek
politicians. His visit was thus greeted with enthusiasm by the
parties of the opposition and particularly EK-ND which hoped
that Hugh Greene would instil some of his 'liberal democratic
spirit' into the Greek broadcasting organization25.
In his report submitted to Lambrias in January 1975, Greene
suggested that Instead of a reform, Greek broadcasting
organizations should undergo a 'radical change'. The main
problems of EIRT that he underlined in his report were the huge
and sluggish bureaucracy, the total dependence of the
Institute's management on the Ministry of Finance for the
approval of every item of expenditure, the absence of an
efficient organizational structure and the lack of modern
equipment and of trained personnel, especially in the sphere of
programme production. The most important problem according to
the report was that EIRT operated as part of the state machine
and according to the regulations of the civil service: "the
civil service mentality and the creative outlook on which good
broadcasting depends are like oil and water", he remarked.
"Promising men and women will never be attracted to a broadcast
system which strangles initiative with civil service
regulations" 26 . More specifically Sir Hugh Greene made the
following proposals:
- The transformation of EIRT into a corporation functioning
under private law with the state as its sole shareholder. The
new organization should be empowered to hire and dismiss
personnel and to set Its own salaries according to Its own
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rules, without any reference to civil service regulations or
any government interference;
- of the 770 civil servants, whose presence contributed to the
bureaucratic congestion of the administrative services, those
considered as redundant should be transferred to other
government departments.
- an administrative structure, which was modelled on that of
the BBC and which was to consist of: 1) a Board of Governors
with six members, appointed by the President of the Republic or
the Prime Minister following consultations with the leader of
the official opposition. The members of the board should be
chosen for their personal achievements within society and
should not be representatives of political parties, ministries
or any other organization. The board was to deal with overall
programming, administrative and economic policy. ii) a Director
General who was to run the day-to--day affairs of the
organization. The director was to be appointed and dismissed
solely by the board. iii) an Advisory Body representative of
the nation politically, socially and geographically, whose main
aim would be to bring to the broadcasting organization the
views of the audience at large. In particular, It should deal
with programming and the preservation of political objectivity
and impartiality27.
- the separate existence of YENED should be brought to an end
and a unified national broadcasting service should come into
being by the end of 1976.
- on programming, which Hugh Greene found to be of very low
cultural and intellectual standards, steps should be taken
urgently towards the increase of EIRT's own programme
production. For this purpose the Institute's facilities should
be Increased and a programme of training, especially for
programme and technical staff, should be urgently under-
taken28.
Apart from the above proposals, Hugh Greene also suggested
to Lambrias that he should seek the assistance of another two
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British specialists, the deputy editor of BBC news Alan
Protheroe and Joanna Spicer, an expert on organizational
matters, to make more specific recommendations on the reform of
EIRT's news department and of the television service
respectively. Both Protheroe and Spicer submitted their reports
to the Undersecretary in April 1975. Together with those of the
Greene report, their findings constitute the best illustration
of the problems that Greek broadcasting was facing at that
time.
6.3.2 The Spicer report
As Spicer wrote in the introduction to her report to
Lambrias, her aim was to "suggest how the output, organization
and operation of EIRT could be developed on the basis and in
the spirit of Sir Hugh Greene's report" 29 . According to her
observations, EIRT completely lacked the organizational
structure that was necessary for the development of television
output. There was no managerial staff responsible for
different sectors of programme production below the Deputy
Director General in his television capacity and the Television
Programme Director. Moreover, there was a lack of knowledge,
of trained staff and of the facilities necessary for large-
scale television production. Even existing facilities and staff
were under-used. Under these circumstances, EIRT programme
production was confined to News and Current Affairs and to
minor talk shows, while the bulk of Greek material was supplied
by independent production companies to which EIRT granted long-
term contracts. According to Spicer's own 	 estimate3° the
comparison between EIRT-made programmes and external
production in the entire Greek produced material transmitted












It was Spicer's view, however, that not even the external
producers had any particular experience of television
production31.
Additionally, EIRT relied heavily on foreign material which
accounted for 41 per cent of the entire weekly output. In
general terms, EIRT output was particularly low in quality and
limited In variety:
"There are many programme formats not yet represented in
EIRT schedules. No feature programmes using outside broadcast
cameras have been developed (...) and there is as yet a limited
development of serious music productions. There are a number of
programmes which are not visual In character (...) the
programmes for children (...) are all foreign and garly all of
trivial standard below EIRT guidelines acceptance".
There were no rules to guide the organization's policy on
commercials. On many occasions there was a readiness to 'chop
up' a programme before it was due to finish In order to add
advertisements which had arrived on the day of the
transmission. Also, advertising agencies were able to specify
the exact placing of a commercial in the daily programme
schedule. All In all, according to Spicer, EIRT's programme
output fell far short of the standards required from a public
service broadcaster33.
The main step that EIRT should take in the direction of
public service television, she argued, was to become "a
programme producing organization no longer using external
companies and foreign purchases for the greater part of its
transmission and all major programmes in peak hours" 34 . To this
end, Spicer recommended the organization of a programme
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structure which was to build up expertise In the creation and
selection of programmes. Such a structure would consist of
programme 'heads' to specialize In different programme
categories 35 . Training should be also provided for them at the
BBC and elsewhere,
In terms of facilities for programme production, the
building of another two large studios was necessary. Moreover,
there should be a review and renovation of technical equipment.
Furthermore, Investment should be transferred from the work of
external production companies to the development and Increase
of work within the organization. Finally, there should be a
review of the policy of foreign purchases. EIRT should seek a
reduction In the quantity of foreign material In Its schedules
and at the same time a more critical selection should be made,
leading to better quality. Also, EIRT should tighten its
advertising regulations and seek their enforcement on every
occasion.
In Splcer's view, these steps and In particular the
organization of a programme structure should and could take
place until the end of 1975. For, as she explained:
"The decision to create an independent National Broadcasting
Service is needed urgently: but new legislation necessarily
requires debate and preparatory time. It Is my belief that
actions can be taken now in some areas by the Director General
and the Board of Governors which will be conducive to a new
situation and a gain In themselves (...) If some steps can be
taken In the next few weeks, It is p4psIble to expect a fresh
impetus In television In Autumn l975"°.
6.3.3 The Protheroe report
Commenting on EIRT news, Alan Protheroe did not hesitate to
suggest that " EIRT transmitted some of the worst broadcast
news" that he had seen and that the news department was in a
state of chaos with regard to technical standards and
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professional specialization 37 . Many years later, Protheroe
referred to the EIRT news department as a "teddy bear with its
stuffing taken out". There was no permanent head, nor permanent
journalists and reporters. The news operation depended almost
entirely on people who were coming In after a day's work in the
daily press and for whom work on television was only a
secondary job.
Neither was there any permanent technical staff with any
experience In the production of television news. Technicians,
such as cameramen for Instance, were transferred from the
preparation of other programmes to help with the transmission
of news 38 . The news department also lacked a budget
specifically designed to meet Its needs and was suffering from
a bureaucratic organization which put further constraints on
Its operation.
News programmes consisted mainly of an announcer reading the
news to the camera; there was a lot of speech and very little
visual material. There was an excessive dose of political news
with most emphasis placed on the activities of the government.
"What are the Greeks doing and saying? Where are the IndustrIal
developments, the accidents, (...) the successes, the human
stories of the people" 39 . Moreover, the news covered events
which were taking place almost solely within the area of
Athens: "Greece expands beyond Syntagma square, but this is not
apparent In the bulletins"40.
As remedies, Protheroe recommended the following:
- the news department should acquire its own permanent staff, a
total of 56 people of whom 22 should be journalists. Those
chosen to work In the production of news and current affairs
should have special training, possibly In another country, to
reach the high standards required for such work.
- additionally, the news department should acquire Its own
technical equipment and its own budget. It should also move
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from the main building of Aghia Paraskevi to the centre of
Athens in order to facilitate access and speedy reaction to
events, particularly political ones.
- there should	 also be more extensive coverage of events
taking place outside Athens and this could be achieved through
the development of a network of reporters situated in
different parts of the country. Finally, there should be
greater variety of news stories which should be reported with
accuracy and impartiality41.
In the same spirit the three British experts pointed to the
problems that the forty year-long authoritarian political
practice and the absence of a specific philosophy on the role
of broadcasting had created and made recommendations for the
modernization of the radio and television services. Yet the
implementation of their proposals presupposed a re-definition
of the role of broadcasting in a democratic society. In the
following sections we shall examine the impact of the three
reports on the developments that took place within Greek
broadcasting in the first period of the transition and
evaluate these developments in the light of the
recommendations.
6,4 The post-dictatorial legal framework for broadcasting.
6.4.1 The provisions of the Constitution of 1975
The abuse of radio and particularly of television by the
dictators led after 1974 to an increased concern among
politicians about the definition of the principles which should
guide the operation of broadcasting in a democratic society and
the need to enshrine these principles in the new Constitution.
Under the Constitution of 1952 broadcasting was mentioned only
in a negative sense, as an exception from the clauses which
protected the press against censorship and any other
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restrictive measures imposed by the state 42 . Underlying this
provision was the rapid expansion of radio and the belief that
the new medium could exert enormous influence upon audiences43,
State control was seen therefore as the only effective
safeguard for the responsible operation of broadcasting,
although the social obligation of radio, and later also of
television, that the state was supposed to safeguard was never
explicitly defined.
The same mentality was reflected In the draft of the new
Constitution that the ND government submitted to the Assembly
in 1975. Clause 15, paragraph 1, of the constitutional draft
was only a repetition of the 1952 provision with the addition
of television to the media which were excluded from the
protective measures provided for the press. A second paragraph
containing a positive provision for broadcasting was for the
first time proposed by the opposition, namely EK-ND, PASOK, EDA
and KKE-es. There were two main components to this proposal:
first, radio and television should abide by the principles of
objectivity and impartiality; secondly, broadcasting should be
subject to the control of the state as the guarantor of the
application of these principles. It Is worth noting that the
parties of the opposition also proposed the establishment by
the Constitution of the state monopoly of broadcasting which,
nevertheless, was not accepted by the government44.
The ND government, however, did respond to the opposition's
proposal by adding a second paragraph to Article 15. According
to the new provision, the objective of broadcasting was to
provide information and news as well as works of literature and
art, based on the principles of Impartiality and objectivity.
In order to fulfil this purpose radio and television were
placed under 'immediate state control' 45 . Thus, by common
agreement of the government and the opposition, the
Constitution of 1975 defined for the first time the social
mission and the character of Greek broadcasting as a public
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service 46 . State control of broadcasting was unanimously
acknowledged as the only safeguard of objectivity and
impartiality in programming. There was, however, a broad
disagreement between the ND government and the parties of the
opposition as to the general framework within which this
control was to be organized. The opposition demanded the
establishment by the Constitution of mechanisms which would
guarantee the implementation of the above principles. Among
other things, they proposed the participation of
representatives of all parties In Parliament in the
administrative bodies of the broadcasting organizations and the
explicit banning of government control over them 47 . According
to the government's view, however, once the Constitution had
established the main obligations of broadcasting, the details
of the organization of state control could be defined by a
common law48 . As a distinguished lawyer commented, "it was
obvious that the governing majority of the time did not want to
bound itself with a provision which would deprive it of control
of the most important medium it had at its disposal in order to
elicit the tolerance or even the consent of the masses" 49 . The
ensuing analysis of the 1975 law for broadcasting will provide
a better understanding of the government's intentions and its
view of the role that radio and television should perform in
the period of transition.
6.4.2 Law 230/1975
By the end of 1975, the ND government had put forward the
new bill for broadcasting which was to replace the existing
legislation for EIRT. Following Hugh Greene's recommendation,
the government planned the transformation of the EIRT into a
public limited company which would allow it to operate with
more fiscal flexibility and independence. The preparation of a
first draft of the bill was entrusted to lawyer D. Synadinos
who had had long experience in the organization of public
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administration. Synadinos, who followed the law on public
limited companies, submitted his proposal to a committee whose
main members were the Undersecretary P. Lambrias and lawyer G.
Oikonomopoulos. The latter had been a member of the junta-
appointed committee for the drafting of the Constitution of
1968 and was to become the first Chairman of the new
broadcasting company's Board of Governors 50 . However, Synadinos
was not allowed to present his proposal before the committee,
which made extensive changes to the Initial draft, particularly
to those parts dealing with the composition and appointment of
the new organlzation t s administrative bodies. A major example
was the appointment of the Director General by the government
rather than by the Board of Governors as Synadinos had
proposed 51 . Apparently the draft was reviewed so that It could
guarantee greater government control over the future
broadcasting organization.
Implemented in December 1975, Law 230 transformed EIRT into
a public limited company, Hellenic Radio and Television (ERT).
The new Corporation had the state as its sole shareholder and
was to operate under the rules of private enterprises with
'financial and administrative autonomy' and with the aim of
serving the 'public interest' 52 . The law re-affirmed the state
monopoly of broadcasting which was to be enjoyed jointly by ERT
and YENED, until the two networks merged into a unitary
organization 53 . The principle of the state monopoly was
accepted by all sides in Parliament as the only form of
ownership which would safeguard the social role of broadcasting
as it was prescribed In the Constitution. No other forms of
broadcasting - such as community radio or stations run by
social groups - were proposed. On the contrary, all the parties
unanimously agreed to include a provision for the prosecution
of pirate radios which had proliferated after the collapse of
the dictatorship54.
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In general terms the new broadcasting law did follow the
broad outlines of Hugh Greene's proposal, but it failed to
incorporate its liberal spirit. Thus, ERT was placed under the
direct supervision of the Minister to the Prime Minister who
was empowered to transfer his competences on broadcasting to
the Undersecretary for the Press and Information 55 . In effect,
the Minister's control over the ERT consisted of extensive
powers on financial and organizational matters such as the
Corporation's annual budget, balance sheets, investment
programmes, salary increases, organizational questions and
internal regulations. The Minister's powers therefore limited
the financial and administrative independence and flexibility
that ERT should have enjoyed as an enterprise operating under
private law. What was more important, the Minister, or the
Undersecretary, could influence programme content, as he was
empowered by the law to ban any programme or part of it 'in
extreme cases' without having to justify his decision 56 . The
law also established an obligation for the ERT to transmit
announcements of the government whenever this was requested by
the Minister57.
Beyond the Minister's extensive competences, the new law
reproduced the government's firm control over all key
appointments in the ERT. Thus the seven members of the Board of
Governors were to be appointed by the government at its sole
discretion, with no other criteria than their 'well-established
reputation'. Moreover, although the duration of their office
was to be three years, they could be dismissed before the end
of their term if the government considered it necessary. The
Board of Governors was not even empowered to elect its chairman
and vice chairman who were also to be nominated by the
government58.
The main executive organs of the Corporation, the Director
General and his two deputies - one responsible for programming
and the other for administration - were also to be appointed by
the government (and not by the Board, as Hugh Greene and
Synadinos had proposed) for a three-year term. Like the members
of the Board of Governors, they could be dismissed by the
government before their term of office was due to end, while
the terms of their contracts were to be subject to the approval
of the Minister to the Prime Minister59.
Finally, the General Assembly that was established by the
new law was a far cry from the highly representative body that
Hugh Greene had proposed. It was to consist of 20 (not 50)
members, fourteen of whom were appointed 'ex officio' 60 . From
the remaining six, who should not be MPg , three were to be
nominated by the Prime Minister and three by the leader of the
official opposition 61 . Explaining its composition to
Parliament, Lambrias suggested that the legislation on limited
companies provided for an assembly of shareholders; since in
the case of the ERT the only shareholder was the state, the
General Assembly was to be composed of 'those who represent the
state' 62 . In practice the General Assembly would not be the
active body serving as a channel of communication between ERT
and the public as Greene had proposed (six meetings a year,
wide publicity). Nor was it the 'dominant and supreme organ' of
the corporation that Lambrias had suggested 63 . Its role was
mainly advisory rather than supervisory, with a concern for
financial and administrative matters as well as programming64.
To summarize, the new statute was only a marginal improve-
ment on the previous legislation of the EIRT, since the
government's control of broadcasting continued to be tight. In
effect, the government's practice vis-a-vis broadcasting from
the first year of transition left little doubt about its real
view of radio and television. The first Director General, D.
Horn, and his deputy P. Bakoylannis, had resigned shortly after
the 1974 general election blaming government Intervention in
their policies and a general authoritarian outlook with regard
to broadcasting 65 . Moreover, by the time the bill was introdu-
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ced in Parliament for discussion in November 1975, the second
Director General, A. Viachos, his deputy, A. Solomos and the
Chairman of EIRT's Board of Governors were also preparing their
resignations for the same reasons as their predecessors.
Incidents of censorship had been reported by the press66,
while the constant exclusion of the opposition from news and
current affairs had generated a lot of discontent and criticism
among politicians 67 . At the beginning of November, the press
had published for the first time Alan Protheroe's report on
EIRT's news service which gave the opportunity even to
Conservative papers to attack the government for its
authoritarian mentality and practice 68 . In view of this state
of affairs, the government's assurances that the new law was
intended to turn EIRT into an 'instrument of objectivity and
impartiality' 69 could hardly convince the other political
parties who grasped the opportunity of the debate to stage an
attack against the government's authoritarianism vis-a-vis
broadcasting 70 . The opposition rejected the bill as
perpetuating one-party control over the broadcasting media and
as vesting the responsible minister with 'the power to exercise
preventive censorship on programming' 71 . Not surprisingly the
issue of objectivity and impartiality dominated the
parliamentary debate. The opposition made various proposals
seeking to minimize the government's control over appointments
and to secure a broader political and social representation in
the administrative bodies of the new organization 72 . It is
remarkable, however, that no party of the opposition presented
any concrete and coherent proposal for an overall reform of the
broadcasting system; rather, the opposition's criticism and
proposals centred on political broadcasting and the need for a
balanced coverage of all political activities.
The parliamentary debate revealed a lack of any serious
consideration among politicians about the social and political
role that broadcasting could perform in a democracy. If for the
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government radio and television were the official organs of the
state, for the parties of the opposition they were little more
than an extension of the political arena. For Instance, the
highly centralized system of organization and the idea of
direct state control were not challenged from any group in
Parliament. There was no consideration of the establishment of
an independent public authority on the lines of the British
model, otherwise much discussed during the debate, which could
supervise the application of the principles of public service
broadcasting in practice. It is also indicative that there was
no discussion of the need for a code to regulate journalistic
practice and commercial advertising, or of the development of a
regional information network which could give voice to the
largely neglected provinces.
The system of formal controls that was introduced by the new
statute constituted a continuity with the pre-1967 practices
towards broadcasting. Law 230/1975 did not provide any
guarantees for the application of Impartiality and objectivity
in practice. As the KKE-es deputy L. Kyrkos commented during
the debate,
"the protection of objectivity and the democratic spirit
that Mr Lambrias has praised is left to the discretion of the
government. If the government so wishes, it guarantees them; If
not, it suspends them. In any.7çase. these principles are not
institutionalized in this Bi1l"'.
6.5 YENED: Militarism and commercial orientation
The developments in YENED during the transition are here
dealt with separately because the policy that was followed by
the governments under Karamanlis towards the military channel
was completely different to that on EIRT.
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In the aftermath of the junta's collapse, the new Minister
of Defence E. Averoff, sought to place YENED under his direct
personal supervision. The junta-appointed commander and the
other officers of the network's hierarchy were removed and
replaced by officers who enjoyed Averoff's personal
confidence 74 . In effect Averoff's powers over YENED extended
beyond the control normally exercised by the Minister of
Defence over the activities of a military unit. He assumed
effective control of all appointments and chose the two
successive heads of the network's news department from among
his personal confidants 75 . He also dealt personally with many
aspects of YENED's everyday operation; as he emphatically told
Parliament, "1 make every effort to place YENED under the
greatest possible control exercised by myself or a close
associate of mine to the point where I deal with certain issues
personally" 76 . In addition to the control exercised by the
Minister of Defence, YENED's news department was also placed
under the supervision of the Undersecretariat for the Press in
order to follow the general government guidelines on news
coverage in the same way as did the EIRT. Thus, after 1974
YENED came under a peculiar regime: on the one hand it retained
its status as a military unit under the command of the General
Staff, and on the other the control over its operation was
transferred to two separate government departments. Ostensibly,
the main aim of this policy was to limit the military's
autonomy in such a vital sphere as information, and to minimize
the risk of a resurrection of juntist propaganda. Averoff was
in a position to claim in January 1975, "YENED is not an
uncontrollable organization that is under bad Influence. On the
contrary, It is a military organization controlled by the
civilian government"77.
However, Insofar as YENED remained a military unit under the
command of the General Staff, It retained Its organizational
structure and militaristic mentality (as described in the
previous chapters). It also retained its arch-conservative
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political outlook. Purges were limited to its senior military
staff while the civilian personnel went largely unchanged78.
Characteristically, as head of news and current affairs
remained the same person who had been appointed by the
dictators (K. Sismanis). Moreover, programmes which had started
during the dictatorship and become renowned for their
nationalistic, ultra-conservative style and content continued
or were repeated 79 . People who had cooperated with the junta,
such as the former deputy Director General of EIRT during the
dictatorship, I. Moschovitis, were also invited to make their
own programmes by YENED 80 . Whereas any reference to the anti-
fascist resistance movement and the civil war was excluded from
the programmes of both networks, YENED regularly covered events
such as, nationalist gatherings for the commemoration of the
military victories against the Communists in the civil war (it
should be noted here that EIRT did not broadcast similar
reports). Asked by a newspaper about the necessity of such
programmes, an YENED commander was reported as saying that
historical facts could not be changed and that "on these
historical matters there was a lot of sensitivity"81.
Throughout the seven years of ND government there were
repeated allegations that committees of censorship continued to
operate within YENED, effectively vetting radio and television
programmes 82 . In September 1977 the newspaper Ta Nea published
a long article containing details of the composition, aims and
rules of operation of these censorship committees. This
information, which the newspaper claimed was drawn from a
report from the unions of YENED employees, suggested that
within the network there were three censorship committees which
had been in operation since the dictatorship. These had been
set up by Papadopoulos himself to vet radio and television
broadcasts83 . To our knowledge, this report was never
officially rejected. Nonetheless, in 1980 Averoff denied in
Parliament the existence of any committees of control or
censorship. He emphasized, however, that,
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"the administration of YENED which is responsible for the
selection of programmes, used (...) employees of specialized
knowledge to preview certain programmes and to make suggestions
regarding their historical accuracy and their social, religious
and aesthetic deontology, but the views of 0 hese employees are
simply advisory for the commander of YENED"°
Throughout the 1970s, YENED became a target of the parties
of the opposition as well as for the press (especially the
Conservative Kathimerini 85 ) who maintained that a broadcasting
organization run by the military was an insult and a danger to
democratic principles 86 . Replying in early 1975 to the
opposition's claims that "it was unacceptable, after the
horrific experience of the dictatorship, for the military to
control such a dangerous medium for democracy" 87 , Averoff
argued that the latter was a successful organization which,
thanks to Its "good housekeeping", had made considerable
profits. Comparisons were also made between the "economically
sick EIRT", which had accumulated a deficit of 800 million
drachmas, and the "healthy and strong" YENED88.
Many factors had contributed to the latter's economic
robustness. First, YENED employed a much smaller number of
employees than EIRT. By the time the transition took place, the
ratio between the two organizations was almost one to three
(580 employees for YENED compared with more than 1500 for
EIRT) 89 . Almost a fifth of the personnel (military officers and
MoD employees) received their salaries from the Ministry of
Defence 90 . Moreover, YENED received a military subsidy In the
form of technical staff, transport and communication equipment
and energy91 . Most Important of all, however, YENED had a huge
income from advertising, which In 1974 alone amounted to 200
million drachmas 92 . Notwithstanding the considerable subsidy
from the MoD, YENED was forced to be self-supporting, which In
practice meant recourse to advertising and a programme policy
which could guarantee high audience ratings. Its programme
schedule was dominated by sport, American series, Greek popular
films of the 1950's and 1960's and low budget Greek series.
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Such a diet made the channel decidedly popular, attracting in
1974 sixty per cent of the entire viewing public 93 . As a
consequence, and thanks to a policy of relatively cheap
advertisement rates 94 YENED received high advertising revenues
through which it financed its programme production 95 . Although
a military unit, YENED was operating by the criteria of a
commercial enterprise and with the main aim of maximizing
profits by selling air time to advertisers96.
The argument of YENED's economic success was repeated by
many ND deputies during the debate on the new broadcasting law,
when the issue of the organization's merger with EIRT was put
forward by the opposition 97 . To those who claimed that YENED's
programmes were a menace to democracy because they "cultivated
a jingoistic and militaristic spirit and were imbued by a
reactionary mentality" 98 , it was suggested that "YENED has a
viewing rate of 60 per cent to 40 per cent for EIRT. This is
the democratic principle (...) That's what the people want and
we must support it" 99 . These arguments are indicative of the
absence of any clear perspective or consideration by
politicians regarding the purpose of Greek broadcasting. Thus,
YENED's performance was evaluated solely according to criteria
of profitability. These arguments, especially when they
involved references to the crisis-stricken EIRT, implied that
it was precisely the organization and the operation of YENED by
the military which had led to the network's popularity and
success.
Another argument in favour of YENED's continued existence
was presented by Averoff: that the abolition of the network as
a military operation would be a great affront to the armed
forces. "YENED was born in a (...) period of war and (...)
became a child that the Greek people came to love; and It was
especially loved by the Armed Forces which I would not wish to
upset today with the abolition of their successful child"00.
It is possible that the retention of YENED was an additional
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component in Karamanlis' strategy - which included a limited
purge of the junta, the institutionalization of the military's
considerable autonomy (Law 660/1977) and the absence of any
criticism against the officers' corps - to achieve the consent
of the Armed Forces to the democratic institutions.
This view, however, could be challenged. First, there
appeared to be disagreement on what constituted the
government's policy on the future of YENED. On the one hand the
Minister of Defence had declared that "any discussion about the
abolition of YENED should be ruled out"°-. On the other hand,
the Undersecretary for the Press, P. Lambrias, although
defending YENED from the opposition's criticism, stated during
the parliamentary debate on EIRT's new statute: "It is
necessary to have a clear idea of what is the government's
policy on this issue (...). Radio and television cannot
progress If we do not aim at a unitary organIzation"°2.
Moreover, It is difficult to accept that the parties of the
opposition would have Insisted on the network's
'demilitarization' especially In a period of transition, if
this could have had a destabilizing effect for the new
democratic regime. It should be noted here that since the
downfall of the dictatorship there had been a general consensus
in Parliament on military Issues. The armed forces had scarcely
been criticized; all political parties had made a clear
distinction in their discourse between the junta and the
officers' corps at large; and unlike the pre-1967 period, the
opposition has never pressed for any cuts In the military
budget-°3 . It is characteristic that during the debates on the
broadcast media the representatives of the opposition took care
not to appear to attack the military Itself. Instead, it was
argued that the maintenance of YENED constituted an obstacle to
the process of reconciliation between the military and the
people104.
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Finally, even if the security of democracy entailed YENED's
continued existence in the first years of the transition, it is
not easy to explain why the network was not amalgamated with
EIRT at a later stage. After the aborted coup in February 1975,
which Averoff himself attributed to a few 'stagonidla'
(droplets) of pro-junta officers'° 5 , there was no other known
attempt against parliamentary institutions; on the contrary,
though the allegiance of the military to democracy might be
questionable, the armed forces seemed to be content to confine
themselves to barracks. Insofar as the legitimacy of the young
democracy was firmly rooted among both the electorate and the
political elites, it seemed unlikely that the abolition of the
military channel could have presented any real risk for
parliamentary Institutions.
In our view, therefore, the preservation of YENED must have
been favoured by a large part of the governing party headed by
the Minister of Defence for reasons that could be best
described as ideological: the military network was a relic of
the civil war legacy and nationalistic mentality, represented
by ND's right wing under Averoff. The organizational structure,
with military officers 'guarding the gates' of radio and
television, and Averoff's overall supervision could ensure that
no other approach which would challenge the nationalistic view
of Greek politics and history would be shown on YENED's
programmes. As such, YENED could be a counter-balancing factor
vis-a-vis EIRT, which, at least during the first years of the
transition, appeared to be influenced by the general climate of
liberalization. Comparing the two channels, an ND deputy
remarked that "EIRT has generated the gravest of all
accusations: it distorted the history of Greece when it
Identified the history of the 28th October 1940 with ELAS and
EAN'°6 ". And another MP argued that "YENED produces work which
is really national, which really helps and informs the
conscripts and the people"107.
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It was perhaps due to the pressure from the governing
party's ultra-conservatives that the new broadcasting statute
did not contain a binding provision for the future merger of
YENED with ERT. Article 4, paragraph 4, of Law 230/1975
provided for the networks' amalgamation to be carried out two
years after the implementation of this law and, most
importantly, the decision for the merger was left to the
government's sole discretion. To a question on YENED's
demilitarization submitted by a PASOK deputy in 1981, the then
Undersecretary for the Press A. Tsaldaris, replied : "Since I
have not (...) started the merger process, it means that I do
not wish to do so"108. The preservation of YENED must have also
been facilitated by Lambrias's departure from government in
1977 and the ND's gradual turn to more right-wing policies.
Thus, internal contradictions within the governing party and
a lack of a clear vision on the purpose of broadcasting led to
the continuation of the incoherent, haphazard policy of the
previous decades. The only difference was that in practice the
two separate broadcasting organizations were not controlled by
two conflicting centres of power (the elected government and
the military) but by two different government departments.
The co-existence of two public networks with a different
policy outlook and largely in competition with each other for
audiences and advertisers was a constant hurdle to the
development of Greek broadcasting along public service lines.
Political considerations prevailed to all other views about the
social and cultural role of broadcasting. As we will see in the
following sections, these political considerations did not only
determine the formal distribution of power and control within
EIRT/ERT and YENED, but also the informal processes through
which government power was wielded during the first seven years
of transition.
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6.6 Distribution of power and control in post—junta Greek
broadcasting: appointments and intervention
In this section we will examine the formal relations between
the Greek broadcasting institutions and the government, as well
as the informal processes through which the latter influenced
the overall policies of the former. In particular, attention
will be drawn to the role of the managerial staff, the policy
options which were open to them and the ways in which external
pressure was internalized in the daily practices of the
organizations. It should be stressed from the outset, however,
that the ensuing analysis will deal with the distribution of
control and the policy of appointments mainly within the
EIRT/ERT. This is because the organization of YENED as a
military unit substantially limited both the possibilities of
choice for the network's administrators and the means of
pressure that could be exercised on the latter by various
departments In the government. Moreover, the discipline
inherent in the military profession was sufficient to guarantee
that no conflicts would easily arise among the military!
administrative staff.
By contrast EIRT/ERT continued to suffer from frequent
changes of heads and discontinuities in its programming policy.
Despite its transformation from a state administration Into an
independent public corporation, ERT did not escape government
intervention in all aspects of its policies. The result was a
series of crises which are best reflected In the sheer number
of appointees to the three highest posts of the organization.
Within seven years ERT had four different Chairmen of the Board
of Governors, five Directors General and five deputy
Directors109 . Most of the occupants of the above posts were
selected among friends of the government. Karamanlis appeared
to have a personal interest in EIRT/ERT affairs and in many
cases the appointments included some of his close friends. The
-3 0-
first two Directors General (D. Horn and A. Vlachos) as well as
the deputies (A. Solomos, R. Manthoulis and G. Stefanakis) were
chosen by Karamanlis himself. Director General N. Delipetros
was in turn asked to accept the post by Karamanlis' successor
as Prime Minister, G. Rallis, while he was concurrently General
Secretary for Press and Information11°.
Nevertheless, two of the three Deputy Directors General to
be appointed in the first two years of the transition belonged
to the opposition. The first was P. Bakoyiannls, a journalist
and self-proclaimed supporter of the Centre Union, who during
the dictatorship had been actively Involved in the anti-junta
campaign In Germany. His appointment by the government of
'national unity' was made amid the general climate of political
reconciliation and unanimity that characterized the first days
of the transitionUl.. The second was R. Manthoulis, a film
director working for the French ORTF, who had been close to
Karamanlis 112 and was invited by the latter to help with the
organization of EIRT in 1975. Both appointments reflected a
significant degree of confidence by the government and, as
Manthoulis suggests, a genuine will, particularly on
Karamanlis's part, to proceed with the renovation and
democratization of broadcasting. Yet, a retreat from this
position by the government led to the resignation of
Bakoyiannis only three months after he had been appointed and
of Manthoulis after he had completed just a year In office.
Most of the appointees were selected for their achievements
and reputation in the arts and journalism. Among them, there
were actors, directors, journalists and writers (see Appendices
1 and 2). The selection of such people for the top
administrative posts was an indication that the government was
concerned about the improvement of quality standards In
programming. Only two of them, Director General K.Hondros and
deputy Director General M. Vallindras, were selected mainly for
their previous experience and reputed skills In administration:
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Hondros was a former Chairman of Olympic Airways and deputy
director general of administration at the ERT and Vallindras
was a former programme director of YENED113.
There was, however, another reason for this preference for
members of the Greek intellectual elite: In the absence of
personnel with experience In broadcasting production and
administration, managerial staff had to be sought after from
spheres more relevant to radio and television. Inevitably,
therefore, amateurism and improvisation prevailed In the daily
practice of the organization. A major Implication of this
policy on appointments was that the managerial posts were held
by people with different professional backgrounds and different
perceptions of the needs of the medium. Joanna Spicer was quick
to point out this problem in a letter to Lambrias shortly after
she had submitted her report:
"I believe that a number of steps can be taken towards a new
character for EIRT, If EIRT management has a united purpose and
will to do so (...). What I can mention only to yourself is my
anxiety that this essential consensus of purpose does not at
the moment exist In the Directorate of EIRT. It is normal In
broadcasting organizations that strong differences of opinion
should exist among senior officials on policy, programme and
organization subjects; but it is axiomatic to air the
differences and arrive at a consensus (...). It Is my fear that
this process is not occurring in EIRT and its absence means a
weakness In central policy. In Is situation it Is not easy to
make proposals for the future"
What Spicer observed was a lack of mutual confidence between
the heads of different areas which, In her view, was due to the
fact that none of them "had grown up in the same sort of
organization or in the same sort of national life"- 5 . At the
time that she compiled her report, the Director General was A.
Viachos, a retired career diplomat and writer, and his deputy
was theatre director A. Solomos. In an interview to the
newspaper Ta Nea ten years later, the latter alleged that when
It came to policy making he was usually Ignored and that his
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relations with the Director General were strained most of the
time-6.
Personal distrust and conflicts between different heads of
the ERT also emerged because of the vagueness with which the
competences of each office-holder were defined in the new
broadcasting law. This vagueness particularly affected the
relations between the Chairman of the Board of Governors and
the Director General. Far from being "the trustees of
parliament and the nation" in safeguarding the principles of
public service broadcasting, as Sir Hugh Greene had suggested,
the Board of the ERT had purely administrative functions,
copied from the law on private limited companiesU7. W1iat was
particularly confusing was the way in which the new law for
broadcasting prescribed the competences of the Chairman of the
Board and the Director General. According to article 11 par.2,
"the Chairman of the Board of Governors exercises supervision
and control over the services of ERT", while, according to
article 12 par.l, "the Director General heads the ERT services
(•••)118• In the 'absence of a consensus of purpose' and with
the existence of strong personal ambitions, this vagueness
became the breeding ground for conflict between the first
Chairman of ERT, G. Olkonomopoulos and the Director General, I.
Lampsas. This was so because the Chairman of the Board sought
to perform the role of the organization's chief executive. For
this reason, he moved his office from the centre of Athens,
where the EIRT Board used to be housed, to the headquarters of
Aghia Paraskevi. As Lampsas characteristically remarked later,
"he demanded an office opposite mine to control me better. I
slammed the door in his face" 119 . A proposal made by the then
deputy director for administration, D. Synadinos for the Board
to designate in detail the competences of the D.G. was hastily
rejected by Oikonomopoulos' 20 . The result was internal
wrangling and disruption in the everyday operation of the ERT;
Lampsas's resignation in 1978 was partly due to this conflict
with the Chairman121.
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Nevertheless, the main reason for the frequent resignations
of ERT senior managerial staff was, according to the
testimonies of almost all appointees, the persistent government
intervention in the day-to-day activities of the organization.
Apart from the firm control over news and current affairs
programmes, government intervention expanded to all aspects of
ERT policy, from programme content to administration.
First and foremost, there was control of the ideological
content of programmes by the supervising Ministry to the Prime
Minister and particularly the Undersecretary for Press and
Information. In general, governments under Karamanlis exhibited
a high degree of sensitivity regarding political matters and,
especially, contemporary Greek history. For Director General
I. Lampsas, such caution was entailed by the need to safeguard
the young and fragile democracy:
"The civil war of 1947-1950 left behind a lot of hatred
within Greek society, and the dictatorship of 1967-1974 did
nothing but add to the discord. Although the transition from
dictatorship to democracy took place peacefully, great care was
needed to avoid a revival of dangerous controversies. The
management of E9 tried to avoid extremism from whatever
direction It came" 22
It is true that feelings about the civil war continued to be
very strong in the first years of the transition. However,
instead of airing all views, the government preferred to avoid
any reference to the Issue. Apparently, this policy was also
based on another political calculation: insofar as television
was regarded by politicians as a powerful instrument for the
manipulation of public opinion, the government might have
feared the influence that left-wing views could have on the
electorate. In radio and television practice this meant that
any approach challenging the views held by the governing party
were continuously excluded from programmes. This does not mean,
however, that programmes underwent scrutiny before they were
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shown; usually, intervention came after the transmission as a
'reproach', rather than in advance as a guideline123.
A major incident which created uproar in the press of both
sides, and finally led to the resignation of EIRT's Director
General, occurred in October 1975 following the transmission of
two programmes commemorating Greece's entry into World War II.
The first of them challenged the dominant nationalistic view of
Metaxas as the inspirator of the struggle against the Axis
forces and attributed the victories against the Italians solely
to the Greek people and their anti-fascist feelings. In the
second programme, references were made to the left-wing
resistance movement and pictures of Communist guerillas were
shown124 . The transmission of these programmes prompted the
immediate reaction of the government' 25 . The next day, Lambrias
visited EIRT and criticised the Board of Governors for what, he
alleged, constituted a distortion of recent Greek history.
Subsequently, the Board asked the Director General, A. Viachos
to hold an investigation to punish those responsible 126 . A
month later, the person considered to be responsible for the
transmission, Television Director S. Payatakis, resigned. He
was followed by Vlachos, who also considered himself
responsible127.
On other occasions EIRT/ERT management was asked by the
government to end a series before it was due to finish, because
It was deemed controversial or 'annoying'. For the same reasons
some current affairs programmes were stopped while the
transmission of others was indefinitely postponed, although
they had already been published in the EIRT/ERT weekly
schedules128 . The production of programmes could also be
abandoned at the government's request. On one such occasion,
the preparations for a documentary about the fiftieth
anniversary of the establishment of the Second Hellenic
Republic ended abruptly - Ironically after a phone-call from
the President of the Republic (K. Tsatsos), who suggested that
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the content of the programme was offensive to the royalist part
of the electorate129.
After the crisis caused by the programmes of 28th October
1975, EIRT management became more cautious with historical or
political matters. In some cases, plans for programmes were
submitted to the Undersecretary in order to obtain the
government's endorsement for the subject and even for the
specific producers of the programines30.
In general terms, the government's stance created confusion
even among its own appointees to the network, who, although
coming from the same political camp, proved unable to perceive
what could please or annoy their political masters. As a former
deputy Director General remarked, "the guideline, silent and
vague, was there: the interest of the government. But nobody
had the courage to provide a practical definition of how it
should be pursued"31-.
During his period in office at the ERT, deputy Director
General M. Vallindras proposed the introduction of a code for
programme content, which would set guidelines according to
which a programme could be acceptable to the government. Such a
code, he believed, would safeguard a considerable degree of
independence for ERT's managers and producers and limit the
powers of the responsible Minister and Undersecretary. Needless
to say, such a plan never materialized, in Vallindras's view
because the government did not wish to see its powers over
television programming curtailed132.
Intervention was not restricted, however, to the content of
individual programmes, nor did it come only from the Ministry
to the Prime Minister. The heads of EIRT/ERT had also to put up
with pressure exercised by many other members of the
government. For one thing, ministers would press for the
coverage of the daily activities of their ministries by
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television. Additionally, ministers would often request, over
the phone or in brief written messages, the allocation of
favours to political supporters. Such favours included the
provision of employment and the granting of contracts for drama
series to actors, writers, directors or producers, who were
friends of the governing party or of the ministers themselves.
Requests such as these were not exceptional; in effect they
were part of the daily exchanges of the ERT administrators with
the government. Although impossible to quantify, according to
the testimonies of most former heads of the period under study,
patronage to a large extent determined the policy of employment
and programming'33.
Constant government intervention meant that the policy
options of the EIRT/ERT managers and broadcasters were in
practice limited, even minimal. Viachos said
characteristically: "I was like a magician with handcuffs. How
could I perform?" 134 . And Lampsas stated: "When one is
appointed to ERT, one must give up hoping. Like in Dante's
'Inferno'" 35 . Resistance to pressure seemed to be pointless
insofar as the government was empowered by law to dismiss Its
appointees. Bakoyiannis was sacked only three months after he
had been appointed. Even such an outspoken advocate of the
government's broadcasting policy as Lampsas was finally asked
to resign after a row with the new Undersecretary Tsaldaris. In
an acidic statement to the Press, Lampsas spoke of "government
intervention that was coming, not only from the Ministry to the
Prime Minister, but from all ministries without exception and
from all public authorities" and he alleged that "intransigent
elements had prevailed, who, for a long time pressurized the
management of ERT for radical changes In personnel using the
sole criterion of political sympathies"136.
Those who enjoyed the personal support of the Prime Minister
like Manthoulis, could be Ignored when It came to decisions on
programmes whose content was deemed as embarrassing to the
-
government. At a press-conference following his resignation,
Manthoulis spoke of a McCarthy-like psychosis in both the ERT
and the government: "There Is a fear that they will give more
freedom than is necessary; and there is also a tendency to
return to stricter control" 137 . The general feeling appeared to
be one of total disappointment and the Inability to realize any
ambitious programme of reform. The achievement of a surplus In
the balance sheet or the introduction of two or three new
programmes appeared to be the most that a Director General and
a deputy D.G. for programmes were able to accomplish. To quote
some indicative examples:
"I am afraid that all I managed to do was to prevent the
realization of plans which were unnecessary or were against my
aesthetic. On the positive side, I Introduced modern Greek
plays on tely.sion and got some BBC television productions of
Shakespeare"
"I left EIRT with an economIc 1 rplus (...). Apart from that,
I found chaos and I left chaos"'.
"My ambitions were limited; I wanted to Improve the standards
of Greç programmes (...). But even there we missed the
target"' O•
Most heads left the network as soon as they had started to
understand its problems and needs and to gather experience.
This resulted in an Inconsistent programme policy, the absence
of a coherent programme philosophy and the perpetuation of
ERT's perennial organizational problems. As long as the
ultimate control on broadcasting rested with the government,
the introduction of real reforms required strong political
will. And, as Vallindras remarked:
"all governments have the vague impression that television
is a weapon in their hands. (...) Looking for its hidden
trigger they see everyday practice as an annoyance.(...) No
government was ever interested in the programme schedule as a
whole, or] In the influence that certain programmes could
exercise"
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6.7 Broadcasting as a political actor: news, current affairs
and elections.
Throughout its history, Greek broadcasting adopted its own
peculiar concept of newsworthiness, which was defined according
to the needs of each government to generate and maintain the
tolerance and support of the population. In crude terms, this
meant that priority was given to the promotion of the
activities of the government irrespective of their practical
significance to the electorate. A tour by the Prime Minister in
the provinces or the laying of a foundation stone by a minister
could take up a significant part of a news bulletin. As long as
the government was identified with the interests of the
existing political regime, the principles of objectivity,
impartiality and balance could be sacrificed in favour of
political stability.
This approach to broadcast news was influenced by two
assumptions: first, that each government was faced with a
generally hostile press and, therefore, manipulation of
broadcasting was necessary in order to redress the balance; and
secondly, that radio and, to a larger extent, television, were
powerful machines for indoctrinating a highly volatile
public' 42 . These assumptions, ostensibly reinforced by the
spectacular expansion of television in the 1970s (Table Int.2),
also influenced to a large extent the stance of ND governments
vis-a-vis broadcasting. According to News Director Ev.
Bistikas, "(.1.) the press exaggerates things. Before waiting
to see what happens, it jumps to conclusions. There must be a
kind of equilibrium. When the newspapers exaggerate, I don't
say television must distort the truth, but It must restore the
balance"143.
After the general elections of November 1974, the spirit of
reconciliation and liberalization which had prevailed In EIRT
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under the government of national unity gave way to a stricter
government control over the content of news broadcasts. The
first sign of this change In the government's attitude was the
dismissal of deputy Director General of EIRT P. BakoyiannIs,
which took place on the very day that the new ND government was
sworn in144 . As both Bakoylannis and Director General D.Horn
maintained, their policy of objective and balanced reporting
which they had applied particularly during the electoral
campaign, had met with fierce opposition from within the
governing party. Bakoyiannis alleged that he had clashed with
people close to Karamanlis, who pressed for a more favourable
coverage of ND's campaign; this, he suggested, "reinforced the
view that they consider EIRT at least as property of their
party and a personal instrument for the promotion of their
leader" 145 . Remarkably, Bakoylannis' dismissal generated a wave
of resignations of senior members of EIRT staff who had been
appointed during the first few days of the transition; with
most prominent among them D. Horn himself and the Chairman of
the Board, 0. E1yt1s146.
After the brief opening to pluralistic Information during
the first four months of the transition, the EIRT's news
department was turned again Into an Instrument of the
government's Information policy. It goes without saying that
the same applied to YENED, the news service of which had been
placed under the control of the Undersecretariat of Press and
Information since the collapse of the dictatorship. The
prevailing view was that broadcast news should concentrate
primarily on the work and activities of the government 147 . The
explanation for this was nothing more than a mere repetition of
arguments that had been frequently presented by pre-1967
governments. In the words of Undersecretary TsaldarIs "only the
government's activities and decisions created rights and
obligations for the people" and, therefore, the government
should inform the electorate "on the way It dealt with the
problems that It was facing and the solutions that it intended
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to provide"' 48 . On the other hand, radio and television should
avoid the reporting of any social or political conflict, as
this could have a destabilizing effect for what was perceived
as a fragile democracy.
Apart from general instructions, the heads of both networks
were the recipients of specific guidelines issued by the
Ministry to the Prime Minister and especially by the
Undersecretary for the Press in an unofficial and unwritten
manner. A set of such criteria postulated that there should be
no reporting of unconfirmed rumours, no reporting liable to
create propaganda from events, and no reporting of political
remarks of a personal nature'49 . This In practice meant that
stories which had not been confirmed by the government could
not be reported and the same applied to strikes and
demonstrations - as they would constitute propaganda - and to
criticisms by opposition leaders of the government.
In the case of YENED, instructions and guidelines for the
editorial policy of the network were given to the News Editor
who was directly accountable to the Undersecretary of the
Press' 50 . At the ERT, the government's rules were conveyed by
the Director General to the Head of News and Current Affairs.
The Director General was in effect, to repeat Schlesinger's
phrase, the Editor-in-Chief of the organization 151 . Regarding
the news, his main task was to observe the application of the
pro-government line in news programmes. In turn, the task of
the News Editor was to coordinate the production of the news
according to the received instructions 152 . On matters of
crucial importance - for Instance, foreign policy or matters
deemed as liable to create a controversy - the Director General
would receive specific orders from the Minister to the Prime
Minister or the Undersecretary for the Press and communicate
them to the staff of the news department 153 . This is not to say
that the news was dictated; It meant, however, the
strangulation of any initiative and a working framework which
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allowed hardly any freedom to journalists to exercise their own
news judgements.
The editorial power of the news head and also the Director
General were further restricted by pressure exercised by
different ministries and even public authorities to have their
policies promoted on television. The daily routine in the
newsrooms of both ERT and YENED included a series of phone
calls from ministers or senior civil servants asking for a crew
to cover the day's activities of their sectors154.
Instructions were fully respected and, unlike general
programming, news and current affairs programmes did not
provoke any fierce reaction from the government. For one thing,
the heads of ERT were government nominees; the same applied to
News Editors on both networks, who were appointed in ERT's case
by the Undersecretary of the Press in agreement with the
Director General 155 and in the case of YENED by the Minister of
Defence. Political loyalty, however, is not the only
explanation for such compliance. Not all ERT Heads shared in
full the government's views on news policy156 . Nevertheless,
the fact that they were appointed by the government seemed to
create an obligation for them to conform with the latter's
requirements. As an ERT news editor who belonged to the Centre-
Left said characteristically, "Lambrias could trust me that I
would behave without any ideological biases" 1- 57 . Moreover,
compliance appeared to be rewarding. One of the ERT's news
editors, E.Bistikas, went on to become President Karamanlis'
personal press officer' 58 . Another news editor, Th. Karzis, who
fell from grace because of a report on the Helsinki Conference,
was removed from the news department only to become Head of
ERT's Directorate of Educational Television'59.
Securing one's career in broadcasting under these
circumstances was also a major determinant of the professional
attitude of newsmen in both channels. This applies particularly
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in the case of sub-editors who, in the Greek context of
television news production, are primarily responsible for the
compilation of each bulletin and often double as news
presenters 160 . Employment in television news production was
prestigious, promising a celebrity status and, since 1974,
financially rewarding, particularly for the senior staff of the
news department161 . It has been argued by ERT heads and top
journalists that editorial freedom in broadcasting depends
entirely on the personality of the individual in charge of the
news and his ability to resist the pressures exercised 162 . It
is true that on occasion a Director General or a news editor
(even the sub-editors) could afford to refuse coverage of a
minister's activities, particularly if the latter belonged to
the lower levels of the cabinet hierarchy 163 . Yet, the pro-
government line was never seriously challenged by the editorial
policy of any Director General or news editor. From what has
just been said, it is no surprise that the presentation of news
was, as McDonald has observed, a "nightly cavalcade of the
activities of the cabinet to the almost total exclusion of any
mention of the opposition"164.
It has often been suggested by writers on the media that
"news values are explicitly hierarchical, stressing the
importance of people at the top of political and social
organizations" 165 , and that television "creates a rigid
hierarchy among politicians" 166 , as those considered most
important are usually invited to participate in the news or
other programmes. In the case of Greek radio and particularly
television, this hierarchy was even more pronounced, as
attention was directed exclusively to the government and
especially to those occupying the top positions In the cabinet.
Most emphasis was placed upon Prime Minister Karamanlis, who
was projected as the central figure in Greek public life.
Television news covered a variety of his activities, from being
on a state visit in a foreign country, to presiding over a
cabinet meeting. So often did he feature in news programmes
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that some opposition MPs claimed that the two networks were
suffering from "a Karamanlis psychosis" 167 . Furthermore, the
insistence on promoting the work of the government and of
particular figures in it meant that a significant, if not the
largest, part of the daily news was taken up by trivialities,
such as a Minister's visit to a hospital or the official
inaugurations and ceremonies attended by members of the
government. In addition, some ministries had their own weekly
programme on radio and television of both networks aimed at
informing the public about their activities. For the parties of
the opposition, however, these programmes were deemed to be
promoting the policies of the government as well as the
personality of Individual ministers168.
By contrast, there was no coverage of the activities of the
other parties, and their comments on the government's policies
and general performance were never transmitted. Representatives
of the opposition, though not the leaders, were occasionally
invited to participate in discussions, usually on topics of
general interest where any reference to their party's policies
or any criticism of the government would be out of context. The
banning of the opposition from news programmes led to
absurdities, such as viewers listening to government's replies
to criticisms by the opposition leaders which had never been
broadcast 169 . The official explanation for this policy was that
the transmission of party conflicts would be a threat to
political stability. Karamanlis himself had repeatedly stated
that "party politics (in television) divide the nation" 170 . And
as Undersecretary, Tsaldaris said characteristically, "It is
not possible to transfer party conflicts to television (...). I
believe that television would then be turned into an arena for
bulifights and the final result would be the demise of
democracy"' 71 . The avoidance of any conflict also meant that
events such as strikes and protest demonstrations received
minimal coverage, while the statements of trade unionists and
political activists were hardly ever transmitted. Prolonged
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strikes In crucial sectors such as education or the banks went
largely unreported save for a ministerial statement In which
the strike was usually condemned or declared unlawful'72.
In view of the above, it is not surprising that no political
programmes were developed on either radio or television
throughout the seven years of the ND government' 73 . There were
no round-table discussions among politicians on television, and
on major national issues, such as the country's accession to
the European Community, the broadcast analyses constituted an
incessant government monologue 174 . The only occasion when
political controversy was presented by television was during
coverage of parliamentary debates. However, this occurred
rather irregularly and then only to record sessions in which
the Prime Minister was participating. The usual process was the
transmission of the entire speech of the Premier and then an
equal amount of time was divided among the leaders of the
opposition according to the strength of their parties in
Parliament 175 . Under this arrangement the recordings of
parliamentary debates could run up to three or even four
hours176.
The predominance of political factors over the need for
accurate information left television news totally under-
developed as a cultural form. Visual material was limited and
usually focussed on individual figures rather than on
collective activity. Talking heads remained the predominant
characteristic of news programmes, with the news presenter
reading lengthy statements and comments emanating from
government offices to camera. Interviews were scarce and so
were commentary1- 77 and analysis of major events. The lack of
editorial freedom and Initiative prevented any experimentation
and imposed constraints on the building up of technical
expertise. Technical resources for the production of news
remained limited and this contributed further to the low
standards of news programmes. The report of A. Protheroe was
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largely ignored and ERT continued to lack the necessary
equipment (machine for the montage and cameras for outside
broadcasts), while the majority of journalists continued to be
employed on a part-time basis 178 . At YENED the situation was
even worse, with the television news service largely dependent
on the radio office to supply news copy. The network did not
develop a proper news department until as late as 1980179.
Television, and particularly its news programmes constituted
a continuous source of conflict between the government and the
opposition. Less than two months after the 1974 general
elections EK-ND submitted an interpellation, accusing the
government of having turned the two networks Into "Instruments
for the propagation of its vIews" 180 to the detriment of all
the other parties. Commenting on the performance of the Greek
broadcasting organizations EK-ND deputy D. Tsatsos remarked:
"The problem of television and radio is a problem of balance
between the government and the opposition as a whole (...). If
we build a political system without having safeguarded the
(...) information of the Greek people, then we are building a
stillborn system. For this reason, the way that both EIRT and
YENED operate is unacceptable" 181 . The parties of the
opposition proposed the establishment of an all-party committee
to supervise the application of objectivity and Impartiality
in programming. However, no suggestions were made as to the
specific composition and functions of such a body 182 . Early In
1978, PASOK, by then the official opposition in Parliament,
refused to send representatives to the ERT General Assembly in
protest at the 'decorative' role that the opposition had ended
up playing In it 183 . A second interpellation was submitted at
the same time by all political forces of the opposition
criticizing the government for the continuous monopolization of
radio and television. The opposition focussed its attacks on
Law 230/1975 whIch, It claimed, perpetuated the government's
control over broadcasting. A change in ERT's statute was
stressed by all parties and pluralism had to be safeguarded.
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PASOK and KKE-es in particular proposed a new composition for
the Board of Governors which was to include representatives of
all political parties, local authorities, trade unions and
other social organizations 184 . In addition, broadcasting often
became the target of the opposition press and of groups of
intellectuals and professionals, who considered government
intervention In television as a direct threat to democracy185.
Yet, such protests had hardly any impact upon the operation of
the two networks. Ostensibly, there was an implicit belief
within the government that the transmission of views rival to
its own would be more harmful to its supporters than any
accusation of authoritarianism by the opposition.
Nevertheless, the government monopoly on broadcasting was to
be broken during the periods of national election campaigns. As
was shown in the previous chapter, the establishment of a fully
competitive party system after 1974 and fairly conducted
general elections were the basis of legitimation of the
political system. Thus, in the entire period of the transition
successive governments were to secure the organization of
unfettered elections, the result of which no side of the
political spectrum would be able to dispute. In this context,
the access of all the major parties to radio and television for
their campaigns was seen as an essential component of electoral
competition. Yet, as Bakoyiannis' case revealed, the Idea of
sharing the broadcast media on equal terms with the other
parties was not fully accepted within ND. Lambrias himself told
Parliament that far from being an obligation on the government,
the allocation of equal amounts of time to all major
contestants in 1974 was due to Karamanlis' "magnanimity" 186 . In
general terms, however, during election campaigns ND
governments were Increasingly sensitive to the complaints and
demands of the opposition. Hence, in the 1977 general elections
the government replaced the Undersecretary of Press, P.
Lambrias, and ERT's Director General, I. Lampsas, who had both
been repeatedly attacked by the parties and press of the
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opposition for a policy of bias on radio and television187.
Similarly, in 1981 the government of G.Rallis agreed to replace
Lambrias's successor, A. Tsaldaris 188 . In addition to these
measures, during the election campaigns of 1977 and 1981 orders
were given to the two networks to avoid the coverage of
activities of individual ministers 189 , while in 1981, following
a bilateral agreement between the government and PASOK, ERT and
YENED cancelled the transmission of twenty two radio and
television programmes which were considered by the opposition
to be government propaganda190.
During the 1977 and 1981 election campaigns ND consented to
the formation of an all-party committee to propose terms under
which the parties' activities would be covered by radio and
television and to supervise the implementation of these
terms' 91 . It should be noted here that in 1974 and 1977 the
campaign was covered only by EIRT/ERT, for as Averoff explained
to Parliament, YENED as a military organization had to keep out
of politics as much as possible 192 . It was only in 1981 and due
to the strong protests of the opposition that YENED was
eventually allowed to transmit summaries of the party leaders'
speeches at those rallies which were extensively covered by
ERT193.
In Seymour-Ure's terms 194 , non-partisanship was to be judged
by purely quantitative criteria, with the inter-party
committees themselves deciding how much time was to be
allocated to each of the major contestants. The political
polarization of the party system and the government's eagerness
to prove that "democracy was working" made the coverage of the
electoral campaign too crucial an issue to be left to the
broadcasters. The latter were not allowed to make their own
programmes about the election and interviews with or debates
between politicians were absent from both channels.
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TABLE 6.1
1977 Election coverage on television (as decided by the inter-
party committee for the elections)
Parties	 Type of coverage	 Duration
ND	 Three rallies	 25'-50' each
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' each
EK-ND	 Three rallies	 25'-47'each
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' each
PASOK	 Three rallies	 25'-30' each
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' each
Alliance	 Three rallies	 20'-25' each
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' each
KKE	 One studio appearance of leader 	 12'
EP	 One studio appearance of leader 	 12'
Source: The national press, 25-29.10.1977
TABLE 6.2
1981 Election coverage on television (as decided by the inter-
party committee for the elections)
Parties	 Type of coverage 	 Duration
ND	 Two rallies	 lh 15' each
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' and 10'
PASOK	 Two rallies	 lh 15' each
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' and 10'
KKE	 One rally	 lh 15'
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' and 10'
KKE-es	 One rally	 35'
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' and 10'
EDIK	 One rally	 35'
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' and 10'
KODISO	 One rally	 35'
Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' and 10'
K.Proodeft.	 Three studio appearances of leader 	 12'(2), 10'
Ep.Aristera	 Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' and 12'
EKKE-KKE M-L Two studio appearances of leader 	 12' and 12'
Source: The national press, 3 and 5.10.1981.
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In the general elections of 1974, the first ever to be
covered by television, EIRT transmitted rallies of the four
biggest parties (ND, EK-ND, PASOK and United Left), while each
evening television provided a thirty minute-long compilation of
the day's campaign activities' 95 . Following a similar inter-
party agreement, four of the competing parties in the 1977
election (ND, EDIK, PASOK and SPAD) had their largest rallies
broadcast by ERT's radio and television services; moreover,
party leaders (including in this case those of KKE and EP)
addressed for the first time the electorate from the television
studios (see Table 6.1). A fairer arrangement was made by the
Rallis' government in 1981 so that airtime was also allocated
to the smaller parties, including those of the extra-
parliamentary Left (see Table 6.2).
All in all, television had only limited Impact upon the
format of the election campaign In the first three electoral
contests of the transition. Far from becoming a new arena where
politicians were to compete for support, television was a
passive transmitter of the parties' traditional methods of
electioneering and especially of the central activity of the
campaign, namely the tours of political leaders around Greece
and their speeches in massive open-air rallies. Thus, In the
elections of 1981 for instance, out of a total of fifteen hours
of election broadcasting on television, ten and a half hours
were given over to the coverage of the parties' rallies196.
The attendance of election rallies had always been a major
mode of political participation in Greece 197 ; although there
are no comparable data available, It might be suggested that
the significance of such participation was reinforced after the
dictatorship due to a number of factors. First, the
disappearance of persecution against political opponents of the
Right and also Improvements in transportation made
participation in political rallies easier for large numbers of
people. Secondly, such events offered an opportunity for
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political expression to a population which had been deprived of
freedom of speech for seven years. Finally, the political
polarization which prevailed in the l970s and the particular
party political culture with its emphasis on the role of the
leader' 98 also contributed to the dominance of party rallies as
a form of election campaigning.
Moreover, open-air rallies, although not especially staged
for television, when televised constituted spectacular events.
The huge crowds, the sea of flags with the parties' colours,
the slogans, the party messages delivered in an emotional
manner by the leaders and received enthusiastically by the
gathered supporters, all created a fervent atmosphere which,
thanks to television, could now be conveyed to audiences in the
remotest villages of the country. The size of a mass rally was
regarded by all political parties as a clear indicator of
likely electoral success. Huge efforts and considerable expense
went into the organization of rallies so that they could appear
on television as large 'laothalasses' (seas of people), which
would perhaps Influence the votes of the undecided members of
the electorate199 . In view of this, It does not seem surprising
that political parties did not seek to exploit the
possibilities for new forms of presentation of the election
campaign that the advent of television offered. By contrast,
the parties developed new kinds of publicity activities, such
as the extensive political advertising by the press and the
unprecedented use of huge posters which absorbed enormous
resources200.
The emphasis on mass rallies and the absence of
sophistication regarding television coverage of the election
can also be attributed to the attitude of Greek politicians
towards the new medium. Political leaders might have considered
television as a means of mass persuasion which presented a
"menace to democracy greater than the tanks", but they did not
seem to be fully aware of its potential as a medium of
_321-
political communication. Moreover, most of them had been used
to the traditional ways of electioneering and appeared to be
sceptical, or perhaps fearful of the impact that their
appearance In television studios might have upon their votes.
Thus, KaramanlIs did not even bother to use the second slot
allocated to ND for a studio broadcast In the 1977
elections 201 , while Papandreou when presented in 1981 with a
choice between a televised debate with Premier Rallis and the
coverage of yet another PASOK rally opted for the latter202.
Clearly, political leaders preferred the fervour of a party
rally where they could manipulate their audiences with their
oratorical skills to the risk of being manipulated by an
interviewer in the much more sober atmosphere of a television
studio. Nevertheless, there was a degree of adaptation to the
needs of television, as mass rallies became increasingly stage-
managed for the cameras. For Instance, at his final speech
prior to the 1977 elections, Karanianlis appeared at the balcony
of Athens' Syntagma Square stern, erect, surrounded by white
pigeons, deliberately reminiscent of the national heroes'
statues, a true "Ethnarchis" (the Nation's Leader), as his
supporters liked to call him.
To summarize, the election campaign as presented on
television reflected and emphasized the personalistic character
of Greek politics and the dominance of political leaders as the
embodiment of their supporters' Ideas and aspirations. The rest
of the parties' leading cadres were remarkably absent from the
television screens, although they were intensely involved In
electoral activities especially at the local level. Certainly,
television coverage of the elections did not help to promote
the parties' Images or programmes. What It did underline was
that major characteristic of Greek political culture which a
political analyst has aptly described as 'apolitical over-
politicization'; that is, the Greeks' passionate approach to
politics, exemplified by their enthusiastic participation in
mass rallies, the centrality of the activities of the state in
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the daily political discourse, the emphasis on the role of
leadership, and at the same time the absence of any serious
discussion of the political process and social structures203.
The electoral campaign was not so much about real problems and
proposed solutions, as about the performance of political
leaders and their appeal to the mass of their supporters.
Moreover, the coverage of the election campaign created a
different political hierarchy to that presented by radio and
television in the periods between elections. If everyday
politics on television appeared to be the task of the Prime
Minister and his ministers, the fight and potential success In
an election was clearly the task of the parties' leaders.
6.8 Conclusion
The transition to democracy and the establishment of a
competitive pluralist system were not accompanied by any
thorough, democratic reform of the broadcasting organizations,
as one might have expected. Instead, New Democracy seized upon
the opportunity to further its political ends through the new
medium of television. Thus, early considerations for the re-
organization of Greek radio and television following the BBC
model of public service broadcasting were very soon abandoned
in favour of a system which perpetuated the subjugation of the
broadcast media to the will of the government. Law 230 on ERT
enabled ND to impose political control over broadcast output,
either by appointing trusted political friends or party members
to the organization's key editorial and managerial posts or
through direct ministerial Intervention In the formulation of
programme content. Additionally, the preservation of YENED
provided a channel for the expression of the party's ultra-
conservative wing.
In all, ND's policy on broadcasting revealed a paternalistic
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outlook of politics and a profound mistrust for the independent
operation of institutions within civil society. Opposition
parties and organized groups were offered no scope to express
their alternative views of society on radio and television, for
the coverage of political and social conflict was considered by
ND as undermining political stability. Thus, news programmes
presented politics as the exclusive province of those holding
executive power, rather than as a process involving conflict,
debate and accommodation.
The Conservatives seemed to be convinced that the exposure
of Greeks to the exclusive influence of the government would
confer legitimacy to their policies and secure their electoral
interests. Yet, the political and ideological monopolization of
the broadcast media by ND became a permanent source of
controversy and tension between the government and the parties
of the opposition.
ND's broadcasting policy revealed also an indifference to
the cultural and educational functions of broadcasting. All
recommendations of foreign experts were ignored completely and
the Greek broadcasting organizations continued to suffer from
bureaucracy, irrational distribution of personnel and resources
and lack of technical equipment. The objective of operating a
real public broadcasting service, although enshrined In the new
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The general election of October 18 1981 was a major turning
point In the history of post-war Greece. For the first time a
political party of the Left was brought to power, putting an
end to the almost uninterrupted thirty-year rule of the Right.
PASOK scored an overwhelming victory with 48.07 per cent of the
vote and a clear majority of seats In Parliament. The defeat of
New Democracy constituted the first real test of parliamentary
democracy. Yet, the smooth transition from a Conservative to a
Socialist government proved that the regime enjoyed widespread
legitimacy among both the electorate and the political elite in
a country where the prospect of a Centre Union electoral
victory had led to a military dictatorship fourteen years
earlier.
The Socialist landslide reflected the disillusionment of
large segments of the electorate with ND and Its paternalistic
practices and a consequent desire for political change. PASOK's
policy pronouncements included the application of a fairer
income policy; the establishment of a new health system; a
solution to Athens' perennial environmental problems; the
abolition of patronage and the use of meritocratic criteria in
public appointments; and the democratization and modernization
of the state machinery. Among other things, PASOK was expected
to introduce a new ethos to the country's political life.
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One aspect of this new political ethos was to be the
independent operation of the broadcast media from any
government interference. Significantly, the broadcasting reform
was included in a number of institutional changes regarding the
operation of Parliament, the political parties, the judicial
system and the armed forces: changes which according to PASOK
itself were essential for the safeguarding of political
pluralism and of democracy.
However, in order to understand better the party's attitude
towards broadcasting, It is essential first of all to examine
PASOK's overall philosophy and general strategy while in
opposition, as well as its performance in government during
the period 1981-87. This is the aim of the present chapter. The
following chapter will deal more specifically with PASOK's
relationship with the media.
7.2 The General Election of 1981 and the Socialists' victory
The result of the 1981 election marked the end of the
restructuring of the post-1974 party system. One could now talk
of a transition from a 'predominant party system' (if the
prolonged reign of the Right was taken into account) to a two-
party system, In terms of the possibilities for alternation in
government under the existing electoral law, or to a three-
party system in terms of parliamentary representation 1 . As G.
Mavrogordatos has pointed out 2 , as in the period immediately
before the dictatorship each one of the broad traditional camps
(Right-Centre-Left) was represented after 1981 by a single
political party: ND, PASOK and the KKE respectively, who
together shared 95 per cent of the votes and all seats in
Parliament (see Table 7.1).
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PASOK's victory also terminated the competition between the
parties of the Centre and the Left for the political leadership
of all those social forces which were seeking political change.
The traditional Centre was virtually eliminated. Following its
1977 election disaster, EDIK had undergone a profound crisis
which had led to the resignation of G. Mavros as party leader
and to the fragmentation of the centre forces into a variety of
minuscule parties. Moreover, a significant number of centrist
cadres had meanwhile sought a better political fortune in
either ND or PASOK. Eventually, the combined vote of the
TABLE 7.1
OCTOBER 1981 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
Parties	 % of votes	 no. of seats	 % of seats
PASOK	 48.0	 172	 57.33
New Democracy	 35.88	 115	 38.33
KKE	 10.94	 13	 4.33
Party of the
Progressives	 1.69	 -	 -




Workers (KODISO-KAE) 	 0.71	 -	 -
EDIK	 0.41	 -	 -
Liberal Party	 0.36	 -	 -
Christian Democracy	 0.15	 -	 -
Extreme Left	 0.23	 -	 -
Other	 0.22	 -	 -
TOTAL	 100.00	 300.00	 100.00
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centre parties (EDIK; the electoral alliance between the Party
of Democratic Socialism-KODISO-and the Party of Peasants and
Workers-KAE; the Liberal Party) did not exceed a meagre 1.5 per
cent.
The orthodox KKE increased its share of the vote by 1.58 per
cent gaining 10.94 per cent and 13 seats in Parliament,
whereas its main rival the KKE-es with only 1.35 per cent was
deprived of parliamentary representation. The KKE thus
completed its dominance within the traditional Left, but its
result, which in fact fell far short of its stated objective of
17 per cent, Indicated the limits of the party's Influence upon
the electorate.
PASOK, on the other hand, having Increased its credentials
within both the Centre and Left through the last-minute
accessions of G. Mavros and N. Glezos, the secretary general
of EDA and a wartime resistance hero, appeared to be the only
force that could guarantee political change. The party's
principal slogan was 'Allaghi' (Change), a vague term which
could be given a variety of meanings ranging from the socialist
transformation of society to the widespread popular desire to
get rid of the Right.
The Socialist victory was also facilitated by the electoral
system which favoured the formation of strong majoritarlan
governments. Given the extensive political polarization of the
time, the so-called 'psychology of the lost vote' must have
Influenced the decision of a significant number of supporters
of the Communist Left and other minor parties, to switch their
preference to PASOK as the only force that could remove the
Right from power. An Indication that the workings of the
electoral system favoured PASOK is the significantly different
result of the concurrent election for the European Parliament,
which was held under a system of proportional representation
(see Table 7.2).
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PASOK benefited largely from the unpopularity of the ND
government; towards the end of its second term in office (1979-
81), New Democracy appeared increasingly unable to cope with
the country's economic and social problems (galloping
inflation; lack of industrial investment; decrease of real
wages; rising unemployment; the poor state of the health
system) or environmental issues (like the heavy air pollution
in the Athens basin). Moreover, the party's failure to develop
fully a liberal philosophy and its gradual drift towards more
paternalistic policies under the influence of its ultra-
conservative wing added to the soaring popular discontent. The
party's ideological contradictions and internal crisis
aggravated with Karamanlis's resignation from the leadership in
spring 1980. At the same time ND had been deprived of a major
asset - Karamanlis's great appeal to the electorate. The new
TABLE 7.2
THE EUROPEAN ELECTION OF 1981
Parties	 % of votes	 no. of	 seats
PASOK	 40.12	 10





Party of the Progressives 	 1.96	 1
Christian Democracy	 1.15	 -
EDIK	 1.12	 -
Liberal Party	 1.04	 -
Movement of Greek
Reformers (KEME) 	 0.87	 -
TOTAL	 100.00	 24
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party leader, G. Rallis, though a moderate and worthy
politician, was a lacklustre and uninspiring figure who could
not compete with Papandreou's oratorical skills and powerful
personality. It is very likely therefore, that a part of ND's
more socially liberal wing and potential party voters from the
traditional Centre switched to PASOK and Its charismatic
leader.
New Democracy also failed to benefit from the strategy of
'dievrinsi' (broadening ) towards the Centre, which had been
Initiated by Karamanlis after 1977 and had led to the accession
of a significant number of Centrist cadres to the party3.
Liberal voters were disaffected by ND's attempt to win back
those Right-wing voters who had switched their support to the
National Camp, EP, in 1977. Faced with a potential Socialist
victory, EP finally agreed to withdraw from the contest;
Instead, some of Its deputies were included In ND's electoral
lists4.
Apart from this, ND's programme did not offer an appealing
and convincing proposal for the future. The party's campaign,
although highly expensive and conducted under the supervision
of a large advertising company, was dull and uninspiring,
mainly drawing upon the policies and achievements of the
previous seven years and promising more of the same5.
Eventually, the party received 35.88 per cent of the vote (and
115 seats in Parliament), which was down 6 per cent from its
1977 result. In reality, however, the loss was much greater,
since in the 1981 result the votes of the Extreme Right were
also included. By contrast, the combined vote of the entire
Right (ND and EP) in 1977 was 48.66 per cent. In 1981 the
ultra-Right was represented by Narkezinis's Komina Proodeftikon
(Party of the Progressives) which received a mere 1.69 per cent
of the vote and did not win a seat in Parliament.
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It appeared, therefore, that PASOK had not only absorbed
almost the entire support of the traditional Centre, but had
also attracted a significant number of disaffected ND voters.
What made the Socialist victory most remarkable was the fact
that the pro-PASOK vote was evenly distributed both
geographically and socially. Support for PASOK was almost the
same in rural, semi-urban and urban areas (48.4, 46.7 and 48.2
per cent respectively) and in only seven out of 56 electoral
districts did it fall below 40 per cent 6 . PASOK appealed
equally to almost all social classes and groups. Thus, in
addition to the peasants, the blue and the white-collar workers
(who gave PASOK 47, 57 and 53 per cent respectively), the party
gained the support of top-rank civil servants, managerial
personnel and academics (62 per cent), artisanal simple-
commodity producers (48 per cent) and the liberal professions
(doctors, lawyers, architects etc, who gave it 40 per cent)7.
Clearly, PASOK had united under its banner of 'Allaghi' all
social interests and political tendencies who wished to put an
end to right-wing rule.
The party's success, however, cannot be explained solely by
the crisis within the Conservative government and the inability
of the other parties of the opposition to present credible
alternatives to ND. PASOK's success must also be attributed to
its election strategy which aimed at attracting the support of
all social strata rather than a particular class or classes.
Perhaps the best expression of PASOK's catch-all strategy was
the emphasis that the party put on the needs and interests of
the 'under-privileged' Greeks (mi-pronomioukhi), a vague term
which the vast majority of the population could identify with,
as against the 'privileged' minority (pronomioukhl).
After 1977, the party had increasingly moved towards more
moderate positions in order to give re-assurance to the large
middle-ground population of small property owners who could be
alarmed by any prospect of socialist reform. It Is
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characteristic that the word 'socialism' was not mentioned at
all in the party's 1981 electoral manifesto. The socialist
transformation of society might continue to be the party's
ultimate objective, but it was not to be pursued in the
foreseeable future. Instead, PASOK's government programme dealt
with more immediate and pressing problems: its proposals
included an increase in wages and salaries; more funds for the
education and health services; the curbing of inflation; and
the introduction of a new taxation system which was to benefit
lower incomes and reduce tax evasion.
Another significant factor which contributed to PASOK's
victory was its grass roots organization which was turned Into
a formidable electoral machine,	 mobilizing the party's
supporters and spreading its message all over Greece.
According to one estimate, by 1981 the members of the party had
reached 110,000 and were organized in a large number of local
and sectoral organizations as well as cells inside and outside
the country 8 . Finally, PASOK's victory was the achievement of
Andreas Papandreou himself, who apart from his strong appeal to
the electorate had been the main architect of the party's
catch-all strategy.
However Important these factors were, to understand the
reasons which led to PASOK's development and spectacular rise
(support for the party had Increased 3.5 times within seven
years), a lengthier examination of the party's ideology,
leadership and social basis is necessary. Such an analysis will
provide an explanation not only of PASOK's key features, but
also of Its policies and contradictions while in government.
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7.3 PASOK: a new force in Greek politics
The rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement as a
political formation of the non-Communist Left has been
considered by some analysts as the most notable development in
the post-dictatorial party system 9 . PASOK's development and
strategy have provoked a broad academic debate concerning the
party's character and position within the Greek political
system. Particular attention has been paid to the links between
PASOK and the pre-1967 Centre Union party (EK) of which Andreas
Papandreou was a prominent cadre. Some writers have stressed
the elements of continuity between the two parties in terms of
their political personnel and role as forces promising
political change, that is, capable of removing the Right from
power. As G. Mavrogordatos has argued, PASOK is the "prodigal
son of the centre, rather than an Illegitimate offspring of the
left" 10 . Others have maintained that it Is an entirely new
political formation "substantially different from any other
party in Greek political history".
It is true that PASOK is in many respects a new force In
Greek party politics. The party's ancestry certainly goes back
to EK and especially to its radical wing which, under Andreas
Papandreou, became particularly influential after the crisis of
1965 and the subsequent defection of many of EK's more
conservative cadres to the royalist camp. An indication that
PASOK's historical roots relate to the traditional Centre is
the fact that 53 per cent of the party's 1981 parliamentary
group had been members of either EK or its youth organization
EDIN12.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that PASOK is a direct
descendant of the EK, a party which represented mainly
bourgeois interests and operated in the mould of traditional
party politics (a loose political formation of notables with
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significant local clienteles, gathered around a powerful
leader). It is more plausible to view PASOK's emergence as the
outcome of the radicalization of the 1960s and the resistance
against the dictatorship: its creation reflected the need for
new political formations which would Introduce different forms
of political mobilization and participation.
During the dictatorship most members of ETC's centre-left,
together with some independent left-wing activists went on to
join the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) one of the most
important resistance organizations that Papandreou founded In
exile in May 196813. The experience of the resistance against
the dictatorship and the influence of the various left-wing
movements of that time had a major radicalizing effect upon
PAK's centrist cadres. Papandreou's own political outlook
changed significantly from a social-democratic to a neo-Marxist
position14 . PAK adopted the centre-periphery dichotomy as the
basis of Its political analysis, according to which the
military regime was seen as the outcome of US imperialism and
the resistance against It as an anti-imperialist liberation
struggle. As Papandreou claimed in a letter to EK's 1971.
conference, the collapse of the dictatorship could be achieved
only through a "politico-military movement in the classic model
of the Third World", which was to carry out "a dynamic armed
struggle" against the regime, with the aim of establishing a
democratic, socialist system, but not a merely social-
democratic one 15 . Clearly such positions were incompatible with
EK's mild reformist line and Papandreou's statement marked the
inevitable political divorce between PAK and the Centre Union.
Although P/dC found remarkable support abroad and especially
from the Greek migrant workers in West Germany and the students
In Italy, like the rest of the resistance organizations It had
hardly any impact inside Greece, mainly due to the passivity of
the vast majority of the population. Thus, despite Its
revolutionary Ideas, PAK's resistance activities remained
insignificant and limited in scope (for instance, speeches
delivered by Andreas Papandreou or participation in anti-
dictatorial demonstrations and campaigns organized abroad).
Nevertheless, despite its limited appeal in Greece, PAK's
significance as a political formation should not be
underestimated. PAK was the first well-structured organization
outside of the Communist Left in the post-war era to advocate
socialist ideas and to put forward a concrete programme for the
socialist transformation of Greek society. It was also a pool
which provided new political personnel with radical ideas and
experience in political organization. It was precisely the core
of PAK's cadres which played the central role in the creation
of PASOK in September 1974, while, as we will see, the new
party's ideological manifesto adopted many of the principles
which characterized the programme of PAK.
Apart from the latter, PASOK also drew together a group of
independent members of the student movement who had been
involved in the Polytechnic uprising and a small number of
former EK cadres who had apparently been disillusioned with the
traditional party practices of the period prior to the
dictatorship' 6 . Finally, in October 1974 the group of
Democratic Defence (DA) joined PASOK. DA had been one of the
most important resistance organizations and, although
numerically small, it had had an impressive record of
resistance activities against the dictatorship within the
country; before 1970 about two thirds of its members had been
arrested and imprisoned by the junta 17 . All in all, PASOK
rallied a significant number of members of the resistance
organizations and cadres from the traditional Centre, the
Centre-Left and even the Communist Left, thus becoming the main
political expression of the forces which had been radicalized
during the dictatorship and the political campaigns of the
1960s.
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Having incorporated many of PAK'S ideas, PASOK emerged as
the only party of the non-Communist Left to declare the
socialist transformation of society as its main objective. Its
ideological manifesto, the 'Declaration of the 3rd of
September' marked a major shift from the social democratic
ideas advocated by the pre-1967 Centre-Left and at the same
time proposed a model of socialism markedly different to the
Marxist-Leninist one as this had been expressed by the
traditional Left. Following PAK's line of analysis, PASOK
viewed the complex problems of Greek society as the outcome of
the country's political, economic and strategic dependence on
the 'imperialistic establishment of the US and NATO' 18 . In this
context, the 1967 military coup and the tragedy of Cyprus were
nothing more than 'a crude form of colonization by the Pentagon
and NATO' which aimed at best serving the Interests of
American monopoly capital In the South-Eastern part of the
Mediterranean 19 . For PASOK, US Imperialism was primarily
responsible for the poverty and exploitation of peasants and
workers, the unemployment, the consequent emigration and the
devastation of the Greek countryside 20 . PASOK promised to put
an end to this state of affairs through its struggle for
'national renaissance for a socialist and democratic Greece'21.
This struggle was summed up In four major principles or aims:
National Independence, which was considered a prerequisite for
Popular Sovereignty, which was Itself necessary for Social
Liberation and in turn was an essential condition for
Democratic Structures 22 . The achievement of these objectives
would lead to the 'creation of a polity independent from
foreign control and intervention (...) as well as from the
control and influence of the financial oligarchy, a polity
working for the protection of the Nation for the service of the
People'23.
PASOK's declaration propounded a number of major reforms
which were to lead to the socialist transformation of Greek
society. The list included:
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-the socialization of the banking system, of major industries
such as chemicals, metallurgy and shipbuilding and of the main
units of the import-export trade;
-the decentralization of economic planning and the
introduction of workers' self-management in the productive
sectors;
-the establishment of a new type of agricultural co-operative
which would end the exploitation of peasants by middlemen, as
well as co-operatives of artisanal simple commodity producers;
-and administrative decentralization and reinforcement of the
powers of local government.
On foreign policy the declaration called for Greece's
withdrawal from both the military and political wings of NATO
and advocated the nuclear disarmament of the Balkan peninsula
and the abolition of all international treaties which had led
to the country's economic, political and strategic dependence
on foreign monopolies 24 . Both the principles and the language
of the 'Declaration of the 3rd of September' revealed a kind of
political radicalism which was unknown to the parties outside
the traditional Left in the pre-junta period. Moreover,
obviously influenced by the international left-wing movements
of the 1960s, PASOK referred to issues which were new to Greek
political discourse, such as the 'social and economic equality
of sexes' 25 , the protection of the mother and child, the
protection of the environment, the improvement of the quality
of life and cultural development26.
It was not only PASOK's ideas and programme that
distinguished it from the other non-Communist parties; PASOK
also proved to be completely different In terms of its
organization. Right from its creation, it presented Itself as a
breakthrough in party politics and In Its manifesto it fiercely
criticized the pre-1967 bourgeois parties for their
clientelistic policies and oligarchic structures 27 . It was a
common belief among PASOK's founder members that new political
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formations which would adopt new modes of organizational
practice 28 were necessary. A formal party structure was
developed, which reflected the influence of Communist
organizational practices, as the introduction of organizational
cells. PASOK's supreme body was to be the Congress which would
elect the party's Central Committee and President. The activism
of PASOK's organized membership proved to be very effective as
the rapid growth of its grass roots organization shows: in 1977
PASOK had about 50,000 members; by 1979 the number had
increased to 65,000 and to 75,000 a year later. By 1981 the
party membership had reached 110,000 and was organized in 1,000
local and 500 sectoral organizations and 700 cells across the
country as a whole 29 . Apart from the Communist Left, no other
party in modern Greek political history had ever achieved such
a massive and well-structured organization.
Another notable feature of PASOK was that the majority of
its leading cadres were newcomers to Greek politics. For
instance, in the 1977 Central Committee, 58 out of 80 members
(72.5 per cent) had emerged during the dictatorship through the
resistance organizations or had no previous experience in
politics at all. In 1981, out of PASOK's 170 elected MPg , those
who had entered Parliament for the first time through the
party's list reached 15030. There was also an extensive
renovation of political personnel in terms of the age of the
members, as 65 per cent of PASOK's 1981 parliamentary group
were between 30 and 49 years of age, while in the Central
Committee about 70 per cent of its members were aged between 20
and 49 years 31 . All in all, PASOK's leading personnel consisted
mainly of the generation and of the social strata which had
been radicalized during the 1960s and the struggle against the
dictatorship. It is characteristic that PASOK's 1977
parliamentary group did not include any leading cadres of the
Centre from the period 1950-1960. The vast majority of the
latter had become members of New Democracy or EDIK.	 It
becomes clear from the above analysis that in terms of its
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programmatic principles, its membership and its organization,
PASOK was a completely new force in Greek politics.
Nevertheless, although it constituted a major break with
traditional party politics, PASOK is not a mass party of the
traditional West European type. A major difference with
comparable European parties has been the entire domination of
the party structure by the leader. Andreas Papandreou, PASOK's
only President so far, determines the party's strategy and is
primarily responsible for the selection of Its leading
personnel. So far, his extensive powers have been beyond the
effective control of the party's Institutionalized bodies and
procedures.
The primacy of Papandreou's position within the party is due
to a number of factors, some of which are related to his own
personality and history as a political figure. Papandreou had
been a reputed economist 32 and in 1961 Karamanlls had appointed
him head of the Centre for Economic Research and Planning
(KEPE). For many people Papandreou was able to "lead Greece out
of its economic straits" 33 . During the political crises of the
1960s, Papandreou's opposition to the Right and the Throne, and
his clashes with the conservative cadres In his own party,
enhanced his prestige as a modernizer and an incorruptible and
uncompromising politician 34 . Finally, the creation of PAK
during the dictatorship and his close contacts with foreign
political circles and personalities not only kept his star
alive, but gave new momentum to his career as a politician. For
all these reasons, he became a pole of attraction for a wide
range of political tendencies and currents, Including
technocrats, those who rejected cilentelism and traditional
party politics and left-wing cadres outside the Communist
camp. He had also gathered around him a significant following
of activists and politicians, personally attached to him - the
so-called 'Andrelsts' 35 - and willing to back the leader's
political initiatives and decisions36.
Papandreou was able to impose his firm control upon his
party largely due to the existence of numerous political
currents within it, which held differing and often conflicting
views about the party's aims and function. Soon after the 1974
general election, two main tendencies emerged regarding PASOK's
future organizational structure. The first, which consisted
mainly of members of the Democratic Defence and left-wing
cadres sought a form of democratic mass organization within
which PASOK's rank-and-file would be the dominant force in
shaping the party's policy37 . The second, which included
members of PAK with a 'leninist' background and
'traditionalist' ex-cadres of EK (the so-called 'paleo-
kommatikoi') favoured a centralized structure and a strong
leadership 38 . Papandreou himself did not favour the idea of a
democratic organization that would function according to
institutionalized procedures, since this would seriously
curtail his own powers39.
The disagreements about PASOK's role and organization
quickly led to a major confrontation. In early June 1975 the
Executive Bureau, which had been appointed by Papandreou
himself amid a lot of controversy, expelled eleven members of
the Central Committee with the allegation that they had formed
a faction. This incident provoked a surge of protests,
expulsions and resignations of numerous dissidents, a large
number of whom had belonged to the Democratic Defence and
other resistance groups. By mid-June 1975, thirty-five members
of the Central Committee had been expelled and the body was
dissolved by Papandreou, with a new one being elected only in
July 197740. A second major crisis erupted in 1976, which led
to the near-dissolution of PASP - PASOK's youth organization -
the expulsion of the vast majority of PAK's cadres and the
resignation of many others. According to one estimate, by the
spring of 1977 two thousand members had left the party41.
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The end of what has been called 'the conflict between
charisma and organization' 42 marked the consolidation of
Papandreou's power over the entire party structure. As
Spourdalakis argues, the 1975 split "underlined the fact that
PASOK was the creation of Papandreou and that he was in the
last analysis the only source of power within it" 43 . Now that
the party was cleared of all advocates of democratic
procedures, the leadership was able to crystallize a
centralized organizational structure. In 1977, at the first
Panhellenic Conference of the Movement, a new Central Committee
was elected, which was dominated by members known for their
loyalty to the party leader44 . It is perhaps for this reason
that the Central Committee, although the supreme organ in-
between congresses (according to the party's constitution),
restricted its role to the endorsement of policies decided by
the President and the Executive Bureau. It should be noted
here, that a party congress was not held until May 1984, almost
ten years after the party's foundation. Hence, Papandreou
effectively concentrated in his hands all the supreme powers
within his party.
With the absence of any kind of internal opposition, PASOK
acquired political homogeneity and a party base characterized
by obedience to the decisions of the leadership 45 . The
elaborate party base was thus reduced to a channel for the
communication of the leader's positions to PASOK's rank-and-
file and the execution of orders emanating from the top of the
party hierarchy. Its main function was that of an electoral
machine which, thanks to the enthusiasm of its members, could
mobilize support for the party all over the country. PASOK's
impressive 1977 campaign46 and the huge 'laothalasses' (seas of
people) of 1981 were the outcome of the intense activism and
effectiveness of the party's organizations.
At the same time, there was a major shift In the party's
political strategy and objectives. From a left-wing force
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advocating social change, PASOK was gradually transformed into
a 'catch-all' party, seeking a rapid elevation to power.
PASOK's 1977 electoral manifesto constituted a first clear turn
towards more moderate positions. The promise of the socialist
transformation of the society was played down, while national
independence was not seen any more as a precondition for
'popular sovereignty' and 'social liberation'; instead, it was
linked to the need to rescue the country's integrity from
foreign (especially Turkish) aggression. Regarding economic
policy, PASOK abandoned its initial plan for a large-scale
'socialization' of 'major production sectors', in favour of a
programme which would encourage the development of domestic
capital and the attraction of foreign investors under
conditions of fair competition. 'Socialization' was to take
place only In the state-run sector of the economy47 . If in 1974
PASOK had emerged as a new, radical force In Greek politics, by
1977 it sought to dissociate Itself from any form of political
extremism. It projected the image of a responsible alternative
government, promising viable solutions to the country's
immediate problems rather than major structural changes.
PASOK's spectacular advance in the 1977 elections was
definitive proof that its new strategy had been largely
effective.
Having emerged as the official opposition in Parliament,
PASOK appeared to be the only force which could provide a
convincing alternative to the Right. The result of the 1977
election created widespread euphoria within the party, as It
enhanced the belief that PASOK was now well on the way to
power. In the following period 1977-1981, the party was to
readjust its discourse and formulate its political line with
the sole objective of winning the next general election. PASOK
sought to cultivate the image of a moderate and pragmatic party
of government. In the party's discourse, the advocacy of
socialist reform was Increasingly supplanted by a technocratic
approach to economic and social issues. For Instance, PASOK's
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criticisms of Karamanlis' economic policy were no longer based
on the party's socialist principles, but was focussed on the
government's inability to provide a 'stable and coherent
development policy' 48 . The same technocratic spirit also
characterized the party's 1981 'Declaration of Government
Policy' or, 'Contract with the People" . In general terms,
PASOK's 1981 manifesto followed the same lines as that of 1977,
but its moderation was now more pronounced. PASOK declared as
its major objective the 'independent and decentralized
development and reconstruction of the country' 49 and promised
to support productive Investment through a new policy of credit
and incentives 50 . It also pledged to attract foreign investors
who, as the manifesto stressed, could perform a significant
role in the country's economic development51.
In addition, the party watered down Its intransigence vis-a-
vis NATO and the EEC (Greece had become a full member of the
EEC in January 1981). On the European Issue, It abandoned its
Initial positions which had rejected altogether the country's
accession to the Community and had proposed the holding of a
referendum to decide whether Greece was to remain a member of
the EEC or establish a special relationship with It, similar to
that of Norway and Yugoslavia 52 . Although PASOK continued its
attacks against NATO for Its failure to protect Greece from
Turkish expansionism, It no longer advocated the country's
withdrawal from the Alliance. Instead, withdrawal was made
subject to the fulfilment of the party's strategic objective,
namely, the dismantling of both cold war blocs 53 . Of course,
PASOK's programme included a number of policies - such as, the
'democratic	 planning	 of	 the	 economy',	 economic	 and
administrative decentralization, reinforcement of local
government, the establishment of cooperatives In agriculture
and small-commodity production - which, although not very
specific, seemed to be rather radical In the Greek political
context. Yet, the 1981 manifesto was a far cry from the third
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woridish conception of socialism presented in the 'Declaration
of 3rd September'.
The catch-all strategy that PASOK adopted after 1977 was
also marked by the abandonment of any reference - vague as it
might have been - to social classes and the presentation of
Greek society as one split by the division between an all-
embracing 'under-privileged' majority and a 'privileged'
oligarchy of wealth. Moreover, as 1981 came closer, the promise
of the socialist transformation of society was gradually
replaced by a vague demand for 'Change' (Allaghi). Through
these readjustments In its discourse, PASOK succeeded In
becoming the political expression of all those forces which
were discontent with right-wing rule. To summarize, PASOK
emerged as an entirely new force in the political context of
the transition and soon established Its dominance within the
Greek Left, becoming the main political expression of the
radicalized forces of that transition. Nevertheless, PASOK
remained a personalistic party - not very different In this
sense from ND, ERE or the pre-1967 Centre Union - dominated by
its charismatic leader. Under Papandreou's leadership, PASOK
continuously changed its discourse on the basis of the
political and social conjecture of the time and with the sole
aim of achieving a rapid rise to power.
What Is intriguing Is that the party's authoritarian
structure, the constant changes of policy and the abandonment
of many of its radical Ideas did not affect the party's
popularity and electoral prospects. On the contrary, both the
dominant role of PASOK's leader and the readjustments of Its
discourse proved to be crucial for the party's spectacular
rise. This is not as paradoxical as It might seem at first; for
PASOK's development and political practice emanate from and
reflect the particularitles and contradictions of Greek
political tradition and society. First, unlike other European
Socialist parties, PASOK was established from above, by small
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groups of left-wing intellectuals and activists of the
resistance against the dictatorship. No mass movement of the
lower classes with concrete objectives and ideology had
participated In its creation. Just as they had restricted
themselves to passive resistance against the dictatorship, the
social forces in their vast majority remained outside the
political arena during the transition. Under these
circumstances, Papandreou eventually prevailed as the most
prestigious and powerful personality, and as the one who
enjoyed the greatest support within the party and the
electorate.
Papandreou's dominance over the party organization and
PASOK's strong reliance on charismatic leadership must be seen
In the context of Greek political culture and tradition. In a
country where political parties - those of the Communist Left
included - have suffered from lack of Internal democracy and
where charismatic leaders have dominated the political stage
most of the time, PASOK's undemocratic organization seemed to
be for the large part of the population a rather insignificant
detail. Thus, the expulsions did not discourage would-be
members from joining the party en mass from 1977 onwards.
Papandreou became a main pole of attraction for PASOK's members
and supporters, with whom he developed a direct relationship
that bypassed intermediary structures. With his aura as an
academic and fighter for democracy and, above all, with his
unmatched oratorical skills Papandreou became the embodiment of
the aspirations and hopes of all those social groups who were
tired of right-wing rule.
The appeal of PASOK's vague, incoherent and even confusing
discourse Is largely explained by the ideological fluidity that
existed In Greece after the fall of the dictatorship. Thus, the
radicalization of the transition could be more easily defined
by Its negative, anti-Right, anti-Western aspects and by a
general affection for everything termed 'socialist', than by
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any concrete vision of a democratic socialist society. Under
these circumstances PASOK succeeded in dominating the broad
political space expanding between the Right and the Communist
Left, by formulating a discourse which attracted the support of
individuals and groups with markedly different political views.
Its success was facilitated by the inability of both the
traditional Centre and the Communist parties to present
credible alternatives to the Right. By advocating ideas which
until then belonged to the traditional Left, PASOK presented a
programme that was far more radical than that of EK-ND or EDIK,
yet without being branded communist. This last point was
particularly crucial for the party's electoral fortunes in a
country where the traumas of the civil war and the anti-
communist propaganda of the state had generated a deep-seated
distrust of - or even hatred - for communism. Moreover, by
advocating national independence and anti-Western values, PASOK
was able to capitalize on the nationalistic feelings of a
population who had always felt persecuted and bound to fight
for its survival.
The adoption of a catch-all strategy by PASOK must also be
seen In connection with the political climate of the time and,
particularly, the rapid drop in ND's popularity after 1977. The
authoritarianism of the right-wing government and the
monopolization of the state apparatus did not provide the
grounds for the development of a broad and constructive debate
among the different political and social forces about the
country's complicated and serious problems. Instead, ND's
practices contributed to political polarization and Inflated
the popular desire for a 'change here and now'. Following the
public mood at the end of the 1970s, PASOK's projection of the
Right as 'obsolete, morally wrong and responsible for all the
evil present in Greek society' 54 appeared to be fully justified
and convincing. Thus, the country's economic and political
dependence on foreign power centres, the dangers posed to
Greece's national Integrity, the uneven economic development
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and social Inequalities, all were simplistically attributed by
PASOK to the Right.
In addition to the above, another factor which shaped to a
high degree PASOK's discourse were the particularities of the
Greek social structure. Despite Impressive rates of economic
growth in the 1960s, Greece does not have a large working class
as exists in advanced Industrial societies. The overall
percentage of wage and salary earners in the economically
active population has remained significantly low (48.1 per cent
in l98l), compared not only to the countries of mature
capitalism 56 but also to Spain (69.8 per cent) and Portugal
(67.1 per cent) 57 . What is particularly important Is that due
to the economic crises and consequent de-Industrialization the
proportion of workers in the economically active population Is
declining, while a large and ever increasing proportion of the
salaried population Is employed in the state-controlled sector.
While between 1975 and 1983 the number of workers In the Athens
area dropped by 7.4 per cent (from 41.6 to 34.2 per cent), the
proportion of those employed In the governmental and social
services, banks and communications increased from 23 to 31 per
cent58.
Also, with the exception of the small percentage of
employers (about 4 per cent), almost half of the economically
active population of Greece (approximately 48 per cent)
consists of self-employed strata - farmers (28 per cent),
artisanal simple commodity producers, merchants, shopkeepers,
middlemen and professionals. It becomes clear, therefore, that
the Greek social structure is dominated by the middle strata -
self-employed population and other white collar workers.
Despite their precarious economic situation- underpayment for
state employees, the danger of bankruptcy for the plethora of
small industrial and agricultural units, etc - these strata
have not been preoccupied with the transformation of social
relations; instead, they have oriented their demands towards
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the state, depending on it for employment and economic support
(wage Increases, loans, subsidies for their products, tax
relief ete). This attitude is explained by the tradition of
state intervention in Greek society and the special role that
the state has played as a massive employer or as a mechanism
for extracting economic surplus and allocating resources to
different social groups59.
The incoherence of the Greek social structure largely
explains the vagueness of PASOK's discourse and the absence of
any specific definition of the class or classes which were to
carry out the socialist transformation of Greek society. In the
'Declaration of 3rd September' PASOK made a fleeting
description of the social groups - peasants, workers, small
commodity producers, salary earners, white collar workers and
the youth 6° - whose views and interests the party intended to
represent politically. Even this vague reference to social
classes was replaced from 1977 onwards by the dichotomy
'privileged-underprivileged'. By dividing the terrain Into two
opposed camps, PASOK established a unity of purpose among the
different social groups whose support It wished to attract,
that is the fight of the underprivileged majority against the
economic and political oligarchy.
PASOK's discourse glossed over the profound contradictions
and differences inherent in Greek society. For instance, how
could the broad demand for the modernization of the state
apparatus be reconciled with the interests of all those who
were benefiting from the continuous expansion of the state
sector? Or, how could a welfare state be established at a time
of acute recession? PASOK also presented all demands as
'legitimate rights of the people' and created the illusion
that, once the Right was removed from power, all perennial
problems of Greek society would be automatically solved. As
Elephantis suggests in his analysis, "the masses wanted to hear
their own voice. And indeed, It was their voice that came out
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of Papandreou's lips, unchanged, contradictory, disjointed,
neither more, nor less refined, but enormously amplified, like
the echo of a voice In a canyon or in an empty room" 61 . Thus,
like the rest of the bourgeois parties before and after the
dictatorship, PASOK did not seek to educate politically its
social base in new forms of political participation; Instead,
it sought to exploit for Its own benefit the existing political
culture and develop an oversimplified approach which seemed to
suit the often conflicting interests of the various social
groups.
In analysing PASOK's development and strategy, many scholars
have disputed its Ideological self-designation as a Socialist-
Marxist party and have stressed particular aspects of its
organizational structures, which, they argue, bring the party
closer to the populist movements of Latin America than to Its
Socialist counterparts in Western Europe. According to these
studies, PASOK's populism can be recognized in the party's
discourse, the vagueness of its political platform, the
emphasis on 'popular struggles' against whoever Is defined as
'the enemy', as well as in its organizational structure - the
dominance of the party leader, his direct relationship with
PASOK's grassroots and the weakness of Intermediary
administrative levels 62 . Although this approach Is Indisputably
valid and significant for the analysis of PASOK's rise as well
as for its policy In government, populism is a complex and
contradictory concept and an in-depth examination of it goes
far beyond the scope of the present study.
What the previous analysis suggests, however, is that PASOK
has not been a class-based party, nor did its rise and
electoral victory signify the emergence of clear class
cleavages In Greek society. PASOK sought and achieved the
formation of a coalition of forces that transcended social
classes. Yet, this strategy was to impose limits to its freedom
of action. For, after its advent to power, PASOK had to
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implement at least part of Its programme and to cope with the
various and often contradictory promises which had been given
to almost everybody in order to hold this coalition of forces
together.
7.4 PASOK In government - the first term
PASOK's victory, 'the appointment with history' as the party
had Itself called it, was greeted with wild enthusiasm by its
supporters who on the night of the election flooded the
streets of Athens waving green flags (the party's colour) and
shouting pro-PASOK slogans. As we have seen, although the party
had abandoned Its radical strategic objectives for a socialist
transformation of society as early as 1977, with its electoral
campaign it had created high expectations for 'independent
economic development', prosperity and the democratization of
public life.
Shortly after its election the Socialist government carried
out policies which would raise wage incomes and improve social
welfare. Thus, through the system of Indexation, wages and
salaries were substantially increased in both the public and
private sectors, partially offsetting the losses of the last
two years of Conservative government. According to one estimate
for example, the minimum wage was raised by 32 per cent63;
there was also a sharp increase In pensions; the introduction
of pensions for women peasants; and special provisions and
benefits for students, pensioners and disadvantaged groups. The
length of paid holidays was Increased to one month per year for
all workers and weekly working hours were reduced to forty. The
Papandreou government also introduced a National Health Service
and made substantial increases In public expenditure on social
services and particularly health64.
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Perhaps the most impressive of PASOK's reforms were those
which related to the modernization of Greek politics and
society. To start with, PASOK introduced a significant number
of reforms which aimed at the democratization of public life.
Many remnants of the anti-communist legislation of the l930s
and the post-war period were finally abolished and so were the
celebrations of victories against the Communists in the civil
war. Also, the PASOK government abolished military control over
broadcasting as well as the Conservatives' law on terrorism.
The use of torture was outlawed and could be punished by
imprisonment from two years up to life. Finally, the anti-
fascist resistance was officially recognized and political
refugees to the East European countries were allowed to return
to Greece; additionally, pensions and other benefits were
granted to resistance fighters and their families. With these
last measures, PASOK enhanced its image as a descendant of the
wartime Left-wing movement and deprived the Communist parties
of the monopoly of significant historical traditions and themes
of the Greek Left. More importantly, a large part of the
history, ideas and culture of the Left were incorporated in the
official political discourse and together with the
rehabilitation of the resistance movement Inflicted a further
blow to the anti-communism that has persisted within Greek
society.
The Socialists' genuine efforts to advance the position of
women within the family and the workforce 66 and to promote the
general secularization of society should also be mentioned.
Most notable of PASOK's policies in this respect were: the
Institutionalization of formal equality of the sexes; the
abolition of the dowry institution; the reform of family law;
the reduction of the age of consent to eighteen years for both
sexes; the recognition of equal rights for illegitimate
children and the introduction of civil marriage and divorce
by consent. Moreover, christening ceased to be obligatory and a
name can now be acquired through the local registry.
-366-
With regard to trade unionism, PASOK abolished ND's anti-
labour legislation and introduced a number of new measures of
unprecedented liberalism. Law 1264/1982 fully established the
right of employees to organize; employers' lock-outs were
outlawed; provisions for the 'legal' banning of a strike were
abolished; and rubber-stamp unions, which as we saw were used
in order to secure right-wing control of the trade union
leadership, disappeared under the new law 67 . Finally, PASOK
introduced significant, albeit never fully implemented,
legislation for the modernization and democratization of
further and higher education68.
The widespread euphoria that 'Allaghi' had brought about was
not to last long, however, as PASOK faced the difficulties of a
harsh economic situation, Only a year after its rise to power,
the government had to admit publicly that its economic policy
which aimed at boosting production through the stimulation of
demand had failed. In reality PASOK's neo-Keynesian measures
had led to a sharp increase in imports, while domestic
production of both consumer and capital goods had continued to
decline, as had the rate of investment 69 . Thus, by the end of
its first year in office, the government was forced to
introduce a programme of relative austerity which Included a
15.5 per cent devaluation of the drachma, restrictions on a
wide range of Imports and a temporary wage freeze as a means of
cutting production costs. Yet neither these measures, nor the
significant Incentives provided for both domestic and foreign
capital were enough to encourage private entrepreneurs and to
attract new Investors 70 . In manufacturing the production of
consumer and capital goods stagnated between 1981 and 1984,
while in agriculture the growth was a mere 0.9 per cent for the
same period, as a large part of the resources allocated to
farmers in the form of loans and subsidies were used to finance
consumption and the acquisition of real estate or were
deposited with banks 71 . The economy continued to suffer from
high rates of inflatIon (around 20 per cent in the period 1981-
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1985) and unemployment rose to almost nine per cent by the end
of PASOK's first year in office, compared to 4.3 per cent in
1981.
In its election manifesto PASOK had proposed to deal with
the country's economic problems through a number of measures
which included democratic, decentralized planning, the
socialization of basic units of production, the introduction of
workers' self-management and the curbing of tax evasion. Four
years later, however, most of these policies had been either
abandoned or only partially implemented. For instance, in 1982
the government had proposed the introduction of a tax on urban
real estate which was to constitute a considerable state
revenue. The Bill, however, caused such an uproar among a large
section of PASOK supporters that Papandreou hastily withdrew
it. Tax evasion remained difficult to tackle with a growing
black economy, estimated to be responsible for almost one third
of GNP72.
As for the much heralded socialization of 'strategic sectors
of the economy', this did not go beyond the extension of state
control over the production of pharmaceuticals and military
equipment. What was more important was that in practice the
idea of socialization appeared to serve other purposes than
those stated by PASOK. In summer 1983 the government introduced
employees' participation in the management of these companies
which already belonged to the state such as electricity,
communications, transport and banks (Law 1365/1983), though the
law did not specify the terms under which employees were to
participate. The decrees which were drafted in February-March
1985 for the Implementation of the law determined that
employees were to send representatives to the Representative
Councils of Social Control (ASKE) which, however, had only
advisory and supervisory functions, while real power was
reserved for directors general and administrative councils.
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Thus, in effect, employees had no decisive vote on crucial
Issues concerning their companies t policies.
To understand the logic of this policy, three points must be
emphasized: first, the crucial importance of the public sector
(which includes 90 per cent of the banking system, the whole of
communications, transport, the electricity production and some
sectors of heavy Industry) for the Greek economy; secondly,
public companies have been notorious for their Inefficiency and
huge budget deficits; and thirdly, their 100,000 employees are
organized in particularly militant unions which since the end
of the dictatorship have always been at the forefront of
industrial action. Clearly, If the PASOK government was to
fulfil its electoral promise to modernize these companies, It
would need the employees' consent to a number of harsh measures
that it would have to take, such as the introduction of modern
technology, the potential dismissal of excess personnel, and
the freeze on wages and salaries as a means of tackling these
companies' deficits and also as part of the general austerity
programme. Thus, as Lyrintzis has suggested, "the so-called
socialization of these units was designed to neutralize the
employees unions and to secure peace by offering them a minimum
of participation, so that they would be co-responsible for the
companies' policies"73.
More importantly, the law imposed significant restrictions
on the right to strike. According to article four, a strike in
the socialized companies was Illegal unless it had gained the
support of an absolute majority of the registered members of
the union through a secret ballot. Not surprisingly, this
particular provision led to fierce protests by trade unions and
the Communist opposition. It also generated a controversy
within PASOK itself as the government was criticized for
virtually abolishing the right to strike in the public sector.
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In general, PASOK's attitude towards labour was ambivalent,
largely reflecting the contradictions of its policies and its
difficulty In coping with the deepening economic crisis. As we
saw, the government had already fulfilled many of its election
pledges for the democratization of trade unionism during Its
first months in office. An early Indication of the change in
the climate of labour relations in the first months of
"AllaghI" was the increased militancy of the unions; 7.9
million working hours were lost In strikes in 1982 as compared
to 5,34 million In l98l. On the other hand, while in its
electoral manifesto PASOK had promised to free the labour
movement from government tutelage, it demonstrated the same
eagerness to control the trade union leadership as had the
outgoing right-wing government. Only in December 1981, through
a court injunction was the ND-controlled leadership of the
General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) deposed and a new one
was appointed with a majority of PASKE (PASOK's labour branch)
representatives 75 . There was also a marked change in PASOK's
attitude towards industrial action. Thus PASKE, once actively
Involved in the organization of strikes, now joined the
government in condemning strikers as acting against popular
Interests. What was previously projected by PASOK rhetoric as
the struggle of the 'working people' to defend their legitimate
rights was now branded as the attempt of irresponsible and
hostile unions to 'undermine the work of Allaghi' and bring
about a right-wing comeback76 . As the preservation of the
social coalition that had brought PASOK to power proved to be
an Increasingly difficult task, the government was constantly
to invoke the common cause of the 'underprivileged' In the
fight for the consolidation of 'change'. Yet by presenting
strikes as unjustified and damaging to the general interest,
the PASOK government only contributed to the deepening of the
legitimacy crisis that has always bedevilled the Greek trade
union movement.
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One of the most controversial aspects of the Socialists'
policy was what has been broadly described as the 'ethos and
style of power'. While still in opposition, PASOK had
repeatedly criticized New Democracy for the monopolization of
the state apparatus and the distribution of spoils to
party supporters. It had subsequently pledged to end party
favouritism and to establish meritocracy in the employment
policy of the state and the allocation of resources.
Nevertheless, as the new government inherited a gigantic,
Right-dominated bureaucracy, it was expected to make dismissals
and appoint new personnel, particularly to the top ranks of the
administrative hierarchy in an attempt to establish reliable
lines of communication and effectively advance its own
policies. Indeed, according to Featherstone, 300 ND-appointed
general directors and managers of the public sector were
dismissed and replaced by an equal number of party members and
affiliates during PASOK's first few months in office 77 . The
government presented these changes as a necessary step towards
the rationalization and democratization of the state
bureaucracy and the effective implementation of its reforms,
especially as the new appointees were considered as experts in
the relevant areas of government policy78.
Soon, however, the recruitment of new personnel was expanded
to all levels of public administration as party members,
particularly from PASOVs sectoral organizations, were
massively hired as employees, consultants, managers or
researchers in the various departments. It has been estimated
that about three to four thousand party members were appointed
to various posts in the state sector throughout the first
three years of Socialist rule 79 . Evidently, the government was
now preoccupied with the consolidation of its power within both
the state machinery and the electorate, even though this meant
the further swelling of the hydrocephalic state bureaucracy.
This policy was facilitated by the continuing crisis of the
economy and the increasing unemployment which enhanced further
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the significance of the state as an employer. According to the
same OECD report, while in the period 1982-1985 employment in
manufacturing declined by 2.5 per cent, employment in the
public sector increased at around 3 per cent per annum80.
Most interesting was that PASOK introduced a new form of
favouritism, as party membership became almost the exclusive
criterion of selection for employment in the state sector.
PASOK's mass organization was effectively turned into a channel
for the allocation of spoils to the party membership. It Is
thus no wonder that the latter, despite the organizational
inertia which followed the 1981 electoral victory, doubled
within three years to reach 220,000 by 198481. In many cases,
the new appointees, the 'green guards' as they were scornfully
called by the opposition and even by PASOK supporters, acted as
the party watchdogs within the state apparatus, selectively
promoting the Interests of other party members. The practice of
the 'green guards' in the state machine created tensions within
the government and the party and led Papandreou himself to
denounce them as 'government policemen' and to call for a
separation between state and party, which however was never
realized82.
PASOK failed to proceed with the democratization of some
crucial sectors of the state as It had Initially promised.
Despite a relative opening to the views of the opposition, the
broadcast media remained under the tight control of the
government. Moreover, by invoking similar reasons as the ND
governments before them, the Socialists effectively kept the
military beyond the control of Parliament. The role of
Parliament was not upgraded as PASOK had pledged In Its
electoral manifesto, while in contrast the power of the
executive was particularly reinforced. This was largely due to
the highly personalistic style of leadership exercised by
Papandreou. The Prime Minister made rare appearances in
Parliament and had only scarce meetings with PASOK's
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parliamentary party. More important was that Papandreou became
in essence solely responsible for all aspects of government
policy and even for the appointment or dismissal of managerial
personnel in the public companies. At times he would overrule
his own ministers without even notifying them In determining
Issues that fell under their competence 83 . Papandreon appeared
as 'the sole neutral power factor who could personally respond
to the different popular demands and even settle the conflicts
between his ministers and various Interest groups'84.
Ministers or deputies who criticized the government's
policies were soon to find out that with their stance 'they had
placed themselves outside the movement' 85 . Papandreou's
complete domination of the party and consequently the
government was consolidated further with PASOK's first congress
held In May 1984. It is characteristic that no criticism was
heard during the four days of the congress about Papandreou's
heavy-handed style of leadership and no attempt was made for
the legitimation of the leader's position through an election
procedure, symbolic as this might have been. Moreover,
according to the party's new constitutIon, Papandreou
effectively remained beyond the collective control of the
party's elected organs86.
Finally, the Socialist government abandoned its plan to
Introduce straightforward proportional representation, the only
system, as PASOK had argued in opposition, which could
accurately reflect the will of the electorate. As the 1985
general election approached, PASOK sought to secure a new
absolute majority in parliament by maintaining the system of
reinforced proportional representation. Nevertheless, the new
electoral law Introduced in January 1985 contained some
provisions which benefited the smaller parties, particularly
the KKE-es which In 1981 had been left without representation
in Parliament.
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7.5 PASOK's second tera - the politics of impasse
Notwithstanding the reversal of some of its most popular
policies and the abandonment of many of its pre-electoral
pledges, PASOK was safely returned to government in the
election of June 2 1985 with 45.8 per cent of the vote (a
marginal decline of only 2.3 per cent from its 1981 result) and
a comfortable parliamentary representation of 161 seats (see
Table 7.3). Ostensibly, the democratic reforms that the
Papandreou government had carried out and the significant
Improvement in incomes and social welfare accomplished In the
first year of "Allaghi", together with a new wave of high
public spending during the first half of 1985, had played a
significant role in maintaining support for PASOK.
Moreover, the party's Image as a progressive political force
had been undoubtedly enhanced by Papandreou's last-minute
decision in March 1985 not to support Karamanlis' re-election
as President of the Republic. Papandreou, who had repeatedly
praised Karamanlls for his Impeccable attitude as Head of
State, announced that PASOK was to nominate Instead Christos
Sartzetakls, a Supreme Court judge highly reputed for his fight
against the para-state in the 1960s and his opposition to the
military dictatorship 87 . As the Prime Minister explained to
PASOK's parliamentary party, the government's Intention was to
introduce a major constitutional reform which would abolish the
extensive powers of the President; so far as the 1975
Constitution was in essence Karamanlis' 'brainchild', It would
be hard for him to serve as President under a revised
Constitution88 . By effectively ousting Karamanlis, a figure who
in the eyes of many within the Centre and Left symbolIzed
right-wing authoritarianism, and by promising to abolish the
reserve powers of the President, PASOK appeared to contradict
those critics who had suggested that the movement had
reconciled itself with the establishment.
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As in 1981, the anti-Right syndrome played again a crucial
role in determining the outcome of the election. Again, the
central theme of PASOK's campaign was the fight of the
democratic forces against the return of the Right. Papandreou
described the election as a struggle between the light of the
sun (the party's emblem is a green, rising sun) and the forces
of darkness. He emphasized the achievements of the Socialist
government and he warned that a victorious Right would seek
revenge against the progressive movement and try to turn the
clock back to the repressive regime of the post-civil war
era. A vote for PASOK, it was stressed, was a vote against the
Right and for the deepening of change 89 . As the result
suggested, PASOK managed to maintain the support of the vast
majority of the centre voters and even to attract some
supporters of KKE which saw its share of the vote decline by
one per cent since 1981.
TABLE 7.3
RESULTS OF TUE ELECTION OF JUNE 2 1985
Parties	 % of votes	 seats	 % of seats
PASOK	 45.8	 161	 53.7
New Democracy	 40.9	 126	 42.0
KKE	 9.9	 12	 4.0
KKE-es	 1.8	 1	 0.3
National Political Union
(EPEN)	 0.6	 -	 -
Liberal Party (K.Phil.) 	 0.2	 -	 -
Others	 0.8	 -	 -
TOTAL	 100.0	 300	 100.0
Nevertheless, the wait for the 'even better days' that PASOK
had promised during the campaign was to be very long, as the
country's economic situation was constantly deteriorating. In
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order to finance its welfare programme the Socialist government
had resorted to foreign loans and EEC subsidies; yet, the
increasing debt burden had hardly any impact on domestic
production. Exports had fallen from $4.7 billion in 1981 to
$4.4 billion in 1984 while, due to the changed world economic
conditions, invisible earnings which had been extensively used
in the past to finance the expansion of imports had also been
drastically reduced (from $4.6 billion in 1980 to $3.2 billion
in 1984). There was a rampant increase In the balance of
payments deficit and also in the foreign debt which by 1985 had
reached $14.8 billion compared to $7.9 billion four years
earlier90 . With the worries of a coming election now removed,
the new PASOK government introduced in October 1985 a new
package of austerity measures, euphemistically called
'stabilization programme'. It included yet another 15 per cent
devaluation of the drachma; serious cutbacks in state social
spending; more incentives for private capital; more freedom for
employers in setting the terms for the hiring and firing of
personnel and, finally, the abolition of the Indexation of
wages. With the latter measure, which in fact constituted the
basis of the stabilization programme, the government aimed at
reducing production costs and thus at improving competitiveness
especially of the light consumer industries. As a result of the
government's new incomes policy in 1986 alone real wages
declined by 8.6 per cent91.
The economic measures caused an uproar within the communist
opposition and the trade unions, though the reaction from the
Right was rather mild, since ND did not disagree with the
substance of the government's economic policy. From the end of
1985, the Socialist government was confronted with an
increasing surge of Industrial action all over the country. The
number of hours lost in strikes increased from 7.66 million in
1985 to 8.84 million in 1986 to reach a staggering 16.35
million in 198792. The austerity measures caused a lot of
strife within the ranks of PASOK itself, as numerous trade
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unionists of the party broke party discipline and participated
in strikes. In October 1985, seven members of the GSEE
executive conunittee and leading PASKE cadres were summarily
expelled from PASOK for criticizing the government's harsh
measures, to be followed a little later by a number of militant
PASOK trade unionists and even deputies who failed to support
Papandreou's new economic and social policy. Even the GSEE
president, G. Raftopoulos, well known for his loyalty to the
government supported the decision for a general strike in
January 1987.
As PASOK's influence on the labour movement rapidly
declined, the government adopted a highly aggressive attitude
towards the unions. Major strikes were broken under the threat
of military tribunals and pickets were confronted with the
violence of the anti-riot police, while at times the latter
were called in to provide protection to blacklegs 94 . The role
of the repressive mechanisms of the state was particularly
reinforced during PASOK's second term in office; for example,
there was heavy policing of protests and marches, while the
clashes between demonstrators and the police became a frequent
occurrence95.
With a policy which served the interests of private capital
and big business rather than those of the middle and lower
strata, it seemed harder for PASOK to maintain the broad
social coalition that constituted its electoral base. Yet while
PASOK had clearly failed to carry out a social-democratic, let
alone a socialist, reform of the economy and society, none of
the other parties of the Left, including the political
organizations formed by PASOK dissidents was able to
articulate a concrete and convincing proposal for a solution to
the crisis96.
In contrast, New Democracy was undergoing a major renovation
which increased the party's appeal within the middle strata.
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Having lost the control of the state machinery and consequently
the ability to preserve and extend its base of support through
patronage, ND for the first time made a genuine effort to
develop an elaborate mass organization and to adopt a coherent
political platform. Its 'New Proposal for Freedom', published
in February 1985, marked a clear shift away from the Keynesian
policies of the Karamanlis era and the espousal of 'neo-
liberal' doctrine. In its new manifesto, the party defined the
existence of an over-inflated, unproductive state sector as one
of the country's major problems and promised to separate
completely the state from the party, to limit state
intervention in the economy and to create the conditions for
more economic freedom as the only remedy for the country's
critical problems. More important was ND's effort to project
itself as a progressive and moderate party committed to
'strengthening freedom and democracy in the country'97.
With its new, liberal image and organizational activism, ND
managed to establish a strong presence within the public sector
unions, professional associations and the youth movement; in
high schools the Right gained an absolute majority while in the
students' unions it obtained between 30 and 40 per cent of the
vote98 . ND's commitment to modernization and Its pro-European
line appeared to be particularly attractive to the younger
generation which had been politically socialized under PASOK's
patronage and authoritarian practices and which was oriented
towards consumerism and careers.
The growing appeal of the Right was clearly proven in the
1986 municipal elections when, after the refusal of the
Communists to support PASOK candidates in the second round, the
three largest urban areas of the country - Athens, Piraeus and
Thessaloniki - came under ND control. The three new Mayors,
Evert, Andrianopoulos and Kouvelas respectively, belonged to
the younger generation of ND cadres and of them Andrianopoulos
and Evert especially represented the new style and ethos of the
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Greek Centre-Right, advocating political moderation, reconcili-
ation with the Left and development through the transition to a
free market economy. Although these local developments did not
mean the definitive decline of the influence exercised by the
party's traditionalist, anti-communist wing, they certainly
improved ND's public image as a liberal, democratic party.
Under these circumstances PASOK seemed no longer able to
exploit the Right-Left cleavage in order to rally support for
its policies. Papandreou's fervent anti-Right rhetoric was
increasingly failing to convince an electorate which was now
realizing that the suppression of incomes, the monopolization
of the state apparatus and party favouritism were not
exclusively associated with right-wing rule. The personal
appeal of the PASOK leader also appeared to be on the wane,
while that of party cadres with a low-key style was steadily
Increasing 99 . Public discontent with the government gradually
turned into resentment as numerous allegations about corruption
scandals In the public sector and the companies run by state
agencies surfaced the one after the other. The most highly
publicized of them, Involving the relationship of top
government officials including Papandreou himself with the
money embezzler tycoon George Koskotas, was the final blow to
the popularity of the party. PASOK was finally defeated in the
general elections of June 1989.
7.6 Conclusion
PASOK emerged In the political scene of the transition as an
entirely new force, bringing with it new political personnel
and a new radical discourse. Moreover, it was the first non-
communist party to develop an elaborate mass organization.
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Nevertheless, PASOK failed to become a mass party of the
West European type. It remained highly personalistic, depending
on its leader for the formulation of its platform and for its
electoral appeal. Collective procedures were never institutio-
nalized and the party base had no essential participation in
party affairs. The Impressive mass organization was gradually
transformed into a formidable electoral machine able to
mobilize support from all over the country.
PASOK sought to exploit the Right-Left cleavage present in
Greek society in the 1970s and the exasperation of a large part
of the population with right-wing rule. Its strategy was
specifically articulated to appeal to the large middle strata
whose centrality within Greek society meant that their support
was necessary if the party was to gain power. Thus, PASOK's
references to the 'underprivileged' and the anti-Right
discourse aimed at masking the contradictions inherent in Greek
society and unite all social groups under its call for
'Change'.
However, the Socialists' strategy proved to be an Impasse.
PASOK had created the illusion that almost all problems present
in Greek society would be solved once the Right was removed
from power, thus generating high expectations to a large part
of the population. Yet, its Inability to deliver the "better
days" it had promised and its gradual drift towards austerity
measures, similar to those applied by ND, eroded the coalition
of forces which constituted its electoral base. Additionally,
PASOK's authoritarian practices towards trade unions, the
reinforcement of the role of the security forces and the
monopolization of the state apparatus - including broadcasting
- generated widespread disillusionment among the Left, for
which authoritarianism and suppression of lower incomes had
been until then identified with the Right.
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CHAPTER 8
PASOK's POLICY ON BROADCASTING: 1974-1987
8.1 Introduction
In its 1981 'Contract with the People' PASOK stated that
Popular Sovereignty (one of the central principles-objectives
of the party's 1974 ideological manifesto) "was firmly tied" to
pluralism and the freedom of expression: "The conflicts between
different classes and strata", the election manifesto wrote,
"are not abolished by decree, nor are they suppressed through
prohibition and exclusion. The free political expression of
conflicts, the democratic debate, constitutes a fundamental
right (of the people) "i. In the same document, broadcasting
was defined as one of those Institutions (including Parliament,
local government, trade unions, education and justice) whose
democratization and reinforcement was imperative for the
consolidation of democracy in Greece.
Some changes did take place with regard to the legal
framework of broadcasting as well as to the government's every-
day attitude towards the two networks. Yet, PASOK's general
performance vis-a-vis the broadcast media was primarily shaped
by the existing political conjuncture and by the overriding
criterion of 'political cost or benefit' as this has
traditionally been defined in the context of Greek politics by
the party in power. In this chapter, we will examine PASOK's
position on the media while the party was still in opposition
and in the light of these earlier pronouncements we will
analyse the legal reforms and political practices introduced
into the broadcasting organizations by PASOK in government.
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Apart from its significance for a full understanding of recent
developments In the sphere of Greek broadcasting, the study of
PASOK's broadcasting policy will 	 also	 exemplify	 the
contradictions of PASOK's general strategy and organization
and the limitations that these imposed upon the realization of
the programme of reforms that the party had been elected to
implement.
8.2 The media policy of the Socialists in opposition
As the preceding analysis has shown (see chapter 6),
throughout the seven years of Conservative rule, the content
and tone of the political debate on broadcasting were highly
influenced by the continuing government monopolization of radio
and television. ND's broadcasting policy, particularly the
exclusion of the entire opposition from news programmes,
constituted a permanent cause of controversy and tension
between the government and the parties of the opposition. Under
these circumstances, the parties of the Centre and Left
concentrated their attention on the question of balance and
demanded the establishment of new forms of organization for
the control of broadcasting, which would safeguard its
Institutional independence and enable the fair representation
of different political opinions In radio and television
programmes.
However, except for the fierce criticisms of ND's practices
and the lengthy speeches In Parliament about the power of
television, none of the opposition parties was able to put
forward a concrete and elaborated proposal for the
democratization and rationalization of the broadcasting
Institutions. The few suggestions made by representatives of
the opposition In the frequent parliamentary debates 2 on
broadcasting seemed to be Impromptu and too general In content.
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For instance, the opposition repeatedly called for the setting
up of an all-party committee to deal with broadcasting matters;
the definition of the committee's role, however, was set out in
vague terms, and so it was by no means clear whether this body
was to act as an ad hoc commission of enquiry or to be
accorded the powers of a supreme broadcasting authority.
Moreover, insofar as politicians considered broadcasting
mainly from the very restricted viewpoint of information, other
aspects of the two networks' operation - such as their overall
cultural policy, quality of programming or inadequate financial
resources - were not given much consideration by the parties of
the opposition. Questions related to the organization of
programmes or the educational and cultural role of broadcasting
were never seriously discussed by the opposition parties nor
did they become the basis for a thorough investigation Into the
structures of Greek broadcasting Institutions.
PASOK's own view of radio and television throughout the
1970s provides a clear example of this attitude of the
opposition as a whole towards broadcasting. Remarkably, the
Socialists did not offer any more coherent or detailed project
for the reform of the broadcasting organizations than did the
other parties of the Centre and Left. Apart from some brief and
Infrequent references to the issue in the party's official
documents 3 , the main features of PASOK's broadcasting policy
while in opposition emerge mainly from the various
parliamentary speeches of its leading cadres and especially of
Papandreou himself. In fact, as In all other areas of party
policy, it was the leader who articulated PASOK's position in
the field of the mass media.
Early in 1975, during the parliamentary debate on
constitutional reform, PASOK published Its own proposal for the
new Constitution, which It called 'Constitution for a
Democratic Greece'. In a special section of this draft, PASOK
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made a first general outline of its position regarding the mass
media. However, five out of the six paragraphs of the section
were dedicated to matters pertaining to the freedom of the
press and only one addressed the problems of broadcasting. In
it, PASOK criticized the government draft for explicitly
exempting broadcasting, the cinema and sound recordings from
the provisions which protected the press from censorship.
"The constitutional draft", said the Socialist proposal,
"...does not safeguard the free expression of opinion in the
main media for the transmission of news, nor the formation of
public opinion in the modern technological era. In this way,
the constitutional draft not only runs counter to modern
constitutional practice, but it also manifests a profoundly
undemocratic intention to impose control on the basic mass
media. Because of the one-party political exploitation of
radio and television In the past, the Constitution should not
only safeguard the free expression of opinion, but also
stipulate that these essential meia are placed under the
control of an inter-party committee"
PASOK firmly supported the establishment of a state monopoly
In broadcasting,	 regarding it as the only framework which
could	 guarantee	 objectivity, fairness and quality in
programming.	 For the same reason,	 PASOK and the other
opposition parties called for the institutionalization of the
broadcasting monopoly In the Constitution. Papandreou In
particular, proposed that the ownership of the broadcast
media should be shared between the "state and the other social
Institutions" 5 . The latter were defined primarily to Include
local government, trade unions and the "large organizations
which express either in class terms or more generally the
Interests of the Greek people"6.
Nevertheless, as the analysis of ND's broadcasting policy
has shown, if the establishment of the broadcasting monopoly
was based on a broad political consensus, the way in which the
Conservatives sought to organize state control over the EIRT
caused a major controversy between the government and the
parties of the opposition. PASOK dismissed the bill (later Law
-39'-
230/1975) as merely changing the legal status of the EIRT7,
whereas in essence It perpetuated the subjugation of the
organization to the commands of the party in government.
Commenting on the formidable powers of intervention in both
management and programming that the law reserved for the
Minister to the Prime Minister, PASOK's main speaker In the
parliamentary debate said somewhat melodramatically:
"It is not the Board of Governors those who make appoint-
ments, who make decisions and who In the final analysis
organize the services of the Institute. The relevant orders
will be sent to the general management of the company directly
from the 0Personnel Secretariat of the Ministry to the Prime
Minister"0.
With reference to YENED, PASOK viewed the continuous
existence of the military channel as a threat to the democratic
system and called for its abolition and merger with ERT:
"Taking into account the country's particular history"
Papandreou told Parliament, "it is inconceivable for a sector
of the state machine, namely the armed forces, to be in control
of the people's mass media" 9 . "The reconciliation of the people
and the army Is the prerequisite for the survival of democracy
in this country. We have a chance in this Parliament to find a
solution to the problem once and for all"10.
During the first years of its life as a party, PASOK had
followed a line of low-key opposition towards the broadcasting
policies of the government, focussing its criticism primarily
on the legal aspects of the organization of the broadcasting
institutions. By 1977, however, the party had started to
harden its position vis-a-vls ERT and YENED, becoming more
critical of the continuous manipulation of radio and television
by the Conservative government. This change of attitude was due
not only to the increasingly tight grip of ND on the broadcast
media; it had also a lot to do with a major change in PASOK's
strategy which took place in the same period.
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As we saw in the preceding chapter, in the period prior to
the 1977 general election, the party sought to project the
image of a responsible and reliable alternative to the Right by
making a clear shift to more moderate positions. At the same
time PASOK intensified its attacks against the government of
New Democracy presenting it as incompetent, backwards and
authoritarian. PASOK's increasingly aggressive tone of
opposition to right-wing policies was apparent in the language
that Papandreou and other party cadres used both inside and
outside Parliament when referring to broadcasting. For
instance, in April 1977 Papandreou told a conference discussing
the problems of the Greek press: "Radio and television in
Greece are a moral scandal. The parties do not express their
views; (broadcasting) is an instrument of the one party state
of the Right"' 1 . Undoubtedly, the operation of radio and
television provided a clear example of what PASOK defined as
right-wing authoritarianism and the party leadership sought to
exploit this at every given opportunity.
Thus, in January 1978 PASOK's press office announced that
the party, now the official opposition in Parliament, would not
send representatives to the General Assembly of ERT as it was
entitled to do by Law 230. The reason given in the party
statement was that the General Assembly was in essence a
powerless body with a 'pre-arranged majority' in which the
presence of the opposition served only to create the illusion
of a broader political representation in the administration of
the company12 . At the same time, Exormissi, PASOK's official
weekly paper, mounted a campaign on broadcasting by publishing
a series of reports in which well known journalists spoke about
the dangers that continuous government control of television
created for the democratic system13.
More importantly, PASOK sought to bring the problem before
Parliament. It requested the listing of broadcasting as a topic
for discussion in the parliamentary agenda, but the ND
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government dismissed the idea on the grounds that the operation
of radio and television did not constitute a major national
Issue to be given particular consideration by the assembly14.
Nevertheless, a group of PASOK MPs submitted an Interpellation
In Parliament criticizing the government for its continuous
monopolization of the broadcast media. Early in February 1978,
after a significant number of similar Interpellations had been
submitted by representatives of all other opposition parties,
PASOK demanded a full debate on the issue, which meant that
apart from those MPs who had signed the interpellations time
would be given to other MPs who wished to participate in the
discussion15'
By pursuing the idea of a broad debate on broadcasting,
PASOK aimed to draw public attention to the question of the
political independence of radio and television and to increase
the pressure on the government to review Its policy vis-a-vIs
the broadcasting organizations. Apart from this however, the
debate was of strategic Importance for PASOK itself. First, to
the extent that the government would come under the concerted
fire of the entire opposition, the debate could enhance the
impression of mounting discontent against ND, which only three
months before had seen its majority shrink by 12.5 per cent.
Moreover, the debate would give the opportunity to PASOK's most
eloquent deputies and especially to Papandreou himself to give
strong performance in which he could once more manipulate the
party's main themes of popular sovereignty and national
Independence. The debate to which ND eventually conceded lasted
two days and was extensively reported particularly by the pro-
PASOK press 16 , although the government did not give permission
for televised coverage.
The main argument advanced by PASOK during the debate was
that the government's broadcasting policy was unconstitutional
in that it did not safeguard objectivity, balance and quality
in programmes as postulated by clause 15, paragraph 2 of the
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Constitution' 7 . "The mass media in our country", Papandreou
suggested, "lead to the creation of a citizen who is
politically inactive (...) and culturally disorientated C...)
whereas the foundation stone of popular sovereignty is a
citizen who thinks, judges and decides" 18 . This malfunctioning
of Greek radio and television, Papandreou argued, was the
outcome of their continuous manipulation by the right-wing
government.
"ERT is a peculiar (...) and queer organization. The
government appoints the Board of Directors and, as if it didn't
find this enough, it also appoints the Chairman, the Deputy
Chairman, the Director General and the Deputy Directors (...).
The news is the news of the Underseqçetary of Information
(...). It Is the news of the government".
PASOK also criticized the broadcasting organizations for
lacking an overall cultural policy and for feeding Greek
audiences with cultural by-products of domestic or foreign -
primarily American - production. As a result, Papandreou
argued, the basic characteristics of Greek television were
"obscurantism, Imported culture (...) and rape - this is the
right word - of our national tradition. Are all these
accidental? For they clearly tend to undermine popular
sovereignty as much as our national Independence 20". The
dangers of such a broadcasting policy were so great, because of
the enormous Impact that television had upon the people. For
Papandreou, the viewer was a "captive, a hostage of the
screen", deprived of the freedom of conscious selection of
Information that a newspaper provided and unable to resist the
brainwashing of programmes and commercials21.
For these reasons, PASOK's leader called for the complete
elimination of advertising from radio and television.
"We must liberate the citizenry from this miasma, this
pollution which comes through the networks (...). For
advertising not only subjugates radio and television to the
government's policy; It also subjugates them to the big
monopolistic conglomerates which, in our country's case,
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undermine no	 only our
Independence" 2
economy but also our national
Clearly, the debate gave Papandreou the opportunity to
utilize very skilfully the nationalistic themes and anti-
Western values which had become a basic component of PASOK's
rhetoric. Yet, beyond the militant language, PASOK's approach
to broadcasting appeared to be shallow and certainly not the
product of a thorough study of the problems of the two
networks. Many of the points made were vague - for instance,
how could advertising subjugate broadcasting to the policies of
the government? - and sounded like slogans for public
consumption. Papandreou's attacks against imported programmes
were clearly verging on xenophobia as no distinction was made
between high quality productions and cheap popular series, nor
was any consideration given to the significant role that
television could perform as a means of cultural exchange among
different countries. The message that came across was that
everything foreign was bad and should be exorcised. Moreover,
PASOK's objection to commercials was not accompanied by any
suggestion of alternative sources of funding the investment and
programming policies of the broadcasting organizations.
Nevertheless, PASOK did offer some positive proposals for
the re-organization of broadcasting. It called for the merger
of ERT and YENED Into a unitary organization. To safeguard the
Institutional independence of the broadcast media, Papandreou
proposed their 'socialization', that Is, the establishment of a
Board of Governors with a broad political and social
representation. This Board, which "ought to be the expression
of the Nation", would include representatives of political
parties, local government, trade unions, agricultural
cooperatives, professional and artistic associations, students'
and women's organizations, and unions of journalists and press
publishers. For news and current affairs, Papandreou proposed
the formation of a committee of journalists who, under the
supervision of the Board of Governors, would prepare political
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programmes, decide what was to be transmitted and allocate time
to the political parties. Similarly, for entertainment
programming, PASOK proposed the setting up of a Committee of
artists (writers, actors, film directors etc.) to make
programme policy. Finally, PASOK demanded the formation of an
ad hoc Committee of all parties to prepare new broadcasting
legislation which would guarantee the independence of radio and
television from any form of political intervention23.
Although this was the lengthiest proposal ever made by
PASOK, it was far from constituting a detailed draft for the
institutional and organizational reform of broadcasting.
Compared to the powers which PASOK attributed to television,
its overall views of Greek broadcasting reflected dispropor-
tionally little consideration and understanding of the problems
regarding the organization and operation of the medium. It is
questionable, for instance, whether a broadcasting organization
could function effectively if executive powers were vested in
collective bodies, such as the news and general programming
committees proposed by Papandreou. Furthermore, PASOK did not
at all examine the development of new means of communication
such as cable television or local stations and the new options
they opened up for a more pluralistic model of broadcasting.
PASOK's concept of broadcasting as an institution was based
upon the idea of a state monopoly, run by a public authority,
while the plurality of opinion would be safeguarded by the
broad range of political and social forces represented in it.
This insistence upon the state monopoly of broadcasting -
which as we saw was common among politicians of all colours at
that time - was largely due to the general perception of the
expansion of state control as a progressive, even socialist
policy. This accounted to a significant extent for PASOK's
refusal to consider any other form of ownership and control of
radio and television, until well into the 1980s.
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In the period between the 1978 debate and the 1981 general
election, PASOK made no effort to develop a more concrete and
substantial plan for the reform of broadcasting. A pledge made
in 1978 to set up a specialist party committee to investigate
the problems of Greek broadcasting and make a report to
Parliament never materialized. In effect, the pronouncements
included in the 1981 'Contract with the People' were less
specific than the suggestions made in 1978
PASOK devoted less than a page of its 1981 election
manifesto, to the broadcast media, listing all Its proposals
under the title 'Democratization of the mass media'. Here,
PASOK declared its duty to "safeguard the objective information
of the people through television and radio", and its aim of
transforming broadcasting into an Instrument of "information,
entertainment, cultural development and also of open discussion
and exchange of Ideas" 24 . It also promised to secure proper
access to radio and television for all political parties.
However, apart from declaring its determination to abolish the
military channel, PASOK avoided any explicit commitment to the
institutional reform of broadcasting. Instead, there was a
general promise to secure the participation of political
parties, local authorities, trade unions and other Interest
groups in the administration of the broadcasting Institutions
to safeguard "pluralism and artistic expression". Unlike the
1978 proposals, there was no mention of what this broadly
representative body would be called, nor of the competences it
would be vested with.
Significantly, there was no promise to abolish Law 230,
which PASOK had so fiercely criticized since its introduction.
Another notable departure from its 1978 position was the
abandonment of outright rejection of advertising In favour of
a commitment to introduce a system of tight controls over the
content and number of broadcast commercials. It seemed that the
closer PASOK found itself to power, the more It avoided binding
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Itself with specific promises which might deprive a prospective
Socialist government of control over what the PASOK leadership
believed to be a powerful instrument of mass persuasion.
8.3 The dismantling of the military broadcasting service and
the establishment of ERT-2
In August 1982, ten months after their electoral victory,
the Socialists realized their pre-electoral promise to abolish
the military control of YENED. The organization was to continue
to operate, though under a new institutional framework. As
PASOK had stressed in its 'Contract with the People', the
existence of a second and perhaps of more publicly-owned
networks was essential if variety and choice were to be
secured25 . The reform of YENED was imperative, the Socialists
argued, because the continuing operation of military-controlled
radio and television was unconstitutional and counter to the
principle of political neutrality of the armed forces26.
In effect, the Socialists had sought to establish political
control over the network as soon as they had come to power in
October 1981. YENED'S commander, who had been appointed by the
Minister of Defence, E.Averoff, was replaced by another
military officer who enjoyed the confidence of the new
government. Another of Averoff's proteges, the head of YENED's
news, D. Giannarakos, was given monthly leave. His successor to
the post was former editor-in-chief P. Korovilas, who had close
ties with the governing party 27 . Moreover, along with the new
military administration, PASOK formed a semi-official committee
of party members to articulate the network's new programming
policy28 and exercise control over programme content.
The result was a dramatic change in YENED's political and
ideological orientation which brought about fierce criticism
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from New Democracy. As Conservative NP A. Pavlidis told
Parliament: "Your friends (at YENED) try to spread through
broadcasting their Marxist messages all over Greece: on
Wednesday before Easter, for instance, the Greek People watched
how the Communist system - the Comsomol - was training the
young Ivan Ivanovich 29 ". The projection by YENED of left-wing
ideas, policies and works of art, reflected more clearly than
anything else the change in the official ideology and discourse
of the state. Yet, neither the 'Marxist propaganda', nor
PASOK's determination to go ahead with the abolition of the
armed forces network caused any known reaction from the
military establishment. In view of the new balance of forces
which had emerged after the dictatorship and the redefinition
of the military's role within the state and society, the
question of YENED's continuous operation no longer constituted
a matter of controversy between the army and the political
world.
Besides, given PASOK's cautious posture towards the military
establishment since 1974, it seems unlikely that the party
would have attempted any reform liable to strain its
relationship with the latter or provoke a military intervention
of any kind. As already said, since 1974 a consensus had been
reached in Parliament over military Issues, as political
parties of all colours abstained from serious criticism of the
military, in essence absolving the officers from any
responsibility concerning the dictatorship. PASOK's own
practice was no exception to this rule. On the contrary,
Papandreou was quick to make a distinction between the small
group of junta members and the army officers as a whole, whom
he repeatedly praised for their contribution to the struggles
and victories of the Greek nation30.
Also, unlike EK's policy in the 1960s, PASOK never pressed
for cuts in the defence budget. Instead, the party had always
been a keen supporter of the Conservatives' increases In
military spending, for, as Papandreou stressed, the "armed
forces were the backbone of Greece's national defence" 31 . These
gestures towards the military, together with PASOK's fierce
nationalism and security considerations vis-a'-vis the threat
from Turkey, largely aimed at legitimating the party's version
of socialism among the military establishment. The PASOK
government made no effort to reinforce parliamentary control
over the military, whose considerable institutional autonomy
has remained Intact to the present day.
The same attitude of caution and appeasement towards the
armed forces also characterized PASOK's approach to the whole
question of reforming YENED. Thus, the Socialists' attacks
against the military channel were less frequent than those
against ERT and their criticism never took the form of outright
condemnation, as it sometimes did In the case of the 'civilian'
broadcasting organization. Papandreou and the other PASOK
deputies took great care not to offend the military when
calling for an end to Its control over radio and television.
"We honour the armed forces" MP A. KakiamanIs told Parliament
in 1975, "we honour the efforts and work of YENED staff, but
following (...) democratic principles which are Incompatible
with the (...) existence of this organization (...), we demand
Its Integration Into the state-controlled network" 32 . As the
PASOK deputy keenly stressed, the continuous existence of an
army-controlled broadcasting service was harmful not only to
the democratic system, but to the military itself.
Following the same line of argument, the Socialist
government presented the reform of YENED in 1982 as an attempt
to "safeguard the authority of the armed forces and to
elucidate their role and mission within the framework of the
Constitution and the Law"33.
PASOK'S decision to do away with the military broadcasting
service found unanimous support from the opposition In
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Parliament. New Democracy, although now under the leadership of
the most ardent advocate of YENED's preservation, E.Averoff,
expressed no objection to the transfer of the network to the
civilian sector of the state. As the Conservatives had lost
control over the state apparatus, YENED's particular structures
and mentality were of no use to them. Nevertheless, while no
disagreement was expressed against the idea of the
institutional reform of YENED, both parties of the opposition
(ND and KKE) strongly criticized the content of the bill.
Despite its earlier pronouncements, PASOK did not proceed with
the merger of YENED with ERT as Law 230/1975 postulated.
Instead, the second broadcasting organization of the country
was to be reformed into a 'decentralized department' of the
Ministry to the Prime Minister, under the name "Hellenic Radio
and Television-2" (ERT-2). ERT was subsequently renamed ERT-l.
The government stressed, that this was only a 'transitional
legal framework' and that the final institutional reform of the
broadcast media would be introduced later. According to the
representative of PASOK In Parliament, with the new bill the
government sought to do what was 'feasible', which was the
abolition of military control over the network, whereas what
was 'desirable', the final democratic reform of broadcasting,
was to come later, when various problems involved with the
operation of YENED had been resolved 34 . PASOK, however, did not
specify the nature of these problems, nor did it set a
timetable according to which the steps towards the final merger
would be taken. Such vague arguments failed to convince the
opposition parties, who dismissed the bill as offering too
little, too late. KKE, in particular, stressed that conditions
were ripe for the establishment of a unitary broadcasting
organization35 . The main source of disagreement between the
government and the opposition parties, however, was the
proposed organization of political controls over ERT-2,
according to which the Minister to the Prime Minister was
-
vested formidable powers over the operation of the network.
Among other things, the minister could:
- appoint the five members of the Board of Governors - of
which one was to act as Chairman - and define the duration of
their office at his discretion36;
- establish new posts for permanent staff or staff under
freelance contracts37;
- define the organizational structure and operation of ERT-2,
as well as the competences of its decision-making bodies;
- hire, dismiss or transfer personnel to different
positions38;
- and change the institutional framework of ERT-2 and
designate the mission, tasks and composition of its personnel,
as well as determine any other matter regarding the network's
operation which was not settled by the statute39.
In view of the above provisions and the long tradition of
government intervention in the operation of the broadcast
media, the new legislation not only failed to safeguard the
institutional independence of ERT-2, but also subjugated it
entirely to the control of the Minister to the Prime Minister.
What was most ironic was the fact that PASOK was the first
elected government to vest a minister not simply with
extensive powers of intervention and control over those who
held the right to broadcast, but also with the power to run a
broadcasting organization. The Minister to the Prime Minister
was effectively the supreme authority of ERT-2, whereas the
Board of Governors was reduced to a subordinate executive
organ. It should also be noted that ERT-2 was not to have a
budget of its own. Instead, It was to depend on subsidy from
the Ministry to the Prime Minister for its finances In the same
way as YENED had been dependent on the subsidies of the
Ministry of Defence in the past40.
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The excessive powers of the Minister to the Prime Minister
were criticized by leading lawyers who considered that the new
broadcasting legislation was not only undemocratic, but
unconstitutional too. According to Professor P. Dagtoglou,
"the complete subordination of the quasi-decentralized ERT-2
to the almost unlimited power of the Minister (...) exceeded by
far the constitutional provision for 'immediate State control'
over broadcasting and was in conflict with the principles of
objectivity d fairness as these had been defined by the
Const1tution"'.
In our opinion, the reform of YENED is a clear example of
PASOK's practice of paying lip-service to ideas and
pronouncements which were main components of its political
platform. Certainly, the 1982 legislation did not aim at
resolving the perennial problem of the institutional autonomy
of the Greek broadcasting organizations. It enabled the
Socialist government, nevertheless, to present the dismantling
of YENED as a major step towards the demilitarization of the
state and as proof of its "intention to reinforce and broaden
the role of the broadcast media" 42 . At the same time the
government institutionalized its absolute control over the new
organization.
A major indication of PASOK's true intentions vis-a-vis
YENED was the method by which it chose to bring the matter to
Parliament. In reality, the proposed reform of YENED consisted
of a mere four clauses and was part of a broad bill which dealt
with fourteen different issues regarding the competence of the
Ministry to the Prime Minister. The bill, which inter alia
transferred to the Minister significant powers concerning the
structure and operation of public administration, was largely
dismissed by the opposition as paving the way for the
occupation of the state machine by PASOK members43 . Thus, the
debate on the institutional reform of YENED was squeezed among
discussions on a variety of different and largely unrelated
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topics. Moreover, the bill was introduced to Parliament during
the surmner session, when most deputies were absent, as the
government claimed that the reforms were of an extremely urgent
character44 . These circumstances did not allow the thorough
examination of the particular reform and of the general issue
of broadcasting in Parliament. Apparently, the Socialist
government sought to pass through a brief and impromptu
procedure a piece of legislation which would facilitate and
enhance its control over the second broadcasting organization
of the country.
8.4 Partisan control and internal conflict: PASOK's policy on
appointments.
Soon after Its advent to power, PASOK replaced all ND-
appointed personnel in the key posts of the state machine with
persons from its own ranks. In the Greek political context, the
practice of filling all Important posts of the state
administration and public utility companies with supporters of
the party In power had always been considered as the natural
outcome of alternation in government. PASOK did not try to
overturn this long-standing tradition, although It had
repeatedly attacked the outgoing ND government for Its
continuous occupation of the state apparatus.
However, the Socialists did try to rationalize their own
version of party political favouritlsm by presenting the
massive appointments of members and cadres as the only
guarantee of the successful implementation of their programme
of reforms. The party laid great emphasis upon the
'qualifications and eligibility' of the new appointees, who,
it was argued, not only shared the same political objectives as
the government, but were also experts in the respective areas
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of policy and thus able to deal most effectively with the
country's serious problems45.
For the same apparent reasons the PASOK government took care
to appoint party members or personalities with close ties to
the Socialists to administrative posts at ERT-l. As experts on
broadcasting or professionals with long experience of radio and
television have always been rare species in Greece, the
Socialist government had to seek for the organization's new
administrators among specialists from fields related to
broadcasting, such as journalism, arts and science (see
Appendices 1 and 2). The party organization included a far
from negligible number of journalists, artists, intellectuals
and academics, many of whom had been prominent within their
particular field of expertise46.
Yet, despite their professional and party political
credentials, none of the new appointees was able to carry out
his plans unchallenged, nor to secure the smooth operation of
the organization. Instead, the administration of ERT-1 became
the scene for continuous conflict among different office
holders or between them and members of the government, a
situation which led to resignations and frequent changes of
managerial personnel. Six Directors General and an equal number
of Chairmen of the Board of Governors were appointed to ERT-1
within the first six years of Socialist rule, with the longest
office holder lasting for twenty eight months and the shortest
for just over two.
However, very little information has surfaced regarding the
circumstances under which the various conflicts arose. The main
protagonists have so far chosen to remain silent, with a
persistence which suggests either a profound loyalty to the
party or an unwillingness to refer to issues which were not
about the principles that should govern broadcasting, but
perhaps of a more personal nature 47 . Thus, no bitter letters
were exchanged, no acidic statements were made and no press
conferences were held in the wake of an official's resignation.
So cautiously were the particulars of the crises concealed,
that in many cases the untimely change of heads appeared to be
a normal, routine issue. Since each resignation was due to
different factors, an examination of individual cases is
necessary before we are able to reach any conclusion regarding
PASOK's policy towards the broadcasting organizations.
The first Director General of ERT-1 to be appointed by PASOK
was the journalist G. Romeos, who at the time was managing
director of the liberal daily To Vima. A PASOK member, Romeos
was chosen for the post by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou48.
As Chairman of the Board of Governors, PASOK appointed K.Bels,
a professor of Law at the University of Athens. The post of
Assistant Director General vent to the highly acclaimed left-
wing novelist V. Vassilikos, and that of the Director of Radio
to the equally acclaimed playwright I. Kambanellis. The four
together were to form a well-balanced combination of
journalistic, academic and artistic talent which seemed to bode
well for the democratic operation of ERT-1 and a qualitative
improvement of its output.
The newly appointed team set about to implement the planned
reform of programme policy, by postponing the transmission of
fourteen programmes (series, quizzes and current affairs) which
had been commissioned by the outgoing administration and which
Romeos found to be of unacceptably low quality49 . As Vassilikos
explained In a flamboyant style, typical of PASOK, "We (...)
stopped the supply of the heroin that the audience was
receiving for fifteen years without providing any
substitutes" 50 . Although this decision led to a substantial
loss of vital resources 51 and to a large vacuum in the
organization's peak viewing time schedule, It appeared to be an
Impressive gesture, indicating that the ERT-1 management was
determined to improve programme quality at all costs. By the
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end of 1982, there was a visible improvement in the quality of
production, and for the first time television had opened up to
the works of Greek avant-garde film-makers. The new
administration substantially increased the expenditure on
programme production (the number of internally produced
programmes was up by 44 per cent) while advertising time was
cut by a third.
The more pronounced change that the management of ERT-1
brought about, however, was found in the political and ideo-
logical content of the broadcast material. Radio and television
espoused a new approach to history, which reflected the general
change in the official state Ideology. The largest part of
daily programming - series, documentaries or discussions -
acquired leftist undertones, as a wide range of productions
referred to the Resistance movement, the civil war, the
opposition against the dictatorship or historic strikes and
other political or social struggles 52 . The Conservative
opposition levelled hostile criticism against what it
considered to be "Marxist propaganda" 53 , but the parties of the
left-wing camp welcomed the new political line with a feeling
of vindication of the struggles and ideas which had been
penalized and outcast from the official state discourse for
almost five decades.
The truth is that PASOK did not encourage the discussion of
historical or ideological issues any more than ND had done. The
approach to controversial matters such as the civil war,
remained clearly one-sided and manichean in character. The
opinions of the right were rejected as 'morally wrong' and
excluded altogether from broadcast programmes. In general, the
new Ideological orientation of the broadcasting media seemed to
enhance PASOK's left-wing image. Television - and also radio -
included a variety of entertainment or current affairs
programmes which were in line with the efforts towards the
modernization of social life that PASOK was making at that
time. Programmes about the equality of sexes, the problems of
youth, family relations and the proliferation of drugs were
frequently broadcast on both media. Government Intervention In
programme content seemed to be non-existent or very limited.
This was due not only to the widespread feeling of euphoria
that PASOK's electoral landslide had generated within the party
and the government, but also to the faithful application of the
political and ideological line of the party by ERT's
administrators. Describing the relationship between ERT-1 and
the government, Romeos said that it was one of "cooperation but
not dependence". And referring to his role in the organization
he stressed: "so far as I am concerned, I work only as the
Director General of ERT at the moment. Of course I belong to
the movement which advocated 'Allaghi' (Change). And here, I am
at the service of this change" 54 . The formulation of programme
policy was largely a collective process involving managerial
personnel from all programme departments and, remarkably, there
seemed to be no petty conflicts for control at any level of the
organization's hierarchy55.
This state of affairs, however, was to come to an abrupt end
following Romeos' resignation in February 1984. A month
earlier, in a reshuffle of his government, Papandreou appointed
- for the first time in the history of Greek radio and
television - a minister without portfolio with special
responsibility for broadcasting. The new minister was to
exercise control for both ERT-1 and ERT-2, taking over from the
Undersecretary for Press and Information and the Minister to
the Prime Minister respectively 56 . For the post Papandreou
chose Anastassios Peponis, the EK appointed Director General of
EIR in the period 1964-1965 and a former PASOK Minister of
Industry. Peponis had also manifested a profound interest In
the electronic media and had published many articles and
studies on the role and purpose of broadcasting. The rationale
behind the Prime Minister's decision to appoint a minister
specifically responsible for broadcasting was never to become
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officially known. As Peponis explained, state control over
radio and television - as this had been defined in the
Constitution - was to become more effective, so far as it was
exercised by a minister "dealing only with this subject and not
distracted by affairs in other (...) irrelevant areas"57.
Some press reports suggested, however, that Peponis'
appointment was an effort by Papandreou to put an end to a
bitter conflict between the Minister to the Prime Minister A.
Koutsogiorgas, and the Undersecretary for Press, D. Maroudas,
each one of whom was seeking to extend his personal control
over both broadcasting organizations 58 . Whatever Papandreou's
intentions, the fact was that by appointing a minister whose
only responsibility was to supervise the operation of ERT-1 and
ERT-2, the already extensive state control over broadcasting
could only be reinforced.
Peponis settled himself in an office at the ERT-1
headquarters of Aghia Paraskevi and, in essence, he started
acting as a super-Director General, exercising executive power
over both networks 59 . Romeos, who had already expressed his
objection to co-habitation with the minister, found that there
was no ground for cooperation with Peponis and resigned a month
later, along with the newly appointed Chairman of the Board of
Governors Kovaios 60 . Although no information has surfaced so
far about Romeos' relationship with Peponis, a highly likely
source of disagreement must have been their diametrically
opposed proposals for the institutional reform of broadcasting.
Just days before Peponis' appointment, Romeos had published a
draft, In which he proposed the merger of ERT-1 and ERT-2 into
a unitary organization which would operate under a modification
of Law 230/1975 61 . On the other hand, Peponis' draft which was
published two weeks later envisaged a competitive system with
two independent broadcasting organizations. ERT-2 was to be
transformed into a public limited company of mixed ownership
(LORT), whose shares would belong 51 per cent to the State and
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49 per cent to local authorities, trade unions and other social
and cultural associations62.
With Romeos out of the way, Peponis felt free to choose the
new occupants of the organization's top administrative posts
from among his personal friends. The new Director General was a
journalist and member of PASOK, D.Katsimis, who had also served
as Director of ERT-1 News Department between 1981 and 1983. The
Chairmanship of the Board of Governors went to E.
Georgantopoulos, an ex-officer of the Port Police and professor
of the Higher School of Industry. Personal ties, however, did
not provide any guarantee of smooth cooperation between the
three men. Four months after Romeos' resignation, ERT-1 was
shaken by a new crisis when a dispute arose between the
Director General and the Chairman regarding the organization's
financial policy. Georgantopoulos imposed a programme of
austerity at ERT-1 in an attempt to tackle the corporation's
mounting debts (around £660,000) 63 . Katsimis on the other hand
considered that an increase in expenditure for programme
production was necessary for the substantial improvement of the
quality of television output. Peponis took the Chairman's side
in the conflict and after a row between the Minister and
Katsimis, the latter resigned.
This new dramatic incident at ERT-1 marked the beginning of
the end of Peponis' own career as minister. Undoubtedly, his
controversial period of office had caused a lot of
embarrassment within the PASOK government. His heavy-handed
policy vls-a-vis the broadcasting organizations had not only
generated two major crises within ERT-1, but also had become
the focus of concerted attacks by the entire press. Moreover,
his proposed reform of ERT-2 - which was in opposition to
Papandreou's earlier pronouncements for the establishment of a
unitary organization - had been condemned as authoritarian by
the opposition parties and a large part of the Press64.
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Papandreou stepped in to appoint the new Director General,
yet another journalist, Vassos Mathiopoulos. The latter
demanded the removal of the minister's office from the
broadcasting building and substantial limitations of his powers
of intervention in the formulation of the organization's
policy. Peponis refused to cooperate and resigned, to be
followed by his protege Georgantopoulos a few days later.
Subsequently, the post of minister responsible for broadcasting
was abolished. The Undersecretary for the Press D.Maroudas re-
assumed his competences over ERT-1 and extended his control
over ERT-2 65 . Whether it was a desperate effort by Papandreou
to remove the 'apple of discord' - namely, state control over
radio and television - from the hands of two powerful cadres
within the government or an attempt to rationalize the system
whereby this control was exercised, the appointment of a
minister solely responsible for broadcasting created more
problems than It was expected to resolve. It also revealed an
entire lack of a coherent policy on broadcasting.
The Socialists appeared to be improvising in order to tackle
the problems arising from the existing legislation, whereas
what was needed was the democratic reform of broadcasting
institutional framework which would free the networks from
partisan political control and redefine their role within
society. Instead, PASOK kept Law 230/1975 in force for most of
its two terms In government. What was more important, the
Socialists proved no better than the Conservatives In dealing
with the various conflicts that the contradictions of the law
generated within ERT-l. Some of the crises were directly linked
to the vagueness with which the ERT-1 statute defined the
competences of the Director General and the Chairman of the
Board of Governors. Based on this vagueness, Chairman
Georgantopoulos considered it legitimate to intervene directly
in the formulation and execution of programme policy,
cancelling any initiative that was taken by Katsimis66.
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A similar dispute arose between Vassos Mathiopoulos,
Katsimis' successor, and the Board of Governors of ERT-1, which
was now under the Chairmanship of 1.-A. Metaxas, a professor of
Politics at the University of Athens. Metaxas sought to
reinforce the competences of the board, so that it would be
able to perform a dominant role In the policy-making of the
organization. Thus, a resolution was passed by the board In
January 1985, whereby the governors empowered themselves to
determine every issue pertaining to the content, structure and
general framework of daily programming. Among other things, the
board would approve scripts and budgets allocated to ERT-1
productions, purchase foreign programmes and decide which
cultural events were to be covered by radio and television. In
this way, the ERT-1 governors deprived the Director General of
all his major competences regarding the formulation of
programme policy and reduced his role to the mere
implementation of decisions taken by the Board67.
The vagueness of the legislation and the overlapping of
competences between different office holders generated tensions
at lower levels of the Corporation's hierarchy as well. For
instance, there was a lot of competition between the Assistant
Director General and the Director for Television for control of
television programming policy. Passions ran so high that,
according to Vassilikos, who had apparently faced the problem
during his three years In office, "even brothers would fight
each other to death if appointed to these competitive posts"68.
Former appointees have blamed the fighting within ERT-1 on
the broadcasting legislation69 . Yet, the defects of the law
were not the only reason for these crises; rather, the defects
constituted the breeding ground for the development of
conflicts whose roots were to be found elsewhere, namely in the
absence of a common vision for the operation and role of the
broadcasting media. The appointees had different backgrounds,
and the vast majority of them had no previous experience in
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broadcasting. Hence, each one of them came to ERT-1 with
proposals based on different perceptions of the organization's
role and needs. Georgantopoulos, for instance, considered that
the improvement of ERT-1 finances was a priority target that
should be pursued at any cost, even at the expense of
programming. "Whenever I made a plan", Katsimis confessed, "the
Chairman would intervene to state that there was no money. But
television is programming. It is not only salaries and
administration"70.
A more important reason for this lack of unity of purpose
among different office-holders was PASOK's failure to
articulate a clear-cut policy for the broadcasting media and to
set targets which could provide the basis for close work and
cooperation among the ERT-1 administrators. Instead, the
cultural, information and other policies of the Corporation
were identified with each official's personal approach to
broadcasting, based on his own set of priorities, standards and
abilities. According to a former Director of Programming and,
later, Assistant Director General, due to the lack of a
coherent philosophy for radio and television programmes, the
organization's programme policy was characterized by improvisa-
tion and confusion71.
In all the cases that we have examined so far, the
resignation of ERT-1 heads was the result of conflicts which
concerned the distribution of power within the organization or
particular policy Issues. There was, however, an occasion when
the Director General, Theodoros Chalatsis, was dismissed by the
government under circumstances which have not been clarified to
the present day. A lawyer and a member of PASOK's Central
Committee, Chalatsis was the first party official to hold an
administrative post within ERT-1, and the first PASOK-appointed
Director General who did not come from the domains of
journalism, academia or the arts. His appointment took place in
November 1985 at a time when, following the implementation of
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the austerity programme, PASOK was facing its worst crisis in
office. Within ERT-1 itself, the wave of demonstrations and
protests against the government had wiped away the only
independent administration ever appointed by the Socialists.
Apparently, the appointment of a party official as Director
General at a time of mounting social discontent was an attempt
by PASOK to secure its control over the content of political
broadcasts. Chalatsis, however, had been selected for the post
for another reason as well: as Prefect of Kilkis in Northern
Greece, he had won the acclaim of the press for the
organization of the regional radio station in his prefecture
which provided wide access to social groups and cultural
organizations.
Together with Assistant Director General Nikos Sotiriadis,
who had been promoted to the post from the Directorate of
Programming, Chalatsis carried out a major re-structuring of
ERT-1 programmes. Transmission time was Increased from 60 to 80
hours weekly, the share of Greek productions in the television
output as a whole was also up (to 70 per cent) and new live
shows and current affairs programmes were added to the weekly
schedules. By the end of their first year in office, ERT-1 had
produced a surplus of 2.5 billion drachmas which was to be
invested In the construction of new studios. Meanwhile, the new
administrators of ERT-1 had carried out an extensive renovation
of the network's technical equipment 72 . It seemed that after
two years of instability and bitter conflict, ERT-1 had entered
a new period of smooth operation.
Nevertheless, a year after his appointment to the post,
Chalatsis was asked to submit his resignation which he did
dutifully. Sotiriadis also decided to leave in silent protest
against the Director's General dismissal 73 . Both men chose to
remain silent about the reasons which led to their resignation,
and at a press conference that was held shortly before their
departure from ERT-1 they confined themselves to an account of
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their policy at the Corporation. So far, no details of any
controversy between them and the government have surfaced. The
available evidence suggests, however, that Chalatsis had fallen
from grace for reasons which were irrelevant to both ERT-l's
political line and the organization's performance 74 . Chalatsis
sacking revealed the indifference of the Socialist government
to the disruptions that it caused to the operation of ERT-1
and, in the last analysis, to the development of broadcasting
as a medium of information and culture.
PASOK's policy on ERT-2 was no more successful in securing
the administrative stability of the organization and certainly
no more liberal than its stance towards ERT-l. On the contrary,
the direct dependence of ERT-2 upon the Ministry to the Prime
Minister enabled the government to exercise more direct control
over programme content, as well as over the general running of
the organization. As in the case of ERT-1, this was achieved by
means of appointments of party members to the post of the
Chairman of the Board of Governors. All five chairmen appointed
in the period 1982-1987 were PASOK members and three of them
were at the time of their appointment, or had been in the past,
members of the party's Central Committee (we do not include
here the first ERT-2 Chairman journalist N. Alexiou who
resigned from the post a month after his appointment invoking
health reasons). There was, however, a marked difference from
ERT-1 in the professional background of officials appointed to
the post of ERT-2 chairman. Unlike top appointees of ERT-1, the
chairmen of the country's second broadcasting organization came
from areas which were largely irrelevant to broadcasting, such
as finance, engineering or the legal profession. Indeed, In
terms of PASOK's appointments to the two networks, ERT-2 looked
like the poor relative of its much larger competitor, which
monopolized all the journalistic, academic and artistic talent
that could be found among the party's ranks.
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By selecting widely reputed journalists and intellectuals
for the top managerial posts at ERT-1, PASOK aimed to a large
extent at improving the quality of programmes and adding
credibility to Its general broadcasting policy. On the other
hand, the appointment of unknown party members to the highest
executive positions at ERT-2 suggested that the Socialist
government did not entertain similar considerations about the
second channel.
Initially, PASOK's main objective seemed to be the smooth
transition of ERT-2 from a military service to a civilian
broadcasting organization. The person who was chosen by the
government to carry out this task was Soulis Apostolopoulos, an
engineer and economist, who had no experience of broadcasting
and, as he later admitted, had scarcely watched television
prior to his appointment 75 . He had a reputation, however, for
his managerial skills and the government selected him in order
to rationalize the network's organizational structure and to
improve its finances 76 . Apostolopoulos set about re-structuring
the Internal organization of ERT-2 which, astonishingly, was
still operating according to the regulations set by the
dictatorial decree 300/1974 for YENED. New directorates were
added (i.e. of economic and legal services, personnel,
equipment purchases etc.) which corresponded to the operational
needs of a broadcasting organization. An extensive renovation
of personnel was carried out with the hiring of university
graduates - according to Apostolopoulos, the first ones ever to
enter the organization - to man all departments of ERT-2. For
this purpose, a substantial increase in salaries was also
introduced to offer incentives to specialized career oriented
personnel. Moreover, Apostolopoulos transferred to the Ministry
of Defence a significant number of employees who had been hired
during the dictatorship and whose specialisms, though perhaps
necessary for a military unit (shoemakers, locksmiths) were
entirely useless for a broadcasting organization.
On the economic side, there was a major increase in the
charge for commercials, although the government refused to
endorse a drastic increase in advertising time in the daily
schedules. Finally, a Programme Committee consisting of well-
known artists and journalists was set up to outline the general
programming policy of the network and to decide on the content,
quality and budget of the programmes before these were finally
endorsed by the Board of Governors77.
Despite the relative success of his re-organization project,
Apostolopoulos was to resign in May 1984, amid a public furore
that was caused when a disturbing satire of Greek family morals
was shown in peak-viewing time during Saturday evening Greek
film78 . As he later maintained, however, this incident was only
the opportunity he was seeking to submit his long-planned
resignation. In reality, he had decided to leave the
chairmanship of ERT-2 when the minister responsible for
broadcasting vetoed his plan to hire ten new managers for the
newly established directorates of the organization79.
The formidable powers of intervention in the running of ERT-
2 that the legislation reserved for the Minister to the Prime
Minister were the underlying cause of the resignation of
another ERT-2 chairman in 1987. The crisis erupted when the
Undersecretary for the Press, Yiannis Kapsis, to whom the
minister had transferred his competences over ERT-2, sought to
impose control on the organization's expenditure. Alleging that
there was a considerable waste of ERT-2 money due to
inefficient management, the Undersecretary demanded that
Chairman Alekos Papadopoulos submit to him all decisions and
projects of the board which involved expenditure of any kind so
that he could endorse them before they were Implemented80.
Papadopoulos resigned immediately, claiming that Kapsis had
effectively abolished the powers of the ERT-2 board regarding
the formulation of the network's general policy81.
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Ministerial interventions in the running of the organization
were not the only cause of disruptions In the operation of ERT-
2. According to the chairmen themselves, the main obstacles to
the implementation of policy in the organization were the
serious lack of financial resources and the sluggish
bureaucracy. The amount of money allocated was considered to be
insufficient to finance any ambitious project of programme
production or technical renovation. Moreover, all income from
commercials was not invested by ERT-2; instead, it was absorbed
by the budget of the Ministry to the Prime Minister82.
Furthermore, because ERT-2 was a department of public
administration, all kinds of expenses had to be subjected to
time-consuming procedures, such as submitting to tender even
the purchase of a camera and then requiring approval of the
expenditure by the Ministry of Finance 83 . Lack of adequate
money and flexibility in expenditure accounted largely for the
shortage of studios as well as of technical equipment - from
vehicles to cameras. In the end, It was the quality of
programming which suffered. For Antonis Stratis, who succeeded
Papadopoulos as Chairman, ERT-2 continued to operate against
all odds thanks to "the heroism of Greeks". Every night, when
the programme schedule comes to an end, I feel relieved",
Stratis said. "We made it yet again today, I say to myself"84.
Under such circumstances, the most the ERT-2 management could
do was to keep the organization going until the much
anticipated and long delayed merger with ERT-l.
In short, an analysis of PASOK's policy of appointments to
the two networks reveals a lack of an overall political
strategy towards broadcasting. It also reveals an absence of
political will by the Socialist government to change structures
and to overturn traditional practices which had not only
perpetuated the subjugation of radio and television to
partisan political control, but had also led to recurrent
crises and consequent disruptions in the operation of the two
broadcasting organizations.
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The appointment of party members to key administrative posts
In ERT-1 and ERT-2 left little doubt as to PASOK's real
intentions vIs-a-vis broadcasting. Throughout the eight years
of Socialist government both networks faithfully conveyed the
political and ideological messages of PASOK. Unlike the period
of Conservative rule, there seemed to be no confusion and no
controversy relating to the political content of broadcast
material. This was the case because the managers of both
organizations were not just compliant to the dictates of the
government, but shared in full its political objectives.
Programme makers were also selected from party ranks or were
ideologically close to PASOK. Those who had been associated
with ND were either suspended from duty or transferred to other
posts and were allowed no participation in the formulation of
programming policy85 . The result was most clearly seen in the
content of programmes which favoured values and approaches to
reality obviously in line with the political and electoral
interests of PASOK. Indeed, in crude terms, the promotion of
the party's policies and ideological platform ended up being
the main, If not the sole, objective of PASOK's broadcasting
policy.
The Socialist government failed to rationalize and modernize
ERT-l. On the contrary, PASOK felt obliged somehow to gratify a
large number of party members by providing employment to tens -
even hundreds - of them in ERT-1, usually on a temporary
contract basis 86 . As a result, ERT-1 continued to employ an
excessive number of employees whose salaries absorbed 62 per
cent of its annual budget. According to Sotiriadis, the
organization needed no more than 1500 employees 87 . Instead,
according to Sotiriadis estimation, vital resources of up to 2
billion drachmas (6.7 million) which could have been utilized
in programme production or technical modernization went in
salaries of staff who were completely supernumerary. Moreover,
there was a completely irrational distribution of personnel, as
2000 of the employees were occupied In the organization's
administrative services and only 500 in production per se88.
The continuous changes of administrators meant that no long-
term project of reform of the ERT-1 operation and structure
could be realized. For instance, Romeos, as Director General of
ERT-1 and Apostolopoulos, as Chairman of ERT-2, planned to set
up a public company for television programme production. The
scheme however, was abandoned after the two men's resignation
in 198489. Similarly, Mathiopoulos' plans to build new studios
and to establish an effective system of internal production did
not come to fruition as he resigned from the post only a year
after his appointment as Director General90.
Equally, the Socialists' overall policy towards ERT-2
reflected a profound indifference to its development into a
modern, democratic organization, and gave the impression that
PASOK kept the network running only in order to serve Its own
short-term political ends.
8.5 News and Political Prograiinies
As in other areas of policy of the PASOK government, its
attitude in the sphere of news was characterised by an
incongruity between pre-electoral promises and actual measures
applied when in power. Instead of allowing the 'free expression
of conflicts' or the development of 'democratic discussion' of
issues, PASOK sought right from Its advent to power to
establish firm control over political programmes In order to
secure social consensus and legitimacy for its policies.
Generally speaking, PASOK regarded the mass media as the
means par excellence for the projection of the political
discourse which had united its heterogeneous social base. The
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party's interest in the media is seen not only in its attitude
towards broadcasting, but also in Its support for the pro-PASOK
press 91 . PASOK made repeated efforts to establish new papers
which would be more committed than the existing ones to the
faithful promotion of the party line. Moreover, PASOK greatly
Increased the number of positions for journalists in the Athens
Press Agency, the broadcasting organizations and the press
offices of various ministries, state-owned banks and public
utility companies. By the end of 1985, more than half of the
members of the Union of Journalists employed In the Athenian
press were working exclusively, or in most cases had a second
job, In the state apparatus with a far from negligible
salary93 . Whereas the support of the press could not always be
relied upon, broadcasting enabled PASOK to establish full
control over the content of political news. The ND-appointed
directors of news In both organizations were dismissed and
replaced with journalists who were members of PASOK or had
close political and personal ties with the party. Also, a
significant number of journalists who had been associated with
the previous government were suspended from their jobs or
allowed no participation In the preparation of the news
bulletins. A large, though unspecified, number of journalists,
- members or friends of the governing party - were hired, while
many experienced news-presenters disappeared from the screen to
give way to entirely new faces94.
Change In the content of news programmes was already visible
from the first days of the Socialist government. To start with,
there was a clear shift to the Left In the Ideological and
political orientation of the bulletins. More emphasis was
placed on events taking place In developing countries and left-
wing or liberation movements world-wide always received
favourable coverage. The same applied to the countries of the
Eastern Bloc, whereas the presentation of USA or EEC policies
became increasingly critical 95 . With reference to domestic
political life, radio and television news programmes were
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opened up for the first time to the activities, opinions and
criticism of the opposition parties. So keen was PASOK to
appear to pursue objectivity and impartiality in political
output, that even the most trivial aspects of the parties'
function - for instance, a party leader's meeting with
representatives of the party's regional organizations - were
covered on a daily basis by both channels at the expense of
more crucial domestic and International events 96 . Although it
constituted a significant change from the past practice of
complete exclusion of the opposition from the news, this
quantitative Increase of references to the opposition did not
bring PASOK very close to the achievement of balance in
political coverage. Only rarely did politicians of the
opposition appear live on the screen. Instead, still
photographs were used to illustrate the text read by the
announcer in the studio. There was also a tendency to
trivialize important events of a political party, such as a
regional or national congress. Television would usually show
some 'live' shots from the place where the meeting was held,
read over by the newscaster who would give details about the
venue and the number of speakers. What was discussed or the
significance of the event for the party and for political life
as a whole were never the subject of commentary or analysis.
Criticism of the government was presented In the form of
written statements by the party's leader or press office, and
was always followed by a written reply from the government
spokesman. The news departments of both ERT-1 and ERT-2 had set
a specific deadline for the parties to submit their statements,
so that time was given to the government to issue a reply97.
PASOK had always to have the last word on every matter, and
this was not simply a practice but an unwritten rule that had
to be carefully observed. Those who underestimated its
significance - and broke It - were Immediately dismissed98.
The news did not promote dialogue on major political issues;
instead of substantive arguments In favour of or against a
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particular policy, viewers were exposed to a war of bitter
statements, full of aphorisms and accusations fired from the
opposition against the government and vice-versa.
The government was always presented in a positive manner
which either celebrated its achievements or projected the
efforts and determination of its members to find solutions to
serious impending problems. As in the past, news programmes
were dominated by pictures of the Prime Minister and the
members of his cabinet. Ministers were always shown at work -
shots of their participation in inaugurations and celebrations
were avoided - In their offices, or in situations and at events
directly related to their competences. Still photographs were
often used to Illustrate the announcement of a statement or a
new policy plan.
Only weeks after PASOK's electoral victory in 1981, Romeos
accepted that there was an overdose of televised government
activity in news programmes. He argued, however, that this was
only a temporary practice which was justified by the
Socialists' need to make themselves known to the public99.
Nevertheless, once established, this practice was difficult to
break and news about government activities continued to take up
a disproportionately large part of news bulletins throughout
the entire period of the Socialists rule. Unlike the
Conservatives, PASOK ministers usually did not phone up the
news departments directly to demand coverage of their
activities. It was said that Papandreou himself had forbidden
them to do so at various cabinet meetings 100 . In most cases,
ministerial wishes and requests were conveyed to newsmakers by
the Undersecretary for the Press, and then the decision was
largely left to the broadcasters as to where crews were to be
sent101.
A large part of news programmes was taken up by reports
about the activities of Andreas Papandreou. He was not only
projected as working hard for the realization of 'Allaghi', but
was also portrayed as a politician of international stature,
devoted to the achievement of peace102.
Generally speaking, under PASOK the two broadcasting
organizations continued to make their own evaluation of news,
based not on the application of journalistic criteria but, to a
large extent, on what was defined as the interest of the
government in the light of a given political conjuncture. For
Instance, as long as Karamanlis was President of the Republic,
the news programmes on both channels began almost every evening
with a report on his activities. No matter how trivial these
activities might have been, they would almost always take
precedence over all other stories of the day. This practice had
been initiated by the ND government, but It was continued by
the Socialists apparently as part of their wider effort to
maintain a working relationship with the Conservative Head of
State. This practice was abandoned after Karamanlis'
resignation in 1985.
News, of course, was not dictated from any ministerial
office, nor did journalists receive specific Instructions as to
what should or should not be reported 103 . The government line
was communicated to the newsroom by the Undersecretary for the
Press in the form of general guidelines and suggestions104.
News directors and journalists in both ERT-1 and ERT-2 usually
had no difficulty in conforming with what the government saw as
a profitable news policy. A large part of them were members and
followers of the governing party, and even those who were not,
usually applied a kind of self-censorship in order to secure
their position and career in the organization 105 . Of course,
there was always some room for resistance to pressure,
especially If this came from individual ministers and if it
referred to news of minor importance 106 . However, on matters
which the government considered to be crucial or sensitive, or
where there was doubt as to what the government line was, there
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was always communication and counselling from the
Undersecretary for the Press. Such matters included coverage
of activities and statements of the opposition and of national
defence issues° 7 . This was particularly true for ERT-2, where
the direct dependence on the Ministry to the Prime Minister
appeared to increase the obligation of newsmakers to conform to
the wishes or dictates of the government. According to one
editor-in-chief of ERT-2 news, "there was always an open
telephone line between the director of news and the
Undersecretary of the Press"108.
Under these circumstances, news as a cultural form was not
allowed to develop much further than it had done in the past.
The truth is that In the first two or three years of the PASOK
government, bulletins became more lively, fewer stills of
politicians were used, and much more footage was included which
referred not only to the policies of the government, but also
to major social issues. Simple people from the Athenian suburbs
appeared on the screen to talk about their problems and
opinions. More foreign correspondents were sent to European
countries and the U.S. and as a result the number and quality
of foreign reports Improved substantially 109 . On the whole,
however, the face of the announcer continued to be the main
feature of news programmes. Coverage of social and political
issues was superficial, never reaching the substance of the
problem, with the result that the significance of any event,
action or opinion was lost in the sheer number of news Items or
Images of government members. No events were really forbidden,
not even controversial ones, but they were usually described in
a fleeting, almost telegraphic way. Expression of popular
discontent against PASOK's policies was almost non-existent in
the news. Once they came to power, the Socialists did not
appear to favour attacks against domestic capital any more than
New Democracy had done. Thus, while television made lengthy
reports on the British miners' strike in 1984-1985, there was
little information about industrial action within Greece
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itself11-°. Pictures from social tensions, strikes or
demonstrations continued to be rare on television, and the same
applied to the opinions of organized social groupings.
Apart from political control over news output, the quality
of news programmes continued to suffer under PASOK from a lack
of technical infrastructure, which, in the case of ERT-2, had
reached a stage of desperation. The lack of studios and film
crews meant that many significant events went uncovered. There
was also a lack of proper offices to serve as news rooms, and
news scripts were typed on no more than two antiquated
typewriters111.
At the same time, a lot of money went on the salaries of an
excessive number of journalists. According to available
information, by 1987 ERT-1 employed at least 140 journalists
and ERT-2 almost 200, whereas no more than 80-100 were
necessary in either organization 112 . Both ERT-1 and ERT-2 had
taken on an unspecified number of journalists who were either
members or supporters of PASOK, or were recommended by
Influential figures within the government and the party'13.
Many of them were unqualified young people with almost no
experience at all In journalIsm- 4 , who were given unimportant
assignments only thanks to the pressure exercised by their
patrons on the management of the two networks 5 . More often
than not, these young journalists were motivated by narrow
political party criteria, posing as the only ones who genuinely
expressed the government line within the broadcasting
organizations. Their main preoccupation was the promotion of
the work of the government and, In many cases, they also acted
as the party's police in the news departments 11- 6 , causing
tensions between them and the rest of the employees.
Yet, the fact that PASOK failed to free news programmes from
partisan political control should not lead us to overlook the
Introduction by the Socialists of a considerable number of
current affairs programmes and, above all, the first live
programmes of political dialogue on television 117 . Most
Important among the latter was 'Open Cards' (AnoIchta Hartla),
which inaugurated a dialogue on social and political issues
between the government, the opposition parties and major social
organizations. The viewers could participate by posing
questions to the panel of guests by phone. Anoichta Hartia
reflected more than anything else the will of the first PASOK
government and ERT-1 administration to make television an
active participant In the political process. The programme went
on air in mid-1983 and at the beginning it was something of an
event. For one thing, it was the first time - outside of
election campaigns - that politicians took time off their
public duties to appear before a television audience. Indeed,
it was also the first time that television did not passively
watch the developments on the political stage, but was to
become Itself an arena where politics was taking place.
However, politicians, nurtured In the heated atmosphere of
Parliament and election campaigns, found It hard to adjust to
the requirements of a televised debate. Most of them looked
undisciplined, talked incessantly and supported fervently their
views, with the usual result that the most crucial points of
the debate were lost in a sea of statistical details and
specialist jargon. The programme, the duration of which would
at times exceed two hours, often appeared as a transfer of a
crucial and Inconclusive debate from Parliament or ministerial
offices to the television studios. The host of the programme
acted mainly as the coordinator between the different sides,
and did not ask embarrassing questions or expose the actions of
the participant politicians to public scrutiny118.
Apart from current affairs programmes, the Socialists also
Initiated weekly televised coverage of parliamentary
proceedings. Each Saturday evening, at peak viewing time, ERT-2
transmitted a long account of the week's developments in the
Greek Parliament. The programme included passages of the
speeches delivered by deputies, with each of the three parties
being allocated airtime according to its strength in
Parliament. The main feature of the programme were the
appearances of the Minister to the Prime Minister, Menios
Koutsogiorgas, an ardent advocate of the anti-Right struggle.
Koutsogiorgas always appeared at the end of the programme to
reply to the opposition and to launch his ferocious attacks
against ND and the Right as a whole, whom he blamed for all the
misfortunes suffered by Greece.
The programme provoked a fierce reaction from the leader of
New Democracy, C. Mitsotakis, who called it a 'disgrace to
Parliament' and threatened to prevent further transmission of
speeches delivered by the party's deputies. The programme
producers were accused of being biased against ND and of
distorting the meaning of crucial points of the speeches
through editing. Particularly hostile criticism was levelled at
ERT-2 for having positioned the sole camera which recorded the
programme in the rear end of the chamber behind the ND seats.
The absurd result was that, when the ND deputies and leader
spoke from the benches, they would always appear speaking with
their back to the screen- 1- 9 . Eventually, the government
conceded to the Installation of a second camera to face the
opposition benches. In response to pressure exerted by both
opposition parties, PASOK also agreed to set up a three-member
committee of party representatives to determine which parts of
the parliamentary debates were to be included In the
broadcasts1-20.
Controversy between the government and the opposition
parties was also caused by PASOK's treatment of the
broadcasting media during the 1985 election campaign. The terms
according to which the campaign was to be covered by television
were set unilaterally by PASOK, without any consultation with
the other opposition parties. PASOK substantially increased the
amount of television time allocated to each party, with the
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TABLE 8.1
1985 Election Coverage on ERT-1 and ERT-2 television (as
decided by the Socialist government)
Parties	 Type of coverage	 Duration
PASOK	 Three Rallies	 1 hour each
One press-conference of leader 	 1 hour
Two studio appearances of leader 	 15' each
ND	 Three Rallies	 1 hour each
One press-conference of leader 	 1 hour
Two studio appearances of leader 	 15' each
KKE	 Two Rallies	 1 hour each
Two studio appearances of leader 	 15' and 10'
KKE-es	 Two Rallies	 45' and 15'





tions) One studio appearance of leader
for each party 15'
Source: The national press, 3.5.1985.
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major beneficiary being the KKE which was granted a further 48
minutes' coverage time compared to the 1981 general election.
Again, the emphasis was placed on campaign rallies, the
coverage of which took up by far the greatest part of the time
allocated to each party (see Table 8.1). This was hardly
surprising given PASOK's experience in organising mass events
and Papandreou's formidable oratorical skills. On the other
hand, ND protested against the arrangement and demanded that
political parties should have been allowed to use their airtime
in any way they considered to be most effective for their
campaign. In addition, Mitsotakis repeatedly called for a
televised debate between the Prime Minister and himself, but
Papandreou dismissed the idea 121 . Nevertheless, time was
allocated to both leaders of PASOK and ND for a 60-minute press
conference, at which the interviewers were journalists of
opposition and pro-government papers respectively122.
Complaints were also expressed by the KKE and the KKE-es,
both of which demanded equal treatment with the two major
parties. More protests were made by KKE, however, when, during
the campaign the coverage of the party's rally in Thessaloniki
was cut off just before the speech of Anastasslos Intzes, a
former PASOK deputy who had resigned from the party to join the
Communists. In protest at this incident, KKE withdrew its
representative from the all-party committee which had been
formed to supervise the entire election campaign123.
Equally controversial was the coverage of PASOK's rally at
the Athens' Syntagma Square on May 31 1985, which concluded the
entire campaign. Pictures of this rally were accompanied by
music from Karl Orff's 'Carmina Burana', while a pigeon flying
above a huge chanting crowd was added in the montage; at the
bottom of the screen was written: 'PASOK, The March Towards
Victory ('Poria pros tin Niki'). The whole show looked more
like a party political broadcast than a political event among
many similar ones recorded by the state television. To put it
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more crudely, It looked like the appropriation of the
television for electoral purposes and as such did not escape
criticism from the opposition124.
As a whole, PASOK's policy on news and current affairs
reflected an oscillation between earlier promises for the
democratization of the broadcasting system and the party's need
to safeguard the social and political consensus which had led
to its elevation to power. The applied changes were evidence of
the new political ethos that PASOK had promised to introduce in
public life and these were intended to reinforce the party's
image as a democratic force in Greek politics. However, as the
party's strategy started to show signs of strain in view of the
deteriorating economic situation from 1985 onwards, the
Socialists appeared to lose much of their democratic
sensitivity vis-a-vis broadcasting. PASOK started to rely more
heavily on radio and television as the means for the re-
establishment of legitimacy and consensus through the promotion
of government policies and especially of the leader's
indisputable charisma' 25 . The more the crisis deepened, the
more did the government Intensified its efforts to tighten
control over the broadcasting institutions. At the same time,
within PASOK those cadres who pursued a more active and
efficient role for civil society in political life were
marginalized, as the party's hard-liners appeared to gain
ground.
The ill-fated attempts of the Undersecretary for Press
Costas Laliotis, to bring about a major reform at ERT-1 in 1985
not only proved that PASOK's policy on broadcasting was
directly linked to the existing social and political
conjuncture, but was also indicative of the conflict between
the so-called modernizers and the party's traditionalists. For
this reason, It Is worth giving a brief account of what ended
up as a "romantic loner's experiment"126.
-k32-
One of PASOK's youngest cadres - he was 34 at the time -
Laliotis was appointed Undersecretary for the Press and
Information after the 1985 election. With its confidence
boosted by the new electoral landslide, PASOK appeared able to
afford to loosen Its control over the broadcasting
organizations. LaliotIs' plan was to redefine the relationship
between broadcasters and the state by granting complete
independence to journalists and programme-makers to determine
the content of broadcast output. Changes In organization and
working practices were to be safeguarded by the pending new
broadcasting legislation127 . With carte blanche given by
Papandreou 128 , Laliotis chose to appoint to the key posts of
ERT-1 personalities who were thought to be politically closer
to KKE-es than to PASOK. The new Director General was the
Rector of the Pantelos School of Political Science George
Kontogiorgis; the Chairmanship of the Board of Governors was
given to lawyer and civil rights activist, Chrlstoforos
Argyropoulos; and as Head of the Directorate of News was
appointed the journalist, NikIforos Antonopoulos.
The first sector to undergo an immediate change during this
transitional period was the news department. The new
management's view was that a main task of democratic television
was the 'visualization of political and social rivalrIes'-29
and the promotion and 'respect of pluralism and multi-party
character of modern democracy' 130 . Thus, the news became more
lively, enriched as it was with more footage, while the daily
reports of trivial ministerial activities gave way to daily
coverage of industrial action and activities of the opposition
parties' 31 . The main factor behind this change was Laliotls
himself, who acted as a breakwater against any pressure
exercised by members of the government upon journalists. The
new policy in news programmes was soon to be praised by the
majority of the press132.
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Nevertheless, the 'spring of Greek television' was to be
short-lived, for the three men were forced to resign in
November 1985, amid the surge of popular discontent generated
by PASOK's austerity measures. ERT-1 television news was
dominated by scenes of demonstrations, strikes and union
representatives waging fierce attacks against PASOK's new
economic policy. Clearly the time was not right for PASOK to
proceed with a major reform in the Information policy of
television. To allow the coverage of increasing anti-government
protest by state-owned television at a time when PASOK was
facing Its most serious crisis was seen by many Socialist
ministers as capitulation. Suddenly Laliotis became the target
of attacks by other government ministers, who pressured him to
reconsider his broadcasting policy 133 . The 'last straw' came on
November 14 1985 when the Minister of Labour demanded the
manuscripts of two ERT-1 reports covering Industrial action
which had been transmitted on the 13th and 14th of that month.
This was considered by the three heads of the organization as
an unacceptable Intervention In their policy-making and on the
same day they submitted their resignations to LalIotis 34 . In a
letter of reply, Laliotis admitted that there was fierce
opposition to their broadcasting policies. "It is an opposition
emanating from people who are content with yesterday's patterns
and unable to realize tomorrow's needs. It is a fight between
the old and the new, not In terms of age but In terms of how
they perceive politics, society and the Institutions' 35 . Having
been isolated within the government, Laliotls also resigned
from his post as Undersecretary for the Press as well as from
PASOK's Central Committee. A few days later, commenting on
Lallotis' policies regarding ERT-1, Papandreou outlined his
position on the role of state broadcasting:
"In Greece there are no independent private networks, nor Is
the management of public ones appointed by mass organizations
to which It should be responsible. In Greece there Is state-
owned television, and responsible for Its operation is the
(...) government. Therefore, all those appointed to key posts
in television should implement the government's policy on the
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subject and not their own. The managerial staff is not
representing anything, since its powers emanate from the
confidence placed in them by the cabinet which makes the
appointments. (...) The government does not donate television
to anybody to do whatever he plaes with it, as the three
heads of ERT-1 might have thought"".
This statement is particularly Important, as in it
Papandreou declared as legitimate the practice of political
intervention in the operation of broadcasting, a practice which
he had so fiercely opposed while In opposition. The Prime
Minister's statement inaugurated a period of further government
controls over the content of broadcast programmes, which only
deepened the crisis of credibility and legitimacy of the Greek
broadcasting Institutions.
8.6 The crisis of legitimacy of the broadcasting Institutions
and the introduction of 'free radio'
The subordination of broadcasting to the political control
of PASOK and the systematic promotion of those ideas and values
which the party considered beneficial to its political
interests made the performance of the two broadcasting
institutions a source of continuous tension and polarization
between the government and the Conservative opposition. New
Democracy complained about lack of balance in political
programmes and accused PASOK of pursuing the indoctrination of
the Greek people with left-wing ideas. More importantly, the
monopolization of radio and television by the Socialists
provided ND with a major opportunity to fight PASOK with Its
own weapons. After their defeat In 1981, the Conservatives
tried to reverse PASOK's anti-RIght, anti-authoritarian
discourse by exposing its effort to occupy the state and by
presenting the Socialist regime as a 'junta' that should be
brought down; hence, the slogans 'Down with PASOK's junta'
('Kato i hounta tou PASOK') and 'Deliverance' ('Apallaghi', as
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opposed to PASOK's promised 'Allaghi'). The Socialist
government's stance vis--vis ERT-1 and ERT-2 seemed to provide
a good example of PASOK's authoritarianism, and ND sought to
exploit to the full. Thus, a first move by C.Mltsotakis after
he was elected ND's leader in September 1984 was to stage a
campaign against the 'fascist television' and to organize a
protest rally outside ERT-2'37.
By contrast, the opposition of KKE to PASOK's media
practices was initially rather mild, although it criticized the
government for its hesitation in bringing about a major reform
of the broadcasting system' 38 . Generally speaking, the
Communists seemed to be content with the new Ideological
orientation of the state-run media. It was only after the 1985
elections that the Communists changed their tolerant attitude
towards the PASOK government. This was partly due to the
latter's austerity measures and heavy-handed policies towards
the unions and partly because they realized that the successful
exploitation of the Right-Left cleavage by PASOK had worked
against their own electoral interests'39.
From the mId-1980s onwards, there was a change In the
context within which the broadcasting issue was discussed.
First, the debate was no longer confined to Parliament, nor was
it the exclusive concern of the political elite; academics,
artists and Intellectuals also focused their attention on the
problems of the Greek media, organizing conferences' 4° and
setting up special committees to monitor the content of
television broadcasts' 41 . What is more Important Is the fact
that the debate was not limited to the search for
organizational safeguards for the political autonomy of the
state-run media. In Athens, intellectual groups such as
'Channel 15' and the political review ANTI set up their own
radio stations - which were eventually suppressed by the police
- to campaign against the state monopoly in radIo 142 . The
emergence of such currents was to a large extent, the result of
disappointment created by PASOK's policy on radio and
television. When it became clear that PASOK's advent to power
had not marked the end of authoritarian practices - until then
associated with right-wing rule - a part of the Left, as well
as representatives of the more liberal tendency within the
Right, started to question the validity of the state-monopoly
as a means of safeguarding the independence of broadcasting
from partisan political control.
This new attitude towards the state monopoly was also
influenced by trends In mass communications in Western Europe.
The development of FM technology and Its availability at cheap
prices, the breaking of national monopolies, the authorised
establishment of Independent radio and television channels in
many European countries, and the trend towards the deregulation
of broadcasting, especially vls-a-vis the expansion of cable
and satellite, undermined the adherence to the state monopoly
model of Greek broadcasting. In the light of a potential common
market for television within the European Community, attention
was drawn to the deficiency of the national media and their
Inability to compete with a plethora of European programmes
transmitted via satellite. For the supporters of free
enterprise, only the establishment of private networks and the
competition with the state-owned media would guarantee the
quality of television production and prevent an absorption of
audiences by the satellite channels. On the other hand, the
development of cross-frontier transmission within the EEC was
seen by many intellectuals, journalists and politicians as a
significant means for the cultural integration of Greece into
Europe143.
Apart from developments elsewhere, another challenge to the
state monopoly was the high penetration of video cassette
recorders' 44 and the proliferation of parabolic antennae in the
wealthy suburbs of Athens and Thessaloniki. Although largely
the outcome of a shift towards a consumerist lifestyle, these
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developments indicated a high level of dissatisfaction with
existing output and the need for greater variety of choice felt
by audiences. A notable change in the political climate of the
media debate, however, was ND's support for private
broadcasting, which was to a large extent, due to its espousal
of the ideals of neo-liberalism and the free market economy. A
first step towards a new policy on the media was ND's proposal
on the reform of broadcasting published in 1986 which, although
favouring the continuation of the state monopoly, called for a
small-scale privatization of future cable and satellite
systems. Since then the Conservatives have supported a mixed
system of ownership and control, with the coexistence of both
public and commercial broadcasters which in their view could
guarantee a large variety of options for Greek viewers145.
The decisive change in the structure of Greek broadcasting
was to come from within the Conservative opposition. In the
1986 municipal elections, PASOK, having failed to secure the
cooperation of the Communist Left, lost the three major cities
of Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus to Conservative candidates.
Three of ND's younger cadres, the new mayors M.Evert,
S.Kouvelas and S.Andrlanopoulos, had announced during the
election campaign that once elected, they would set up local
authority-run radio stations in their cities, a pronouncement
also made by the Communist-supported candidate for Athens. In
June 1987 Evert proceeded with the de facto establishment of
the Athens radio station, to be followed suit by the two other
mayors. Although the three new stations were illegal, as they
were in breach of the state monopoly, the government granted
them provisional licences until the final framework for
broadcasting could be implemented later that year. The
establishment of "free radio" - as the new local stations were
popularly called - was a major success for the Conservatives
who appeared to have snatched the initiative in broadcasting
policy-making from the government and to have presented it with
a fait accompli. Apart from that, the crusade for independent
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radio was also a vehicle for the three ND cadres to further
their personal political careers by gaining popularity and,
hence, consolidating their power base within their party. For
M.Evert in particular, the emphasis on balanced and impartial
coverage of politics became the flagship of his campaign for
further democratization of political structures and the
promotion of pluralism. It is worth noting that the setting up
of the new radio station was keenly supported by the Communist
opposition in the Athens local council who considered it as a
breakthrough towards a more pluralistic broadcasting system'46.
As far as PASOK was concerned, its stance throughout the
revived media debate was characterized by embarrassment and
hesitation. For a long time the Socialists seemed reluctant to
proceed with a democratic reform of the broadcasting framework,
fearing that this would deprive them of the main means they had
at their disposal for the influence of public opinion. For the
same reasons, the government hesitated to introduce independent
radio stations, although pressure towards this end had been
exercised by the younger cadres of the governing party'47 . In
an effort to defuse the situation, the government set up an
all-party committee to make proposals for a reform of the
system. However, the committee failed to produce any concrete
plan for the re-organization of broadcasting, based on a broad
consensus among political parties'48.
Eventually in 1987 PASOK introduced the long-due reform on
broadcasting. Apart from the promised merger of ERT-1 and ERT-2
into a joint administrative body, ERT-AE, the new law
(1730/1987) abolished the state monopoly for radio but
maintained it on television. It also made provision for the
establishment of a third channel within the public corporation.
It seems that the Socialists responded to the pressures of the
opposition to introduce independent radio in order to reap the
benefits from the de facto breaking of the state monopoly by
appearing to be the first to change the structure of the
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broadcasting system. In essence, however, the new statute
constituted a major effort by PASOK to minimize the political
cost caused by the loss of control over radio. PASOK sought to
retain its tight control over the state-owned media by
reproducing the same pattern of centralized administration as
In the previous law. Thus, the Minister to the Prime Minister
retained the extensive powers designated by Law 230/1975 in
making appointments to the key managerial posts of the company
and In deciding on crucial issues (financial, organizational,
etc) regarding its operation149.
As in other companies of the public sector, the new law
established within ERT-AE a 'Representative Council of Social
Control' (ASKE), a fifty-member body with wide social and
political representation from political parties, local
authorities, trade unions, social and scientific groups150.
According to PASOK's law on the socialization of public
companies, ASKE were to be the main administrative bodies
of these companies. In practice, however, these structures -
Including that of ERT-AE - had only advisory and supervisory
functions. The same applied to the newly established
Broadcasting Council, which consisted of representatives of the
government and the opposition' 51 . The Introduction of these
two, largely decorative bodies was characteristic of PASOK's
general strategy to appear as fulfilling earlier promises - In
this case, the establishment of social control of broadcasting
- while In essence It applied policies which served Its narrow
political Interests.
It would be fair to say, however, that with the new statute
PASOK made an effort to avoid the problems caused by the
previous legislation. Thus, the dyarchy between the Chairman of
the Board and the Director General was abolished; Instead, the
Chairman was to act as the company's Managing Director. ERT-AE
was to consist of Hellenlc Television-I (ET-1), Hellenic
Television-2 (ET-2) and Hellenlc Radio (ERA). The latter
-1f1fO
service was administratively separated from television and
constituted the merger of the radio services of ERT-1 and ERT-
2. Each one of the three services was to be administered by a
Director appointed by the Board of Governors'52.
The law also provided for the establishment of a subsidiary
company for producing and trading programme material and an
Institute to promote research in the sphere of broadcasting,
create a national audio-visual archive and provide training to
ERT-AE staff 153 . Both these institutions reflected PASOK's
concern to rationalize the operation of the broadcasting media
and improve the quality of output. However, by the time of its
electoral defeat in June 1989, none of the two projects had
materialized. Finally, the law introduced a code of deontology
- a set of news values and principles to be applied in
advertising and in general programming154.
With reference to the independent radio stations, the law
set a significant number of regulations, such as limiting
communication range to the local level, prohibiting the
formation of networks and restricting ownership to Greek
citizens only, a provision which reflected PASOK's
preoccupation with the protection of Greek culture from foreign
influences 155 . The Minister to the Prime Minister was given the
right to grant licences at his discretion, following a proposal
by the Committee for Local Radio, which was established by the
new statute' 56 . Only one licence could be granted to each
private citizen or company, a restriction apparently aimed at
preventing concentration of ownership. The stations could be
financed by the local authorities or their private owners
and/or by advertising. Licence fees were not permitted. The
stations' operation should also conform to a significant number
of regulations, some of which were also applied to the state-
owned media: the stations' daily output had to be objective,
pluralistic, of good quality and to safeguard and promote Greek
culture, tradition and language. Moreover, the programmes
should have a local character and promote the tradition and
culture of the region where the station operated. News of
national interest - apart from local news - could be broadcast
only by stations run by local authorities or private stations
employing professional journalists. Like the national networks,
the daily amount of advertising could not exceed 8 per cent of
the total output. All stations were obliged to allow access to
their programming for local social and cultural groups. The
application of the regulations was to be supervised by a three-
member committee of deontology appointed to each station by the
local council or the private owners'57.
All In all, the new legal framework reflected again the hap-
hazard attitude and political calculation which had always
characterized the policies of Greek governments In the sphere
of broadcasting. Neither the dismantling of the state monopoly,
nor the re-organization of the state networks were products of
a carefully planned and coherent media policy. They were rather
calculated moves In a political game, in which each of the two
main players - the Conservatives and the Socialists - were
trying to make most gains out of the communications explosion.
Despite the re-structuring of the public broadcasting
organizations, the new law did not solve the chronic problems
of Greek broadcasting. To start with, state control over
broadcast output remained as strict as ever and even reached
scandalous proportions towards the end of PASOK's rule
(especially in the period 1988_1989)158. PASOK did not dare to
lay off the unnecessary staff with which successive governments
had loaded the two networks, apparently fearing the political
implicatIons of causing massive redundancies In a period of
rising social discontent. Finally, the government failed to
provide the new Corporation with the substantial subsidy that
was necessary for the modernization of technical infra-
structure, especially that of ET-2. Irrational organization and
lack of modernization of production meant that ERT-AE continued
to suffer major financial losses and to provide an output of
low quality. The implications of such policies were
particularly serious for the Corporation in view of the
competition from private television stations which appeared at
the end of 1989 and which have absorbed a large part of the
audience and advertising revenue from public broadcasting159.
At the same time, ERA faced strong competition from the new
local authority-run stations, which became highly popular
partly because of their novelty and partly because of their
lively music programmes and informal style of presentation.
This was particularly true for the Athens station '9.84' which,
with the new ethos It Introduced Into the political coverage
and its popular music programme, not only attracted the largest
part of the radio audience, but also absorbed vital advertising
revenue from the state-owned radio channels' 60 . Soon, new
stations were mushrooming all over the country, as local
authorities - or, rather, mayors, political parties, indivIdual
politicians, press publishers and other entrepreneurs - sought
to gain a foothold In the broadcasting field.
However, the initial euphoria soon evaporated as due to
increasing competition for a relatively small audience and
advertising base and the lack of realistic and effective
financial planning, the vast majority of stations - Including
'9.84' - suffered heavy financial losses 161 . Another serious
problem was the lack of effective controls over the
implementation of the rules governing the operation of
Independent stations. Hence, the context within which 'free
radio' has been operating is one of anarchy and violation of
the law162 . The committees of deontology have been In practice
abolished In all stations, so there is no control of the
implementation of the principles set by the law' 63 . The
situation has become even more chaotic with the proliferation
of Independent television stations since 1989. Phenomena such
as the operation of television stations without official
authorization, the concentration of different media - radio,
television, press - in fewer hands, the deteriorating quality
of broadcast material, the emphasis on crime and
sensationalism, have been notable characteristics of the
deregulation (in practice, if not institutionally) of radio and
television164.
These dramatic new developments in the field of broadcasting
are also gradually changing the political agenda regarding the
operation of the mass media in Greece. The question of the
redistribution of political control over broadcasting does not
constitute a crucial political issue any more, although it
remains open in the case of the state-controlled media. The
multiplicity of radio and television outlets has somehow
eliminated the necessity for the safeguarding of the balanced
coverage of politics within a single organization. The
situation now in broadcasting is more similar to the situation
of the press, in that through the largely partisan reporting of
each station audiences are provided with the whole range of
political opinions - at least those representing the party
political spectrum - that exist in the country today. It could
be argued that this arrangement is closer to Greek political
culture, characterized by a passionate approach to politics and
a preference for monologue rather than dialogue.
If state manipulation of broadcasting is becoming an issue
of the past, the new question on the political agenda Is how to
make the large number of broadcasters now operating within the
country accountable. The Codes of Deontology which were
published recently In the press 165 constitute an effort to
tackle this problem. This will entail, however, a redefinition
or, rather a proper clear definition of the mission of radio
and television In the changing Greek society.
_LfkLf_
8.7 Conclusion
PASOK's policy on radio and television revealed that the
party lacked entirely a concrete plan for democratic reform of
broadcasting institutions. Notwithstanding its condemnation of
ND's authoritarian practices vis-a-vis broadcasting, while in
government PASOK pursued a policy on the broadcast media
similar to its predecessor. As In the case of the Conservative
government, PASOK sought to use radio and television to gain
legitimacy for Its policies. A helpful law and a compliant
management was all that PASOK was interested in regarding the
two broadcasting organizations.
It is true that under the Socialists the broadcast media
offered more access to the opposition or other major social
organizations to air their views and criticisms of the
government. Yet, the balance was always in favour of PASOK's
policies. Moreover, PASOK sought to promote those Ideas which
would best serve its own political Interests.
Eventually, the party's overall attitude towards broad-
casting deepened the crisis of legitimacy of Greek broadcasting
institutions, especially as It was proved that partisan
political control on radio and television was not an exclusive
characteristic of right-wing policies. Like New Democracy,
PASOK never pursued the development of a public service ethos
in broadcasting. Thus, the final decision to do away with the
state monopoly did not involve any consideration as to whether
or how this ethos should be preserved in the emergent broad-
casting system. As a result, the deregulation has led to a
chaotic situation In radio and television.
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CONCLUSION
The object of this thesis was to describe, analyse and
explain the organization of Greek broadcasting and its
relationship to the political process from the establishment of
the first public broadcasting service in 1936 to the abolition
of the state monopoly with the introduction of independent
radio stations in 1987. Using a historical and political
approach, the present study has critically examined the
evolution of Greek broadcasting institutions and set this
against the background of major developments in the social,
economic and, above all, political spheres over a period of
more than fifty years. Thus, we have analysed the political
background of successive institutional reforms of the state
broadcasting services and evaluated the implications of these
reforms for the operation of broadcasting and for its
relationship to the government.
The main conclusion to emerge from our research is that all
governments of the period under examination, whether civilian
or military, dictatorial or democratically elected, imposed
strict controls over the political output of state
broadcasting. What seems more remarkable is that with the
exception of dictatorial regimes - during which the
broadcasting services were incorporated into the government
machine and subjected to preventive censorship - the form of
these controls remained largely the same throughout the first
fifty years of Greek broadcasting. Direct ministerial
interventions and partisan appointments to key managerial and
editorial posts in the broadcasting organizations were the
common features of the policy of all Greek governments on radio
and television.
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As the findings of our research suggest, the 'fourth estate
model' as a description of the role of broadcasting in liberal
democracies is not applicable to the government-broadcasting
relationship at any stage In the history of Greek broadcasting
until 1987. The independence of broadcasters to report
Impartially political reality, enquire into the actions of
politicians and expose them to public scrutiny, as the 'fourth
estate' model would entail, was never pursued as an objective
by the Greek political class. Instead, successive governments
seized upon the great opportunities offered by radio and
television to further their own political ends; that Is, to
secure the consent and - at least - the tolerance of the people
to their policies. All that was needed for this purpose was a
helpful law and a compliant management, and politicians - from
I. Metaxas to A. Papandreou - sought to have both at their
disposal.
As became apparent from our detailed study of the various
reforms of broadcasting legislation introduced since 1936,
effective power rested with the minister responsible for the
control of radio and television, namely the Minister to the
Prime Minister or the Undersecretary for Press and Information.
Apart from making appointments to the key posts of the
broadcasting organizations, the Minister or the Undersecretary
was empowered In the 1950s and 1960s to decide upon the general
programming policy of EIR and even to exercise preventive
censorship on the content of programmes. After 1974 his role
was to communicate the political and ideological line of the
government to both ERT/ERT-1 and ERT-2.
The Minister or the Undersecretary, however, Is neither the
only nor the main source of policy-making on broadcasting
within the executive. As our analysis of government practices
for the period after 1974 has shown, the ultimate source of
major policy decisions regarding the running of the
broadcasting companies has been the Prime Minister. Karamanlis,
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Rallis and Papandreou all manifested an equally strong interest
in the performance of ERT/ERT-1 and ERT-2 by selecting personal
friends and proteges for the chief executive posts of the two
organizations. Moreover, the choice of the person to become
Undersecretary for Press reflected to a high degree the kind of
policy on broadcasting that each Premier wished to see
implemented. Thus, both Lambrias during the first term of ND
rule as well as Laliotis In the first few months of PASOK's
second term In office were selected to liberalize the operation
of radio and television. In contrast, the appointment of
Tsaldaris to the post in the wake of the 1977 election
reflected the increasing Insecurity of the ND government and
Its shift towards more conservative positions. Individual
ministers have also played a significant role in shaping the
content of news and other programmes as well as the general
employment patterns of Greek broadcasting organizations.
The other actors involved in the production of political
messages have been subject to a significant number of
constraints, so that they have become in practice incapable of
determining the programme content to any significant extent.
The Boards of Governors, dominated as they were by government
supporters, have exercised very little power over the running
of the organizations for the most part of Greek broadcasting
history. Certainly, their role has been far from that of a
supreme regulatory authority. The broadcasting management -
namely, the Director General, the head of news and heads of
other programming departments - has always consisted of
supporters or members of the governing party, a fact which has
led to the convergence or, indeed, Identification of their
political interests with those of the government. Besides, they
could always be dismissed if, for any reason, they failed to
satisfy their political masters. Apart from this, the recurrent
conflicts over the distribution of power between the Director
General of ERT and the Chairman of the Board under Law 230/1975
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further undermined the power and authority of the
organization's chief executive.
In addition, journalists, employees and external collabo-
rators rarely expressed any political or ideological opposition
to the heavy-handed policies of the government or of the
directors of the broadcasting organizations. The repression of
political opponents, especially those of the Left, from the
first years of radio until 1974, the purges of those with
'unhealthy' views and the offering of employment in the state
machine as a reward for the 'nationally minded' generated
widespread insecurity among the staff of the broadcasting
organizations. They also led to the creation of a submissive
attitude towards the government and the management.
Apart from repression, however, there have been more covert
controls imposed by politicians upon employees. Journalists
have been selected in most cases from those ideologically close
to the government and usually employed on a part-time basis in
the news departments of radio and television. Working in the
broadcasting networks has provided a second and far from
negligible source of income to members of a profession which is
characterized by great job insecurity. This has largely led to
the development of a patron-client relationship between
journalists and government politicians in which editorial and
professional independence are exchanged for economic benefits
and major career prospects. The same applies to many employees
under temporary contracts and to outside collaborators, who
were more often than not supporters or members of the party in
power. The preoccupation with improving the financial situation
of their members Is perhaps the key to understanding the lack
of any opposition to government control of programme content
from journalists' unions as well as from unions of employees
which have usually been very active when it comes to economic
demands.
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The dependence of broadcasters upon the political will of
the government and the need to secure one's position have
discouraged the development of any creative initiative within
the broadcasting organizations. Instead, as Sir Hugh Greene
observed, what has emerged among employees is a civil service
mentality permeating all levels of the organizations' hierarchy
according to which compliance with the government's wishes has
been considered almost an obligation. Under these circumstances
Greek radio and television were not allowed to adopt a critical
stance towards those In power. Greek broadcasters have been
required to deal with the affairs of the state only In the way
that politicians In government have wished them to do so. In
the classic model of communication,
A (politicians)____ C (channels of communicatlon)^ B (voters)
the element C, if Identified as Greek broadcasting, has never
been actively Involved In the process of political
communication. Instead, it has served as a mere transmitter of
messages from A to B or, as an opposition politician put it, as
"the humble servant of the government".
Our conclusion - that those In political power have
continuously exercised strict control over broadcasting
Institutions - leads us to the second question Included In the
objectives of the present thesis: in whose Interests has this
control been exercised? According to the classic Marxist
approach to the media, broadcasting in liberal democracies
serves as the Instrument of domination of the ruling class or
classes, reproducing the values and norms which best serve
those classes' Interests. On the basis of evidence presented in
this study it could be arguably suggested that Greek
broadcasting has indeed served as a legitimating mechanism of
the established order. Such evidence Includes, for example, the
promotion of anti-communism as the official state ideology by
both the EIR and the armed forces radio; and the practice of
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negative references to, or even the complete silence on,
industrial action and generally to social protests which has
characterized radio and television coverage, not only under
right-wing governments but also under PASOK. In contrast, other
evidence - such as the systematic promotion and even exaltation
of left-wing ideas, struggles and values during the years of
Socialist rule - suggest that the role of Greek broadcasting
institutions is not as clear-cut as that described by the
dominance paradigm.
To suggest that Greek broadcasting has been the instrument
of the dominant classes Is to argue that the state is also an
instrument of bourgeois domination. Yet, as we were able to
demonstrate at various stages of this analysis, the Greek state
has enjoyed a considerable degree of Independence from direct
control. The very establishment of the colonels' dictatorship,
despite the hostility or mistrust towards the junta manifested
by a large part of the Greek bourgeoisie, reflects most clearly
the Inability of this class to Influence directly developments
which take place in the political sphere. Due to the delayed
and limited Industrial development of the country, the state
has acquired a central position not only In the economy but
also In social and political life. After World War II In
particular, the state played a dominant role In the socio-
economic development of Greece by allocating resources and
providing a favourable institutional framework for the
reproduction of capital. In addition, as an employer and re-
distributor of Incomes to different social groups, the state
became the guardian of vital Interests of a large part of the
population.
On the other hand, owing to the underdeveloped character of
the Greek economy, the capitalist classes have been relatively
weak and largely dependent on state support for their survival
and growth. Similarly, the working class has remained small In
size and poorly organized, whereas the middle ground has been
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occupied by a large peasant population connected with
political power through extensive clientelistic networks and by
smaller social groups with different, even conflicting,
Interests.
Economic and social underdevelopment have largely affected
the evolution of political parties. Social Incoherence and the
consequent lack of a class-based discourse, together with the
poverty of the Greek political culture and the persistence of
patronage as the prevailing means for mobilizing mass support,
have prevented Greek political parties, other than the KKE,
from becoming autonomous forces with a clear identity and mass
organization. The main features of bourgeois parties both
before and after World War II were their organizational
weakness, clientelistic structure and dependence upon the
personality of the leader as a means for securing unity and
increasing their electoral appeal. Unable to become well-
organized forces with a concrete social base, political parties
relied heavily on the mechanisms of the state in order to
expand their clientelistic networks and even to persecute their
political opponents. The fragile character of political parties
and their inability to cope effectively with the emergence of
new demands and Increased mobilization generated by the process
of economic and social development have been largely
responsible for recurrent political crises which have often led
to the breakdown of parliamentary institutions.
Even after the collapse of the military regime in 1974 and
despite the extensive renovation of political personnel, the
persistence of the same social structures and political
practices imposed limitations on the establishment of mass
parties. Thus, ND continued to rely on clientelism failing to
develop a clear Identity and mass organization. As for PASOK,
In the absence of a mass social movement, it became
increasingly dominated by its leader, whereas its elaborate
organization was reduced to the role of an electoral machine.
-1f63
As a result, New Democracy and PASOK remained attached to the
state mechanisms to secure and expand their electoral bases.
Patronage continued to determine the dominant political ethos.
The vagueness of the social structure has greatly influenced
the policies and discourse of Greek political forces. In order
to expand their appeal, the parties have been led to the
articulation of discourses which are intended to mask the
contradictions inherent in Greek society and establish a unity
among groups with different interests. Thus, the mobilization
of political support has been largely based on the exploitation
of historic cleavages, symbols and slogans, or on the appeal of
charismatic leaders able to express the aspirations of the
largest possible part of the population. In this respect, the
anti-communism of the l950s and 1960s played a decisive role,
not only in the legitimation of the post-war bourgeois regime
but - long after the communist peril had disappeared - in the
reproduction of the power of the Right. With the establishment
of a fully competitive party system after the collapse of the
junta, political parties have appeared to be increasingly pre-
occupied with the articulation of a discourse able to attract
support from all groups present in Greek society. Thus,
throughout the 1970s ND projected itself and its leader as the
only safeguard against regression to authoritarianism and the
only guarantee of economic, social and political modernization.
On the other hand, PASOK sought to unite under Its green banner
the fragmented middle strata by exploiting the Right-Left
cleavage and Papandreou's Indisputable charisma.
Anxious to preserve the social alliances which brought them
to power, Greek politicians have always manifested a profound
mistrust of the independent operation of Institutions - such as
trade unions or broadcasting - which could serve as channels
for the articulation of social interests and/or for the
expression of opposition to the policies of the government. The
organizational weakness of Greek political parties and,
consequently, their insecurity caused by the fluidity of their
electoral base are a key to understanding why democratically
elected governments insist upon exercising tight control over
broadcasting Institutions In ways not very dissimilar to those
applied at times of authoritarian rule. Broadcasting has been
continuously subjected to conscious and deliberate manipulation
by successive governments - both authoritarian and democratic -
in order to serve as a legitimating mechanism, not so much of
the established social order, as of those governments' specific
policies and practices. Even at the time of transition to
democracy, when freedom of the press was considered an
essential precondition for the establishment of a competitive
political system, the operation of broadcasting organizations
was closely controlled by Conservative and Socialist
governments alike. In fact, both PASOK and ND have used this
rare state-owned resource to counter-balance what they always
considered to be negative or even hostile coverage of their
policies by the entire national press.
The insistence of Greek politicians upon exercising close
control over broadcast political output in the period of
democratic transition stemmed from their almost naive
perception of radio and particularly television as powerful
weapons, whose effect upon audience were as direct and dramatic
as those of a tranquillizing injection. Both ND and PASOK
appeared to think that the exaltation of their ideas, policies
and leaders by television would directly influence public
opinion in favour of the government and would reproduce the
consensus which had brought these parties to power. Greek
politicians also seemed to be unaware of the negative effects
of their over-exposure on television and of the possibility
that the silence of the broadcast news on major controversial
Issues at a time when these Issues were being extensively
reported by the daily press would only underline the
authoritarian and paternalistic practices of the party in
power.
-465—
To summarize, the political history of Greek broadcasting,
as discussed in the present study, casts grave doubts on the
applicability of either the 'fourth estate' or the 'dominance'
paradigm of broadcasting in an economically and politically
developing country, where the democratic rules of the political
game became fully and universally accepted less than two
decades ago. Indeed, the study of government-broadcasting
relations in the first fifteen years of transition to democracy
gives support to the observation of G. Pridham that Greece -
along with the other new Mediterranean democracies, Spain and
Portugal - has successfully established Its political-
Institutional structures, but still has some way to go before
It develops the major characteristics of a system-supportive
political culture: popular participation, articulation of
pluralism and modern political parties with mass organizations,
elements which are crucial for the stabilization of the new
democracy. Whereas after the dictatorship the institutionaliza-
tion of a fully competitive system was recognized by all
political forces as a necessary precondition for the effective
resolution of conflict, Greek politicians have done little
since 1974 to promote the development of a democratic political
culture within Greek society. Both the formal organization of
powers - I.e. the establishment of a powerful executive and a
relatively weak Parliament - as well as the policies and
practices of successive governments vls-a-vls civil society
have revealed a paternalistic view of politics and society
which transcends all forces In the political spectrum. Through
the control of the trade unions and the broadcasting media and
through the articulation of discourses which can appeal to all
social groups alike, the major political forces of the
transition have tried to establish a 'unity of the polity at
the top' rather than to educate the citizens In new forms of
political participation.
This behaviour has reinforced the a-political characteri-
stics of Greek politics, that Is, the absence of any link
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between political practices and programmes with real events
taking place in the social sphere, and the transfer of all
social demands to the state for immediate satisfaction. As the
experience of both PASOK and ND governments has shown, this
strategy has been counter-productive in terms of both these
parties' electoral interests and the general effort of economic
and social modernization. The deterioration of the economy and
the inability of governments to deliver their promises
generated disappointment and increased the pressure by social
groups for the satisfaction of their demands. Also, the
tendency of parties in government to avoid the introduction of
reforms which might meet a lot of opposition and thus harm
their short-term electoral interests has prevented the
rationalization and modernization of social and economic
structures and has led to the perpetuation of chronic problems.
The failure of PASOK's economic policy, the near-bankruptcy of
the state, the scandals and the general disillusionment with
Socialist policies in the late 1980s and, currently, the
inability of the ND government to forge ahead with a programme
of reforms which, though necessary, might entail significant
political cost, are all products of this mentality'.
Yet, insofar as 'democracy' is a "joint learning
experience" 2 the mistakes and Impasses of the past can lead to
re-adjustments In political behaviour of the political elites
and the citizenry at large. The coalition government of ND and
the forces of the Left - the KKE and the Greek Left (EAR) - in
summer 1989 and the all-party government in November of the
same year were crucial steps towards not only the historical
reconciliation between Right and Left but also the
establishment of a new consensus among the political forces
regarding the resolution of Greece's acute economic crisis.
Additionally, the gradual disentanglement of the social forces
from the Left-Right cleavage has given rise to new social
struggles such as the ecology movement which even succeeded In
electing a parliamentary representative in two consecutive
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elections (November 1989 and April 1990). Apart from the above,
the environment of the European Community has also influenced
the process of democratic transition. Beyond economic
interdependence and the implementation of guidelines and
institutional changes common to all member-states, the
democratic traditions and participant cultures of European
nations are a form of political socialization for the large
number of Greek visitors and especially for students in other
EEC countries.
The dismantling of the broadcasting monopoly in 1987,
although primarily motivated by party political Interests,
reflected to a large extent the influences of the European
context as well as the resentment of authoritarian policies and
the Increasing need within Greek society for more information
and discussion about crucial Issues. Although at the moment
Greece is experiencing the slow and painful death of an old era
without the new one yet being in sight, it is already clear
that the formation of new social and political contracts based
on the thorough and sincere discussion of real problems and the
balancing of different social interests is the only realistic
option for national development.
In such a case, a redefinition of the terms of the political
game would be necessary. Specifically, this would mean the
establishment of an autonomous trade union movement, the
emergence of well-organized parties whose base will participate
fully In the formulation of party policies and, more generally,
the active participation of civil society in public life.
Broadcasting could perform a crucial role in realizing these
objectives. In particular, radio and television could become
the fora for the discussion of problems facing Greek society by
offering access to all main arguments and proposed solutions.
They could also set the agenda for new issues by allowing scope
for new social and political movements to express their ideas
and inform and influence public opinion. In this way,
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broadcasting could both become the expression of a more
pluralistic society and at the same time contribute to its
development. However, this redefinition of the role of Greek
broadcasting Is easier said than done, especially now that the
public broadcaster (ERT-AE) which could most effectively
perform this task is facing fierce competition from private
channels and the challenge of cross-frontier transmissions.
If pursued, this new role for broadcasting would entail the
review of the present institutional framework and of the terms
under which both Independent and state-run broadcasting
operate. In other words, this would mean the re-organization
and rationalization of public broadcasting, as well as the
establishment of restrictions on the operation of commercial
television. It could also involve the establishment of a
network of regional stations which could provide access to
different social groups and organizations both at the local and
national level. New media technologies, such as FM radio and
cable television, could also provide new channels of
communication for different social groups.
Undoubtedly, the relationship between broadcasting and
politicians in Greece has a long way to go before it
stabilizes. The fluidity of the present situation, both
regarding political forces as well as broadcasting institu-
tions, makes any prediction as to what the characteristics of
this future relationship are going to be difficult. However,
judging from the importance that politicians have attached to
the function of broadcasting Institutions so far, it Is not an
exaggeration to suggest that future policy on radio and
television will reflect the real intentions of the Greek
political elites regarding the development of democracy.
Future research
This thesis has concentrated on the historical development
of Greek broadcasting Institutions and their relationship to
the political process. Although we have tried to be as
comprehensive as possible, the length of the period under
examination has Imposed some limitations on the scope of this
analysis and on the number of aspects of the operation of
broadcasting discussed. Therefore, we have thought it useful to
suggest possible future lines of Inquiry which would to a
considerable extent complement our own. Three in particular
seem highly relevant.
The first area of research would concentrate on the Internal
organization of different broadcasting companies. In particu-
lar, the emergence of independent radio and television stations
provides material for a comparative study of role allocation
and patterns of behaviour within both the state-run and
Independent broadcasting organizations. Especially, a lengthy
study Inside the news departments of different companies would
enrich our knowledge about the principles, priorities and ethos
of public and Independent broadcasters. The tradition of
Inquiry on the sociology of broadcasting Institutions which has
developed In Britain could be usefully employed as the basis
for research into the Greek broadcasting organizations3.
A content analysis of programming and particularly of news
programmes would be another line of research which could
complement our own. A methodical analysis of radio and
television news content over a specific time period during
different phases of the history of Greek broadcasting
organizations could be used to exemplIfy, or even to falsify,
some of the necessarily impressionistic conclusions about news
content contained In this thesis. Unfortunately, the absence
of adequate archive data renders this a very dIfficult, If not
Impossible task. However, current news output could provide the
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basis for research on news values and more generally on the
ideological role of broadcasting in Greek society. Once again,
in Britain there is a significant tradition of inquiry into the
content of news programmes which could provide the framework
for such a study4.
Finally, a third line of inquiry could involve a comparative
analysis of the historical evolution of broadcasting and its
role in the political communications process in Greece and in
other countries which have had a similar tradition of partisan
political control over broadcast output. In particular, the
countries of Southern Europe, and especially Spain and
Portugal, seem to invite such a comparison for a variety of
reasons which include: their simultaneous transition to
democracy, consequently the comparable stages of democratic
development, and the similarities in their socio-economic
development. Of course, one should not underestimate the
difficulties which could be caused by the possible lack of
adequate data regarding the historical evolution of
broadcasting in these countries. If realized, however, such a
study could broaden our knowledge on the political systems and
cultures of developing democracies and help us understand
whether similar patterns of soclo-economic development lead
to similar attitudes vis-a-vis broadcasting, or whether other
factors also influence these countries' broadcasting policies5.
These constitute three areas which in the light of our work
require further research. The three proposals are intended only
as examples of the kind of work that a media student can engage
him/herself in and in no way exhaust all the possibilities.
The area of political communications, and more generally of
mass communications, in Greece is a goidmine for those who wish
to learn and understand more about Greek society, its
institutions, its values and its living patterns. It is hoped
that this thesis has been a modest contribution to furthering
the understanding of the institutional evolution and role of
broadcasting in the political development of Greece.
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NAME	 DURATION OF OFFICE
I. Petmezas	 July 1945-January 1946
K. Dimaras	 January 1946-April 1946
P. Sifnaeos	 April 1946-December 1946
I. Bettos	 December 1946-December 1947
D. Svolopoulos	 December 1947-March 1950
C. Tsigantes-Svoronos	 March 1950-March 1953
I. Alexiades	 March 1953-May 1954
C. Kokkolas	 May 1954-July 1955
I. Bettos	 July 1955-December 1955
E. Apokoritis	 December 1955-April 1957
V. Aslanides	 April 1957-January 1958
V. Schmidt	 January 1958-February 1959
A. Margarltis	 February 1959-April 1959
S. Spyromilios	 April 1959-March 1961
I. Bettos	 March 1961-April 1961
K. Bastias	 April 1961-November 1963
E. Stasinopoulos 	 November 1963-April 1964
A. Peponis	 April 1964-August 1965
V. Aslanides	 August 1965-October 1965
G. Dafnis	 October 1965-May 1967
I. Anastasopoulos	 May 1967-December 1970
K. Ploumbis	 December 1970-September 1971
K. Mitrellis	 September 1971-December 1973
I. Karaiosifoglou	 December 1973-August 1974
D. Horn	 August 1974-November 1974
A. Viachos	 November 1974-December 1975
I. Lampsas	 December 1975-February 1978
K. Hondros	 February 1978-August 1981
N. Delipetros	 August 1981-October 1981
G. Romeos	 October 1981-February 1984
D. Katsimis	 February 1984-July 1984
V. Mathiopoulos	 July 1984-September 1985
C. Kontogiorgis	 September 1985-November 1985
T. Halatsis	 November 1985-January 1987
N. Sifounakis	 January 1987-July 1988
AppendIx 1: DIrectors General of EIR, EURT, ERT and ERT-1, 1945-1988
Appendix 2: BiographIcal Notes of Directors General and Chairmen of EIR, EURT,
ERT-1 and ERT-2.
APDXORITIS EVANGELOS. Born in 1897 in Ainphilochia. Major-
General, professor at the Military Academy (1925-1937),
military advisor in the Balkan Committee of the U.N. (1945-
1951). DIrector General of EIR, 1955-1957.
APOSTOLOPOULOS SOULIS. He studied Engineering and Economics. He
worked as manager in several companies and was appointed as
advisor in the Ministry of Finance by PASOK. He was then
appointed as Chairman of ERT-2 (1982-1984). After his
resignation he was transferred to the state-owned company ITCO
which dealt with imports and exports. After a scandal regarding
the import from Yugoslavia of corn that was later exported in
the EEC as Greek, he resigned in December 1986. He kept on
holding, however, similar positions in other state-owned
companies. In 1990 he was put on trial for the "corn scandal"
and found guilty. He is currently serving a prison sentence.
ARGYROPOULOS CHRISTOS. Born in 1937 in Lamia. He is an Athens
lawyer. During the 1967-1974 dictatorship he defended In
martial courts several members of the anti-junta resistance. He
is a member of Law societies and other scientific groups and
also, Chairman of the Independent Peace Movement. Chairman of
the Board of ERT-1, 19-9-1985 to 29-11-1985.
BASTIAS KOSTIS. Born in 1901 in Ermoupolis. He worked as an
author and journalist in several newspapers since 1923. During
1947-1949 he was cultural attache in the Greek Embassy in
Washington. He was Director General of EIR (1961-1964).
BEIS KOSTAS. Born in 1933 in Athens. He holds a Law doctorate
and is a professor at the University of Athens. He has written
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several legal monographs and he runs a monthly procedural law
review. He was Chairman of the Board of ERT (1981-1983).
BETTOS IOANNIS. Born in 1898 in loannina. He was Director of
the Foreign Ministry's Press Office (1948). A journalist, he
was appointed several times as Director General, Chairman and
Vice-Chairman of EIR (1946-1947, 1955-1957, 1961).
CHONDROS CONSTANTINE. He was a veteran pilot in both military
and civil aviation, with a distinguished record. He held the
post of Director in Olympic Airways for 16 years. He was
appointed Assistant Director General at ERT in 1977 and
Director General in 1978. He held this position until 1981.
DAFNIS GRIGORIOS. Born in 1909 in Corfu. He was a journalist
and political editor in Athens newspapers. He was also a lawyer
and Director of the Athens Press Agency in 1963. He was
Director General of EIR (1965-1967).
DELIPETROS NIbS. He is a lawyer. During the German occupation
he published several magazines for the resistance. He worked
between 1948 and 1951 as a political editor In the radio.
During the EK government he was appointed Director of the
Department of Social Security. He was sacked by the dictators
in 1967 and fled to Paris, where he published an anti-junta
magazine. After the dictatorship he became a member of ND and
was appointed General Secretary of Press and Information
(1978). He held the post of Director General of ERT from August
to October 1981.
DIMARAS CONSTANTINE. Born in 1904. He studied literature and
became an author. He worked as a journalist and a literary
critic. He held the post of Director of Programming at EIR
(1945-1946) and was Director General in 1946.
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DIMITRAKAKIS CONSTANTINE. Born in 1883 In Trichonis. Chairman
of the Legal Council of the State (1949-1954) and Minister of
Justice in 1958. He was Chairman of the Board at EIR in 1949.
FOKAS DIMITRIOS (1886-1966). He was an officer in the Greek
Navy during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. He left
the Navy In 1935 as a Vice-Admiral. He was a member of the
Athens Academy and Chairman of the Board at EIR (1945-1946).
GEORGANTOPOULOS E. He was an officer of the Port Police and
professor at the Higher School of Industry. During 1984 he was
Chairman of the Board at the ERT-1.
GOTJNARAKIS CONSTANTINE (1895-1953). He was professor of
electronics and electronic communication at the Athens
Technical University. Between 1948 and 1949 he was Chairman of
the Board at EIR.
HORN DIMITRIS. Born in 1921 in Athens. He was an actor, one of
the best talents in Greek theatre. He is a conservative and a
friend of ex-King Constantine. He held the post of Director
General of EIRT from August to November 1974.
KATSIMIS DIMITRIS. He is a journalist and worked as Press
Officer at the Greek Embassy in Lisbon. He was the first
Director of the ERT's News Department under PASOK. From
February to July 1984 he was Director General of ERT-1. In
Summer 1988 he was appointed advisor to the Undersecretary of
Press.
KONTOGIORGIS GIORGOS. Born in Levkada in 1947. He is a lawyer,
with studies in Political Science, Sociology and History
(doctorate from Paris University). He is a professor of
Political Sciences at Pantios University in Athens. He held the
post of Director General of ERT-1 from September to November
1985.
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NATIIIOPOIJLOS VASSOS. He is a journalist with experience in
broadcasting since the time he had been working in West
Germany. He was Director General of ERT-1 during the period
1984-1985. After leaving ERT-1 he became Press Officer at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and resigned from this post in
early 1988.
PANAGIOTOPOULOS lOANNIS. Born in Aetolikon in 1901. He worked
as a literature teacher in the secondary education and was a
well-known author. He was Chairman of the National Theatre for
ten years. He held the post of Chairman of the Board at EIRT
(1974-1975).
PAPACHATZIS GEORGIOS. Born in 1905 in Chalkida. He was a lawyer
and professor of Administrative Law at the Pantlos University.
He was Chairman of the Board at EIR (1966-1967).
PEPONIS ANASTASIOS. Born in 1924. Manager and producer at EIR
during 1945 and 1950-1951. When EK was in government (1964) he
was appointed Director General of EIR. He established the
Demotic language in the radio news and started the Experimental
Television station. During the period 1967-1974 he was
imprisoned and sent in exile. In January 1984 he became
Minister without portfolio responsible for broadcasting, a post
he held until July of the same year.
PESMAZOGLOU STEFANOS. Born in 1901 in Athens. He was a
journalist and publisher of the newspaper PROIA. He held the
post of Chairman of the Board at EIR during the period 1946-
1947.
ROMEOS GIORGOS. Born in 1934 in Corfu. While studying at the
School of Economics and Commerce he worked as a journalist. In
1959 he joined the Athenian daily TO VIMA. In 1971 he was held
in a military prison for a year because of his activities
against the junta. From 1976-1978 he held the post of Vice-
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President at the Union of Journalists of the Athenian dailies.
He was Director General of ERT-1 (1981-1984). He is currently a
Euro-MP for PASOK and deputy Speaker of the European
Parliament.
SOFRONOPOIJLOS GEORGIOS. Born in 1894 in Patras. He worked in
the financial sector of the civil service and became Minister
of Finance in 1963. He held the post of Chairman of the Board
at EIR from 1957 to 1964.
SPYROPOULOS GEORGIOS. Born in 1896 in Piraeus. He was a judge,
and vice Chairman of the Council of the State. He held the post
of Chairman of the Board at the National Broadcasting
Organization. He was Chairman of the Board at EIR (1964-1966).
STASINOPOULOS EPAMINONDAS. Born in 1900. He was an army officer
and an author. He was Director General of EIR (1963-1964).
STASINOPOULOS NICRAIL. Born in 1903 in Kalamata. He was a
distinguished lawyer and professor of Administrative Law in the
Pantios University. In the caretaker governments of 1952 and
1958 he held ministerial posts. He was Chairman of the Board at
EIR during 1951-1954 and 1966. He became the first President of
the Republic after the change of the regime in 1974.
STAVROPOIJLOS MICRAIL. Born in 1901 in Larissa. He was a lawyer,
and Chairman of the Legal Council of the State. He held the
post of Chairman of the Board at EIR (1967-1970).
SVOLOPOULOS DIMITRIOS. Born in 1899 in Kalamata. He was a
journalist and historian. He was Director General of EIR (1939-
1941 and 1947-1950).
TSIGANTES-SVORONOS CHRISTODOULOS. Born in 1897 in Romania. He
was an army officer and fought in the Middle East during the
Second World War. He had a brilliant career and left the army
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as Major-General. He worked as a military editor in several
newspapers and held the post of Director General of EIR from
1950-1953.
VASSILIKOS VASSILIS. Born in Kavala in 1933. He studied law and
television before turning to writing. He published works in all
literary forms: novels, short stories, essays, articles, poetry
and plays. He became internationally famous with his book "Z"
and his work has been translated in 20 languages. After his
return to Greece in 1974 he worked as a regular member of the
editorial staff of Athenian dailies. He was appointed to the
post of Assistant Director General at ERT-1 in 1981 by the
PASOK government. Vassilikos has made a record by Greek
broadcasting standards: he was the only appointee who was not
sacked or forced to resign. He left ERT-1 after the end of his
contract in 1984.
VLACHOS, ANGELOS. A retired career diplomat, whose appointment
as Director General of EIRT caused a fierce reaction from the
opposition which accused the government of appointing to the
Broadcasting Institute a junta collaborator. Vlachos had served
as temporary Undersecretary at the Ministry to the Prime
Minister in 1967 and as General Secretary at the Ministry of













































(	 /'	 ,	 .	 .	 .1W-.	 .;	 .	 .:
2
,, I..,	 .('	 I	 .,	 f	 /	 1
:>
	
	 <-J	 /-'I •2.':	 .	 . :.
,..//64JL2$7'f..	 -
	
1'	 15'4 H -
-	 '--&
- -





I	 J =	 z:Ii Hi:
i2J1iCA 7 :	 ___I--	 - -
P645#.Q:	












AppendIx 4: Page from a log-book In which radio announcers recorded the transmitted
programmes. It is the day which marked the end of World War II (from the archive of N. Hakkas).
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Appendix 5: Letter sent to the head of EIR's news servIce 0. Chronopoulos by the BritIsh
Commander of the A4 Army Broadcasting Unit (from the archive of N. Hakkas).
SUBJECT:STUDIO DISCIPLINE. 	 A4 ARMY CROADCASTING UNIT,
ATHENS,CMF.
REF A4/MSC/8.
DEAR 1ki leeo1 &iL&t1 	 21 JUL 45.
1. I FEEL IT MY DUTY TO BRING THE FOLLO'JING FACTS TO YOUR NOTICE.
2. EVER SINCE WE BEGAN USING STUDIO 6 FOR OUR EVENING TRAMSMISSIONS,THE
RADIO ATHENS 7 TO 7.15 PROGRAMME HAS ALWAYS BEEN BROADCAST FROM THAT
STUDIO-THUS SAVING TIME AND LABOUR,AND ALSO KEEPING UP THE CONTINUITY
OF THE PROGRAMMES.
LAST EVEN1NG,HOWEVER,SOMEONE,FOR NO APPARENT REASON, DECIDED THAT THIS
15 MIN.PROGRAMME SHOULD BE BROADCAST FROM STUDIO 1,OMITTING AT THE SAME
TIME TO INFORM US,WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS.
3. AT 7 O'CLOCK PRECISL$Y,BY THE CLOCK IN THE STUDIO,MY CORBORAL,WHO WAS
PRESENTING OUR 6. 30 TO. 7 O'CLOCK PROGRAMME,CLOSED DOWN OUR PROGRAMME
at4p	 SINCE. THERE WERE NO MEMBERS OF RADIO ATHENs- PRESENT WITH THE NEX1'1
PROGRAMMECONCLUDED,VERY RIGHTLY I THINK, THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SLIGHT
HITCH,AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE NEXT PROGRAMME WOULD BE A FEW MINUTES LATE
BUT THAT IN THE MEAITIME HE WOULD PLAY RECORDS. THIS HE DID,UNTIL THE
ARRIVAL OF ONE OF YOUR STUDIO ENGINEERS,WHO INQUIRED AS TO THE WHWRE-
ABOUTS OF THE GREEK ANNOUNCER AND ENGINEER.. MY CORPORAL REPLIED THAT VHE
DID NOT KNOW,WHEREON THE ENGINEER WENT AWAY,RETURNING SHORTLY AFTERWARDS
WITH THE INFORMATION THAT THE PROGRAMME WAS BEING BROADCAST FROM STUDIO
4. THE AFFECT ON THE AIR,AS YOU WILL NO DOUBT HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING YOUR PROGRAMMES,WAS TO SAY THE LEAST OF IT
A LITTLE 'RAGGED'.
5. I WAS MONITORING THE PROGRAMME IN MY OFFICE,AND HEARD MY CORPORAL CLOSE
DOWN THE PROGRAMME, APOLOGISE FOR A SLIGHT DELAY,BUT THAT IN THE
MEANTIME HE WOULD PLAY A CERTAIN RECORD. THIS HE DID,AND IN THE MIDDLE OF
THE RECOR1 THERE WAS A SHARP 'CLICK'-COMPLETE SILENCE FOR AT LEAST A
MINUTE, AND THEITTHE GREEK ANNOUNCER CAME ON AND OPENED . THE NEXT PROGRAMME.
6. F FEEL SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT THIS UNFORTUNATE INC IDET
COULD HAVE BEEN QUITE EASILY AVOIDED,IF ONLY SOMEONE HAD ADVISED US OF THE
CHANGE OF STUDIOS.
7. THERE ARE TWO FURTHER POINTS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION ON THE SUBJECT
OF STUDIO DISCIPLINE. THE FIRST IS THE SUBJECT Of' LIGHT SIGNALS.AT THE
MOMENT ONE IS LIKELY TO GET ANY OF' THREE TYPES OF' SIGNAL. THE FIRST,THE
CORRECT ONE,IS THE RED LIGHT FLICKERED FOR THIRTY .SECONDS,FOLL.OWED BY
A STEADY RED LIGHT. THE SECOND,THE INCORRECT ONE,IS A WARNING WHITE LIGHT
FOLLO'JED BY A STEADY RED, AND THE THIRD,WHICH IS ALSO INCORRECT,AND MOST
UPSETTING,IS A STEADY RED LIGHT WITHOUT ANY PRIOR WARNING. COLJUD
STEPS PLEASE 'BE TAKEN TO SEE THAT AL THE ENGINEERS KNOW AT LEAST ONE OF
THE ABOVE METHODS,AND THAT THEY ALL USE THE SAME METHOD. THE FIRST VS THE
CORRECT METHOD,AND I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT THAT 	 THE METHOD USED.
FINALLY,COULD STEPS BE TAKEN TO SEE THAT ALL THE CLOCKS IN THE STATION
ARE CORRECT, AND FURTHER THAT THEY AGREE WI7H ONE ANOTHER.I AM WILLING
TO ASSIST IF YOU SQ DESIRE IT,IN ANY WA? POSSIBLE,SINCE IT IS IN OU OWN
INTERESTS AS WELL AS YOURS.
8. MAY I ASSURE YOU ONCE AGAIN OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE IN ANY
WAY POSSIBLE, OUR MAIN AIM IS TO HELP TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF PROGRA 'MES
BROADCAST FROM THIS STATION,AND IT IS WITH THIS IDEA UPPERMOST IN MY IND
THAT I HAVE BROUGHT THESE FACTS TO YOUR NOTICE.
I REMAIN,
YOURS SINCERELY,
O.C. A4 ARMY ROADCASTING UNIT,
ATHENS.
-5O5









I write to send my most sincere thanks to you for the opportunity which
you gave me to study EIRT and to consider its future programme development.
I am most grateful for the time that you gave to me to discuss my work: and
to everyone in your Ministry and in EI1?T who received me so kindly and gave
me so much information. My visit was an experience which has left me
deeply interested in the future of television in Greece.
As you know, I left with your Office on 14 April a report in which I
attempted to offer to you some observations and suggestions. I found that
these, could not go as far or offer as much positive information as I would have
wished. In the immediate situation, before a new constitutional basis is
created, for television in Greece, I believe that a number of steps can 'be
taken towards a new character for EIRT, if EIRT Management has a united
purpose and will to do so. I also believe that when a new constitution has
been created, this united purpose and will continues to be the essential
requirement for the development of a National Broadcasting service. These
beliefs are I hope expressed in my report. What I can mention only to
yourself is my anxiety that this essential consensus of purpose does not at
the moment exist in the Directorate of EIRT. It is normal in broadcasting
organisations that strong differences of opinion should exist among senior
officials on policy, programme and organisation subjects = but it
axiomatic that discussions take place to air the differences and,Iive at
a consensus,so that action follows which has a firm basis of mutual confidence
and support. It is my fear that this process is not occurring in EI1?I = and
its ab. ence means	 W'kness in central policy. In this situation it
is not easy to make proposals for the future.
was fortunate to have a long meeting with Mr. Vlachos on the last
my stay - after my.report was written - when I was able to raise
a number of policy subjects. I learned of the creation of a Programme
Committee, composed of two members of the Board with the Director General
Appendix 6: Joanna Splcer's letter to Undersecretary for Press and Information -P. Lambrias.
